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Preface and Acknowledgments 
After teaching game theory (at both the undergraduate and graduate level) at 
the University of California, Davis for 25 years, I decided to organize all my 
teaching material in a textbook. There are many excellent textbooks in game 
theory and there is hardly any need for a new one. However, there are two 
distinguishing features of this textbook: (1) it is open access and thus free,
1
 and 
(2) it contains an unusually large number of exercises (a total of 165) with 
complete and detailed answers.  
I tried to write the book in such a way that it would be accessible to anybody 
with minimum knowledge of mathematics (high-school level algebra and some 
elementary notions of probability) and no prior knowledge of game theory. 
However, the book is intended to be rigorous and it includes several proofs. I 
believe it is appropriate for an advanced undergraduate class in game theory and 
also for a first-year graduate-level class. 
I expect that there will be some typos and (hopefully minor) mistakes. If you 
come across any typos or mistakes, I would be grateful if you could inform me: 
I can be reached at  gfbonanno@ucdavis.edu.  I will maintain an updated 
version of the book on my web page at 
http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/bonanno/ 
 I also intend to add, some time in the future, a further collection of exercises 
and exam questions with a solution manual to be given only to instructors. 
Details will appear on my web page. 
I am very grateful to Elise Tidrick for meticulously going through each chapter 
of the book and for suggesting numerous improvements. Her insightful and 
constructive comments have considerably enhanced this book. 
I would also like to thank Nicholas Bowden, Lester Lusher, Burkhard Schipper and Matthieu 
Stigler for pointing out typos. 
Davis, October 27, 2015 
                                                                        
1
 There may be several other free textbooks on game theory available. The only one I am aware 
of is the excellent book by Ariel Rubinstein and Martin Osborne, MIT Press, 1994, which 
can be downloaded for free from Ariel Rubinstein’s web page: http://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il. 
In my experience this book is too advanced for an undergraduate class in game theory. 
GAME THEORY – G. Bonanno 
1 
Introduction 
he discipline of game theory was pioneered in the early 20th  century by 
mathematicians Ernst Zermelo (1913) and John von Neumann (1928). 
The breakthrough came with John von Neumann and Oscar 
Morgenstern’s book, Theory of games and economic behavior, published  
in 1944. This was followed by important work by John Nash (1950-51) 
and Lloyd Shapley (1953). Game theory had a major influence on the 
development of several branches of economics (industrial organization, 
international trade, labor economics, macroeconomics, etc.). Over time the 
impact of game theory extended to other branches of the social sciences 
(political science, international relations, philosophy,  sociology, anthropology,  
etc.) as well as to fields outside the social sciences, such as biology, computer 
science, logic, etc. In 1994 the Nobel prize in economics was given to three 
game theorists, John Nash, John Harsanyi and Reinhardt Selten, for their 
theoretical work in game theory which was very influential in economics. At 
the same time, the US Federal Communications Commission was using game 
theory to help it design a $7-billion auction of the radio spectrum for personal 
communication services (naturally, the bidders used game theory too!). The 
Nobel prize in economics was awarded to game theorists three more times: in 
2006 to Robert Aumann and Thomas Schelling, in 2007 to Leonid Hurwicz, 
Eric Maskin and Roger Myerson and in 2010 to Lloyd Shapley and Alvin Roth.  
Game theory provides a formal language for the representation and analysis of 
interactive situations, that is, situations where several “entities”,  called players,  
take actions that affect each other. The nature of the players varies depending 
on the context in which the game theoretic language is invoked: in 
evolutionary biology (see, for example, John Maynard Smith, 1982) players are 
Chapter 
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non-thinking living organisms;
2
 in computer science (see, for example, Shoham-
Leyton-Brown, 2008) players are artificial agents; in behavioral game theory 
(see, for example, Camerer, 2003) players are “ordinary” human beings, etc. 
Traditionally, however, game theory has focused on interaction among 
intelligent, sophisticated and rational individuals. For example, Aumann 
describes game theory as follows:  
 “Briefly put, game and economic theory are concerned with the 
interactive behavior of Homo rationalis - rational man. Homo 
rationalis is the species that always acts both purposefully and 
logically, has well-defined goals, is motivated solely by the desire 
to approach these goals as closely as possible, and has the 
calculating ability required to do so.” (Aumann, 1985, p. 35.) 
This book is concerned with the traditional interpretation of game theory.  
Game theory is divided into two main branches. The first is cooperative game 
theory, which assumes that the players can communicate, form coalitions and 
sign binding agreements. Cooperative game theory has been used, for example, 
to analyze voting behavior and other issues in political science and related 
fields. We will deal exclusively with the other main branch, namely non-
cooperative game theory. Non-cooperative game theory models situations 
where the players are either unable to communicate or are able to communicate 
but cannot sign binding contracts. An example of the latter situation is the 
interaction among firms in an industry in an environment where antitrust laws 
make it illegal for firms to reach agreements concerning prices or production 
quotas or other forms of collusive behavior. 
The book is divided into three parts.  
Part I deals with games with ordinal payoffs, that is, with games where the 
players’ preferences over the possible outcomes are only specified in terms of 
an ordinal ranking (outcome o  is better than outcome o  or o  is just as good as 
o ). Chapter 1 covers strategic-form games, Chapter 2 deals with dynamic 
games with perfect information and Chapter 3 with dynamic games with 
(possibly) imperfect information. 
                                                                        
2
 Evolutionary game theory has been applied not only to the analysis of animal and insect 
behavior but also to studying the “ most successful strategies”  for tumor and cancer cells (see, 
for example, Gerstung et al., 2011). 
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Part II is devoted to games with cardinal payoffs, that is, with games where the 
players’ preferences extend to uncertain prospects or lotteries: players are 
assumed to have a consistent ranking of the set of lotteries over basic outcomes. 
Chapter 4 reviews the theory of expected utility, Chapter 5 discusses the notion 
of mixed strategy in strategic-form games and of mixed-strategy Nash 
equilibrium , while Chapter 6 deals with mixed strategies in dynamic games. 
Parts III, IV and V cover a number of advanced topics. 
Part III deals with the notions of knowledge, common knowledge and belief.  
Chapter 7 explains how to model what an individual knows and what she is 
uncertain about and how to extend the analysis to the interactive knowledge of 
several individuals (e.g. what Individual 1 knows about what Individual 2 
knows about some facts or about the state of knowledge of Individual 1). The 
chapter ends with the notion of common knowledge. Chapter 8 adds 
probabilistic beliefs to the knowledge structures of the previous chapter and 
discusses the notions of Bayesian updating, belief revision, like-mindedness and 
the possibility of “agreeing to disagree”. Chapter 9 uses the interactive 
knowledge-belief structures of the previous two chapters to model the players’ 
state of mind in a possible play of a given game and studies the implications of 
common knowledge of rationality in strategic-form games. 
Part IV focuses on dynamic (or extensive-form) games and on the issue of how 
to refine the notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium (which was introduced in 
Chapters 3 and 6). Chapter 10 introduces a simple notion, called weak 
sequential equilibrium, which achieves some desirable goals (such as the 
elimination of strictly dominated choices) but fails to provide a refinement of 
subgame-perfect equilibrium. Chapter 11 explains the more complex notion of 
sequential equilibrium, which is extensively used in applications of game 
theory. That notion, however, leaves to be desired from a practical point of 
view (it is typically hard to show that an equilibrium is indeed a sequential 
equilibrium) and also from a conceptual point of view (it appeals to a 
topological condition, whose interpretation is not clear).  Chapter 12 
introduces an intermediate notion, called perfect Bayesian equilibrium, whose 
conceptual justification is anchored in the so called AGM theory of belief 
revision, extensively studied in philosophy and computer science, which was 
pioneered by Carlos Alchourrón (a legal scholar),  Peter Gärdenfors (a 
philosopher) and David Makinson (a computer scientist) in 1985. In Chapter 12 we 
also provide an alternative characterization of sequential equilibrium based on the 
notion of  perfect Bayesian equilibrium, which is free of topological conditions.  
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Part V deals with the so-called “theory of games of incomplete information”, 
which was pioneered by John Harsanyi (1967-68). This theory is usually 
explained using the so-called “type-space” approach suggested by Harsanyi. 
However, we follow a different approach: the so-called “state-space” approach, 
which makes use of the interactive knowledge-belief structures developed in 
Part III. We find this approach both simpler and more elegant. For 
completeness, in Chapter 15 we explain the commonly used type-based 
structures and show how to convert a state-space structure into a type-space 
structure and vice versa (the two approaches are equivalent). Chapter 13 deals 
with situations of incomplete information that involve static (or strategic-form) 
games, while Chapter 14 deals with situations of incomplete information that 
involve dynamic (or strategic-form) games. 
Appendix E (‘E’ for ‘exercises’) at the end of each chapter contains several 
exercises, which are divided according the that chapter’s sections. Indeed, at the 
end of each chapter section the reader is invited to go to the appendix and try 
the exercises for that section. Complete and detailed answers for each exercise 
can be found in Appendix S (‘S’ for ‘solutions’) at the end of each chapter. For 
each chapter, the set of exercises culminates into a “challenging question”, 
which is more difficult and more time consuming than the other exercises. In 
game theory, as in mathematics in general, it is essential to test one’s 
understanding of the material by attempting to solve exercises and problems. 
The reader is encouraged to attempt solving exercises after the introduction of 
every new concept. 
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Games with  
Ordinal Payoffs 
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Ordinal games in strategic form  
1.1. Game frames and games 
game theory deals with interactive situations where two or more 
individuals, called players, make decisions that jointly determine the final 
outcome. To see an example point your browser to the following video 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tBtr8-VMj0E 
(if you search for ‘Split or Steal’ on youtube.com you will find several instances of 
this game). The video shows an excerpt from Golden Balls, a British daytime TV 
game show. In it each of two players, Sarah and Steve, has to pick one of two balls: 
inside one ball appears the word ‘split’ and inside the other the word ‘steal’ (each 
player is first asked to secretly check which of the two balls in front of him/her is 
the split ball and which is the steal ball). They make their decisions simultaneously. 
The possible outcomes are shown in Table 1.1, where each row is labeled with a 
possible choice for Sarah and each column with a possible choice for Steven. Each 
cell in the table thus corresponds to a possible pair of choices and the resulting 
outcome is written inside the cell. 
Split
Sarah gets
$50,000
Steven gets
$50,000
Sarah gets
nothing
Steven gets
$100,000
Steal
Sarah gets
$100,000
Steven gets
nothing
Sarah gets
nothing
Steven gets
nothing
Steven
Split Steal
Sarah
 
 
Table 1.1 
Chapter 
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What should a rational player do in such a situation?  It is tempting to reason as 
follows.  
Let us focus on Sarah’s decision problem. She realizes that 
her decision alone is not sufficient to determine the outcome; 
she has no control over what Steven will choose to do. 
However, she can envision two scenarios: one where Steven 
chooses Steal and the other where he chooses Split.    
• If Steven decides to Steal, then it does not matter what 
Sarah does, because she ends up with nothing, no matter 
what she chooses.  
• If Steven picks Split, then Sarah will get either $50,000 (if 
she also picks Split) or $100,000 (if she picks Steal).    
Thus Sarah should choose Steal. 
The trouble with the above argument is that it is not a valid argument because it 
makes an implicit assumption about how Sarah ranks the outcomes, namely that 
she is selfish and greedy, which may or may not be correct. Let us denote the 
outcomes as follows: 
1
2
3
4
o
o
o
o
: Sarah gets $50,000 and Steven gets $50,000.
: Sarah gets nothing and Steven gets $100,000.
: Sarah gets $100,000 and Steven gets nothing.
: Sarah gets nothing and Steven gets nothing.
  
Table 1.2 
If, indeed, Sarah is selfish and greedy  −  in the sense that, in evaluating the outcomes, 
she focuses exclusively on what she herself gets and prefers more money to  
less −  then her ranking of the outcomes is as follows:  3 1 2 4o o o o≻ ≻ ∼  (which reads 
‘ 3o  is better than 1o , 1o  is better than 2o  and 2o  is just as good as 4o ’ ). But there 
are other possibilities. For example, Sarah might be fair-minded and view the 
outcome where both get $50,000 as better than all the other outcomes. For 
instance, her ranking could be 1 3 2 4o o o o≻ ≻ ≻ ; according to this ranking, besides 
valuing fairness, she also displays benevolence towards Steven, in the sense that – 
when comparing the two outcomes where she gets nothing, namely 2o  and 4o  −  
she prefers the one where at least Steven goes home with some money. If, in fact, 
Sarah is fair-minded and benevolent, then the logic underlying the above argument 
would yield the opposite conclusion, namely that she should choose Split.  
GAME THEORY – Giacomo Bonanno 
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Thus we cannot presume to know the answer to the question “What is the rational 
choice for Sarah?” if we don’t know what her preferences are. It is a common 
mistake (unfortunately one that even game theorists sometimes make) to reason 
under the assumption that players are selfish and greedy. This is, typically, an 
unwarranted assumption. Research in experimental psychology, philosophy and 
economics has amply demonstrated that many people are strongly motivated by 
considerations of fairness. Indeed, fairness seems to motivate not only humans but 
also primates, as shown in the following video:
1
 
http://www.ted.com/talks/frans_de_waal_do_animals_have_morals 
The situation illustrated in Table 1.1 is not a game as we have no information about 
the preferences of the players; we use the expression game-frame to refer to it.  In 
the case where there are only two players and each player has a small number of 
possible choices (also called strategies), a game-frame can be represented −  as we did 
in Table 1.1 −  by means of a table, with as many rows as the number of possible 
strategies of Player 1 and as many columns as the number of strategies of Player 2; 
each row is labeled with one strategy of Player 1 and each column with one strategy 
of Player 2; inside each cell of the table (which corresponds to a pair of strategies, 
one for Player 1 and one for Player 2) we write the corresponding outcome.  
Before presenting the definition of game-frame, we remind the reader of what the 
Cartesian product of two or more sets is.  Let 1S  and 2S  be two sets. Then the 
Cartesian product of 1S  and 2S , denoted by 1 2S S× , is the set of ordered pairs 
1 2( , )x x  where 1x  is an element of 1S  ( 1 1x S∈ ) and 2x   is an element of 2S  
( 2 2x S∈ ). For example, if 1 { , , }S a b c=  and 2 { , }S D E=  then 
{ }1 2 ( , ), ( , ), ( , ), ( , ), ( , ), ( , )S S a D a E b D b E c D c E× = . 
The definition extends to the general case of n sets (n ≥ 2): an element of 
1 2 ... nS S S× × ×  is an ordered n-tuple 1 2( , ,..., )nx x x  where, for each i = 1,…,n,  
i ix S∈ .  
The definition of game-frame is as follows. 
                                                                       
1 Also available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GcJxRqTs5nk 
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Definition 1.1.  A game-frame in strategic form is a list of four items (a quadruple) 
( )1 2, , ,..., , ,nI S S S O f  where: 
●   I = {1,2,…,n} is a set of players (n ≥ 2). 
●   ( )1 2, , ..., nS S S  is a list of sets, one for each player. For every Player i I∈ , iS  is 
the set of strategies (or possible choices) of Player i. We denote by S the Cartesian 
product of these sets: 1 2 ... nS S S S= × × × ; thus an element of S  is a list 
1 2( , ,..., )ns s s s=  consisting of one strategy for each player. We call S  the set of 
strategy profiles. 
●   O is a set of outcomes. 
●   :f S O→  is a function that associates with every strategy profile s an outcome 
( )f s O∈ . 
Using the notation of Definition 1.1, the situation illustrated in Table 1.1 is the 
following game-frame in strategic form:   
●   I = {1,2} (letting Sarah be Player 1 and Steven Player 2), 
●   ( )1 2,S S = ( ){ }, { }Split, Steal Split, Steal ; thus 1 2 { }S S= = Split, Steal , so that the  
set of strategy profiles is { }( ) ( ) ( ) ( )S = Split,Split , Split, Steal , Steal,Split , Steal,Steal ,   
●   O is the set of outcomes listed in Table 1.2,  
●   f  is the following function: 
1 2 3 4
: ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( ) :
s Split Split Split Steal Steal Split Steal Steal
f s o o o o
 
    (that is, ( ) 1( )f o=Split,Split , ( ) 2( )f o=Split,Steal , etc.).  
From a game-frame one obtains a game by adding, for each player, her preferences 
over (or ranking of) the possible outcomes. We use the following notation.  
Notation Meaning 
io o′≻  Player i considers outcome o  to be better than outcome o′  
io o′∼  Player i considers o  to be just as good as o′  
(that is, Player i is indifferent between o  and o′ ) 
io o′  Player i considers o  to be at least as good as o
′   
(that is, either better than or just as good as)  
Table 1.3 
GAME THEORY – Giacomo Bonanno 
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For example, if M denotes ‘Mexican food’ and J  ‘Japanese food’, AliceM J≻  means 
that Alice prefers Mexican food to Japanese food and BobM J∼  means that Bob is 
indifferent between the two. 
Remark 1.1. The “at least as good” relation   is sufficient to capture also strict 
preference ≻  and indifference ∼ . In fact, starting from  , one can define strict 
preference as follows: 
io o′≻  if and only if io o′  and io o′ /  and one can define 
indifference as follows: 
io o′∼  if and only if io o′  and .io o′   
We will assume throughout this book that the “at least as good” relation 
i  of 
Player i  −  which embodies her preferences over (or ranking of) the outcomes −  is 
complete (for every two outcomes 1o  and 2o , either 1 2io o  or 2 1io o ) and 
transitive (if 1 2io o  and 2 3io o  then 1 3io o ).
2
 
There are (at least) three ways of representing, or expressing, a complete and 
transitive ranking of a set of outcomes O. For example, suppose that 
{ }1 2 3 4 5, , , ,O o o o o o=  and that we want to represent the following ranking: 3o  is 
the best outcome, it is better than 5o , which is just as good as 1o , 1o  is better than 
4o , which, in turn, is better than 2o  (so that 2o  is the worst outcome). We can 
represent this ranking in one of the following ways. 
1. By using the notation of Table 1.3: 3 5 1 4 2o o o o o≻ ∼ ≻ ≻ . 
2. By listing the outcomes in a column, starting with the best at the top and 
proceeding down to the worst, thus using the convention that if outcome o  is 
listed above outcome o′  then o  is preferred to o′ , while if o  and  o′  are 
written next to each other, then they are considered to be just as good: 
3
1 5
4
2
best
,
worst
o
o o
o
o
  
                                                                       
2  Transitivity of the “at least as good” relation  implies transitivity of the indifference relation 
(if 
1 2o o∼  and 2 3o o∼  then 1 3o o∼ ) as well as transitivity of the strict preference relation (not 
only in the sense that (1) if 
1 2o o≻  and 2 3o o≻  then 1 3o o≻ , but also that (2) if 1 2o o≻  and 
2 3o o∼  then 1 3o o≻  and (3) if 1 2o o∼  and 2 3o o≻  then 1 3o o≻ ). 
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3. By assigning a number to each outcome, with the convention that if the 
number assigned to o  is greater than the number assigned to o′  then o  is preferred 
to o′ , and if two outcomes are assigned the same number then they are 
considered to be just as good. For example, we could choose the following 
numbers:   1 2 3 4 5
6 1 8 2 6
o o o o o
. Such an assignment of numbers is called a 
utility function. A useful way of thinking of utility is as an “index of 
satisfaction”: the higher the index the better the outcome; however, this 
suggestion is just to aid memory and should be taken with a grain of salt, 
because a utility function does not measure anything and, furthermore, as 
explained below, the actual numbers used as utility indices are completely 
arbitrary.3 
Definition 1.2. Given a complete and transitive ranking  of a finite set of 
outcomes O,  a function :U O →R  (where R  denotes the set of real numbers) is 
said to be an ordinal utility function that represents the ranking  if, for every two 
outcomes o  and o′ , ( ) ( )U o U o′>  if and only if o o′≻  and ( ) ( )U o U o′=  if and 
only if o o′∼ . The number ( )U o  is called the utility of outcome o .  
Remark 1.2. Note that the statement “for Alice the utility of Mexican food is 10” is 
in itself a meaningless statement; on the other hand, what would be a meaningful 
statement is “for Alice the utility of Mexican food is 10 and the utility of Japanese 
food is 5”, because such a statement conveys the information that she prefers 
Mexican food to Japanese food. However, the two numbers 10 and 5 have no other 
meaning besides the fact that 10 is greater than 5: for example we cannot, and 
should not, infer from these numbers that she considers Mexican food twice as 
good as Japanese food. The reason for this is that we could have expressed the same 
fact, namely that she prefers Mexican food to Japanese food, by assigning utility 100 
to Mexican food and  − 25 to Japanese food, or with any other two numbers.  
                                                                       
3 Note that assigning a utility of 1 to an outcome o does not mean that o is the “first choice”. 
Indeed, in this example a utility of 1 is assigned to the worst outcome: 
2o  is the worst outcome 
because it has the lowest utility (which happens to be 1, in this example). 
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It follows from the above remark that there is an infinite number of utility 
functions that represent the same ranking. For instance, the following are 
equivalent  ways of representing the ranking 3 1 2 4o o o o≻ ≻ ∼  (f, g and h are three 
out of the many possible utility functions): 
31 2 4
5 2 10 2
0.8 0.7 1 0.7
27 1 100 1
oo o o→
↓utility function
f
g
h
      outcome
  
Utility functions are a particularly convenient way of representing preferences. In 
fact, by using utility functions one can give a more condensed representation of 
games, as explained in the last paragraph of the following definition. 
Definition 1.3.  An ordinal game in strategic form is a quintuple 
( ) ( )1 1, , ..., , , , , ...,n nI S S O f    where: 
●   ( )1, , ..., , ,nI S S O f  is a game-frame in strategic form (Definition 1.1) and 
●   for every Player i I∈ ,  
i  is a complete and transitive ranking of the set of  
     outcomes O. 
If we replace each ranking  
i  with a utility function iU   that represents it, and we 
assign, to each strategy profile s,  Player i ’s utility of ( )f s  (recall that ( )f s  is the 
outcome associated with s ) then we obtain a function :i Sπ → R  called Player i’s 
payoff function. Thus ( )( ) ( )i is U f sπ = .
4
 Having done so, we obtain a triple 
( ) ( )1 1, , ..., , , ...,n nI S S π π  called a reduced-form ordinal game in strategic form 
(‘reduced-form’ because some information is lost, namely the specification of the 
possible outcomes).  
For example, take the game-frame illustrated in Table 1.1, let Sarah be Player 1 and 
Steven Player 2 and name the possible outcomes as shown in Table 1.2. Let us add 
the information that both players are selfish and greedy (that is, Player 1’s ranking 
is 1 13 2 11 4o o o o≻ ≻ ∼  and Player 2’s ranking is 2 22 3 21 4o o o o≻ ≻ ∼ ) and let us 
represent their rankings with the following utility functions (note, again, that the 
                                                                       
4 Note that, in this book, the symbol π  is not used to denote the irrational number used to 
compute the circumference and area of a circle, but rather as the Greek letter for ‘p’ which 
stands for ‘payoff’. 
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choice of numbers 2, 3 and 4 for utilities is arbitrary: any other three numbers 
would do): 
1
31 2 4
2
 3 2 4 2
 3 4 2 2
o
U
U
o o o→
↓
(Player 1)
(Player 2
         
)
utility function
outcome
 
Then we obtain the following reduced-form game, where in each cell the first 
number is the payoff of Player 1 and the second number is the payoff of Player 2. 
Split 3 3 2 4
Steal 4 2 2 2
Player 2 (Steven)
Split Steal
Player 1
(Sarah)
  
Table 1.4 
On the other hand, if we add to the game-frame of Table 1.1 the information that 
Player 1 is fair-minded and benevolent (that is, her ranking is 1 11 2 13 1o o o o≻ ≻ ≻ ), 
while Player 2 is selfish and greedy and represent these rankings with the following 
utility functions, 
31 4
1
2
2  (Pla
 (Player 1
yer 2) 3 4 2 2
) 4 2 3 1
         outcome oo o o
utility functio
U
n
U
→
↓
 
then we obtain the following reduced-form game: 
Split 4 3 2 4
Steal 3 2 1 2
Player 2 (Steven)
Split Steal
Player 1
(Sarah)
 
 
Table 1.5 
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In general, a player will act differently in different games, even if they are based on 
the same game-frame, because her incentives and objectives (as captured by her 
ranking of the outcomes) will be different. For example, one can argue that in the 
game of Table 1.4 a rational Player 1 would choose Steal, while in the game of 
Table 1.5 the rational choice for Player 1 is Split. 
 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced in 
this section, by going through the exercises in Section 1.E.1 of Appendix 1.E at the 
end of this chapter. 
1.2. Strict and weak dominance 
In this section we define two relations on the set of strategies of a player. Before 
introducing the formal definition, we shall illustrate these notion with an example. 
The first relation is called “strict dominance”. Let us focus our attention on one 
player, say Player 1, and select two of her strategies, say a and b. We say that a 
strictly dominates b (for Player 1) if, for every possible strategy profile of the other 
players, strategy a of Player 1, in conjunction with the strategies selected by the 
other players, yields a payoff for Player 1 which is greater than the payoff 
associated with strategy b (in conjunction with the strategies selected by the other 
players). For example, consider the following two-player game, where only the 
payoffs of Player 1 are shown: 
A 3 … 2 … 1 …
B 2 … 1 … 0 …
C 3 … 2 … 1 …
D 2 … 0 … 0 …
G
Player  2
Player 1
E F
 
Table 1.6 
In this game for Player 1 strategy A strictly dominates strategy B:  
• if Player 2 selects E then A in conjunction with E gives Player 1 a payoff of 
3, while B in conjunction with E gives her only a payoff of 2,  
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• if Player 2 selects F  then A in conjunction with F gives Player 1 a payoff of 
2, while B in conjunction with F gives her only a payoff of 1, 
• if Player 2 selects G  then A in conjunction with G gives Player 1 a payoff of 
1, while B in conjunction with G gives her only a payoff of 0. 
In the game of Table 1.6 we also have that A strictly dominates D and C strictly 
dominates D; however, it is not the case that B strictly dominates D because, in 
conjunction with strategy E of Player 2, B and D yield the same payoff for Player 1. 
The second relation is called “weak dominance”. The definition is similar to that of 
strict dominance, but we replace  ‘greater than’  with  ‘greater than or equal to’  
while  insisting on at least one strict inequality:  a weakly dominates b (for Player 1) 
if, for every possible strategy profile of the other players, strategy a of Player 1, in 
conjunction with the strategies selected by the other players, yields a payoff for 
Player 1 which is greater than or equal to the payoff associated with strategy b (in 
conjunction with the strategies selected by the other players) and, furthermore, 
there is at least one strategy profile of the other players against which strategy a 
gives a larger payoff to Player 1 than strategy b. In the example of Table 1.6, we 
have that, while it is not true that B strictly dominates D, it is true that B weakly 
dominates D: 
• if Player 2 selects E, then B in conjunction with E gives Player 1 the same 
payoff as D in conjunction with E (namely 2),  
• if Player 2 selects F, then B in conjunction with F gives Player 1 a payoff of 
2, while B in conjunction with F gives her only a payoff of 1, 
• if Player 2 selects G then B in conjunction with G gives Player 1 the same 
payoff as D in conjunction with G (namely 0). 
In order to give the definitions in full generality we need to introduce some 
notation. Recall that S denotes the set of strategy profiles, that is, an element s of S is 
an ordered list of strategies 1( ,..., )ns s s= , one for each player. We will often want 
to focus on one player, say Player i, and view s as a pair consisting of the strategy of 
Player i  and the remaining strategies of all the other players. For example, suppose 
that there are three players and the strategy sets are as follows: 1 { , , }S a b c= , 
2 { , }S d e=  and 3 { , }S f g= . Then one possible strategy profile is ( , , )s b d g=  (thus 
1s b= , 2s d=  and 3s g= ) . If we focus on, say, Player 2 then we will denote by 
2s−  the sub-profile consisting of the strategies of the players other than 2: in this case 
2 ( , )s b g− = . This gives us  an alternative way of denoting s, namely as 2 2( , )s s− . 
Continuing our example where ( , , )s b d g= , letting 2 ( , )s b g− = , we can denote s  
also by 2( , )d s−  and we can write the result of replacing Player 2’s strategy d with 
her strategy e in s by 2( , )e s− ; thus 2( , )d s− = ( , , )b d g  while 2( , ) ( , , )e s b e g− = .  In 
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general, given a Player i,  we denote by 
iS−  the set of strategy profiles of the players 
other than i (that is, iS−  is the Cartesian product of the strategy sets of the other 
players; in the above example we have that 
2 1 3 { , , } { , }S S S a b c f g− = × = × = { }( , ), ( , ), ( , ), ( , ), ( , ), ( , )a f a g b f b g c f c g . We 
denote an element of 
iS−  by is− .  
Definition 1.4.  Given an ordinal game in strategic form, let i  be a Player and a and 
b  two of her strategies ( , ia b S∈ ). We say that, for Player i,   
●   a strictly  dominates b (or b is strictly dominated by a) if, in every situation (that is, 
no matter what the other players do), a gives Player i a payoff which is greater 
than the payoff that b gives. Formally: for every 
i is S− −∈ , ( , ) ( , )i i i ia s b sπ π− −> .
5
 
●   a weakly dominates b (or b is weakly dominated by a) if, in every situation, a gives 
Player i a payoff which is greater than or equal to the payoff that b gives and, 
furthermore, there is at least one situation where a gives a greater payoff than b. 
Formally: for every 
i is S− −∈ , ( , ) ( , )i i i ia s b sπ π− −≥  and there exists an i is S− −∈  
such that ( , ) ( , )i i i ia s b sπ π− −≥ .
6
  
●   a is equivalent to b if, in every situation, a and b give Player i  the same payoff. 
Formally: for every 
i is S− −∈ , ( , ) ( , )i i i ia s b sπ π− −= .
7
 
A 3 … 2 … 1 …
B 2 … 1 … 0 …
C 3 … 2 … 1 …
D 2 … 0 … 0 …
G
Player  2
Player 1
E F
 
For example, in the game of Table 1.6 reproduced above, we have that  
•  A strictly dominates B.  
•  A and C are equivalent. 
•  A strictly dominates D. 
•  B is strictly dominated by C. 
                                                                       
5 Or, stated in terms of rankings instead of payoffs, ( , ) ( , )i i if a s f b s− −≻  for every i is S− −∈ .  
6 Or, stated in terms of rankings, ( , ) ( , )i i if a s f b s− − , for every i is S− −∈ ,  and there exists an 
i is S− −∈  such that ( , ) ( , )i i if a s f b s− −≻ . 
7 Or, stated in terms of rankings, ( , ) ( , )i i if a s f b s− −∼ ,  for every i is S− −∈ . 
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•  B weakly (but not strictly) dominates D. 
•  C strictly dominates D. 
Remark 1.3.  Note that if strategy a strictly dominates strategy b then it also 
satisfies the conditions for weak dominance, that is, ‘a strictly dominates b ’ implies 
‘a weakly dominates b ’. Throughout the book the expression ‘a weakly dominates 
b ’ will be interpreted as ‘a dominates b weakly but not strictly ’. 
The expression ‘a  dominates b’  can be understood as ‘a is better than b ’. The next 
term we define is ‘dominant’ which can be understood as ‘ best’. Thus one cannot 
meaningfully say “a dominates” because one needs to name another strategy that is 
dominated by a; for example, one would have to say “a dominates b ”. On the other 
hand, one can meaningfully say “a is dominant” because it is like saying “a is best”, 
which means “a is better than every other strategy”. 
Definition 1.5.  Given an ordinal game in strategic form, let i  be a Player and a one 
of her strategies ( ia S∈ ). We say that, for Player i,   
●   a is a strictly dominant strategy if a strictly dominates every other strategy of 
Player i. 
●  a is a weakly dominant strategy if, for every other strategy x of Player i, one of the 
following is true: (1) either a weakly dominates x or (2) a is equivalent to x. 
For example, in the game shown in Table 1.6, A and C are both weakly dominant 
strategies for Player 1. Note that if a player has two or more strategies that are 
weakly dominant, then any two of those strategies must be equivalent. On the 
other hand, there can be at most one strictly dominant strategy.  
Remark 1.4.  The reader should convince herself/himself that the definition of 
weakly dominant strategy given in Definition 1.5 is equivalent to the following: 
ia S∈  is a weakly dominant strategy for Player i  if and only if, for every i is S− −∈ , 
( , ) ( , )i i i i ia s s sπ π− −≥  for every i is S∈ .
8
 
In accordance with the convention established in Remark 1.3, the expression ‘a is a 
weakly dominant strategy’ will have the default interpretation ‘a is a weakly but not 
strictly dominant strategy’. 
Note: if you claim that, for some player, “strategy x is (weakly or strictly) 
dominated” then you ought to name another strategy of that player that dominates 
x. Saying “x is dominated” is akin to saying “x is worse”: worse than what? On the 
                                                                       
8 Or, stated in terms of rankings, for every i is S− −∈ ,  ( , ) ( , )i i i if a s f s s− −  for every i is S∈ . 
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other hand, claiming that strategy y is weakly dominant is akin to claiming that it is 
best, that is, better than, or just as good as, any other strategy. 
Definition 1.6.  Given an ordinal game in strategic form, let ( )1,..., ns s s=  be a 
strategy profile. We say that 
●   s   is a strict dominant-strategy  equilibrium  if, for every Player i,  
is  is a strictly 
dominant strategy. 
●   s   is a weak dominant-strategy  equilibrium  if, for every Player i,  
is  is a weakly 
dominant strategy and, furthermore, for at least one Player j ,  
js  is not a strictly 
dominant strategy. 
If we refer to a strategy profile as a dominant-strategy equilibrium, without 
qualifying it as weak or strict, then the default interpretation will be ‘weak’. 
In the game of Table 1.4, reproduced below, Steal is a weakly dominant strategy for 
each player and thus (Steal,Steal ) is a weak dominant-strategy equilibrium. 
Split 3 3 2 4
Steal 4 2 2 2
Player 2 (Steven)
Split Steal
Player 1
(Sarah)
 
In the game of Table 1.5, reproduced below, Split is a strictly dominant strategy for 
Player 1, while Steal is a weakly (but not strictly) dominant strategy for Player 2 
and thus (Split,Steal ) is a weak dominant-strategy equilibrium. 
Split 4 3 2 4
Steal 3 2 1 2
Player 2 (Steven)
Split Steal
Player 1
(Sarah)
 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is an example of a game with a strict dominant-strategy 
equilibrium. For a detailed account of the history of this game and an in-depth 
analysis of it see 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma  or 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner's_dilemma. 
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An instance of the Prisoner’s Dilemma is the following. Doug and Ed work for the 
same company and the annual party is approaching. They know that they are the 
only two candidates for the best-worker-of-the-year prize and at the moment they 
are tied; however, only one person can be awarded the prize and thus, unless one of 
them manages to outperform the other, nobody will receive the prize. Each chooses 
between exerting Normal effort or Extra effort (that is, work overtime) before the 
party. The game-frame is as shown in Table 1.7 below. 
Normal
effort
Extra 
effort
Player 2 (Ed)
Normal
effort
Extra
effort
Player 1
(Doug)
1o 2o
3o 4o
 
1
2
3
4
o
o
o
o
: nobody gets the prize and nobody sacrifices family time
: Ed gets the prize and sacrifices family time, Doug does not
: Doug gets the prize and sacrifices family time, Ed does not
: nobody gets the prize and both sacrifice family time
  
Table 1.7 
Suppose that both Doug and Ed are willing to sacrifice family time to get the prize, 
but otherwise value family time; furthermore, they are envious of each other, in the 
sense that they prefer nobody getting the prize to the other person’s getting the 
prize (even at the personal cost of sacrificing family time). That is, their rankings are 
as follows:  3 1 4 2Doug Doug Dougo o o o≻ ≻ ≻   and  2 1 4 3Ed Ed Edo o o o≻ ≻ ≻ . Using utility 
function with values from the set {0,1,2,3} we can represent the game in reduced 
form as follows: 
Normal
effort
2 2 0 3
Extra 
effort
3 0 1 1
Player 2 (Ed)
Normal
effort
Extra
effort
Player 1
(Doug)
 
Table 1.8 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma game 
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In this game exerting extra effort is a strictly dominant strategy for every player; 
thus (Extra effort, Extra effort ) is a strict dominant-strategy equilibrium.  
Definition 1.7.  Given an ordinal game in strategic form, let o  and o′  be two 
outcomes. We say that o  is strictly Pareto superior  to o′   if every player prefers o  
to o′  (that is, if 
io o′≻  for every Player i ). We say that o  is weakly Pareto superior 
to o′  if every player considers o  to be at least as good as o′  and at least one player 
prefers o  to o′  (that is, if 
io o′  for every Player i and there is a Player j such that 
jo o′≻ ).  In reduced-form games, this definition can be extended to strategy profiles 
as follows. If s  and s′  are two strategy profiles, then s  is strictly Pareto superior to 
s′  if ( ) ( )i is sπ π ′>  for every Player i and s  is weakly Pareto superior to s′  if 
( ) ( )i is sπ π ′≥  for every Player i and, furthermore, there is a Player j such that 
( ) ( )j js sπ π ′> . 
For example, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game of Table 1.8, outcome 1o  is strictly 
Pareto superior to 4o  or, in terms of strategy profiles, (Normal effort, Normal effort) 
is strictly Pareto superior to (Extra effort, Extra effort).  
When a player has a strictly dominant strategy, it would be irrational for that 
player to choose any other strategy, since she would be guaranteed a lower payoff 
in every possible situation (that is, no matter what the other players do). Thus in 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma individual rationality leads to (Extra effort, Extra effort ) 
despite the fact that both players would be better off if they both chose Normal 
effort. It is obvious that if the players could reach a binding agreement to exert 
normal effort then they would do so; however, the underlying assumption in non-
cooperative game theory is that such agreements are not possible (e.g. because of 
lack of communication or because such agreements are illegal or cannot be enforced 
in a court of law, etc.). Any non-binding agreement to choose Normal effort would 
not be viable: if one player expects the other player to stick to the agreement, then 
he will gain by cheating and choosing Extra effort. On the other hand, if a player 
does not believe that the other player will honor the agreement then he will gain by 
deviating from the agreement herself. The Prisoner’s Dilemma game is often used 
to illustrate a conflict between individual rationality and collective rationality: (Extra 
effort, Extra effort ) is the individually rational outcome while (Normal effort, Normal 
effort ) would be the collectively rational one.  
 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced in 
this section, by going through the exercises in Section 1.E.2 of Appendix 1.E at the 
end of this chapter. 
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1.3. Second-price auction 
The second-price auction, or Vickrey auction, is an example of a game that has a 
weak dominant-strategy equilibrium. It is a “sealed-bid” auction where bidders 
submit bids without knowing the bids of the other participants in the auction. The 
object which is auctioned is then assigned to the bidder who submits the highest bid 
(the winner), but the winner pays not her own bid but rather the second-highest 
bid, that is the highest bid among the bids that remain after removing the winner’s 
own bid. Tie-breaking rules must be specified for selecting the winner when the 
highest bid is submitted by two or more bidders (in which case the winner ends up 
paying her own bid, because the second-highest bid is equal to the winner’s bid). 
We first illustrate this auction with an example.  
Two oil companies bid for the right to drill a field. The possible bids are $10 
million, $20 million, …, $50 million. In case of ties the winner is Player 2 (this was 
decided earlier by tossing a coin). Let us take the point of view of Player 1. Suppose 
that Player 1 ordered a geological survey and, based on the report, concludes that 
the oil field would generate a profit of $30 million. Suppose also that Player 1 is 
indifferent between any two outcomes where the oil field is given to Player 2 and 
prefers to get the oil field herself if and only if it has to pay not more than $30 
million for it; furthermore, getting the oil field for $30 million is just as good as not 
getting it. Then we can take as utility function for Player 1 the net gain to Player 1 
from the oil field (defined as profits from oil extraction minus the price paid for 
access to the oil field) if Player 1 wins, and zero otherwise. In Table 1.9 we have 
written inside each cell only the payoff of Player 1. For example, why is Player 1’s 
payoff 20 when it bids $30M and Player 2 bids $10M? Since Player 1’s bid is higher 
than Player 2’s bid, Player 1 is the winner and thus the drilling rights are assigned to 
Player 1; hence Player 1 obtains something worth $30M and pays, not its own bid 
of $30M, but the bid of Player 2, namely $10M; thus Player 1’s net gain is $(30 
− 10)M=$20M. It can be verified that for Player 1 submitting a bid equal to the 
value it assigns to the object (namely, a bid of $30 million) is a weakly dominant 
strategy: it always gives Player 1 the largest of the payoffs that are possible, given 
the bid of the other player. This does not imply that it is the only weakly dominant 
strategy; indeed, in this example bidding $40M is also a weakly dominant strategy 
for Player 1 (in fact, it is equivalent to bidding $30M).  
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$10M $20M $30M $40M $50M
$10M 0 0 0 0 0
Player $20M 20 0 0 0 0
1 $30M 20 10 0 0 0
(value $30M) $40M 20 10 0 0 0
$50M 20 10 0 −10 0
Player 2
 
Table 1.9 
A second-price auction where, in case of ties, the winner is Player 2. 
Now we can describe the second-price auction in more general terms. Let n ≥ 2 be 
the number of bidders. We assume that all non-negative bids are allowed and that 
the tie-breaking rule favors the player with the lowest index among those who 
submit the highest bid:  for example, if the highest bid is $250 and it is submitted by 
Players 5, 8 and 10, then the winner is Player 5. We shall denote the possible 
outcomes as pairs ( , )i p , where i is the winner and p is the price that the winner has 
to pay.  Finally we denote by 
ib  the bid of Player i. We start by describing the case 
where there are only two bidders and then generalize to the case of an arbitrary 
number of bidders. We denote the set of non-negative numbers by [0, )∞ . 
The case where n = 2:  in this case we have that I = {1,2}, 1 2 [0, )S S= = ∞ , 
{ }( , ) : {1, 2}, [0, )O i p i p= ∈ ∈ ∞  and :f S O→  is given by 
( ) 2 1 21 2
1 1 2
(1, ) if 
( , )
(2, ) if 
b b b
f b b
b b b
≥
= 
<
 . 
The case where n ≥ 2: in the general case the second-price auction is the following 
game-frame: 
• I = {1,…,n} 
• [0, )iS = ∞  for every i = 1,…,n. We denote an element of  iS  by ib . 
• { }( , ) : , [0, )O i p i I p= ∈ ∈ ∞   
• :f S O→  is defined as follows.  Let ( )1,..., nH b b  be the set of bidders who 
submit the highest bid: ( ) { }1,..., :  for all n i jH b b i I b b j I= ∈ ≥ ∈  and let 
( )1ˆ ,..., ni b b  be the smallest number in the set ( )1,..., nH b b , that is, the winner 
of the auction. Finally, let maxb  denote the maximum bid (that is, 
GAME THEORY – Giacomo Bonanno 
23 
( )max 1,..., nb b b =  1{ ,..., }nMax b b ), and let  ( )1,...,second nb b b  be the second-
highest bid (that is, ( ) { }max1 1 1,..., { ,..., } \{ ( ,..., )}second n n nb b b Max b b b b b= .
9
 
Then ( ) ( )1 1 1ˆ,..., ( ,..., ) , ( ,..., )secondn n nf b b i b b b b b= . 
How much should a player bid in a second-price auction? Since what we have 
described is a game-frame and not a game, we cannot answer the question unless we 
specify the player’s preferences over the set of outcomes O.  Let us say that Player i 
in a second-price auction is selfish and greedy if she only cares about whether or not 
she wins and, conditional on winning, prefers to pay less; furthermore, she prefers 
winning to not winning if and only if she has to pay less than the true value of the 
object for her, which we denote by iv , and is indifferent between not winning and 
winning if she has to pay iv . Thus the ranking of a selfish and greedy player is as 
follows (together with everything that follows from transitivity): 
( , ) ( , )  
( , ) ( , )    ,   
( , ) ( , )   
( , ) ( , )  ,     
i
i i
i i
i
i p i p p p
i p j p j i p p v
i v j p j i p
j p k p j i k i p p
′ ′<
′ ′≠ <
′ ′≠
′ ′≠ ≠
≻
≻
∼
∼
if  and only if
for all and for all if  and only if
for all and for all
for all and for all and
  
An ordinal utility function that represents those preferences is
10
 
( )
if 
,
0 if 
i
i
v p i j
U j p
i j
− =
= 
≠
 . 
Using this utility function we get the following payoff function for Player i : 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 1
1
1
ˆ,..., if ,...,
,...,
ˆ0 if ,...,
second
i n n
i n
n
v b b b i i b b
b b
i i b b
π
 − =
= 
≠
 . 
We can now state the following theorem. The proof is given in Appendix 1.A at 
the end of this chapter.  
                                                                       
9 For example, if n = 5, 
1 2 3 4 510, 14, 8, 14 and 14b b b b b= = = = =  then ( )10,14,8,14,14H =  
{2,4,5}, ( )ˆ 10,14,8,14,14 2i = , ( )max 10,14,8,14,14b =  ( )10,14,8,14,14 14secondb = .  
10 Of course there are many more. For example, also the following utility function represents 
those preferences: ( )
( )2 if 
,
1 if 
iv p
i
i j
U j p
i j
− =
= 
≠
. 
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Theorem 1.1 [Vickrey, 1961]. In a second-price auction, if Player i is selfish and 
greedy then it is a weakly dominant strategy for Player i to bid her true value, that 
is, to choose 
i ib v= . 
Note that, for a player who is not selfish and greedy, Theorem 1.1 is not true. For 
example, if a player has the same preferences as above for the case where she wins, 
but, conditional on not winning, prefers the other player to pay as much as possible 
(she is spiteful) or as little as possible (she is generous), then bidding her true value is 
no longer a dominant strategy. 
 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced in 
this section, by going through the exercises in Section 1.E.3 of Appendix 1.E at the 
end of this chapter. 
1.4. The pivotal mechanism 
An article in the Davis Enterprise (the local newspaper in Davis, California) on 
January 12, 2001 started with the following paragraph: 
By consensus, the Davis City Council agreed Wednesday to 
order a communitywide public opinion poll to gauge how 
much Davis residents would be willing to pay for a park tax 
and a public safety tax. 
Opinion polls of this type are worthwhile only if there are reasons to believe that 
the people who are interviewed will respond honestly. But will they? If I would like 
more parks and believe that the final tax I will have to pay is independent of the 
amount I state in the interview, I would have an incentive to overstate my 
willingness to pay, hoping to swing the decision towards building a new park. On 
the other hand, if I fear that the final tax will be affected by the amount I report, 
then I might have an incentive to understate my willingness to pay.  
The pivotal mechanism, or Clarke mechanism, is a game designed to give the 
participants an incentive to report their true willingness to pay.  
A public project, say to build a park, is under consideration. The cost of the project 
is $C. There are n individuals in the community. If the project is carried out, 
individual i (i = 1,…, n) will have to pay $ ic  (with 1 2 ... nc c c C+ + + = ); these 
amounts are specified as part of the project. Note that we allow for the possibility 
that some individuals might have to contribute a larger share of the total cost C 
than others (e.g. because they live closer to the projected park and would therefore 
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benefit more from it). Individual i has an initial wealth of  $mi  > 0. If the project is 
carried out, individual i receives benefits from it that she considers equivalent to 
receiving $ iv . Note that for some individual i, iv  could be negative, that is, the 
individual could be harmed by the project (e.g. because she likes peace and quiet and 
a park close to her home would bring extra traffic and noise).  We assume that 
individual i has the following utility-of-wealth function: 
($ )i
i
m
U m
m v

= 
+
if  the project is not carried out
if  the project is carried out
 
The socially efficient decision is to carry out the project if and only if  ∑
=
>
n
i
i Cv
1
 
(recall that ∑  is the summation sign: 
1
n
i
i
v
=
∑  is a short-hand for 1 2 ... nv v v+ + + ). 
For example, suppose that n = 2, m1  = 50, m2  = 60, 1v  = 19, 2v  = − 15, C = 6,  
1c  = 6, 2c  = 0. In this case ∑
=
=<=−=
n
i
i Cv
1
641519  hence the project should 
not be carried out. To see this consider the following table. 
If the project is 
not carried out
If the project is 
carried out
Utility of 
individual 1
50 50 + 19 −6 = 63
Utility of 
individual 2
60 60 −15 = 45
 
If the project is carried out, Individual 1 has a utility gain of 13, while Individual 2 
has a utility loss of 15. Since the loss is greater than the gain, we have a Pareto 
inefficient situation. Individual 2 could propose the following alternative to 
Individual 1: let us not carry out the project and I will pay you $14. Then 
Individual 1’s wealth and utility would be 50 + 14 = 64 and Individual 2’s wealth 
and utility would be 60 −14 = 46 and thus they would both be better off.  
Thus Pareto efficiency requires that the project be carried out if and only if 
∑
=
>
n
i
i Cv
1
. This would be a simple decision for the government if it knew the iv ’s. 
But, typically, these values are private information to the individuals. Can the 
government find a way to induce the individuals to reveal their true valuations? It 
seems that in general the answer is No: those who gain from the project would have 
an incentive to overstate their potential gains, while those who suffer would have 
an incentive to overstate their potential losses. Influenced by Vickrey’s work on 
second-price auctions, Clarke suggested the following procedure or game. Each 
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individual i is asked to submit a number iw  which will be interpreted as the gross 
benefit (if positive) or harm (if negative) that individual i associates with the project. 
Note that, in principle, individual i can lie and report a value iw  which is different 
from the true value iv . Then the decision will be: 
Carry out the project?   
1
1
n
j
j
n
j
j
Yes if w C
No if w C
=
=

>


 ≤

∑
∑
 
However, this is not the end of the story. Each individual will be classified as either 
not pivotal or pivotal. 
Individual i is not pivotal if    
1
1
n
j j j
j j i j i
n
j j j
j j i j i
either w C and w c
or w C and w c
= ≠ ≠
= ≠ ≠
  
> >  
  

  ≤ ≤ 
 
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
 
and she is pivotal otherwise. In other words individual i is pivotal if the 
decision about the project that would be made in the restricted society resulting 
from removing individual i is different from the decision that is made when she 
is included. If an individual is not pivotal then she has to pay no taxes. If 
individual i is pivotal then she has to pay a tax in the amount of  j j
j i j i
w c
≠ ≠
−∑ ∑ , 
the absolute value of 
j j
j i j i
w c
≠ ≠
−∑ ∑  (recall that the absolute value of a is equal to 
a, if a is positive, and to − a ,  if a is negative; for instance, 4 4=  and 
4 ( 4) 4− = − − = ). 
For example, let n = 3, C = 10, 1c  = 3, 2c  = 2, 3c  = 5. Suppose that they state the 
following benefits/losses (which may or may not be the true ones): 1w  = − 1,  
2w  = 8 , 3w =  3 . Then 
3
1
10i
i
w C
=
= =∑ . Thus the project will not be carried out. 
Who is pivotal? The answer is provided in the following table. 
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Individual
Σwj 
(including i) 
Σcj 
(including i)
Decision
Σwj    j ≠ i
(without i)
Σcj    j ≠ i
(without i)
Decision Pivotal? Tax
1 10 10 No 8 + 3 = 11 2 + 5 = 7 Yes Yes 11 − 7 = 4
2 10 10 No −1 + 3 = 2 3 + 5 = 8 No No 0
3 10 10 No −1 + 8 = 7 3 + 2 = 5 Yes Yes 7 − 5 = 2
 
It may seem that, since it involves paying a tax, being pivotal is a bad thing and one 
should try to avoid it. It is certainly possible for individual i  to make sure that she 
is not pivotal: all she has to do is to report i iw c= ; in fact, if j j
j i j i
w c
≠ ≠
>∑ ∑ then 
adding ic  to both sides yields 
1
n
j
j
w C
=
>∑ and if j j
j i j i
w c
≠ ≠
≤∑ ∑  then adding ic  to 
both sides yields 
1
n
j
j
w C
=
≤∑ .  It is not true, however, that it is best to avoid being 
pivotal. The following example shows that one can gain by being truthful even if it 
involves being pivotal and thus having to pay a tax. Let n = 4, C = 15, 1c  = 5,  
2c  = 0, 3c  = 5 and 4c  = 5. Suppose that m 1 = 40 and 1v  = 25. Imagine that you 
are individual 1 and, for whatever reason, you expect the following reports by the 
other individuals: 2w  = − 40, 3w  = 15 and 4w  = 20. If you report 1 1 5w c= =  then 
you ensure that you are not pivotal. In this case 
4
1
5 40 15 20 0 15j
j
w C
=
= − + + = < =∑ and thus the project is not carried out and 
your utility is equal to m 1 = 40. If you report truthfully, that is, you report 
1 1 25w v= =  then 
4
1
25 40 15 20 20 15j
j
w C
=
= − + + = > =∑ and the project is carried 
out; furthermore, you are pivotal and have to pay a tax t1 equal to 
4 4
2 2
j j
j j
w c
= =
− =∑ ∑  
( 40 15 20) (0 5 5) 15 15− + + − + + = − =  and your utility will be  1 1 1 1m v c t+ − −  = 
40 + 25 – 5 – 15 =45; hence you are better off. Indeed, the following theorem states 
that no individual can ever gain by lying.  
The proof of Theorem 1.2 is given in Appendix 1.A at the end of this chapter.  
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Theorem 1.2 [Clarke, 1971]. In the pivotal mechanism (under the assumed 
preferences) truthful revelation (that is,  stating wi = vi )  is a weakly dominant 
strategy for every Player i. 
 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced in 
this section, by going through the exercises in Section 1.E.4 of Appendix 1.E at the 
end of this chapter. 
1.5. Iterated deletion procedures 
If in a game a player has a (weakly or strictly) dominant strategy then the player 
ought to choose that strategy: in the case of strict dominance choosing any other 
strategy guarantees that the player will do worse and in the case of weak dominance 
no other strategy can give a better outcome, no matter what the other players do. 
Unfortunately, games that have a dominant-strategy equilibrium are not very 
common. What should a player do when she does not have a dominant strategy? 
We shall consider two iterative deletion procedures that can help solve some games. 
1.5.1. IDSDS. The Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies (IDSDS) is the 
following procedure or algorithm. Given a finite ordinal strategic-form game G, let 
G
1
 be the game obtained by removing from G, for every Player i, those strategies of 
Player i (if any) that are strictly dominated in G by some other strategy; let G
2
 be 
the game obtained by removing from G
1
, for every Player i, those strategies of 
Player i (if any) that are strictly dominated in G
1  
by some other strategy, and so on. 
Let G∞  be the output of this procedure. Since the initial game G is finite, G∞  will 
be obtained in a finite number of steps. Figure 1.10 illustrates this procedure. If 
G∞ contains a single strategy profile (this is not the case in the example of Figure 
1.10) then we call that strategy profile the iterated strict dominant-strategy 
equilibrium. If G∞ contains two or more strategy profiles then we refer to those 
strategy profiles merely as the output of the IDSDS procedure. For example, in the 
game of Figure 1.10 the output of the IDSDS procedure is the set of strategy 
profiles { }( , ), ( , ), ( , ), ( , )A e A f B e B f .  
What is the significance of the output of the IDSDS procedure? Consider game G of 
Figure 1.10. Since, for Player 2, h is strictly dominated by g, if Player 2 is rational 
she will not play h. Thus, if Player 1 believes that Player 2 is rational then he 
believes that Player 2 will not play h, that is, he restricts attention to game 1G ; 
since, in 1G , D is strictly dominated by C for Player 1, if Player 1 is rational he will 
not play D. It follows that if Player 2 believes that Player 1 is rational and that 
Player 1 believes that Player 2 is rational, then Player 2 restricts attention to game 
2G  where rationality requires that Player 2 not play g, etc. It will be shown in a 
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later chapter that if the players are rational and there is common belief of 
rationality11 then only strategy profiles that survive the IDSDS procedure can be 
played; the converse is also true: any strategy profile that survives the IDSDS 
procedure is compatible with common belief of rationality.  
Figure 1.10 
Remark 1.5 . In finite games, the order in which strictly dominated strategies are 
deleted is irrelevant, in the sense that any sequence of deletions of strictly 
dominated strategies leads to the same output. 
                                                                       
11 An event E is commonly believed if everybody believes E and everybody believes that 
everybody believes E and everybody believes that everybody believes that everybody believes 
E, and so on. 
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1.5.1. IDWDS. The Iterated Deletion of Weakly Dominated Strategies (IDWDS) is a 
weakening of IDSDS in that it allows the deletion also of weakly dominated 
strategies. However, this procedure has to be defined carefully, since in this case the 
order of deletion can matter. To see this, consider the game shown in Figure 1.11. 
L R
A 4  ,  0 0  ,  0
T 3  ,  2 2  ,  2
M 1  ,  1 0  ,  0
B 0  ,  0 1  ,  1
Player 2
Player
1
 
Figure 1.11 
Since M is strictly dominated by T for Player 1, we can delete it and obtain 
L R
A 4  ,  0 0  ,  0
T 3  ,  2 2  ,  2
B 0  ,  0 1  ,  1
Player 2
Player
1
 
Now L is weakly dominated by R for Player 2. Deleting L we are left with 
Player 2
R
A 0  ,  0
T 2  ,  2
B 1  ,  1
Player
1
 
Now A and B are strictly dominated by T. Deleting them we are left with  
(T,R)   with corresponding payoffs (2,2). 
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Alternatively, going back to the game of Figure 1.11, we could note that B is 
strictly dominated by T; deleting B we are left with 
L R
A 4  ,  0 0  ,  0
T 3  ,  2 2  ,  2
M 1  ,  1 0  ,  0
Player 2
Player
1
 
Now R is weakly dominated by L for Player 2. Deleting R we are left with 
Player 2
L
A 4  ,  0
T 3  ,  2
M 1  ,  1
Player
1
 
Now T and M are strictly dominated by A and deleting them leads to  (A,L)    
with corresponding payoffs (4,0). Since one order of deletion leads to (T,R) with 
payoffs (2,2)  and  the other to  (A,L) with payoffs (4,0), the procedure is not well 
defined: the output of a well-defined procedure should be unique. 
Definition 1.8 (IDWDS). In order to avoid the problem illustrated above, the 
IDWDS procedure is defined as follows: at every step identify, for every player, all the 
strategies that are weakly (or strictly) dominated and then delete all such strategies in that 
step. If the output of the IDWDS procedure is a single strategy profile then we call 
that strategy profile the iterated weak dominant-strategy equilibrium (otherwise we 
just use the expression ‘output of the IDWDS procedure’). 
For example, the IDWDS procedure when applied to the game of Figure 1.11 leads 
to the following output: 
L R
A 4  ,  0 0  ,  0
T 3  ,  2 2  ,  2
Player 2
Player
1
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Hence the game of Figure 1.11 does not have an iterated weak dominant-strategy 
equilibrium. 
The interpretation of the output of the IDWDS procedure is not as simple as that 
of the IDSDS procedure: certainly common belief of rationality is not sufficient. In 
order to delete weakly dominated strategies one needs to appeal not only to 
rationality but also to some notion of caution: a player should not completely rule 
out any of her opponents’ strategies. However, this notion of caution is in direct 
conflict with the process of deletion of strategies. In this book we shall not address 
the issue of how to justify the IDWDS procedure. 
 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced in 
this section, by going through the exercises in Section 1.E.5 of Appendix 1.E at the 
end of this chapter. 
 
1.6. Nash equilibrium 
Games where either the IDSDS procedure or the IDWDS procedure leads to a 
unique strategy profile are not very common. How can one then “solve” games that 
are not solved by either procedure? The notion of Nash equilibrium offers a more 
general alternative. We first define Nash equilibrium for a two-player game. 
Definition 1.9. Given an ordinal game in strategic form with two players, a 
strategy profile ( )* * *1 2 1 2,s s s S S= ∈ ×  is a Nash equilibrium if the following two 
conditions are satisfied: 
(1) for every 1 1s S∈ , ( ) ( )* * *1 1 2 1 1 2, ,s s s sπ π≥  (or stated in terms of outcomes and  
      preferences, ( ) ( )* * *1 2 1 1 2, ,f s s f s s ) and 
(2) for every 2 2s S∈ , ( ) ( )* * *2 1 2 1 1 2, ,s s s sπ π≥  (or, ( ) ( )* * *1 2 2 1 2, ,f s s f s s ). 
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For example, in the game of Figure 1.12 there are two Nash equilibria: (T, L) and 
(B, C). 
   Player 2 
  L C R 
Player T 3  ,  2 0  ,  0 1  ,  1 
1 M 3  ,  0 1  ,  5 4  ,  4 
 B 1  ,  0 2  ,  3 3  ,  0 
Figure 1.12 
There are several possible interpretations of this definition.  
‘No regret’ interpretation: *s  is a Nash equilibrium if there is no player who, after 
observing the opponent’s choice, regrets his own choice (in the sense that he could 
have done better with a different strategy of his, given the observed strategy of the 
opponent). 
‘Self-enforcing agreement’ interpretation: imagine that the players are able to 
communicate before playing the game and reach a non-binding agreement 
expressed as a strategy profile *s ; then no player will have an incentive to deviate 
from the agreement, if she believes that the other player will follow the agreement, 
if and only if  *s  is a Nash equilibrium.  
‘Viable recommendation’ interpretation: imagine that a third party makes a 
public recommendation to each player on what strategy to play; then no player will 
have an incentive to deviate from the recommendation, if she believes that the other 
players will follow the recommendation, if and only if the recommended strategy 
profile is a Nash equilibrium. 
‘Transparency of reason’ interpretation: if players are all “equally rational” and 
Player 2 reaches the conclusion that she should play y, then Player 1 must be able to 
duplicate Player 2’s reasoning process and come to the same conclusion; it follows 
that Player 1’s choice of strategy is not rational unless it is a strategy x that is 
optimal against y. A similar argument applies to Player 2’s choice of strategy (y must 
be optimal against x) and thus (x,y) is a Nash equilibrium. 
It is clear that all of the above interpretations are mere rewording of the formal 
definition of Nash equilibrium in terms of the inequalities of Definition 1.9. 
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The generalization of Definition 1.9 to games with more than two players is 
straightforward.  
Definition 1.10. Given an ordinal game in strategic form with n  players, a strategy 
profile *s S∈  is a Nash equilibrium if the following inequalities are satisfied: 
for every Player i, * * * * *1 1 1( ) ( ,..., , , ,..., )i i i i i ns s s s s sπ π − +≥  for all i is S∈ . 
The reader should convince himself/herself that a (weak or strict) dominant 
strategy equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium and the same is true of a (weak or strict) 
iterated dominant-strategy equilibrium. 
Definition 1.11. Consider an ordinal game in strategic form, a Player i and a 
strategy profile 
i is S− −∈  of the players other than i. A strategy i is S∈  of Player i is 
a best reply (or best response) to 
is−  if ( , ) ( , )i i i i i is s s sπ π− −′≥  for every i is S′∈ . 
For example, in the game of Figure 1.12, reproduced below, for Player 1 there are 
two best replies to L, namely M and T, while the unique best reply to C is B and the 
unique best reply to R is M; for Player 2 the best reply to T is L, the best reply to M 
is C and the best reply to B is C. 
   Player 2 
  L C R 
Player T 3  ,  2 0  ,  0 1  ,  1 
1 M 3  ,  0 1  ,  5 4  ,  4 
 B 1  ,  0 2  ,  3 3  ,  0 
 
Remark 1.6. Using the notion of best reply, an alternative definition of Nash 
equilibrium is as follows: s S∈  is a Nash equilibrium if and only if, for every 
Player i, 
i is S∈  is a best reply to i is S− −∈ .  
A quick way to find the Nash equilibria of a two-player game is as follows: in each 
column of the table underline the largest payoff of Player 1 in that column (if there 
are several instances, underline them all) and in each row underline the largest 
payoff of Player 2 in that row; if a cell has both payoffs underlined then the 
corresponding strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium. Underlining of the maximum 
payoff of Player 1 in a given column identifies the best reply of Player 1 to the 
strategy of Player 2 that labels that column and similarly for Player 2. This 
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procedure is illustrated in Figure 1.13, where there is a unique Nash equilibrium, 
namely (B,E). 
   Player 2  
  E F G H 
 A 4 ,  0 3 ,  2 2 ,  3 4 ,  1 
Player B 4 ,  2 2 ,  1 1 ,  2 0 ,  2 
1 C 3 ,  6 5 ,  5 3 ,  1 5 ,  0 
 D 2 ,  3 3 ,  2 1 , 2 3 ,  3 
 
Figure 1.13 
Exercise 1.2 in Appendix 1.E explains how to represent a three-player game by 
means of a set of tables. In a three-player game the procedure for finding the Nash 
equilibria is the same, with the necessary adaptation for Player 3: in each cell 
underline the payoff of Player 3 if and only if her payoff is the largest of all her 
payoffs in the same cell across different tables. This is illustrated in Figure 1.14, 
where there is a unique Nash equilibrium, namely (B,R,W ). 
 
                        Player 2                          Player 2    
  L R    L R 
Player T 0  ,  0  ,  0 2  ,  8  ,  6  T 0  ,  0  ,  0 1  ,  2  ,  5 
1 B 5  ,  3  ,  2 3  ,  4  ,  2  B 1  ,  6  ,  1 0  ,  0  ,  1 
         
Player 3 chooses W   Player 3 chooses E 
Figure 1.14 
Unfortunately, when the game has too many players or too many strategies and it 
is thus impossible or impractical to represent it as a set of tables, there is no quick 
procedure for finding the Nash equilibria: one must simply apply the definition of 
Nash equilibrium. For example, consider the following game. 
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Example 1.1. There are 50 players. A benefactor asks them to simultaneously and 
secretly write on a piece of paper a request, which must be a multiple of $10 up to a 
maximum of $100 (thus the possible strategies of each player are $10, $20, …, $90, 
$100). He will then proceed as follows: if not more than 10% of the players ask for 
$100 then he will grant every player’s request, otherwise every player will get 
nothing. Assume that every player is selfish and greedy (only cares about how 
much money she gets and prefers more money to less). What are the Nash 
equilibria of this game? There are several: 
• every strategy profile where 7 or more players request $100 is a Nash 
equilibrium (everybody gets nothing and no player can get a positive 
amount by unilaterally changing her request, since there will still be more 
than 10% requesting $100; on the other hand, convince yourself that a 
strategy profile where exactly 6 players request $100 is not a Nash 
equilibrium), 
• every strategy profile where exactly 5 players request $100 and the 
remaining players request $90 is a Nash equilibrium. 
Any other strategy profile is not a Nash equilibrium: (1) if fewer than 5 players 
request $100, then a player who requested less than $100 can increase her payoff by 
switching to a request of $100, (2) if exactly 5 players request $100 and among the 
remaining players there is one who is not requesting $90, then that player can 
increase her payoff by increasing her request to $90. 
We conclude this section by noting that, since so far we have restricted attention to 
ordinal games, there is no guarantee that an arbitrary game will have at least one 
Nash equilibrium. An example of a game that has no Nash equilibria is the 
Matching Penny game. This is a simultaneous two-player game where each player 
has a coin and decides whether to show the Heads face or the Tails face. If both 
choose H or both choose T then Player 1 wins, otherwise Player 2 wins. Each 
player strictly prefers the outcome where she herself wins to the alternative 
outcome. The game is illustrated in Figure 1.15. 
H 1 0 0 1
T 0 1 1 0
Player 2
H T
Player 1
 
 
Figure 1.15 
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 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced in 
this section, by going through the exercises in Section 1.E.6 of Appendix 1.E at the 
end of this chapter. 
1.7. Games with infinite strategy sets 
Games where the strategy set of one or more players is infinite cannot be 
represented using a table or set of tables. However, all the concepts introduced in 
this chapter can still be applied. In this section we will focus on the notion of Nash 
equilibrium. We start with an example. 
Example 1.2. There are two players. Each player has to write down a real number 
(not necessarily an integer) greater than or equal to 1; thus the strategy sets are 
1 2 [1, )S S= = ∞ . Payoffs are as follows (π1 is the payoff of Player 1, π2 the payoff of 
Player 2, x is the number written by Player 1 and y the number written by Player 
2): 
π1(x,y) = 
1
0
x if x y
if x y
− <

≥
,       π2(x,y) = 
1
0
y if x y
if x y
− >

≤
 
What are the Nash equilibria of this game?  
There is only one Nash equilibrium, namely (1,1) with payoffs (0,0). First of all, we 
must show that (1,1) is indeed a Nash equilibrium.  If Player switched to some  
x > 1 then her payoff would remain 0 and the same is true for Player 2 if he 
unilaterally switched to some y > 1: 1( ,1) 0xπ = , for all [1, )x∈ ∞  and 2 (1, ) 0yπ = , 
for all [1, )y∈ ∞ . Now we show that no other pair (x,y) is a Nash equilibrium. 
Consider first an arbitrary pair (x,y) with x = y > 1. Then π1(x,y) = 0, but if Player 
1 switched to an xˆ  strictly between 1 and x ( ˆ1 x x< < ) her payoff would be  
1
ˆ ˆ( , ) 1 0x y xπ = − >  (recall that, by hypothesis, x = y). Now consider an arbitrary 
(x,y) with x < y. Then π1(x,y) = x −  1 , but if Player 1 switched to an xˆ  strictly 
between x and y ( ˆx x y< < ) her payoff would be  1 ˆ ˆ( , ) 1 1x y x xπ = − > − . The 
argument for ruling out pairs  (x,y) with y < x is similar. 
Note the interesting fact that, for Player 1, x = 1 is a weakly dominated strategy: 
indeed it is weakly dominated by any other strategy: x = 1 guarantees a payoff of 0 
for Player 1, while any ˆ 1x >  would yield a positive payoff to Player 1 in some cases 
(against any y > xˆ ) and 0 in the remaining cases.  The same is true for Player 2. 
Thus in this game there is a unique Nash equilibrium where the strategy of each player 
is weakly dominated! 
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[Note: the rest of this section makes use of calculus. The reader who is not familiar 
with calculus should skip this part.] 
We conclude this section with an example based on the analysis of competition 
among firms proposed by Augustine Cournot in a book published in 1838. In fact, 
Cournot is the one who invented what we now call Nash equilibrium, although his 
analysis was restricted to a small class of games. Consider n ≥ 2 firms which produce 
an identical product. Let iq  be the quantity produced by Firm i (i =1,…,n). For 
Firm i  the cost of producing iq  units of output is i ic q , where ic  is a positive 
constant. For simplicity we will restrict attention to the case of two firms (n = 2) 
and identical cost functions: 1 2c c c= = . Let Q be total industry output, that is, 
1 2Q q q= + . The price at which each firm can sell each unit of output is given by 
the inverse demand function P a bQ= −  where a and b are positive constants. 
Cournot assumed that each firm was only interested in its own profit and preferred 
higher profit to lower profit (that is, each firm is “selfish and greedy”). The profit 
function of Firm 1 is given by 
[ ] 21 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )q q Pq cq a b q q q cq a c q b q bq qπ = − = − + − = − − − . 
Similarly, the profit function of Firm 2 is given by 
2
2 1 2 2 2 1 2( , ) ( ) ( )q q a c q b q bq qπ = − − −  
Cournot defined an equilibrium as a pair ( )1 2,q q  such that  
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1 2 1 1 2 1
2 1 2 2 1 2 2
, , ,  for every 0        ( )
and
, , ,  for every 0         ( )
q q q q q
q q q q q
π π
π π
≥ ≥
≥ ≥
♣
♦
 
Of course, this is the same as saying that ( )1 2,q q  is a Nash equilibrium of the game 
where the players are the two firms, the strategy sets are 1 2 [0, )S S= = ∞  and the 
payoff functions are the profit functions. How do we find a Nash equilibrium? 
First of all, note that the profit functions are differentiable. Secondly note that ( )♣  
says that, having fixed the value of 2 2 at q q ,  the function ( )1 1 2,q qπ  viewed as a 
function of 1q   alone is maximized at the point 1 1q q= . A necessary condition for 
this (if  1 0q > ) is that the derivative of this function be zero at the point 1 1q q= , 
that is, it must be that ( )1 1 2
1
, 0.q q
q
π∂
=
∂
 This condition is also sufficient since the 
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second derivative of this function is always negative ( ( )
2
1
1 22
1
, 2q q b
q
π∂
= −
∂
 for every 
1 2( , )q q ). Similarly, by ( )♦ , it must be that ( )2 1 2
2
, 0.q q
q
π∂
=
∂
 Thus the Nash 
equilibrium is found by solving the system of two equations 
1 2
2 1
2 0
2 0
a c bq bq
a c bq bq
− − − =

− − − =
. The solution is 1 2
3
a c
q q
b
−
= = . The corresponding price is 
2
2
3 3
a c a c
P a b
b
− + = − = 
 
 and the corresponding profits are 
2
1 23 3 3 3
( )
( , ) ( , )
9
a c a c a c a c
b b b b
a c
b
π π− − − −
−
= = . For example, if  25, 2, 1a b c= = =  then the 
Nash equilibrium is given by (4,4) with corresponding profits of 32 for each firm. 
The analysis can easily be extended to the case of more than two firms. The reader 
who is interested in further exploring the topic of competition among firms can 
consult any textbook on Industrial Organization. 
 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced in 
this section, by going through the exercises in Section 1.E.7 of Appendix 1.E at the 
end of this chapter. 
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Appendix 1.A: Proofs of theorems 
Theorem 1.1 [Vickrey, 1961]. In a second-price auction, if Player i is selfish and 
greedy then it is a weakly dominant strategy for Player i to bid her true value, that 
is, to choose 
i ib v= . 
Proof.  In order to make the notation simpler and the argument more transparent, 
we give the proof for the case where n = 2. We shall prove that bidding 1v  is a 
weakly dominant strategy for Player 1 (the proof for Player 2 is similar). Assume 
that Player 1 is selfish and greedy. Then we can take her payoff function to be as 
follows: 
1 2 1 2
1 1 2
1 2
if  
( , )
0 if  
v b b b
b b
b b
π
− ≥
= 
<
. We need to show that, whatever bid 
Player 2 submits, Player 1 cannot get a higher payoff by submitting a bid different 
from 1v . Two cases are possible (recall that 2b  denotes the actual bid of Player 2, 
which is unknown to Player 1). 
Case 1: b2 ≤ v1. In this case, bidding 1v  makes Player 1 the winner and his payoff is 
1 2 0v b− ≥ .  Consider a different bid 1b . If 1 2b b≥ then Player 1 is still the winner 
and his payoff is still 1 2 0v b− ≥ . Thus such a bid is as good as (hence not better 
than) 1v . If  1 2b b< then the winner is Player 2 and Player 1 gets a payoff of 0. Thus 
such a bid is also not better than 1v . 
Case 2: b2 > v1. In this case, bidding 1v  makes Player 2 the winner and thus Player 
1 gets a payoff of 0. Any other bid 1 2b b<  gives the same outcome and payoff. On 
the other hand, any bid 1 2b b≥  makes Player 1 the winner, giving him a payoff of 
1 2 0v b− < , thus making Player 1 worse off than with a bid of 1v .  
 
Theorem 1.2 [Clarke, 1971]. In the pivotal mechanism (under the assumed 
preferences) truthful revelation (that is,  stating wi = vi )  is a weakly dominant 
strategy for every Player i. 
Proof.  Consider an individual i and possible statements wj for j ≠ i. Several cases are 
possible. 
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Case 1: 
j j
j i j i
w c
≠ ≠
>∑ ∑   and i j i j
j i j i
v w c c C
≠ ≠
+ > + =∑ ∑ .  Then 
 decision i’s tax i’s utility 
if  i states vi  Yes 0 i i im v c+ −  
if i states wi such that 
i j
j i
w w C
≠
+ >∑  
Yes 0 
i i im v c+ −  
if i states wi such that 
i j
j i
w w C
≠
+ ≤∑  
No 
j j
j i j i
w c
≠ ≠
−∑ ∑  i j j
j i j i
m w c
≠ ≠
 
− − 
 
∑ ∑  
Individual i cannot gain by lying if and only if 
i i im v c+ −  ≥ i j j
j i j i
m w c
≠ ≠
 
− − 
 
∑ ∑ , 
i.e. if  
i j
j i
v w C
≠
+ ≥∑  which is true by our hypothesis. 
Case 2: 
j j
j i j i
w c
≠ ≠
>∑ ∑ and i j i j
j i j i
v w c c C
≠ ≠
+ ≤ + =∑ ∑ . Then 
 decision i’s tax i’s utility 
if  states vi No j j
j i j i
w c
≠ ≠
−∑ ∑  im  − j j
j i j i
w c
≠ ≠
 
− 
 
∑ ∑  
if states wi such that 
i j
j i
w w C
≠
+ ≤∑  
No 
j j
j i j i
w c
≠ ≠
−∑ ∑  im  − j j
j i j i
w c
≠ ≠
 
− 
 
∑ ∑  
if states wi such that 
i j
j i
w w C
≠
+ >∑  
Y e s  0 
i i im v c+ −  
Individual i cannot gain by lying if and only if i j j
j i j i
m w c
≠ ≠
 
− − 
 
∑ ∑ ≥ i i im v c+ −  , 
i.e. if  
i j
j i
v w C
≠
+ ≤∑  which is true by our hypothesis. 
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Case 3: 
j j
j i j i
w c
≠ ≠
≤∑ ∑ and i j i j
j i j i
v w c c C
≠ ≠
+ ≤ + =∑ ∑ . Then 
 decision i’s tax i’s utility 
if  i states vi No 0 im  
if i states wi such that 
i j
j i
w w C
≠
+ ≤∑  
No 0 
im  
if i states wi such that 
i j
j i
w w C
≠
+ >∑  
Y e s  
j j
j i j i
c w
≠ ≠
 
− 
 
∑ ∑  
(recall that 
j j
j i j i
w c
≠ ≠
≤∑ ∑ ) 
i i i j j
j i j i
m v c c w
≠ ≠
 
+ − − − 
 
∑ ∑  
Individual i cannot gain by lying if and only if  
im  ≥ i i i j j
j i j i
m v c c w
≠ ≠
 
+ − − − 
 
∑ ∑ , 
i.e. if 
i j
j i
v w C
≠
+ ≤∑ , which is our hypothesis. 
Case 4: 
j j
j i j i
w c
≠ ≠
≤∑ ∑ and i j i j
j i j i
v w c c C
≠ ≠
+ > + =∑ ∑ . Then 
 decision i’s tax i’s utility 
if i states vi Yes j j
j i j i
c w
≠ ≠
 
− 
 
∑ ∑  
(recall that 
j j
j i j i
w c
≠ ≠
≤∑ ∑ ) 
i i i j j
j i j i
m v c c w
≠ ≠
 
+ − − − 
 
∑ ∑  
if i states wi such that 
i j
j i
w w C
≠
+ >∑  
Yes 
j j
j i j i
c w
≠ ≠
 
− 
 
∑ ∑  
(recall that 
j j
j i j i
w c
≠ ≠
≤∑ ∑ ) 
i i i j j
j i j i
m v c c w
≠ ≠
 
+ − − − 
 
∑ ∑  
if i states wi such that 
i j
j i
w w C
≠
+ ≤∑  
N o  0 
im  
Individual i cannot gain by lying if and only if   i i i j j
j i j i
m v c c w
≠ ≠
 
+ − − − 
 
∑ ∑  ≥ im , 
i.e. if 
i j
j i
v w C
≠
+ ≥∑ , which is true by our hypothesis. 
Since we have covered all the possible cases, the proof is complete.   
GAME THEORY – Giacomo Bonanno 
43 
Appendix 1.E: Exercises 
1.E.1 .  Exercises  for  Section 1 .1 :  Game frames and games 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this chapter. 
Exercise 1.1. Antonia and Bob cannot decide where to go to dinner. Antonia 
proposes the following procedure: she will write on a piece of paper either the 
number 2 or the number 4 or the number 6, while Bob will write on his piece of 
paper either the number 1 or 3 or 5. They will write their numbers secretly and 
independently. They then will show each other what they wrote and choose a 
restaurant according to the following rule: if the sum of the two numbers is 5 or 
less, they will go to a Mexican restaurant, if the sum is 7 they will go to an Italian 
restaurant and if the number is 9 or more they will go to a Japanese restaurant. 
(a) Let Antonia be Player 1 and Bob Player 2. Represent this situation as a game 
frame, first by writing out each element of the quadruple of Definition 1.1 and 
then by using a table (label the rows with Antonia’s strategies and the columns 
with Bob’s strategies, so that we can think of Antonia as choosing the row and 
Bob as choosing the column). 
(b) Suppose that Antonia and Bob have the following preferences (where M stands 
for ‘Mexican’, I for ‘Italian’ and J for ‘Japanese). For Antonia: 
Antonia AntoniaM I J≻ ≻ ; for Bob:  Bob BobI M J≻ ≻ . Using utility function with 
values 1, 2 and 3 represent the corresponding reduced-form game as a table. 
Exercise 1.2. Consider the following two-player game-frame where each player is 
given a set of cards and each card has a number on it. The players are Antonia 
(Player 1) and Bob (Player 2). Antonia’s cards have the following numbers (one 
number on each card):  2, 4 and 6, whereas Bob’s cards are marked 0, 1 and 2 (thus 
different numbers from the previous exercise). Antonia chooses one of her own 
cards and Bob chooses one of his own cards: this is done without knowing the 
other player’s choice. The outcome depends on the sum of the points of the chosen 
cards, as follows. If the sum of the points on the two chosen cards is greater than or 
equal to 5, Antonia gets $10 minus that sum; otherwise (that is, if the sum is less 
than 5) she gets nothing; furthermore, if the sum of points is an odd number, Bob 
gets as many dollars as that sum; if the sum of points turns out to be an even 
number and is less than or equal to 6, Bob gets $2; otherwise he gets nothing. 
(a) Represent the game-frame described above by means of a table. As in the 
previous exercise, assign the rows to Antonia and the columns to Bob. 
(b) Using the game-frame of part (a) obtain a reduced-form game by adding the 
information that each player is selfish and greedy. This means that each player 
only cares about how much money he/she gets and prefers more money to less. 
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Exercise 1.3. Alice (Player 1), Bob (Player 2), and Charlie (Player 3) play the 
following simultaneous game. They are sitting in different rooms facing a keyboard 
with only one key and each has to decide whether or not to press the key. Alice 
wins if the number of people who press the key is odd (that is, all three of them or 
only Alice or only Bob or only Charlie) , Bob wins if exactly two people (he may 
be one of them) press the key and Charlie wins if nobody presses the key.  
(a) Represent this situation as a game-frame. Note that we can represent a three-
player game with a set of tables: Player 1 chooses the row, Player 2 chooses the 
column and Player 3 chooses the table (that is, we label the rows with Player 1’s 
strategies, the columns with Player 2’s strategies and the tables with Player 3’s 
strategies). 
(b) Using the game-frame of part (a) obtain a reduced-form game by adding the 
information that each player prefers winning to not winning and is indifferent 
between any two outcomes where he/she does not win. For each player use a 
utility function with values from the set {0,1}. 
(c) Using the game-frame of part (a) obtain a reduced-form game by adding the 
information that (1) each player prefers winning to not winning,  (2) Alice is 
indifferent between any two outcomes where she does not win, (3)  conditional 
on not winning, Bob prefers if Charlie wins rather than Alice, (4)  conditional 
on not winning, Charlie prefers if Bob wins rather than Alice. For each player 
use a utility function with values from the set {0,1,2}. 
1.E.2. Exercises for Section 1.2: Strict/weak dominance 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this chapter. 
Exercise 1.4. There are two players. Each player is given an unmarked envelope 
and asked to put in it either nothing or $300 of his own money or $600 of his own 
money. A referee collects the envelopes, opens them, gathers all the money, then 
adds 50% of that amount (using his own money) and divides the total into two 
equal parts which he then distributes to the players.  
(a) Represent this game frame with two alternative tables: the first table showing in 
each cell the amount of money distributed to Player 1 and the amount of 
money distributed to Player 2, the second table showing the change in wealth of 
each player (money received minus contribution). 
(b) Suppose that Player 1 has some animosity towards the referee and ranks the 
outcomes in terms of how much money the referee loses (the more, the better), 
while Player 2 is selfish and greedy and ranks the outcomes in terms of her own 
net gain. Represent the corresponding game using a table. 
(c) Is there a strict dominant-strategy equilibrium? 
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Exercise 1.5. (a) For the game of Part (b) of Exercise 1.1 determine, for each player, 
whether the player has strictly dominated strategies. 
(b) For the game of Part (b) of Exercise 1.1 determine, for each player, whether the 
player has weakly dominated strategies. 
Exercise 1.6. There are three players. Each player is given an unmarked envelope 
and asked to put in it either nothing or $3 of his own money or $6 of his own 
money. A referee collects the envelopes, opens them, gathers all the money and 
then doubles the amount (using his own money) and divides the total into three 
equal parts which he then distributes to the players. For example, if Players 1 and 2 
put nothing and Player 3 puts $6, then the referee adds another $6 so that the total 
becomes $12, divides this sum into three equal parts and gives $4 to each player. 
Each player is selfish and greedy, in the sense that he ranks the outcomes 
exclusively in terms of his net change in wealth (what he gets from the referee 
minus what he contributed).  
(a) Represent this game by means of a set of tables. (Do not treat the referee as a 
player.) 
(b) For each player and each pair of strategies determine if one of the two 
dominates the other and specify if it is weak or strict dominance. 
(c) Is there a strict dominant-strategy equilibrium? 
1.E.3 .  Exercises  for  Section 1 .3 :  Second price auction 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this chapter. 
Exercise 1.7. For the second-price auction partially illustrated in Table 1.9, 
complete the representation by adding the payoffs of Player 2, assuming that Player 
2 assigns a value of $50M to the field and, like Player 1, ranks the outcomes in terms 
of the net gain from the oil field (defined as profits minus the price paid, if Player 2 
wins, and zero otherwise). 
Exercise 1.8. Consider the following “third-price” auction. There are n ≥ 3 bidders. 
A single object is auctioned and Player i values the object $vi , with  vi > 0. The bids 
are simultaneous and secret. The utility of Player i is: 0 if she does not win and 
( )iv p−  if she wins and pays $p. Every non-negative number is an admissible bid. 
Let 
ib  denote the bid of Player i. The winner is the highest bidder. In case of ties 
the bidder with the lowest index among those who submitted the highest bid wins 
(e.g. if the highest bid is $120 and it is submitted by players 6, 12 and 15, then the 
winner is Player 6). The losers don’t get anything and don’t pay anything. The 
winner gets the object and pays the third highest bid, which is defined as follows. 
Let i be the winner and fix a Player j such that 1max({ ,..., } \{ })j n ib b b b=  [if 
1max({ ,..., } \{ })n ib b b  contains more than one element, then we pick one of them]. 
GAME THEORY – Giacomo Bonanno 
46 
Then the third price is defined as  1max({ ,..., } \{ , })n i jb b b b . For example, if n = 3 
and the bids are 1 30b = ,  2 40b =  and 3 40b =  then the winner is Player 2 and she 
pays $30; if 1 2 3 50b b b= = =  then the winner is Player 1 and she pays $50.  
For simplicity, let us restrict attention to the case where n = 3 and 1 2 3 0v v v> > > . 
Does Player 1 have a weakly dominant strategy in this auction? 
1.E.4 .  Exercises  for  Section 1 .4 :  The pivotal mechanism 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this chapter. 
Exercise 1.9. The pivotal mechanism is used to decide whether a new park should 
be built. There are 5 individuals. According to the proposed project, the cost of the 
park would be allocated as follows: 
individual 1 2 3 4 5 
share of cost c1 = $30 c2= $25 c3 = $25 c4 = $15 c5 = $5 
For every individual i = 1, .., 5, let vi be the perceived gross benefit (if positive; 
perceived gross loss, if negative) from having the park built. The vi’s are as follows: 
individual 1 2 3 4 5 
gross benefit v1 = $60 v2= $15 v3 = $55 v4 = $− 25 v5 = $− 20 
(Thus the net benefit (loss) to individual i is  vi − ci.). Individual i  has the 
following utility of wealth function (where mi denotes the wealth of individual 
i):  
i
i
i i
m
U
m v

= 
+
if  the project is not carried out
if the project is carried out
 
(Let 
im  be the initial endowment of money of individual i and assume that im  
is large enough that it exceeds ci plus any tax that the individual might have to 
pay.) 
(a) What is the Pareto-efficient decision: to build the park or not? 
Assume that the pivotal mechanism is used, so that each individual i is asked to 
state a number wi which is going to be interpreted as the gross benefit to 
individual i from carrying out the project. The are no restrictions on the 
number wi: it can be positive, negative or zero. Suppose that the individuals 
make the following announcements: 
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individual 1 2 3 4 5 
stated benefit w1 = 
$70 
w2= $10 w3 = $65 w4 =  $− 30 w5 = $5 
(b) Would the park be built based on the above announcements? 
(c) Using the above announcements and the rules of the pivotal mechanism, fill 
in the following table: 
 
individual 1 2 3 4 5 
Pivotal?       
Tax       
(d) As you know, in the pivotal mechanism each individual has a dominant 
strategy. If all the individuals played their dominant strategies, would the 
park be built?  
(e) Assuming that all the individuals play their dominant strategies, find out 
who is pivotal and what tax (if any) each individual has to pay? 
(f) Show that if every other individual reports his/her true benefit, then it is 
best for Individual 1 to also report his/her true benefit. 
 
1 .E.5 .  Exercises for Section 1.5: Iterated deletion procedures 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this chapter. 
Exercise 1.10. (a) Apply the IDSDS procedure (Iterated Deletion of Strictly 
Dominated Strategies) to the game of Part (b) of Exercise 1.1. 
(b) Apply the IDWDS procedure (Iterated Deletion of Weakly Dominated 
Strategies) to the game of Part (b) of Exercise 1.1. 
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Exercise 1.11. Apply the IDSDS procedure to the following game. Is there a strict 
iterated dominant-strategy equilibrium? 
 
  Player 2  
  d e f 
Player a 8  ,  6 0  ,  9 3  ,  8 
1 b 3  ,  2 2  ,  1 4  ,  3 
 c 2  ,  8 1  ,  5 3  ,  1 
 
Exercise 1.12. Consider the following game. There is a club with three members: 
Ann, Bob and Carla. They have to choose which of the three is going to be 
president next year. Currently, Ann is the president. Each member is both a 
candidate and a voter. Voting is as follows: each member votes for one candidate 
(voting for oneself is allowed); if two or more people vote for the same candidate 
then that person is chosen as the next president; if there is complete disagreement, 
in the sense that there is exactly one vote for each candidate, then the person for 
whom Ann voted is selected as the next president.  
(a) Represent this voting procedure as a game frame, indicating inside each cell of 
each table which candidate is elected. 
(b) Assume that the players’ preferences are as follows: 
Ann AnnAnn Carla Bob≻ ≻ ,   
Bob BobCarla Bob Ann≻ ≻ ,   Carla CarlaBob Ann Carla≻ ≻ . 
Using utility values 0, 1 and 2, convert the game frame into a game. 
(c) Apply the IDWDS to the game of part (b). Is there an iterated weak dominant-
strategy equilibrium? 
(d) Does the extra power given to Ann (in the form of tie-breaking in case of 
complete disagreement) benefit Ann? 
Exercise 1.13. Consider the following game: 
Player 2
a 2 3 2 2 3 1
Player 1 b 2 0 3 1 1 0
c 1 4 2 0 0 4
D E F
 
(a) Apply the IDSDS procedure to it. Is there an iterated strict dominant-strategy 
equilibrium? 
(b) Apply the IDWDS procedure to it. Is there an iterated weak dominant-strategy 
equilibrium? 
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1.E.6 .  Exercises  for  Section 1 .6 :  Nash equilibrium. 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this chapter. 
Exercise 1.14. Find the Nash equilibria of the game of Exercise 1.2. 
Exercise 1.15. Find the Nash equilibria of the games of Exercise 1.3 (b) and (c). 
Exercise 1.16. Find the Nash equilibria of the games of Exercise 1.4 (b). 
Exercise 1.17. Find the Nash equilibria of the game of Exercise 1.6. 
Exercise 1.18. Find the Nash equilibria of the game of Exercise 1.7. 
Exercise 1.19. Find one Nash equilibrium of the game of Exercise 1.8 for the case 
where  
n = 3 and 1 2 3 0v v v> > > . 
Exercise 1.20. Find the Nash equilibria of the game of part (b) of Exercise 1.12. 
Exercise 1.21. Find the Nash equilibria of the game of Exercise 1.13. 
1.E.7. Exercises for Section 1.6: Games with infinite strategy 
sets. 
Exercise 1.22. Consider a simultaneous n-player game where each player i chooses 
an effort level ai ∈ [0,1]. The payoff to player i is given by 
1 1( ,..., ) 4min{ ,..., } 2i n n ia a a a aπ = −  (efforts are complementary and each player’s 
cost per unit of effort is 2).  
(a) Find all the Nash equilibria and prove that they are indeed Nash equilibria. 
(b) Are any of the Nash equilibria Pareto efficient? 
(c) Find a Nash equilibrium where each player gets a payoff of 1. 
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◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊ 
Exercise 1.23: Challenging Question. The Mondevil Corporation operates a 
chemical plant, which is located on the banks of the Sacramento river. Downstream 
from the chemical plant is a group of fisheries. The Mondevil plant emits by-
products that pollute the river, causing harm to the fisheries. The profit Mondevil 
obtains from operating the chemical plant is $Π > 0. The harm inflicted on the 
fisheries due to water pollution is equal to $L > 0 of lost profit [without pollution 
the fisheries’ profit is $A, while with pollution it is $(A − L)]. Suppose that the 
fisheries collectively sue the Mondevil Corporation. It is easily verified in court that 
Mondevil's plant pollutes the river. However, the values of Π and L cannot be 
verified by the court, although they are commonly known to the litigants. Suppose 
that the court requires the Mondevil attorney (Player 1) and the fisheries’ attorney 
(Player 2) to play the following litigation game. Player 1 is asked to announce a 
number x ≥ 0, which the court interprets as a claim about the plant’s profits. Player 
2 is asked to announce a number y ≥ 0, which the court interprets as the fisheries' 
claim about their profit loss. The announcements are made simultaneously and 
independently. Then the court uses Posner's nuisance rule to make its decision (R. 
Posner, Economic analysis of Law, 9th edition, 1997). According to the rule, if  
y > x, then Mondevil must shut down its chemical plant. If x ≥ y , then the court 
allows Mondevil to operate the plant, but the court also requires Mondevil to pay 
the fisheries the amount y. Note that the court cannot force the attorneys to tell the 
truth: in fact, it would not be able to tell whether or not the lawyers were reporting 
truthfully. Assume that the attorneys want to maximize the payoff (profits) of their 
clients. 
(a) Represent this situation as a normal-form game by describing the strategy 
set of each player and the payoff functions. 
(b) Is it a dominant strategy for the Mondevil  attorney to make a truthful 
announcement (i.e. to choose x = Π )? [Prove your claim.] 
(c) Is it a dominant strategy for the fisheries’ attorney to make a truthful 
announcement (i.e. to choose y = L)? [Prove your claim.] 
(d) For the case where Π  > L  (recall that Π and L denote the true amounts), 
find all the Nash equilibria of the litigation game. [Prove that what you 
claim to be Nash equilibria are indeed Nash equilibria and that there are no 
other Nash equilibria.] 
(e) For the case where Π  < L  (recall that Π and L denote the true amounts), 
find all the Nash equilibria of the litigation game. [Prove that what you 
claim to be Nash equilibria are indeed Nash equilibria and that there are no 
other Nash equilibria.] 
(f) Does the court rule give rise to a Pareto efficient outcome? [Assume that the 
players end up playing a Nash equilibrium.] 
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Appendix 1.S: Solutions to exercises  
Exercise 1.1.  (a) {1, 2}I = , 1 2{2,4,6}, {1,3,5}S S= = , { , , }O M I J= (where M 
stands for ‘Mexican’, I for ‘Italian’ and J for ‘Japanese); the set of strategy 
profiles is {(2,1), (2,3), (2,5), (4,1), (4,3), (4,5), (6,1), (6,3), (6,5)}S = ; the 
outcome function is  (2,1) (2,3) (4,1)f f f M= = = ,  (2,5) (4,3)f f= =  
(6,1)f I=  and (4,5)f =  (6,3) (6,5)f f J= = .  The representation as a table is 
as follows: 
1 3 5
2 M M I
Player 1
(Antonia)
4 M I J
6 I J J
Player 2 (Bob)
 
(b) Using values 1, 2 and 3, the utility functions are as follows, where 1U  is the 
utility function of Player 1 (Antonia) and 2U  is the utility function of Player 2 
(Bob): 1
2 : 2 3 1
: 3 2 1
M I J
U
U
 
 
 
 
 
.  The reduced-form game is as follows: 
2 3 2 3 2 2 3
4 3 2 2 3 1 1
6 2 3 1 1 1 1
1 3 5
Player 1
(Antonia)
Player 2 (Bob)
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Exercise 1.2.   
(a) The game-frame is as follows: 
2
Antonia
gets nothing
Bob gets $2
Antonia
gets nothing
Bob gets $3
Antonia
gets nothing
Bob gets $2
4
Antonia
gets nothing
Bob gets $2
Antonia
gets $5
Bob gets $5
Antonia
gets $4
Bob gets $2
6
Antonia
gets $4
Bob gets $2
Antonia
gets $3
Bob gets $7
Antonia
gets $2
Bob 
gets nothing
Player 1
(Antonia)
2
Player  2 (Bob)
0 1
 
(b) When the outcomes are sums of money and Player i is selfish and greedy 
then we can take the following as i’s utility function: ($ )iU x x=  (other utility 
functions would do too: the only requirement is that the utility of a larger sum 
of money is larger than the utility of a smaller sum of money). Thus the 
reduced-form game is as follows: 
2 0 2 0 3 0 2
4 0 2 5 5 4 2
6 4 2 3 7 2 0
Player 1
(Antonia)
2
Player  2 (Bob)
0 1
 
Exercise 1.3.   
 (a) The game-frame is as follows: 
P = Press
P not P
P
Alice not P
Charlie: P
P not P
P
Alice not P
Charlie: not P
Alice wins
Charlie wins
Bob
Bob
Alice wins Bob wins
Bob wins Alice wins
Bob wins
Alice wins
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(b) The reduced-form game is as follows: 
P = Press
P not P
P 1 0 0 0 1 0
Alice not P 0 1 0 1 0 0
Charlie: P
P not P
P 0 1 0 1 0 0
Alice not P 1 0 0 0 0 1
Charlie: not P
Bob
Bob
 
(c) The reduced-form game is as follows. For Alice we chose 1 and 0 as utilities, 
but one could also use 2 and 1 or 2 and 0. 
P = Press
P not P
P 1 0 0 0 2 1
Alice not P 0 2 1 1 0 0
Charlie: P
P not P
P 0 2 1 1 0 0
Alice not P 1 0 0 0 1 2
Charlie: not P
Bob
Bob
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Exercise 1.4.   (a) The tables are as follows: 
Distributed money
0 0 0 225 225 450 450
300 225 225 450 450 675 675
600 450 450 675 675 900 900
Net amounts
0 0 0 225 −75 450 −150
300 −75 225 150 150 375 75
600 −150 450 75 375 300 300
0 300 600
Player
1
Player  2
0 300 600
Player
1
Player  2
 
(b) For Player 1 we can take as his payoff the total money lost by the referee 
and for Player 2 her own net gain: 
0 0 0 150 −75 300 −150
300 150 225 300 150 450 75
600 300 450 450 375 600 300
0 300 600
Player
1
Player  2
 
(c) For Player 1 contributing $600 is a strictly dominant strategy and for Player 
2 contribution $0 is a strictly dominant strategy. Thus ($600,$0) is the strict 
dominant-strategy equilibrium. 
Exercise 1.5.   The game under consideration is the following: 
2 3 2 3 2 2 3
4 3 2 2 3 1 1
6 2 3 1 1 1 1
1 3 5
Player 1
(Antonia)
Player 2 (Bob)
 
(a) For Player 1, 6 is strictly dominated by 2. There is no other strategy which 
is strictly dominated. Player 2 does not have any strictly dominated 
strategies. 
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(b) For Player 1, 6 is weakly dominated by 4 (and also by 2, since strict 
dominance implies weak dominance); 4 is weakly dominated by 2.  Player 2 
does not have any weakly dominated strategies. 
Exercise 1.6.   (a) The game is as follows: 
0 0 0 0 2 −1 2 4 −2 4 0 2 2 −1 4 1 1 6 0 3 0 4 4 −2 6 3 0 8 2 2
3 −1 2 2 1 1 4 3 0 6 3 1 4 1 3 3 3 5 2 5 3 3 6 0 5 5 2 7 4 4
6 −2 4 4 0 3 6 2 2 8 6 0 6 3 2 5 5 4 4 7 6 2 8 2 4 7 4 6 6 6
Player 3:  0 Player 3:  3 Player 3:  6
60 3
Play
er
1
3 60 3 6 0
Player   2 Player   2 Player   2
 
(b) For Player 1, 3 strictly dominates 6, 0 strictly dominates 6, 0 strictly 
dominates 3 (the same is true for every player). 
(c) The strict dominant-strategy equilibrium is (0,0,0) (everybody contributes 
0). 
Exercise 1.7.  The game is as follows: 
$10M $20M $30M $40M $50M
$10M 0 , 40 0 , 40 0 , 40 0 , 40 0 , 40
Player $20M 20 , 0 0 , 30 0 , 30 0 , 30 0 , 30
1 $30M 20 , 0 10 , 0 0 , 20 0 , 20 0 , 20
(value $30M) $40M 20 , 0 10 , 0 0  ,  0 0 , 10 0 , 10
$50M 20 , 0 10 , 0 0  ,  0 −10 , 0 0  ,  0
 
Exercise 1.8.  No. Suppose, by contradiction, that 1bˆ  is a weakly dominant 
strategy for Player 1. It cannot be that 1 1bˆ v> , because when 2 3 1ˆb b b= =  Player 
1 wins and pays 1bˆ , thereby obtaining a payoff of 1 1
ˆ 0v b− < , whereas bidding 0 
would give him a payoff of 0. It cannot be that 1 1bˆ v=  because when 2 1ˆb b>  and 
3 1b v<  the auction is won by Player 2 and Player 1 gets a payoff of 0, while a 
bid of Player 1 greater than 2b  would make him the winner with a payoff of 
1 3 0v b− > . Similarly, it cannot be that 1 1bˆ v<  because when 2 1ˆb b>  and 3 1b v<  
then the auction is won by Player 2 and Player 1 gets a payoff of 0, while a bid 
greater than 2b  would make him the winner with a payoff of 1 3 0v b− > . 
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Exercise 1.9.   (a) Since 
5 5
1 1
85 100i i
i i
v c
= =
= < =∑ ∑  the Pareto efficient decision is 
not to build the park. 
(b)  Since 
5 5
1 1
120 100i i
i i
w c
= =
= > =∑ ∑  the park would be built. 
(c) Individuals 1 and 3 are pivotal and each of them has to pay a tax of $20. The 
other individuals are not pivotal and thus are not taxed. 
(d) For each individual i it is a dominant strategy to report 
iv  and thus, by part 
(a), the decision will be the Pareto efficient one, namely not to build the park. 
(e) When every individual reports truthfully, Individuals 4 and 5 are pivotal 
and Individual 4 has to pay a tax of $25, while individual 5 has to pay a tax of 
$10. The others are not pivotal and do not have to pay a tax. 
(f) Assume that all the other individuals report truthfully; then if Individual 1 
reports truthfully, he is not pivotal, the project is not carried out and his utility 
is 1m . Any other 1w  that leads to the same decision (not to build the park) 
gives him the same utility. If, on the other hand, he chooses a 1w  that leads to a 
decision to build the park, then Individual 1 will become pivotal and will have 
to pay a tax of $45 with a utility of 1 1 1 145 30 45 15m v m m+ − = + − = − , so that 
he would be worse off relative to reporting truthfully.  
Exercise 1.10.  The game under consideration is the following: 
2 3 2 3 2 2 3
4 3 2 2 3 1 1
6 2 3 1 1 1 1
1 3 5
Player 1
(Antonia)
Player 2 (Bob)
 
(a) The first step of the procedure eliminates 6 for Player 1. After this step the 
procedure stops and thus the output is 
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2 3 2 3 2 2 3
4 3 2 2 3 1 1
5
Player 2 (Bob)
Player 1
(Antonia)
1 3
 
(b) The first step of the procedure eliminates 4 and 6 for Player 1 and nothing 
for Player 2. The second step of the procedure eliminates 1 and 3 for Player 
2. Thus the output is the strategy profile (2,5), which constitutes the iterated 
weak dominant-strategy equilibrium of this game. 
Exercise 1.11.  The game under consideration is 
  Player 2  
  d e f 
Player a 8  ,  6 0  ,  9 3  ,  8 
1 b 3  ,  2 2  ,  1 4  ,  3 
 c 2  ,  8 1  ,  5 3  ,  1 
In this game c is strictly dominated by b; after deleting c, d becomes strictly 
dominated by f; after deleting d, a becomes strictly dominated by b; after 
deleting a, e becomes strictly dominated by f; deletion of e leads to only one 
strategy profile, namely (b,f ). Thus (b,f ) is the iterated strict dominant-strategy 
equilibrium.  
Exercise 1.12.  (a) The game-frame is as follows: 
A
N
N
BOB BOB BOB
A
A A A
A A
B
B B
B
B
B
C C C
CCC
Carla votes for A Carla votes for B Carla votes for C
A A A
A
A
A
N
N
A
N
N
A AB
B
B
B B BB B
CC C
C
C
CCCC
B
AA
 
(b) The game is as follows: 
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A
N
N
BOB BOB BOB
A
A A A
A A
B
B B
B
B
B
C C C
CCC
Carla votes for A Carla votes for B Carla votes for C
A
N
N
A
N
N
2,0,1 2,0,1 2,0,1
2,0,1
2,0,1
2,0,1 2,0,1 2,0,1 2,0,1
0,1,2 0,1,2 0,1,2 0,1,2 0,1,2 0,1,2 0,1,2
0,1,2
0,1,21,2,0 1,2,0 1,2,0 1,2,0
1,2,0
1,2,0
1,2,0 1,2,0 1,2,0
 
(c) For Ann, both B and C are weakly dominated by A, while the other two 
players do not have any dominated strategies. Thus in the first step of the 
IDWDS we delete B and C for Ann. Hence the game reduces to: 
CARLA
A
A
B
B C
C
Carla votes for A
B
O
B
0,1 0,1 0,1
0,1
0,1
1,2 0,1
0,1 2,0
 
In this game, for Carla, B weakly dominates both A and C and for Bob A is 
weakly dominated by B (and also by C). Thus in the second step of the 
IDWDS we delete A and B for Carla and A for Bob. In the third and final 
step we delete C for Bob. Thus we are left with a unique strategy profile, 
namely (A,B,B), that is, Ann votes for herself and Bob and Carla vote for 
Bob. This is the iterated weak dominant-strategy equilibrium.  
(d) The elected candidate is Bob, who is Ann’s least favorite; thus the extra 
power given to Ann (tie breaking in case of total disagreement) turns out to 
be detrimental for Ann! 
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Exercise 1.13. The game under consideration is 
Player 2
a 2 3 2 2 3 1
Player 1 b 2 0 3 1 1 0
c 1 4 2 0 0 4
D E F
 
 (a) The output of the IDSDS is as follows (first delete c and then F ): 
a 2 3 2 2
b 2 0 3 1
Player 1
D E
Player 2
 
Thus there is no iterated strict dominant-strategy equilibrium. 
(b) The output of the IDWDS is (b,E) (in the first step delete c and F, the latter 
because it is weakly dominated by D; in the second step delete a and in the 
third step delete D). Thus (b,E) is the iterated weak dominant-strategy 
equilibrium. 
Exercise 1.14.  The game under consideration is 
2 0 2 0 3 0 2
4 0 2 5 5 4 2
6 4 2 3 7 2 0
Player 1
(Antonia)
2
Player  2 (Bob)
0 1
 
There is only one Nash equilibrium, namely (4,1) with payoffs (5,5). 
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Exercise 1.15.  The game of part (b) of Exercise 1.3 is as follows: 
P = Press
P not P
P 1 0 0 0 1 0
Alice not P 0 1 0 1 0 0
Charlie: P
P not P
P 0 1 0 1 0 0
Alice not P 1 0 0 0 0 1
Charlie: not P
Bob
Bob
 
This game has only one Nash equilibrium, namely (not P, P, not P).  
The game of part (c) of Exercise 1.3 is as follows: 
P = Press
P not P
P 1 0 0 0 2 1
Alice not P 0 2 1 1 0 0
Charlie: P
P not P
P 0 2 1 1 0 0
Alice not P 1 0 0 0 1 2
Charlie: not P
Bob
Bob
 
This game does not have any Nash equilibria. 
Exercise 1.16.  The game under consideration is 
0 0 0 150 −75 300 −150
300 150 225 300 150 450 75
600 300 450 450 375 600 300
0 300 600
Player
1
Player  2
 
This game has only one Nash equilibrium, namely (600,0). 
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Exercise 1.17.  The game under consideration is: 
0 0 0 0 2 −1 2 4 −2 4 0 2 2 −1 4 1 1 6 0 3 0 4 4 −2 6 3 0 8 2 2
3 −1 2 2 1 1 4 3 0 6 3 1 4 1 3 3 3 5 2 5 3 3 6 0 5 5 2 7 4 4
6 −2 4 4 0 3 6 2 2 8 6 0 6 3 2 5 5 4 4 7 6 2 8 2 4 7 4 6 6 6
Player 3:  0 Player 3:  3 Player 3:  6
60 3
Play
er
1
3 60 3 6 0
Player   2 Player   2 Player   2
 
This game has only one Nash equilibrium, namely (0,0,0). 
Exercise 1.18.  The game under consideration is as follows: 
$10M $20M $30M $40M $50M
$10M 0 , 40 0 , 40 0 , 40 0 , 40 0 , 40
Player $20M 20 , 0 0 , 30 0 , 30 0 , 30 0 , 30
1 $30M 20 , 0 10 , 0 0 , 20 0 , 20 0 , 20
(value $30M) $40M 20 , 0 10 , 0 0  ,  0 0 , 10 0 , 10
$50M 20 , 0 10 , 0 0  ,  0 −10 , 0 0  ,  0  
This game has 15 Nash equilibria: (10,30), (10,40), (10,50), (20,30), (20,40), 
(20,50), (30,30), (30,40), (30,50), (40,40), (40,50), (50,10), (50,20), (50,30), (50,50). 
Exercise 1.19.  A Nash equilibrium is 1 2 3 1b b b v= = =  (with payoffs (0,0,0)). 
Convince yourself that this is indeed a Nash equilibrium. There are many more 
Nash equilibria: for example, any triple 1 2 3( , , )b b b  with 2 3 1b b v= =  and 1 1b v>  
is a Nash equilibrium (with payoffs (0,0,0)) and so is any triple 1 2 3( , , )b b b  with 
2 3 2b b v= =  and 1 2b v≥  (with payoffs 1 2( ,0,0)v v− ).  
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Exercise 1.20.  The game under consideration is 
A
N
N
BOB BOB BOB
A
A A A
A A
B
B B
B
B
B
C C C
CCC
Carla votes for A Carla votes for B Carla votes for C
A
N
N
A
N
N
2,0,1 2,0,1 2,0,1
2,0,1
2,0,1
2,0,1 2,0,1 2,0,1 2,0,1
0,1,2 0,1,2 0,1,2 0,1,2 0,1,2 0,1,2 0,1,2
0,1,2
0,1,21,2,0 1,2,0 1,2,0 1,2,0
1,2,0
1,2,0
1,2,0 1,2,0 1,2,0
 
There are 5 Nash equilibria: (A,A,A), (B,B,B), (C,C,C), (A,C,A) and (A,B,B). 
Exercise 1.21.  The game under consideration is as follows: 
Player 2
a 2 3 2 2 3 1
Player 1 b 2 0 3 1 1 0
c 1 4 2 0 0 4
D E F
 
There are 2 Nash equilibria: (a,D) and (b,E). 
Exercise 1.22.  (a) For every [0,1]e∈ , ( , ,..., )e e e  is a Nash equilibrium. The 
payoff of Player i is ( , ,..., ) 2i e e e eπ = ; if player i increases her effort to a > e (of 
course, this can only happen if e < 1), then her payoff decreases to 4e −  2a and 
if she decreases her effort to a < e (of course, this can only happen if e > 0), 
then her payoff decreases to 2a. 
There is no Nash equilibrium where two players choose different levels of 
effort. Proof: suppose there is an equilibrium 1 2( , ,..., )na a a  where i ja a≠  for 
two players i and j. Let min 1min{ ,..., }na a a=  and let k be a player such that 
minka a>  (such a player exists by our supposition). Then the payoff to player k  
is min4 2k ka aπ = −  and if she reduced her effort to mina  her payoff would 
increase to min2a . 
(b) Any symmetric equilibrium with e < 1 is Pareto inefficient, because all the 
players would be better off if they simultaneously switched to (1,1,…,1).  On 
the other hand, the symmetric equilibrium (1,1,…,1) is Pareto efficient.  
(c) The symmetric equilibrium ( )1 1 12 2 2, ,..., . 
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Exercise 1.23.  (a) The strategy sets are S1 = S2 = [0,∞). The payoff functions 
are as follows: 
1( , )
0
y if x y
x y
if y x
π
Π − ≥
= 
>
     and  2 ( , )
A L y if x y
x y
A if y x
π
− + ≥
= 
>
 
(b) Yes, for player 1 choosing x = Π is a weakly dominant strategy. Proof. 
Consider an arbitrary y. We must show that x = Π  gives at least a high a 
payoff against y as any other x. Three cases are possible. Case 1: y < Π. In 
this case x = Π or any other x such that x ≥ y yields π1 = Π − y > 0, while 
any x < y yields π1 = 0. Case 2: y = Π. In this case 1’s payoff is zero no 
matter what x he chooses. Case 3: y > Π. In this case x = Π or any other x 
such that x < y yields π1 = 0, while any x ≥ y yields π1 = Π − y < 0. 
(c) No, choosing y = L is not a dominant strategy for Player 2. For example, if 
x > L then choosing y = L yields π2 = A while choosing a y such that  
L < y ≤  x yields π2 = A − L + y > A. 
(d) Suppose that Π > L. If (x,y) is a Nash equilibrium with x ≥ y then it must 
be that y ≤ Π (otherwise Player 1 could increase its payoff by reducing x 
below y) and y ≥ L (otherwise Player 2 would be better off by increasing y 
above x). Thus it must be L ≤ y ≤ Π, which is possible, given our 
assumption. However, it cannot be that x > y, because Player 2 would be 
getting a higher payoff by increasing y to x. Thus it must be x ≤ y, which 
(together with our hypothesis that x ≥ y) implies that x = y. Thus the 
following are Nash equilibria: 
all the pairs (x,y) with L ≤ y ≤ Π and x = y. 
Now consider pairs (x,y) with x < y. Then it cannot be that y < Π, 
because Player 1 could increase its payoff by increasing x to y. Thus it must 
be y ≥ Π (hence, by our supposition that  Π > L,  y > L). Furthermore, it 
must be that x ≤ L (otherwise Player 2 could increase its profits by  reducing 
y to (or below) x.  Thus  
(x,y) with x < y  is a Nash equilibrium if and only if x ≤ L and y ≥ Π. 
(e) Suppose that Π < L. For the same reasons given above, an equilibrium 
with x ≥ y requires L ≤ y ≤ Π. However, this is not possible given that  
Π < L. Hence, 
there is no Nash equilibrium (x,y) with x ≥ y. 
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Thus we must restrict attention to pairs (x,y) with x < y. As explained 
above, it must be that y ≥ Π and x ≤ L.  Thus, 
(x,y) with x < y  is a Nash equilibrium if and only if Π ≤ y and  x ≤ L. 
  (f) Pareto efficiency requires that the chemical plant be shut down if Π < L 
and that it remain operational if Π > L. Now, when Π < L all the 
equilibria have x < y which leads to shut-down, hence a Pareto efficient 
outcome. When Π > L, there are two types of equilibria: one where x = y 
and the plant remains operational (a Pareto efficient outcome) and the other 
where x < y in which case the plant shuts down, yielding a Pareto 
inefficient outcome.  
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Dynamic games with 
perfect information  
2.1 Trees, frames and games 
ften interactions are not simultaneous but sequential. For example, in the 
game of Chess the two players, White and Black, take turns moving 
pieces on the board, having full knowledge of the opponent’s (and their 
own) past moves. Games with sequential interaction are called dynamic  games or 
games in extensive form. This chapter is devoted to the subclass of dynamic games 
characterized by perfect information, namely the property that, whenever it is her 
turn to move, a player knows all the preceding moves. Perfect-information games 
are represented by means of rooted directed trees.  
A rooted directed tree consists of a set of nodes and directed edges joining them. The 
root of the tree has no directed edges leading to it (has indegree 0), while every 
other node has exactly one directed edge leading to it (has indegree 1). There is a 
unique path (that is, a unique sequence of directed edges) leading from the root to 
any other node. A node that has no directed edges out of it (has outdegree 0) is 
called a terminal node, while every other node is called a decision node. We shall 
denote the set of nodes by X, the set of decision nodes by D and the set of terminal 
nodes by Z. Thus X D Z= ∪ .  
Definition 2.1. A finite extensive form (or frame) with perfect information consists of 
the following items. 
• A finite rooted directed tree. 
• A set of players {1,..., }I n=  and a function that assigns one player to every 
decision node. 
• A set of actions A and a function that assigns one action to every directed edge, 
satisfying the restriction that no two edges out of the same node are assigned the 
same action. 
• A set of outcomes O and a function that assigns an outcome to every terminal 
node. 
Chapter 
2 
O 
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Example 2.1. Amy (Player 1) and Beth (Player 2) have decided to dissolve a 
business partnership whose assets have been valued at $100,000. The charter of the 
partnership prescribes that the senior partner, Amy, make an offer concerning the 
division of the assets to the junior partner, Beth. The junior partner can Accept, in 
which case the proposed division is implemented, or Reject, in which case the case 
goes to litigation. Litigating involves a cost of $20,000 in legal fees for each partner 
and the typical verdict assigns 60% of the assets to the senior partner and the 
remaining 40% to the junior partner. Suppose, for simplicity, that there is no 
uncertainty about the verdict (how to model uncertainty will be discussed in a later 
chapter). Suppose also that there are only two possible offers that Amy can make: a 
50-50 split or a 70-30 split. This situation can be represented as a finite extensive 
form with perfect information as shown in Figure 2.1. Each outcome is represented 
as two sums of money: the top one is what Player 1 gets and the bottom one what 
Player 2 gets. 
o  
2 2
1
RejectAcceptRejectAccept
Offer
50-50
Offer
70-30
o  o  o  
1 2
$50,000
$50,000
$40,000
$20,000
$40,000
$20,000
43
$70,000
$30,000  
 
Figure 2.1 
A perfect-information extensive form representing  
the situation described in Example 2.1 
What should we expect the players to do in the above game? Consider the 
following reasoning, which is called backward induction reasoning, because it starts 
from the end of the game and proceeds backwards towards the root:  
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If Player 2 (the junior partner) is offered a 50-50 split then, if 
she accepts, she will get $50,000, while, if she rejects, she will 
get $20,000 (the court-assigned 40% minus legal fees in the 
amount of $20,000); thus, if rational, she will accept. Similarly, 
if Player 2 is offered a 70-30 split then, if she accepts, she will 
get $30,000, while, if she rejects, she will get $20,000 (the 
court-assigned 40% minus legal fees in the amount of $20,000); 
thus, if rational, she will accept. Anticipating all of this, Player 
1 realizes that, if she offers a 50-50 split then she will end up 
with $50,000, while if she offers a 70-30 split then she will end 
up with $70,000; thus, if Player 1 is rational and believes that 
Player 2 is rational, she will offer a 70-30 split and Player 2, 
being rational, will accept. 
The above reasoning suffers from the same flaws as the reasoning described in 
Chapter 1 (Section 1.1): it is not a valid argument because it is based on an 
implicit assumption about how Player 2 ranks the outcomes, which may or 
may not be correct. For example, Player 2 may feel that she worked as hard as 
her senior partner and the only fair division is a 50-50 split; indeed she may feel 
so strongly about this that  – if offered an unfair 70-30 split −  she would be 
willing to sacrifice $10,000 in order to “teach a lesson to Player 1”; in other 
words, she ranks outcome 4o  above outcome 3o .  
Using the terminology introduced in Chapter 1, we say that the situation 
represented in Figure 2.1 is not a game but a game-frame. In order to convert 
that frame into a game we need to add a ranking of the outcomes for each 
player. 
Definition 2.2. A  finite extensive game with perfect information is a finite 
extensive form with perfect information together with a ranking 
i  of the set 
of outcome O, for every player i I∈ .  
As usual, it is convenient to represent the ranking of Player i by means of an 
ordinal utility function :iU O → R . For example, take the extensive form of 
Figure 2.1 and assume that Player 1 is selfish and greedy, that is, her ranking is: 
3
1
2 4
best
worst ,
o
o
o o
        (or, in the alternative notation, 1 13 2 11 4o o o o≻ ≻ ∼ ), 
while Player 2 is concerned with fairness and her ranking is: 
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1
2 4
3
best
,
worst
o
o o
o
          (or, in the alternative notation, 2 21 4 22 3o o o o≻ ∼ ≻ ). 
Then we can represent the players’ preferences using the following utility 
functions:  
31
2
1
2 4
 
 2 1 3
 3 2 1
   
2
   
1
 
U
o
U
oo o→
↓
(Player
outcome
(
utility function
Player 2)
 1)  
and replace each outcome in Figure 2.1 with a pair of utilities or payoffs, as 
shown in Figure 2.2, thereby obtaining one of the many possible games based 
on the frame of Figure 2.1. 
2 2
1
RejectAcceptRejectAccept
Offer
50-50
Offer
70-30
2
3
1
2
1
2
3
1  
 
Figure 2.2 
A perfect-information game based on the extensive form of Figure 2.1. 
Now that we do have a game, rather than just a game-frame, we can indeed 
apply the backward-induction reasoning and conclude that Player 1 will offer a 
50-50 split, anticipating that Player 2 would reject the offer of a 70-30 split, and 
Player 2 will accept Player 1’s 50-50 offer. The choices selected by the 
backward-induction reasoning have been highlighted in Figure 2.2 by doubling 
the corresponding edges.  
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 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced in 
this section, by going through the exercises in Section 2.E.1 of Appendix 2.E at the 
end of this chapter. 
 
2.2 Backward induction 
The backward-induction reasoning mentioned above can be formalized as an 
algorithm for solving any perfect-information game, as follows. We say that a 
node is marked if a payoff or utility vector is associated with it. Initially all 
and only the terminal nodes are marked; the following procedure provides a 
way of marking all the nodes. 
Definition 2.3.  The backward-induction algorithm is the following procedure 
for solving a finite perfect-information game. 
1. Select a decision node x whose immediate successors are all marked. Let i be 
the player who moves at x. Select a choice that leads to an immediate 
successor of x with the highest payoff or utility for Player i (highest among 
the utilities associated with the immediate successors of x). Mark x with the 
payoff vector associated with the node following the selected choice. 
2. Repeat the above step until all the nodes have been marked. 
Note that, since the game is finite, the above procedure is well defined. In the 
initial steps one starts at those decision nodes that are followed only by 
terminal nodes, call them penultimate nodes. After all the penultimate nodes 
have been marked, there will be unmarked nodes whose immediate successors 
are all marked and thus the step can be repeated.  
Note also that, in general, at a decision node there may be several choices that 
maximize the payoff of the player who moves at that node. If that is the case 
then the procedure requires that one such choice be selected. This arbitrary 
choice may lead to the existence of several backward-induction  solutions. For 
example, consider the game of Figure 2.3.  
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2 2
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1 0 1
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0 2 0
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Player 3's payoff
Player 2's payoff
Player 1's payoff
 
Figure 2.3 
A perfect-information game with multiple backward-induction solutions. 
In this game, starting at node x of Player 2 we select choice c  (since it gives 
Player 2 a higher payoff than d). Then we move on to Player 3’s node and we 
find that both choices there are payoff maximizing for Player 3; thus there are 
two ways to proceed. In Figure 2.4 we show the steps of the backward-
induction algorithm with the selection of choice g, while Figure 2.5 shows the 
steps of the algorithm with the selection of choice h. As before, the selected 
choices are shown by double edges. In Figures 2.4 and 2.5 the marking of nodes 
is shown explicitly, but later on we will represent the backward-induction 
solution more succinctly by merely highlighting the selected choices. 
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Figure 2.4 
One possible output of the backward-induction  
algorithm to the game of Figure 2.3. 
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Figure 2.5 
Another possible output of the backward-induction  
algorithm to the game of Figure 2.3 
How should one define the output of the backward-induction algorithm and 
the notion of backward-induction solution? What kind of objects are they? 
Before we answer this question we need to introduce the notion of strategy in a 
perfect-information game. 
 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced in 
this section, by going through the exercises in Section 2.E.2 of Appendix 2.E at the 
end of this chapter. 
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2.3 Strategies in perfect-information games 
A strategy for a player in a perfect-information game is a complete, contingent 
plan on how to play the game. Consider, for example, the following game - 
which reproduces Figure 2.3 - and let us focus on Player 2.  
b
yx
1
3
a
g h
2 2
c d e f
0 32
1 0
1 0 1
02
0 2 0
11
Player 3's payoff
Player 2's payoff
Player 1's payoff
 
Before the game is played, Player 2 does not know what Player 1 will do and 
thus a complete plan needs to specify what she will do if Player 1 decides to 
play a and what she will do if Player 1 decides to play b. A possible plan, or 
strategy, is “if Player 1 chooses a then I will choose c and if Player 1 chooses b then I 
will choose e ”, which we can denote more succinctly as (c , e ). The other possible 
plans, or strategies, for Player 2 are (c , f ), (d , e ) and (d , f ). The formal definition of 
strategy is as follows. 
Definition 2.4.  A  strategy for a player in a perfect-information game is a list of 
choices, one for each decision node of that player.  
For example, suppose that Player 1 has three decision nodes in a given game: at one 
node she has three possible choices, 1 2,a a  and 3a , at another node she has two 
possible choices,  1b  and 2b , and at the third node she has four possible choices, 
1 2 3, , cc c  and 4c . Then a strategy for Player 1 in that game can be thought of as a 
way of filling in three blanks: 
1 2 3 1 2 1 2 3 4one of , , one of , one of , , ,
_______ , _______ , _______
a a a b b c c c c
 
 
 
 
  
. Since there are 3 
choices for the first blank, 2 for the second and 4 for the third, the total number of 
possible strategies for Player 1 in this case would be 3 2 4 24× × = . One strategy is 
( )2 1 1, ,a b c , another strategy is  ( )1 2 4, ,a b c , etc.  
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It should be noted that the notion of strategy involves redundancies. To see this, 
consider the game of Figure 2.6 below. In this game a possible strategy for Player 1 
is (a,g), which means that Player 1 is planning to choose a at the root of the tree and 
would choose g at her other node. But if Player 1 indeed chooses a, then her other 
node will not be reached and thus why should Player 1 make a plan on what to do 
there? One could justify this redundancy in the notion of strategy in a number of 
ways:  (1) Player 1 is so cautious that she wants her plan to cover also the possibility 
that she might make mistakes in the implementation of parts of her plan (in this 
case, she allows for the possibility that −  despite her intention to play a − she might 
end up playing b) or (2) we can think of a strategy as a set of instructions given to a 
third party on how to play the game on Player 1’s behalf, in which case Player 1 
might indeed be worried about the possibility of mistakes in the implementation 
and thus want to cover all contingencies, etc. An alternative justification relies on a 
different interpretation of the notion of strategy: not as a plan of Player 1 but as a 
belief in the mind of Player 2 concerning what Player 1 would do. For the moment 
we will set this issue aside and simply use the notion of strategy as given in 
Definition 2.4. 
b
yx
1
a
g h
c d e f
0 32
1 1
1 0 1
02
1
2 2
 
Figure 2.6 
A perfect-information game. 
Using Definition 2.4, one can associate with every perfect-information game a 
strategic-form (or normal-form) game: a strategy profile determines a unique 
terminal node that is reached if the players act according to that strategy profile and 
thus a unique vector of payoffs. Figure 2.7 shows the strategic-form associated with 
the perfect-information game of Figure 2.6, with the Nash equilibria highlighted.  
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ag 2 1 2 1 0 0 0 0
ah 2 1 2 1 0 0 0 0
bg 3 1 1 2 3 1 1 2
bh 3 1 1 0 3 1 1 0
de df
Player  2
Player 1
ce cf
 
Figure 2.7 
The strategic form of the perfect-information game of Figure 2.6 
with the Nash equilibria highlighted. 
Because of the redundancy discussed above, the strategic form also displays 
redundancies: in this case the top two rows are identical. 
Armed with the notion of strategy, we can now revisit the notion of backward-
induction solution. Figure 2.8 shows the two backward-induction solutions of the 
game of Figure 2.6. 
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(a) 
b
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(b) 
 
Figure 2.8 
The backward-induction solutions of the game of Figure 2.6. 
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It is clear from the definition of the backward-induction algorithm (Definition 2.3) 
that the procedure selects a choice at every decision node and thus yields a strategy 
profile for the entire game: the backward-induction solution shown in Panel a of 
Figure 2.8 is the strategy profile ( )( , ), ( , )a g c f , while the backward-induction 
solution shown in Panel b is the strategy profile ( )( , ), ( , )b h c e . Both of them are 
Nash equilibria of the strategic form, but not all the Nash equilibria correspond to 
backward -induction solutions. The relationship between the two concepts will be 
explained in the following section. 
Remark 2.1.  A backward-induction solution is a strategy profile. Since 
strategies contain a description of what a player actually does and also of what 
the player would do in circumstances that do not arise, one often draws a 
distinction between the backward-induction solution and the backward-
induction outcome which is defined as the sequence of actual moves. For 
example, the backward-induction outcome associated with the solution 
( )( , ), ( , )a g c f  is the play ac with corresponding payoff (2,1), while the 
backward-induction outcome associated with the solution ( )( , ), ( , )b h c e  is the 
play be with corresponding payoff (3,1). 
 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced in 
this section, by going through the exercises in Section 2.E.3 of Appendix 2.E at the 
end of this chapter. 
 
2.4 Relationship between backward 
induction and other solutions 
If you have gone through the exercises for the previous three sections, you will 
have seen that in all those games the backward-induction solutions are also 
Nash equilibria. This is always true, as stated in the following theorem. 
Theorem 2.1.  Every backward-induction solution of a perfect-information 
game is a Nash equilibrium of the associated strategic form.  
In some games the set of backward-induction solutions coincides with the set of 
Nash equilibria (see, for example, Exercise 2.9), but typically the set of Nash 
equilibria is larger than (is a proper superset of) the set of backward-induction 
solutions (as shown for the game of Figure 2.6, which has two backward-induction 
solutions, shown in Figure 2.8, but five Nash equilibria, shown in Figure 2.7). Nash 
equilibria that are not backward-induction solutions often involve incredible threats. 
To see this, consider the following game. An industry is currently a monopoly and 
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the incumbent monopolist is currently making a profit of $5 million. A potential 
entrant is considering whether or not to enter this industry. If she does not enter, 
she will make $1 million in an alternative investment; if she does enter, then the 
incumbent can either fight entry with a price war whose outcome is that both firms 
make zero profits, or it can accommodate entry, by sharing the market with the 
entrant, in which case both firms make a profit of $2 million. This situation is 
illustrated in Figure 2.9  with the associated strategic form. Note that we are 
assuming that each player is selfish and greedy, that is, cares only about its own 
profit and prefers more money to less. 
in
out fight
1 0
2
2
05
accommodate
Incumbent
Potential
entrant
 
fight accommodate
In 0 , 0 2 , 2
Out 1 , 5 1 , 5
Potential
entrant
Chain store
 
Figure 2.9 
The entry game. 
The backward-induction solution is (in, accommodate) and it is also a Nash 
equilibrium. However, there is another Nash equilibrium, namely (out, fight). The 
latter should be discarded as a “rational solution” because it involves an incredible 
threat on the part of the incumbent, namely that it will fight entry if the potential 
entrant enters. It is true that, if the potential entrant believes the incumbent’s threat, 
then she is better off staying out; however, she should ignore the incumbent’s 
threat because she should realize that −  when faced with the fait accompli of entry 
− the incumbent would not want to carry out the threat. 
Reinhard Selten (who shared the 1994 Nobel prize in economics with two other 
game theorists, John Harsanyi and John Nash) discussed a repeated version of the 
above entry game, which has become known as Selten’s Chain Store Game. The 
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story is as follows. A chain store is a monopolist in an industry. It owns stores in m 
different towns (m ≥ 2). In each town the chain store makes $5 million if left to 
enjoy its privileged position undisturbed. In each town there is a businesswoman 
who could enter the industry in that town, but earns $1 million if she chooses not 
to enter; if she decides to enter, then the monopolist can either fight the entrant, 
leading to zero profits for both the chain store and the entrant in that town, or it 
can accommodate entry and share the market with the entrant, in which case both 
players make $2 million in that town. Thus, in each town the interaction between 
the incumbent monopolist and the potential entrant is as illustrated in Figure 2.9 
above. However, decisions are made sequentially, as follows. At date t (t = 1, ..., m) 
the businesswoman in town t decides whether or not to enter and if she enters then 
the chain store decides whether or not to fight in that town. What happens in town 
t at date t becomes known to everybody. Thus, for example, the businesswoman in 
town 2 at date 2 knows what happened in town 1 at date 1 (either that there was no 
entry or that entry was met with a fight or that entry was accommodated). 
Intuition suggests that in this game the threat by the incumbent to fight early 
entrants might be credible, for the following reason. The incumbent could tell 
Businesswoman 1 the following: 
“It is true that, if you enter and I fight, I will make zero 
profits, while by accommodating your entry I would make $2 
million and thus it would seem that it cannot be in my 
interest to fight you. However, somebody else is watching us, 
namely Businesswoman 2. If she sees that I have fought your 
entry then she might fear that I would do the same with her 
and decide to stay out, in which case in town 2  I would make 
$5 million, so that my total profits in towns 1 and 2 would be 
$(0+5) = $5 million. On the other hand, if I accommodate 
your entry, then she will be encouraged to entry herself and I 
will make $2 million in each town, for a total profit of $4 
million. Hence − as you can see − it is indeed in my interest to 
fight you and thus you should stay out.” 
Does the notion of backward induction capture this intuition? To check this, let us 
consider the case where m = 2, so that the extensive game is not too large to draw. 
It is shown in Figure 2.10, where at each terminal node the top number is the profit 
of the incumbent monopolist (it is the sum of the profits in the two towns), the 
middle number is the profit of Businesswoman 1 and the bottom number is the 
profit of Businesswoman 2. All profits are expressed in millions of dollars. We 
assume that all the players are selfish and greedy, so that we can take the profit of 
each player to be that player’s payoff.  
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The backward-induction solution is unique and is shown by the thick directed 
edges in Figure 2.10. The corresponding outcome is that both businesswomen will 
enter and the incumbent monopolist accommodates entry in both towns. 
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in out
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Figure 2.10 
Selten’s Chain-Store game. 
Thus the backward-induction solution does not capture the “reputation” argument 
outlined above. However, the backward-induction solution does seem to capture 
the notion of rational behavior in this game. Indeed, Businesswoman 1 should reply 
to the incumbent with the following counter-argument: 
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“Your reasoning is not valid. Whatever happens in town 1, it 
will be common knowledge between you and Businesswoman 
2 that your interaction in town 2 will be the last; in particular, 
nobody else will be watching and thus there won’t be an issue 
of establishing a reputation in the eyes of another player. 
Hence in town 2 it will be in your interest to accommodate 
entry, since −  in essence − you will be playing the one-shot 
entry game of Figure 2.9. Hence a rational Businesswoman 2 
will decide to enter in town 2 whatever happened in town 1: 
what you do against me will have no influence on her decision. 
Thus your “reputation” argument does not apply and it will in 
fact be in your interest not to fight my entry: your choice will 
be between a profit of $(0+2) = $2 million, if you fight me, 
and a profit of $(2+2) = $4 million, if you don’t fight me. 
Hence I will enter and you will not fight me.” 
In order to capture the reputation argument described above we need to allow for 
some uncertainty in the mind of some of the players, as we will show in a later 
chapter. In a perfect-information game uncertainty is ruled out by definition. 
By Theorem 2.1 the notion of backward induction can be seen as a refinement of 
the notion of Nash equilibrium. Another solution concept that is related to 
backward induction is the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. 
Indeed the backward-induction algorithm could be viewed as a step-wise procedure 
that eliminates dominated choices at decision nodes, and thus strategies that contain 
those choices. What is the relationship between the two notions? In general this is 
all that can be said: applying the iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies to 
the strategic form associated with a perfect-information game leads to a set of 
strategy profiles that contains at least one backward-induction solution; however, 
(1) it may also contain strategy profiles that are not backward-induction solutions 
and (2) it may fail to contain all the backward-induction solutions, as shown in 
Exercise 2.8.  
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2.5 Perfect-information games with two players  
We conclude this chapter with a discussion of finite two-player extensive games 
with perfect information.  
We will start with games that have only to outcomes, namely “Player 1 wins” 
(denoted by 1W ) and “Player 2 wins” (denoted by 2W ). We assume that Player 1 
strictly prefers 1W  to 2W  and Player 2 strictly prefers 2W  to 1W . Thus we can 
use utility functions with values 0 and 1 and associate with each terminal node 
either the payoff vector (1,0) (if the outcome is 1W ) or the payoff vector (0,1) (if 
the outcome is 2W ). We call these games win-lose games. An example of such a 
game is the following.  
Example 2.2.  Two players take turns choosing a number from the set 
{1,2,…,10}, with Player 1 moving first. The first player who brings the sum of 
all the chosen numbers to 100 or more wins.  
The following is one possible play of the game (the red numbers are the ones 
chosen by Player 1 and the blue numbers the ones chosen by Player 2): 
10,  9,  9,  10,  8,  7,  10,  10,  1,  8,  1,  7,  6,  4 
In this play Player 2 wins: at her last move the sum is 96 and with her choice of 4 
she brings the total to 100. However, in this game Player 1 has a winning strategy, 
that is, a strategy that guarantees that he will win, no matter what numbers Player 2 
chooses. To see this, we can use backward-induction reasoning. Drawing the tree is 
not a practical option, since the number of nodes is very large: one needs 10,000 
nodes just to represent the first 4 moves! But we can imagine drawing the tree, 
placing ourselves towards the end of the tree and ask what partial sum represents a 
“losing position”, in the sense that whoever is choosing in that position cannot win, 
while the other player can then win with his subsequent choice. With some 
thought one can see that 89 is the largest losing position: whoever moves there can 
take the sum to any number in the set {90, 91, …, 99}, thus coming short of 100, 
while the other player can then take the sum to 100  with an appropriate choice. 
What is the largest losing position that precedes 89? The answer is 78: whoever 
moves at 78 must take the sum to a number in the set {79, 80, …, 88} and then from 
there the other player can make sure to take the sum to 89 and then we know what 
happens from there! Repeating this reasoning we see that the losing positions are: 
89, 78, 67, 56, 45, 34, 23, 12, 1. Since Player 1 moves first he can choose 1 and put 
Player 2 in the first losing position; then − whatever Player 2 chooses − Player 1 can 
put her in the next losing position, namely 12, etc. Recall that a strategy for Player 1 
must specify what to do in every possible situation in which he might find himself. 
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In his game Player 1’s winning strategy is as follows: 
Start with the number 1. Then, at every turn, choose 
the number (11 − n), where n is the number that was 
chosen by Player 2 in the immediately preceding turn. 
Here is an example of a possible play of the game where Player 1 employs the 
winning strategy and does in fact win: 
1,  9,  2,  6,  5,  7,  4,  10,  1,  8,  3,  3,  8,  9,  2,  5,  6,  1,  10. 
We can now state a general result about this class of games. 
Theorem 2.2.  In every finite two-player, win-lose game with perfect 
information one of the two players has a winning strategy.  
Although we will not give a detailed proof, the argument of the proof is rather 
simple. By applying the backward-induction algorithm we assign to every decision 
node either the payoff vector (1,0) or the payoff vector (0,1). Imagine applying the 
algorithm up to the point where the immediate successors of the root have been 
assigned a payoff vector. Two cases are possible.  
Case 1: at least one of the immediate successors of the root has been assigned the 
payoff vector (1,0). In this case Player 1 is the one who has a winning strategy and 
his initial choice should be such that a node with payoff vector (1,0) is reached and 
then his future choices should also be such that only nodes with payoff vector (1,0)  
are reached.  
Case 2: all the immediate successors of the root have been assigned the payoff 
vector (0,1). In this case it is Player 2 who has a winning strategy. An example of a 
game where it is Player 2 who has a winning strategy is given in Exercise 2.11. 
We now turn to finite two-player games where there are three possible outcomes: 
“Player 1 wins” ( 1W ), “Player 2 wins” ( 2W ) and  “Draw” (D). We assume that the 
rankings of the outcomes are as follows: 1 1 1 2W D W≻ ≻  and 2 2 2 1W D W≻ ≻ . 
Examples of such games are Tic-Tac-Toe (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tic-tac-
toe), Draughts or Checkers (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Draughts) and Chess 
(although there does not seem to be agreement as to whether the rules of Chess 
guarantee that every possible play of the game is finite). What can we say about 
such games? The answer is provided by the following theorem. 
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Theorem 2.3.  Every finite two-player, perfect-information game with three 
outcomes: Player 1 wins ( 1W ), Player 2 wins ( 2W ) and Draw (D) falls within 
one of the following three categories: 
(1) Player 1 has a strategy that guarantees outcome 1W . 
(2) Player 2 has a strategy that guarantees outcome 2W . 
(3) Player 1 has a strategy that guarantees that the outcome will be 1W  or D and 
Player 2 has a strategy that guarantees that the outcome will be 2W  or D, so 
that, if both players employ these strategies, the outcome will be D.  
The logic of the proof is as follows. By applying the backward-induction algorithm 
we assign to every decision node either the payoff vector (2,0) (corresponding to 
outcome 1W ) or the payoff vector (0,2) (corresponding to outcome 2W )  or the 
payoff vector (1,1) (corresponding to outcome D).  Imagine applying the algorithm 
up to the point where the immediate successors of the root have been assigned a 
payoff vector. Three cases are possible.  
Case 1: at least one of the immediate successors of the root has been assigned the 
payoff vector (2,0); in this case Player 1 is the one who has a winning strategy.   
Case 2: all the immediate successors of the root have been assigned the payoff 
vector (0,2);  in this case it is Player 2 who has a winning strategy.  
Case 3:  there is at least one immediate successor of the root to which the payoff 
vector  (1,1)  has been assigned and all the other immediate successors of the root 
have been assigned either (1,1) or (0,2). In this case we fall within the third category 
of Theorem 2.10.  
Both Tic-Tac-Toe and Draughts fall within the third category 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solved_game#Solved_games). As of 2015 it is not 
known to which category the game of Chess belongs. 
 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced in 
this section, by going through the exercises in Section 2.E.5 of Appendix 2.E at the 
end of this chapter. 
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Appendix 2.E: Exercises 
2.E.1. Exercises for Section 2.1: trees, frames and games 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this chapter. 
Exercise 2. 1. How could they do that! They abducted Speedy, your favorite 
tortoise! They asked for $1,000 in unmarked bills and threatened to kill Speedy 
if you don’t pay. Call the tortoise-napper Mr. T.  Let the possible outcomes be 
as follows:  
1
2
3
4
:
:
:
:
o
o
o
o
you don't pay and speedy is released
you pay $1,000 and speedy is released
you don't pay and speedy is killed
you pay $1,000 and speedy is killed
  
You are attached to Speedy and would be willing to pay $1,000 to get it back. 
However, you also like your money and you prefer not to pay, conditional on 
the two separate events “Speedy is released” and “Speedy is killed”. Thus your 
ranking of the outcomes is  1 2 3 4you you youo o o o≻ ≻ ≻ .  On the other hand, you 
are not quite sure of what Mr. T’s ranking is. 
(a)  Suppose first that Mr T has communicated that he wants you to go to 
Central Park tomorrow at 10:00am and leave the money in a garbage can; 
he also said that, two miles to the East and at the exact same time, he will 
decide whether or not to free Speedy in front of the police station and then 
go and collect his money in Central Park. What should you do? 
(b)  Suppose that Mr T is not as dumb as in part (a) and he instead gives you the 
following instructions: first you leave the money in a garbage can in Central 
Park and then he will go there to collect the money. He also told you that if 
you left the money there then he will free Speedy, otherwise he will kill it. 
Draw an extensive form or frame to represent this situation. 
(c)  Now we want to construct a game based on the extensive form of part (b). 
For this we need Mr T’s preferences. There are two types of criminals in 
Mr T’s line of work: the professionals and the one-timers. Professionals are 
in the business for the long term and thus worry about reputation; they 
want it to be known that (1) every time they were paid they honored their 
promise to free the hostage  and (2) their threats are to be taken seriously, in 
the sense that every time they were not paid, the hostage was killed. The 
one-timers hit once and then they disappear; they don’t try to establish a 
reputation and the only thing they worry about, besides money, is not to 
be caught: whether or not they get paid, they prefer to kill the hostage in 
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order to eliminate any kind of evidence (DNA traces, fingerprints, etc.). 
Construct two games based on the extensive form of part (b) representing 
the two possible types of Mr T. 
Exercise 2.2. A three-man board, composed of A, B, and C, has held hearings 
on a personnel case involving an officer of the company.  This officer was 
scheduled for promotion but, prior to final action on his promotion, he made a 
decision that cost the company a good deal of money.  The question is whether 
he should be (1) promoted anyway, (2) denied the promotion, or (3) fired. The 
board has discussed the matter at length and is unable to reach unanimous 
agreement.  In the course of the discussion it has become clear to all three of 
them that their separate opinions are as follows: 
• A considers the officer to have been a victim of bad luck, not bad judgment, 
and wants to go ahead and promote him but, failing that, would keep him 
rather than fire him. 
• B considers the mistake serious enough to bar promotion altogether; he’d 
prefer to keep the officer, denying promotion, but would rather fire than 
promote him. 
• C thinks the man ought to be fired but, in terms of personnel policy and 
morale, believes the man ought not to be kept unless he is promoted, i.e., 
that keeping an officer who has been declared unfit for promotion is even 
worse than promoting him.  
To recapitulate, their preferences among the three outcomes are 
 PROMOTE KEEP FIRE 
A: best middle worst 
B: worst  best middle 
C: middle worst best 
Assume that everyone’s preferences among the three outcomes are fully evident 
as a result of discussion. The three must proceed to a vote.   
Consider the following voting procedure.  First A proposes an action (either 
promote or keep or fire). Then it is B’s turn. If B accepts A’s proposal, then this 
becomes the final decision. If B disagrees with A’a proposal, then C makes the 
final decision (which may be any of the three: promote, keep of fire). Represent 
this situation as an extensive game with perfect information. 
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2.E.2 .  Exercises  for  Section 2 .2 :  backward induction. 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this chapter. 
Exercise 2.3. Apply the backward-induction algorithm to the two games of 
Exercise 2.1 Part c.  
Exercise 2.4. Apply the backward-induction algorithm to the game of Exercise 2.2. 
2.E.3 .  Exercises  for  Section 2 .3 :   
         s trategies  in  perfect - information games.  
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this chapter. 
Exercise 2.5. Write the strategic form of the game of Figure 2.2, find all the 
Nash equilibria and verify that the backward-induction solution is a Nash 
equilibrium. 
Exercise 2.6. Write the strategic form of the game of Figure 2.3, find all the 
Nash equilibria and verify that the backward-induction solutions are Nash 
equilibria. 
Exercise 2.7. (a) Write down all the strategies of Player B in the game of Exercise 
2.2.  
(b) How many strategies does Player C have? 
Exercise 2.8. Consider the following perfect-information game: 
1
2 2
1
L R
EW
a b c d e
2
1
2
0
3
2
1
2
0
3
4
0
 
(a) Find the backward-induction solutions.  
(b) Write down all the strategies of Player 1. 
(c) Write down all the strategies of Player 2. 
(d) Write the strategic form  associated with this game. 
(e) Does Player 1 have a dominant strategy? 
(f) Does Player 2 have a dominant strategy? 
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(g) Is there a dominant-strategy equilibrium? 
(h) Does Player 1 have any dominated strategies? 
(i) Does Player 2 have any dominated strategies? 
(j) What do you get when you apply the iterative elimination of weakly 
dominated strategies? 
(k) What are the Nash equilibria? 
Exercise 2.9. Consider an industry where there are two firms, a large firm, 
Firm 1, and a small firm, Firm 2. The two firms produce identical products. Let 
x be the output of Firm 1 and y the output of Firm 2. Industry output is 
Q x y= + . The price P at which each unit of output can be sold is determined 
by the inverse demand function  130 10P Q= − . For example, if Firm 1 
produces 4 units and Firm 2 produces 2 units, then industry output is 6 and 
each unit is sold for P = 130− 60 = $70. For each firm the cost of producing q 
units of output is ( ) 10 62.5C q q= + . Each firm is only interested in its own 
profits. The profit of Firm 1 depends on both x and y and is given by 
[ ]1
cosrevenue
( , ) 130 10( ) (10 62.5)
t
x y x x y xΠ = − + − +

 and similarly the profit function of 
Firm 2 is given by [ ]2
cosrevenue
( , ) 130 10( ) (10 62.5)
t
x y y x y yΠ = − + − +

. The two firms 
play the following sequential game. First Firm 1 chooses its own output x and 
commits to it; then Firm 2, after having observed Firm 1’s output, chooses its 
own output y;  then the price is determined according to the demand function 
and the two firms collect their own profits. In what follows assume, for 
simplicity, that x can only be 6 or 6.5 units and y can only be 2.5 or 3 units. 
(a)  Represent this situation as an extensive game with perfect information. 
(b)  Solve the game using backward induction. 
(c)  Write the strategic form associated with the perfect-information game. 
(d)  Find the Nash equilibria of this game and verify that the backward-
induction solutions are Nash equilibria. 
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Exercise 2.10. Consider the following perfect-information game where x is an 
integer. 
C
A B
D E F
1
2 2
Player 1's payoff   2
Player 2's payoff   5
1
0
1
0
x
2
 
(a) For every value of x find the backward induction solution(s). 
(b) Write the corresponding strategic-form and find all the Nash equilibria. 
2.E.5 .  Exercises  for  Section 2 .5 :  two-player  games.  
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this chapter. 
Exercise 2.11. Consider the following perfect-information game. Player 1 starts 
by choosing a number from the set {1,2,3,4,5,6,7}, then Player 2 chooses a 
number from this set, then Player 1 again, followed by Player 2, etc. The first 
player who brings the cumulative sum of all the numbers chosen (up to and 
including the last one) to 48 or more wins. By Theorem 2.9 one of the two 
players has a winning strategy. Find out who that player is and fully describe 
the winning strategy. 
Exercise 2.12. Consider the following two-player, perfect-information game. A 
coin is placed in the cell marked ‘START’ (cell A1). Player 1 moves first and 
can move the coin one cell up (to A2) or one cell to the left (to B1) or one cell 
diagonally in the left-up direction (to B2). Then Player 2 moves, according to 
the same rules (e.g. if the coin is in cell B2 then the admissible moves are shown 
by the directed edges). The players alternate moving the coin. Black cells are 
not accessible (so that, for example, from A3 the coin can only be moved to A4 
or B3 and from F3 it can only be moved to G4, as shown by the directed edge). 
The player who manages to place the coin in the cell marked ‘END’ wins.  
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(a) Represent this game by means of an extensive form with perfect 
information by drawing the initial part of the tree that covers the first 
two moves (the first move of Player 1 and the first move of Player 2). 
(b) Suppose that the coin is currently in cell G4 and it is Player 1’s turn to 
move. Show that Player 1 has a strategy that allows her to win the game 
starting from cell G4. Describe the strategy in detail.  
(c) Describe a play of the game (from cell A1) where Player 1 wins 
(describe it by means of the sequence of cells visited by the coin). 
(d) Describe a play of the game (from cell A1) where Player 2 wins 
(describe it by means of the sequence of cells visited by the coin). 
(e) Now go back to the beginning of the game. The coin is in cell A1 and 
player 1 has the first move. By Theorem 2.9 one of the two players has 
a winning strategy. Find out who that player is and fully describe the 
winning strategy. 
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◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊ 
Exercise 2.13: Challenging Question.  Two women, Anna and Bess, claim to 
be the legal owners of a diamond ring that – each claims – has great sentimental 
value. Neither of them can produce evidence of ownership and nobody else is 
staking a claim on the ring. Judge Sabio wants the ring to go to the legal owner, 
but he does not know which of the two women is in fact the legal owner.  He 
decides to proceed as follows. First he announces a fine of $F > 0 and then asks 
Anna and Bess to play the following game. 
Move 1:  Anna moves first. Either she gives up her claim to the ring (in which 
case Bess gets the ring, the game ends and nobody pays the fine) or she asserts 
her claim, in which case the game proceeds to Move 2. 
Move 2: Bess either accepts Anna’s claim (in which case Anna gets the ring, the 
game ends and nobody pays the fine) or challenges her claim. In the latter case, 
Bess must put in a bid, call it B, and Anna must pay the fine of $F to Sabio. The 
game goes on to Move 3. 
Move 3: Anna now either matches Bess’s bid (in which case Anna gets the ring, 
Anna pays $B to Sabio  −  in addition to the fine that she already paid −  and 
Bess pays the fine of $F to Sabio) or chooses not to match (in which case Bess 
gets the ring and pays her bid of $B to Sabio and, furthermore, Sabio keeps the 
fine that Anna already paid). 
Denote by CA the monetary equivalent of getting the ring for Anna (that is, 
getting the ring is as good, in Anna’s mind, as getting $CA) and CB the 
monetary equivalent of getting the ring for Bess.  Not getting the ring is 
considered by both as good as getting zero dollars. 
(a) Draw an extensive game with perfect information to represent the above 
situation, assuming that there are only two possible bids: B1 and B2. Write 
the payoffs to Anna and Bess next to each terminal node. 
(b) Find the backward-induction solution of the game you drew in part (a) for 
the case where   B1 > CA > CB > B2 > F > 0. 
Now consider the general case where the bid B can be any non-negative 
number and assume that both Anna and Bess are very wealthy. Assume also 
that CA, CB and F are positive numbers and that CA and CB are common 
knowledge between Anna and Bess . We want to show that, at the backward-
induction solution of the game, the ring always goes to the legal owner. Since 
we (like Sabio) don’t know who the legal owner is, we must consider two cases. 
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Case 1: the legal owner is Anna. Let us assume that this implies that CA > CB.  
Case 2: the legal owner is Bess. Let us assume that this implies that CB > CA.  
(c) Find the backward-induction solution for Case 1 and show that it implies 
that the ring goes to Anna. 
(d) Find the backward-induction solution for Case 2 and show that it implies 
that the ring goes to Bess. 
(e) How much money does Sabio make in equilibrium? How much money do 
Ann and Bess end up paying in equilibrium? (By ‘equilibrium’ we mean 
‘backward induction solution’.)  
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Appendix 2.S: Solutions to exercises  
Exercise 2.1.  (a) For you it is a strictly dominant strategy to not pay and thus 
you should not pay. 
(b) The extensive form is as follows: 
releasekill
Mr T Mr T
not
pay
pay
release kill
You
1o 2o3o 4o  
(c) For the professional, concern with reputation implies that 2 4MrTo o≻  and 
3 1MrTo o≻ . If we add the reasonable assumption that −  after all −  money is 
what they are after, then we can take the full ranking to be 
2 4 3 1MrT MrT MrTo o o o≻ ≻ ≻ . Representing preferences with ordinal utility 
functions with values in the set {1,2,3,4}, we have 
31 2 4
         
4 3 
1 4 2
1
3
2
MrT
you
U
oo o o
U
→
↓
outcome
utility function
 
The corresponding game is as follows: 
releasekill
Mr T Mr T
not
pay
pay
release kill
You
21 4 3
4 2 3 1
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For the one-timer, the ranking can be taken to be (although this is not the only 
possibility) 4 2 3 1MrT MrT MrTo o o o≻ ≻ ≻ , with corresponding utility representation: 
31 2 4
         
4 3 
1 3 2
1
4
2
MrT
you
U
oo o o
U
→
↓
outcome
utility function
 
and extensive game: 
kill
Mr T Mr T
not
pay
pay
release release kill
You
21 3 4
4 2 3 1
 
Exercise 2.2.   
The game is as follows (“P” stands for promote, “K” for keep (without 
promoting), “F” for fire): 
P P
F F F
A
B
B
B
C C C
P
K
F
accept
ac
ce
pt
reject reject reject
accept
 F
P K F P K F P K F
KK
PK
P3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
K
2
3
1
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Exercise 2.3.  The application of the backward-induction algorithm is shown 
by double edges in the following games, the first refers to the professional Mr. 
T and the second to the one-timer.  
releasekill
Mr T Mr T
not
pay
pay
release kill
You
21 4 3
4 2 3 1
 
releasekill
Mr T Mr T
not
pay
pay
release kill
You
21 3 4
4 2 3 1
 
Thus, against a professional you would pay and against a one-timer you would 
not pay. With the professional you would get Speedy back, with the one-timer 
you will hold a memorial service for Speedy. 
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Exercise 2.4.  The backward-induction algorithm yields two solutions, shown 
below. The difference between the two solutions lies in what Player B would 
do if Player A proposed F. In both solutions the officer is kept without 
promotion. 
PP
F F F
A
B
B
B
C C C
P F
accept
ac
ce
pt
reject reject reject
accept
KK
PK
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
3
1
2
1
2
3
2
3
1
K
 
reject
PP
F F F
A
B
B
B
C C C
P F
accept
ac
ce
pt
reject reject
accept
KK
PK
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
3
1
2
1
2
3
2
3
1
K
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Exercise 2.5.  The game of Figure 2.2 is reproduced below, with the unique 
backward-induction solution marked by double edges: 
2 2
1
RejectAcceptRejectAccept
Offer
50-50
Offer
70-30
2
3
1
2
1
2
3
1  
The corresponding strategic form is as follows (for each of Player 2’s strategies, 
the first element in the pair is what Player 2 would do at her left node and the 
second element what she would do at her right node). The Nash equilibria are 
highlighted. One Nash equilibrium, namely (Offer 50-50,(Accept,Reject)), 
corresponds to the backward induction solution, while the other Nash 
equilibrium, namely (Offer 70-30,( Reject,Reject)) does not correspond to a 
backward-induction solution. 
offer 50-50 2 3 2 3 1 2 1 2
offer 70-30 3 1 1 2 3 1 1 2
Player 1
Player  2
(Accept,Accept) (Accept,Reject) (Reject,Accept) (Reject,Reject)
 
Exercise 2.6.  The game of Figure 2.3 is reproduced below with the two 
backward-induction solutions marked by double edges. 
b
yx
1
3
a
g h
2 2
c d e f
0 32
1 0
1 0 1
02
0 2 0
11  
b
yx
1
3
a
h
2 2
c d e f
0 32
1 0
1 0 1
02
0 2 0
11
g
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The corresponding strategic form is as follows. The Nash equilibria are 
highlighted. The backward-induction solutions are (a , ( c , f ) , g ) and (b , ( c , e ) ,h ) 
and both of them are Nash equilibria. There are three more Nash equilibria 
which are not backward-induction solutions, namely (a , ( d , f ) , g ), (b , ( c , f ) , h ) 
and (b , ( d , e ) ,h ). 
Player a 2 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 2
1 b 3 1 0 1 2 1 3 1 0 1 2 1
Player 3: g
Player a 2 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 2
1 b 3 1 0 0 0 1 3 1 0 0 0 1
Player 3: h
Player 2
ce cf de df
Player 2
ce cf de df
 
Exercise 2.7.  The game of Exercise 2.2 is reproduced below: 
P P
F F F
A
B
B
B
C C C
P
K
F
accept
ac
ce
pt
reject reject reject
accept
 F
P K F P K F P K F
KK
PK
P3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
K
2
3
1
 
(a) All the possible strategies of Player B are shown in the following table: 
 If A chooses P If A chooses K If A chooses F 
1 accept accept accept 
2 accept accept reject 
3 accept reject accept 
4 accept reject reject 
5 reject accept accept 
6 reject accept reject 
7 reject reject accept 
8 reject reject reject 
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(b) Player C has three decision nodes and three choices at each of her nodes. 
Thus she has 3 3 3 27× × =  strategies. 
 
 
Exercise 2.8.   
(a)  One backward-induction solution is the strategy profile ( )( , ), ( , )L W a e   
shown in the following figure by doubling the corresponding edges. The 
corresponding backward-induction outcome is the play La with associated  
payoff vector (2,1). 
1
2 2
1
L R
EW
a b c d e
2
1
2
0
3
2
1
2
0
3
4
0
 
The other backward-induction solution is the strategy profile 
( )( , ), ( , )R W a d   shown in the following figure. The corresponding 
backward-induction outcome is the play Rd with associated  payoff vector 
(3,2). 
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1
2 2
1
L R
EW
a b c d e
2
1
2
0
3
2
1
2
0
3
4
0
 
(b) Player 1 has four strategies are: LW, LE, RW, RE. 
(c) Player 2 has six strategies: ac, ad, ae, bc, bd, be. 
(d) The strategic form is as follows: 
 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 ac ad ae bc bd be 
LW 2  ,  1 2  ,  1 2  ,  1 4  ,  0 4  ,  0 4  ,  0 
LE 2  ,  1 2  ,  1 2  ,  1 4  ,  0 4  ,  0 4  ,  0 
RW 2  ,  0 3  ,  2 1  ,  2 2  ,  0 3  ,  2 1  ,  2 
RE 2  ,  0 3  ,  2 0  ,  3 2  ,  0 3  ,  2 0  ,  3 
 
(e) Player 1 does not have a dominant strategy. 
(f) For Player 2 ae is a weakly dominant strategy. 
(g) There is no dominant strategy equilibrium. 
(h) For Player 1 RE is weakly dominated by RW (and LW and LE are 
equivalent). 
(i) For Player 2 ac is weakly dominated by ad (or ae), ad is weakly 
dominated by ae, bc is (strictly or weakly) dominated by every other 
strategy, bd is weakly dominated by be (and by ae and ad), be is weakly 
dominated by ae. Thus the dominated strategies are: ac, ad, bc, bd and be.  
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(j) The iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies yields the 
following reduced game (in Step 1 eliminate RE for Player 1 and ac, ad, 
bc, bd and be for Player 2; in Step 2 eliminate RW for Player 1: 
 ae 
LW 2  ,  1 
LE 2  ,  1 
Thus we are left with one of the two backward-induction solutions, 
namely ( )( , ), ( , )L W a e but also with ( )( , ), ( , )L E a e  which is not a 
backward-induction solution. 
(k) The Nash equilibria are highlighted in the following table. There are 
five Nash equilibria: (LW,ac), (LE,ac), (RW,ad), (LW,ae) and (LE,ae). 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 ac ad ae bc bd be 
LW 2  ,  1 2  ,  1 2  ,  1 4  ,  0 4  ,  0 4  ,  0 
LE 2  ,  1 2  ,  1 2  ,  1 4  ,  0 4  ,  0 4  ,  0 
RW 2  ,  0 3  ,  2 1  ,  2 2  ,  0 3  ,  2 1  ,  2 
RE 2  ,  0 3  ,  2 0  ,  3 2  ,  0 3  ,  2 0  ,  3 
Exercise 2.9.  (a)  The extensive game is as follows: 
22
1
x=6 x=6.5
y=2.5 y=2.5y=3 y=3
147.5
25
117.5
27.5
132.5
12.5
100
12.5  
(b) There are two backward-induction solutions. The first is the strategy profile 
( )6, (3,3)  shown in the following figure. The corresponding backward-
induction outcome is given by Firm 1 producing 6 units and Firm 2 
producing 3 units with profits 117.5 for Firm 1 and 27.5 for Firm 2. 
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22
1
x=6 x=6.5
y=2.5 y=2.5y=3 y=3
147.5
25
117.5
27.5
132.5
12.5
100
12.5  
The other backward-induction solution is the strategy profile ( )6.5, (3, 2.5)  
shown in the following figure. The corresponding backward-induction 
outcome is given by Firm 1 producing 6.5 units and Firm 2 producing 2.5 
units with profits 132.5 for Firm 1 and 12.5 for Firm 2. 
22
1
x=6 x=6.5
y=2.5 y=2.5y=3 y=3
147.5
25
117.5
27.5
132.5
12.5
100
12.5
 
(c) The strategic form is as follows. 
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6 147.5 25 147.5 25 117.5 27.5 117.5 27.5
6.5 132.5 12.5 100 12.5 132.5 12.5 100 12.5
Firm 1
Firm  2
(2.5,2.5) (2.5,3) (3,2.5) (3,3)
 
(d) The Nash equilibria are highlighted in the above table. In this game the set 
of Nash equilibria coincides with the set of backward-induction solutions. 
Exercise 2.10.  The game under consideration is the following, where x is an 
integer: 
A
C
B
D E F
1
2 2
1
0
1
0
x
2
2
5  
(a)  The backward-induction strategy of Player 2 is the same, no matter what x 
is, namely (C,F). Thus the backward induction solutions are as follows. 
• If x < 2, there is only one: (A, (C,F)). 
• If x = 2 there are two: (A, (C,F)) and (B, (C,F)). 
• If x > 2, there is only one: (B, (C,F)). 
(b)  The strategic form is as follows: 
A 2 5 2 5 1 0 1 0
B 1 0 x 2 1 0 x 2
Player 1
Player  2
CE CF DE DF
 
 
First note that (A, (C,E)) is a Nash equilibrium for every value of x. 
Now, depending on the value of x the other Nash equilibria are as follows: 
• If x < 1: (A, (C,F)). 
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• If 1 ≤  x < 2, (A, (C,F)) and (B, (D,F)). 
• If x = 2, (A, (C,F)), (B, (C,F)) and (B, (D,F)). 
• If x > 2, (B, (C,F)) and (B, (D,F)). 
 
Exercise 2.11.  Let us find the losing positions. If  player i, with his choice, can 
bring the sum to 40 then he can win (the other player with her next choice will 
take the sum to a number between 41 and 47 and then player i can win with his 
next choice). Working backwards, the previous losing position is 32 (from here 
the player who has to move will take the sum to a number between 33 and 39 
and after this the opponent can take it to 40). Reasoning backwards, the earlier 
losing positions are 24, 16, 8 and 0. Thus Player 1 starts from a losing position 
and therefore it is Player 2 who has a winning strategy. The winning strategy is: 
at every turn, if Player 1’s last choice was n then Player 2 should choose (8 −n). 
 
Exercise 2.12.  (a) The initial part of the game is shown below. 
2 2 2
A2
B1
B2
A3
B2
B3 B2 C2 B3
C2
C3
C1
1
 
(b) From G4 Player 1 should move the coin to H5. From there Player 2 has to 
move it to H6 and Player 1 to H7 and Player 2 to H8 and from there Player 
1 wins by moving it to H9. 
(c) 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
1 2 3 4 5 5 6 7 8 9A B C D E F G H H H→ → → → → → → → →  
(d)  
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
1 2 3 4 5 5 6 7 7 8 9A B C D E F G G H H H→ → → → → → → → → →  
(e) Using backward induction we can label each cell with a W (meaning that 
the player who has to move when the coin is there has a winning 
continuation strategy) or with an L (meaning that the player who has to 
move when the coin is there can be made to lose). If all the cells that are 
accessible from a given cell are marked with a W then that cell must be 
marked  with an L. If from a cell there is an accessible cell marked with an L 
then that cell should be marked with a W. See the following picture. 
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From the picture it is clear that it is Player 1 who has a winning strategy. 
The winning strategy of Player 1 is: move the coin to cell B1 and from then 
on, after every move of Player 2, move the coin to a cell marked L. 
 
Exercise 2.13.  (a) The game is as follows: 
Anna
Anna Anna
Bess
give up
claim
assert
claim
accept
challenge and 
choose B
challenge and 
choose B2
1
don't
match
don't
match match
match
0
C
B
C
0
A
−F
C  −  B
C  −  B   −  F
1A
1B −F
−F
C  −  B
2B
C  −  B   −  F
2A
−F
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(b) The backward-induction solution is marked by thick arrows in the above 
figure. 
(c) The structure of the game is as follows: 
Anna
Anna
Bess
give up
claim
assert
claim
accept
don't
match
match
0
C
B
C
0
A
−F
C  −  B
B
C  −  B −  F
−F
challenge and 
choose B
A
 
Suppose that Anna is the legal owner and values the ring more than Bess does:  
CA > CB.  At the last node Anna will choose “match” if CA > B and “don’t 
match” if B ≥ CA. In the first case Bess’s payoff will be − F, while in the second 
case it will be CB − B which is negative since B ≥ CA and CA > CB. Thus in 
either case Bess’s payoff would be negative. Hence at her decision node Bess 
will choose “accept” (Bess can get the ring at this stage only if she bids more 
than the ring is worth to her). Anticipating this, Anna will assert her claim at 
the first decision node. Thus at the backward-induction solution the ring goes 
to Anna, the legal owner. The payoffs are CA for Anna and 0 for Bess. Note 
that no money changes hands. 
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(d) Suppose that Bess is the legal owner and values the ring more than Anna 
does: CB > CA.  At the last node Anna will choose “match” if CA > B and 
“don’t match” if B ≥ CA. In the first case Bess’s payoff will be − F, while in 
the second case it will be CB − B, which will be positive as long as CB > B. 
Hence at her decision node Bess will choose to challenge and bid any 
amount B such that  CB > B > CA. Anticipating this, at her first decision 
node Anna will give up (and get a payoff of 0), because if she asserted her 
claim then her final payoff would be − F. Thus at the backward-induction 
solution the ring goes to Bess, the legal owner. The payoffs are 0 for Anna 
and CB for Bess. Note that no money changes hands. 
(e) As pointed out above, in both cases no money changes hands at the 
backward-induction solution. Thus Sabio collects no money at all and both 
Ann and Bess pay nothing. 
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General dynamic games 
3.1 Imperfect information 
here are many situations where players have to make decisions with only 
partial information about previous moves by other players. Here is an 
example from my professional experience: in order to discourage copying 
and cheating in exams, I prepare two versions of the exam, print one version on 
white paper and the other on pink paper and distribute the exams in such a way 
that if a student gets, say, the white version then the students on his left and right 
have the pink version. For simplicity let us assume that there is only one question 
in the exam. What matters for my purpose is not that the question is indeed 
different in the two versions, but rather that the students believe that they are 
different and thus refrain from copying from their neighbors. The students, 
however, are not naïve and realize that I might be bluffing; indeed, introducing 
differences between the two versions of the exam involves extra effort on my part. 
Consider a student who finds himself in the embarrassing situation of not having 
studied for the final exam and is tempted to copy from his neighbor, whom he 
knows to be a very good student. Let us assume that, if he does not copy, then he 
turns in a blank exam; in this case, because of his earlier grades in the quarter, he 
will get a C; on the other hand, if he copies he will get an A if the two versions are 
identical but will be caught cheating and get an F if the two versions are slightly 
different. How can we represent such a  situation? Clearly this is a situation in 
which decisions are made sequentially: first the Professor decides whether to write 
identical versions (albeit printed on different-color paper) or different versions and 
then the Student chooses between copying and leaving the exam blank. We can 
easily represent this situation using a tree as we did with the case of perfect-
information games, but the crucial element here is the fact that the Student does not 
know whether the two versions are identical or different. In order to represent this 
uncertainty (or lack of information) in the mind of the Student, we use the notion 
of information set. An information set for a player is a collection of decision nodes 
of that player and the interpretation is that the player does not know at which of 
these nodes he is making his decision. Graphically, we represent an information set 
Chapter 
3 
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by enclosing the corresponding nodes in  a rounded rectangle. Figure 3.1 represents 
the situation described above. 
identical
versions
different
versions
STUDENT
copy blank copy blank
Student
gets C
Student
gets A
Student caught
cheating, gets F
Student
gets C
PROFESSOR
 
Figure 3.1 
An extensive form, or frame, with imperfect information 
As usual we need to distinguish between a game-frame and a game. Figure 3.1 
depicts a game-frame: in order to obtain a game from it  we need to add a ranking of 
the outcomes for each player. For the moment we shall ignore payoffs and focus on 
frames. A game-frame such as the one shown in Figure 3.1 is called an extensive form 
(or frame) with imperfect information: in this example it is the Student who has 
imperfect information, or uncertainty, about the earlier decision of the Professor.  
We now give a general definition of extensive form that allows for perfect 
information (Definition 2.1, Chapter 2) as a special case. The first four items of 
Definition 3.1, marked by the bullet symbol •, coincide with Definition 2.1; what is 
new is the additional item marked by the symbol ♦.  
First some additional terminology and notation. Given a directed tree and two 
nodes x and y we say that y is a successor of x or x is a predecessor of y if there is a 
sequence of directed edges from x to y (if the sequence consists of a single directed 
edge then we say that y is an immediate successor of x or x is the immediate predecessor 
of y). A partition of a set H is a collection { }1,..., ( 1)mH H m= ≥H of non-empty 
subsets of H such that (1) any two elements of H  are disjoint (if ,j kH H ∈H  
with j k≠  then j kH H∩ = ∅ ) and (2) together the elements of H cover H: 
1 ... .mH H H∪ ∪ =   
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Definition 3.1. A finite extensive  form  (or frame)  with perfect recall consists of the 
following items. 
• A finite rooted directed tree. 
• A set of players {1,..., }I n=  and a function that assigns one player to every 
decision node. 
• A set of actions A and a function that assigns one action to every directed edge, 
satisfying the restriction that no two edges out of the same node are assigned the 
same action. 
• A set of outcomes O and a function that assigns an outcome to every terminal 
node. 
♦ For every player i I∈ , a partition iD  of the set Di of decision nodes assigned to 
player i (thus iD  is a collection of mutually disjoint subsets of Di whose union 
is equal to Di ). Each element of  iD  is called an information set of player i.  The 
elements of iD  satisfy the following restrictions:  
(1) the actions available at any two nodes in the same information set must be 
the same (that is, for every iD∈D , if  ,x y D∈  then the outdegree of x is 
equal to the outdegree of y and the set of actions assigned to the directed 
edges out of x is equal to the set of actions assigned to the directed edges out 
of y), 
(2) if x and y are two nodes in the same information set then it is not the case 
that one node is a predecessor of the other, 
(3) each player has perfect recall in the sense that if node ix D∈ ∈D  is a 
predecessor of node iy D′∈ ∈D  (thus, by (2), D D′≠ ), and a is the action 
assigned to the directed edge out of x in the sequence of edges leading from x 
to y, then for every node z D′∈  there is a predecessor w D∈  such that the 
action assigned to the directed edge out of w in the sequence of edges leading 
from w to z is that same action a. 
The perfect-recall restriction says that if a player takes action a at an information set 
and later on has to move again, then at the later time she remembers that she took 
action a at that earlier information set (because every node she is uncertain about at 
the later time comes after taking action a at that information set). Perfect recall can 
be interpreted as requiring that a player always remember what she knew in the past 
and what actions she herself took in the past. Figure 3.2 shows two examples of 
violation of perfect recall. In the frame shown in Panel (i) Player 1 first chooses 
between a and b and then chooses between c and d having forgotten his previous 
choice: he does not remember what he chose previously. In the frame shown in 
Panel (ii) when Player 2 has to choose between e and f she is uncertain whether this 
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is the first time she moves (left node) or the second time (right node): she is 
uncertain whether she moved in the past.   
 
a b
c c dd
1
1
 
 
(i) 
2
e e ff
c
b
a
2
1
d
 
(ii) 
 
Figure 3.2 
Examples of violations of perfect recall 
If every information set of every player consists of a single node, then the frame is 
said to be a perfect-information frame: it is easy to verify that, in this case, the last 
item of Definition 3.1 (marked by the symbol ♦) is trivially satisfied and thus 
Definition 3.1 coincides with Definition 2.1 (Chapter 2). Otherwise (that is, if at 
least one player has at least one information set that consists of at least two nodes), 
the frame is said to have imperfect information. An example of an extensive frame 
with imperfect information is the one shown in Figure 3.1. We now give two more 
examples. In order to simplify the figures, when representing an extensive frame we 
enclose an information set in a rounded rectangle if and only if that information set 
contains at least two nodes. 
Example 3.1. There are three players, Ann, Bob and Carla. Initially, Ann and Bob 
are in the same room and Carla is outside the room. Ann moves first, chooses 
either a red card or a black card from a full deck of cards, shows it to Bob and puts 
it, face down, on the table. Now Carla enters the room and Bob makes a statement 
to Carla: he either says “Ann chose a Red card” or he says “Ann chose a Black 
card”; thus Bob could be lying or could be telling the truth. After hearing Bob’s 
statement Carla guesses the color of the card that was picked by Ann. The card is 
then turned and if Carla’s guess was correct then Ann and Bob give $1 each to 
Carla, otherwise Carla gives $1 to each of Ann and Bob. When drawing an 
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extensive frame to represent this situation, it is important to be careful about what 
Carla knows, when she makes her guess, and what she is uncertain about. The 
extensive frame is shown in Figure 3.3. 
Red Black Red Black
Red RedBlack Black
Red Black
CARLA
ANN
BOBBOB
CARLA
Red Black Red Black
−$1
−$1
 $2
−$1
−$1
 $2
−$1
−$1
 $2
−$1
−$1
 $2
$1
$1
−$2
$1
$1
−$2
$1
$1
−$2
$1
$1
−$2
 
Figure 3.3 
The extensive form, or frame, representing Example 3.1. 
Carla’s top information set captures the situation she is in after hearing Bob say 
“Ann chose a red card” and not knowing if he is telling the truth (left node) or he is 
lying (right node). Carla’s bottom information set captures the alternative situation 
where she hears Bob say “Ann chose a black card” and does not know if he is lying 
(left node) or telling the truth (right node). In both situations Carla knows 
something, namely what Bob tells her, but lacks information about something else, 
namely what Ann chose. The fact that Bob knows the color of the card chosen by 
Ann is captured by giving Bob two information sets, each consisting of a single 
node: Bob’s left node represents the situation he is in when he sees that Ann picked 
a red card, while his right node represents the situation he is in when he sees that 
Ann picked a black card. 
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Example 3.2. Yvonne and Fran were both interviewed for the same job, but only 
one person can be hired. The employer told each candidate: “don’t call me, I will 
call you if I want to offer you the job”. He also told them that he desperately needs 
to fill the position and thus, if turned down by one candidate, he will automatically 
make the offer to the other candidate, without revealing whether he is making a 
first offer or a “recycled” offer.  This situation is represented in the extensive frame 
shown in Figure 3.4.  
first call 
Yvonne
first call 
Fran
Fran
yes
no
yes no
no
Yvonne
Employer
yes noyes
 
Figure 3.4 
The extensive form, or frame, representing Example 3.2. 
As before, in order to obtain a game from an extensive frame all we need to do is 
add a ranking of the outcomes for each player. As usual, the best way to represent 
such rankings is by means of an ordinal utility function for each player and thus 
represent an extensive-form game by associating a vector of utilities with each 
terminal node. For instance, expanding on Example 3.2, suppose that the employer 
only cares about whether the position is filled or not,  prefers filling the position to 
not filling it, but is indifferent between filling it with Yvonne or with Fran; thus we 
can assign a utility of 1 for the employer to every outcome where one of the two 
candidates accepts the offer and a utility of 0 to every other outcome. Yvonne’s 
favorite outcome is to be hired if she was the recipient of the first call by the 
employer; her second best outcome is not to be hired and her worst outcome is to 
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accept a recycled offer (in the latter case Fran would have a blast telling Yvonne 
“You took that job?! It was offered to me but I turned it down. Who, in her right 
mind, would want that job? What’s wrong with you?!”). Thus for Yvonne we can 
use utilities of 2 (if she accepts a first offer), 1 (if she is not hired) and 0 (if she accepts 
a recycled offer). Finally, suppose that Fran has preferences similar (but symmetric) 
to Yvonne’s. Then the extensive frame of Figure 3.4 gives rise to the extensive game 
shown in Figure 3.5. 
first call 
Yvonne
first call 
Fran
Fran
yes
no
yes no
no
Yvonne
Employer
yes noyes
1
0
1
0
1
1
1 Employer's utility
2 Yvonne's utility
1 Fran's utility
0
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
0
 
Figure 3.5 
A game based on the extensive form of Figure 3.4. 
 
 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced in 
this section, by going through the exercises in Section 3.E.1 of Appendix 3.E at the 
end of this chapter. 
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3.2. Strategies 
The notion of strategy for general extensive games is the same as before: a strategy 
for Player i is a complete, contingent plan that covers all the possible situations 
Player i might find herself in. In the case of a perfect-information game a “possible 
situation” for a player is a decision node of that player; in the general case, where 
there may be imperfect information, a “possible situation” for a player is an 
information set of that player. The following definition reduces to Definition 2.4 
(Chapter 2) if the game is a perfect-information game (where each information set 
consists of a single node). 
Definition 3.2.  A  strategy for a player in an extensive-form game is a list of 
choices, one for every information set of that player.  
For example, in the game of Figure 3.5, Yvonne has only one information set and 
thus a strategy for her is what to do at that information set, namely either say Yes 
or say No. Yvonne cannot make the plan “if the employer calls me first I will say 
Yes and if he calls me second I will say No”, because when she receives the call she 
is not told if this is a first call or a recycled call and thus she cannot make her 
decision depend on information she does not have. 
As in the case of perfect-information games, the notion of strategy allows us to 
associate with every extensive-form game a strategic-form game. For example, the 
strategic form associated with the game of Figure 3.5 is shown in Table 3.6 with the 
Nash equilibria highlighted. 
Yes No
first call 
Yvonne 1 2 1 1 1 0
first call 
Fran 1 1 2 1 1 2
Fran: Yes
Yes No
first call 
Yvonne 1 2 1 0 1 1
first call 
Fran 1 0 1 0 1 1
Fran: No
Employer
Yvonne
Employer
Yvonne
 
Table 3.6 
The strategic form of the game of Figure 3.5  
with the Nash equilibria highlighted. 
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As another example, consider the extensive form of Figure 3.3 and view it as a game 
by assuming that each player is selfish and greedy (only cares about how much 
money he/she gets and prefers more money to less). Then the associated strategic 
forms is shown in Table 3.7, where Bob’s strategy (x,y) means “I say x if Ann chose 
a black card and I say y if Ann chose a red card”. Thus (R,B) means “if Ann chose a 
black card I say Red and if Ann chose a red card I say Black” (that is, Bob plans to 
lie in both cases). Similarly, Carla’s strategy (x,y) means “I guess x if Bob tells me 
Black and I guess y if Bob tells me Red”. Thus (B,R) means “if Bob tells me Black I 
guess Black and if Bob tells me Red I guess Red” (that is, Carla plans to repeat what 
Bob says).   
BOB
B
R
B
R
B
R
B
R
 B,B           R,R          B,R          R,B
 B,B           R,R          B,R          R,B
 B,B           R,R          B,R          R,B  B,B           R,R          B,R          R,B
-1,-1,2 -1,-1,2 -1,-1,2 -1,-1,2
1,1,-21,1,-21,1,-21,1,-2 -1,-1,2 -1,-1,2 -1,-1,2 -1,-1,2
1,1,-21,1,-21,1,-21,1,-2
-1,-1,2 1,1,-2 -1,-1,2 1,1,-2
1,1,-2 -1,-1,2 -1,-1,2 1,1,-2
1,1,-2 -1,-1,2 1,1,-2 -1,-1,2
-1,-1,2 -1,-1,21,1,-2 1,1,-2
A
N
N
A
N
N
A
N
N
BOB BOB
BOB
CARLA: B, B CARLA: R, R
CARLA: B, R CARLA: R, B
A
N
N
 
Table 3.7 
The strategic form of the game of Figure 3.3. 
In order to “solve” an extensive-form game we could simply construct the 
associated strategic-form game and look for the Nash equilibria. However, we saw 
in Chapter 2 that in the case of perfect-information games not all Nash equilibria of 
the associated strategic form can be considered “rational solutions” and we 
introduced the notion of backward induction to select the “reasonable” Nash 
equilibria. What we now need is a generalization of the notion of backward 
induction that can be applied to general extensive-form games. This generalization 
is called subgame-perfect equilibrium. First we need to define the notion of subgame. 
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 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced in 
this section, by going through the exercises in Section 3.E.2 of Appendix 3.E at the 
end of this chapter. 
3.3. Subgames 
Roughly speaking, a subgame of an extensive-form game is a portion of the game 
that could be a game in itself. What we need to be precise about is the meaning of 
“portion of the game”.  
Definition 3.3.  A  proper subgame  of an extensive-form game is obtained as 
follows: 
(1) start from a decision node x, different from the root, whose information set 
consists of node x only and enclose in an oval node x itself and all its 
successors, 
(2) if the oval does not “cut” any information sets (that is, there is no 
information set S  and two nodes ,y z S∈  such that y is a successor of x 
while z is not) then what is included in the oval is a proper subgame, 
otherwise it is not.  
The reason why we use the qualifier ‘proper’ is that one could start from the root, 
in which case one would end up taking the entire game and consider this as a 
(trivial) subgame (just like any set is a subset of itself; a proper subgame is analogous 
to a proper subset).  
Consider, for example, the extensive-form game of Figure 3.8 below. There are 
three possible starting points for identifying a proper subgame: nodes x, y and z (the 
other nodes fail to satisfy condition (1) of Definition 3.3).  
• Starting from node x and including all of its successors, we do indeed obtain 
a proper subgame, which is the portion included in the blue oval on the left.  
• Starting from node y and including all of its successors we obtain the 
portion of the game that is included in the red oval on the right; in this case, 
condition (2) of Definition 3.3 is violated, since we are cutting the top 
information set of Player 3; hence the portion of the game inside the red 
oval is not a proper subgame.  
• Finally, starting from node z and including all of its successors, we do obtain 
a proper subgame, which is the portion included in the purple oval at the 
bottom. 
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 Thus the game of Figure 3.8 has two proper subgames. 
proper
subgame
not a
subgame
proper
subgame
1
3
2
3
x
y
2
z
1
L
R U
D
a a
b b
c
d
e f
g gh h
4
1
2
1
2
4
2
0
3
3
1
2
0
4
4
4
3
0
3
2
1
2
0
2
1
1
0
 
Figure 3.8 
An extensive-form game and its proper subgames. 
Definition 3.4.  A  proper subgame  of an extensive-form game is called 
minimal if it does not strictly contain another proper subgame (that is, if there 
is no other proper subgame which is contained in it and does not coincide with 
it). 
For example, the game shown in Figure 3.9 below has three proper subgames, one 
starting at node x, another at node y and the third at node z. The ones starting at 
nodes x and z are minimal subgames, while the one that starts at node y is not a 
minimal subgame, since it contains the one that starts at node z. 
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2
3
1
3
2
a
c d e f
g h g h B A B
C D
E F E F
2
2
3
3
0
2
6
3
1
2
1
2
3
0
4
1
1
1
1
1
6
1
0
8
3
2
1
0
0
1
x y
z
2
1
A
0
2
0
b
 
Figure 3.9 
An extensive-form game with three proper subgames, two of which are minimal. 
 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced in 
this section, by going through the exercises in Section 3.E.3 of Appendix 3.E at the 
end of this chapter. 
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3.4. Subgame-perfect equilibrium 
A subgame-perfect equilibrium of an extensive-form game is a Nash equilibrium of 
the entire game which remains an equilibrium in every proper subgame. Consider 
an extensive-form game and let s be a strategy profile for that game. Let G be a 
proper subgame. Then the restriction of s to G, denoted by |Gs ,  is that part of s 
which prescribes choices at every information set of G and only at those 
information sets. For example, consider the extensive-form game of Figure 3.9 
above and the strategy profile 
 
1's strategy 3's strategy2's strategy
( , ) , ( , , ) , ( , )a C d f E h B
 
 
 
 

. Let G be the subgame  
that starts at node y of Player 2. Then   
3's strategy1's strategy 2's strategy
     in G     in G      in G
| , ( , ) ,Gs C f E B
 
 
=  
 
 
.  
Definition 3.5.  Given an extensive-form game, let s be a strategy profile for 
the entire game. Then s is a subgame-perfect equilibrium  if  
(1) s is a Nash equilibrium of the entire game and  
(2) for every proper subgame G, |Gs  (the restriction of s to G) is a Nash 
equilibrium of G. 
For example, consider again the extensive-form game of Figure 3.9 and the strategy 
profile ( )( , ), ( , , ), ( , )s a C d f E h B= . Then s is a Nash equilibrium of the entire 
game: Player 1’s payoff is 2 and, if he were to switch to any strategy where he plays 
b, his payoff would be 0; Player 2’s payoff is 1 and if she were to switch to any 
strategy where she plays c her payoff would be 0; Player 3’s payoff is 2 and if he 
were to switch to any strategy where he plays g his payoff would be 0. However, s 
is not a subgame-perfect equilibrium, because the restriction of s to the proper 
subgame that starts at node z of Player 1, namely ( , )C E , is not a Nash equilibrium 
of that subgame: in that subgame, for Player 2 the unique best reply to C is F. 
One way of finding the subgame-perfect equilibria of a given game is to first find 
the Nash equilibria and then, for each of them, check if it satisfies condition (2) of 
Definition 3.5. However, this is not a practical way to proceed. A quicker and 
easier way is to apply the following algorithm, which generalizes the backward-
induction algorithm for games with perfect information (Definition 2.3, Chapter 2). 
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Definition 3.6. Given an extensive-form game, the subgame-perfect equilibrium 
algorithm is the following procedure. 
1. Start with a minimal proper subgame and select a Nash equilibrium of it.  
2. Delete the selected proper subgame and replace it with the payoff vector 
associated with the selected Nash equilibrium, making a note of the strategies 
that constitute the Nash equilibrium. This yields a smaller extensive-form 
game. 
3. Repeat Steps 1 and 2 in the smaller game so obtained. 
For example, let us apply the algorithm  to the game of Figure 3.9. Begin with the 
proper subgame that starts at node x of Player 2, shown below with its associated 
strategic form, where the unique Nash equilibrium ( , )d h  is highlighted. Note that 
this is a game only between Players 2 and 3 and thus in Figure 3.10 we only show 
the payoffs of these two players. 
 
3
c d
g h g h
2 0 3 1
2
3 2 1 2
 
 
 
c 2 3 0 2
d 3 1 1 2
Player 3
g h
Player 2
 
 
Figure 3.10 
A minimal proper subgame of the game of Figure 3.9 and its strategic form. 
 
Now we delete the proper subgame, thereby turning node x  into a terminal node 
to which we attach the full payoff vector associated, in the original game, with the 
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terminal node following history adh, namely (2,1,2). Hence we obtain the smaller 
game shown in Figure 3.11. 
1
2
1
3
2
a b
e f
A B A B
C D
E F E F
2
1
2
3
0
4
1
1
1
1
1
6
1
0
8
0
2
0
3
2
1
0
0
1
(d,h)
 
Figure 3.11 
The reduced game after replacing a proper minimal subgame 
in the game of Figure 3.9. 
Now, in the reduced game of Figure 3.11 we select the only minimal proper 
subgame, namely the one that starts at the bottom decision node of Player 1. This 
subgame is shown in Figure 3.12 together with its associated  strategic form. The 
unique Nash equilibrium of that subgame is ( , )C F . 
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2
C D
E F E F
3 1 1 1
1
0 1 1 0  
 
C 3 0 1 1
D 1 1 1 0
Player 3
E F
Player 2
 
Figure 3.12 
A minimal proper subgame of the game of Figure 3.11 and its strategic form. 
Then, in the reduced game of Figure 3.11, we replace the selected proper subgame 
with the payoff vector associated with the history beACF, namely (1,1,1), thus 
obtaining the smaller game shown in Figure 3.13. 
1
2
3
b
e f
A B A B
2
1
2
1
1
1
0
2
0
3
2
1
0
0
1
a
(C,F)
(d,h)
 
Figure 3.13 
The reduced game after replacing a proper minimal subgame in the game of Figure 3.11. 
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The game of Figure 3.13 has a unique proper  subgame, which has a unique Nash 
equilibrium, namely ( , )f A . Replacing the subgame with the payoff vector 
associated with the history bfA we get the following smaller game. 
1
2
1
2
3
2
1
a b
(d,h)
(f,A)
(C,F)
 
Figure 3.14 
The reduced game after replacing the subgame in the game of Figure 3.13. 
In the reduced game of Figure 3.14 the unique Nash equilibrium is b. Now patching 
together the choices selected during the application of the algorithm we get the 
following subgame-perfect equilibrium for the game of Figure 3.9: 
( )( , ), ( , , ), ( , )b C d f F h A . 
As a second example, consider the game of Figure 3.15, which reproduces the game 
of Figure 3.8. 
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1
3
2
3
x
y
2
z
1
L
R U
D
a a
b b
c
d
e f
g gh h
4
1
2
1
2
4
2
0
3
3
1
2
0
4
4
4
3
0
3
2
1
2
0
2
1
1
0  
 Figure 3.15 
Reproduction of the game of Figure 3.8. 
Begin with the subgame that starts at node x and replace it with the payoff vector 
(3,1,2). Next replace the subgame that starts at node z with the payoff vector (3,2,1) 
which corresponds to the Nash equilibrium (e,h) of that subgame, so that the game 
is reduced to the one shown in Figure 3.16, together with its strategic form. 
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3
L
R U
D
a a
b b
2
0
3
3
2
1
21
1
2
4
4
1
2
3
1
2
(c)
(e,h)
 
U D
L 3 1 2 3 1 2
R 4 1 2 1 2 4
Player 3:  a
U D
L 3 2 1 3 2 1
R 4 1 2 2 0 3
Player 3:  b
Player  1
Player  1
Player 2
Player 2
 
Figure 3.16 
The game of Figure 3.15 reduced after solving the proper subgames and the associated 
strategic form with the Nash equilibria highlighted. 
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The reduced game of Figure 3.16 has two Nash equilibria: (L,D,a) and (R,U,b). Thus 
the game of Figure 3.15 has two subgame-perfect equilibria: 
  
1 2 3
( , ) , ( , ) , ( , )
Player Player Player
L c D e a h
 
 
 
 
 and    
1 2 3
( , ) , ( , ) , ( , )
Player Player Player
R c U e b h
 
 
 
 
. 
Remark 3.1. As shown in the last example, it is possible that – when applying 
the subgame-perfect equilibrium algorithm – one encounters a proper subgame 
or a reduced game that has several Nash equilibria. In this case one Nash 
equilibrium must be selected to continue the procedure and in the end one 
obtains one subgame-perfect equilibrium. One then has to repeat the procedure 
by selecting a different Nash equilibrium and thus obtain a different subgame-
perfect equilibrium, and so on. This is similar to what happens with the 
backward-induction algorithm in perfect-information games. 
Remark 3.2. It is also possible that – when applying the subgame-perfect 
equilibrium algorithm – one encounters a proper subgame or a reduced game 
that has no Nash equilibria.
12
 In such a case the game under consideration does 
not have any subgame-perfect equilibria. 
Remark 3.3. When applied to perfect-information games, the notion of 
subgame-perfect equilibrium coincides with the notion of backward-induction 
solution. Thus subgame-perfect equilibrium is a generalization of backward 
induction.   
Remark 3.4. For extensive-form games that have no proper subgames (for 
example, the game of Figure 3.3) the set of Nash equilibria coincides with the 
set of subgame-perfect equilibria. In general, however, the notion of subgame-
perfect equilibrium is a refinement of the notion of Nash equilibrium. 
 
  This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced in 
this section, by going through the exercises in Section 3.E.4 of Appendix 3.E at the 
end of this chapter. 
                                                                       
12 We will see in Part II that, when payoffs are cardinal and one allows for mixed strategies, then 
every finite game has at least one Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.  
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3.5. Games with chance moves 
So far we have only considered games where the outcomes do not involve any 
uncertainty.  As a way of introducing the topic discussed in Part II, in this section 
we consider games where uncertain, probabilistic events are incorporated in the 
extensive form.  
We begin with an example. There are three cards, one black and two red. They are 
shuffled  well and put face down on the table. Adele picks the top card, looks at it 
without showing it to Ben and then tells Ben either “the top card is black” or “the 
top card is red”: she could be telling the truth or she could be lying. Ben then has to 
guess the true color of the top card. If he guesses correctly he gets $9 from Adele, 
otherwise he gives her $9. How can we represent this situation? Whether the top 
card is black or red is not the outcome of a player’s decision, but the outcome a 
random event, namely the shuffling of the cards. In order to capture this random 
event we introduce a fictitious player called Nature or Chance. We assign a 
probability distribution to Nature’s “choices”. In this case, since one card is black 
and the other two are red, the probability that the top card is black is 1
3
 and the 
probability that the top card is red is 2
3
. Note that we don’t  assign payoffs to 
Nature and thus the only real players are Adele and Ben. The situation can be 
represented as shown in Figure 3.17, where the numbers associated with the 
terminal nodes are dollar amounts.  
NATURE
2/ 31/ 3
Black Red
ADELEADELE
Black Black
RedRed
Red Red
BEN
BEN
Black
Black
Black BlackRed Red
  9
−9
−9
  9
−9
  9
−9
  9
  9
−9
  9
−9
  9
−9
−9
  9  
Figure 3.17 
An extensive form with a chance move. 
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Clearly, the notion of strategy is not affected by the presence of chance moves. In 
the game of Figure 3.17 Adele has four strategies and so does Ben. However, we do 
encounter a difficulty when we try to write the associated strategic form. For 
example, consider the following strategy profile: ( )( , ), ( , )B R B B  where Adele’s 
strategy is to be truthful (say Black if she sees a black card and Red if she sees a red 
card) and Ben’s strategy is to guess Black no matter what Adele says. What is the 
outcome in this case? It depends on what the true color of the top card is and thus 
the outcome is a probabilistic one: 
Adele gives $9 to Ben Ben gives $9 to Adele
1 2
3 3
outcome
probability
 
 
  
 
  
We call such probabilistic outcomes lotteries. In order to convert the game-frame 
into a game we need to specify how the players rank probabilistic outcomes. 
Consider the case where Adele is selfish and greedy, in the sense that she only cares 
about her own wealth and she prefers more money to less. Then, from her point of 
view, the above probabilistic outcome reduces to the following monetary lottery 
1 2
3 3
$9 $9 − 
 
 
. If Ben is also selfish and greedy, then he views the same outcome as 
the lottery 
1 2
3 3
$9 $9 − 
 
 
.  
How do we convert a lottery into a payoff or utility? The general answer to this 
question will be provided in Chapter 4. Here we consider one possibility, which is 
particularly simple. 
Definition 3.7.  Given a lottery whose outcomes are sums of money 
1 2
1 2
$ $ ... $
...
n
n
x x x
p p p
 
 
 
  ( 1 20,  for all 1,2,...,  and ... 1i np i n p p p≥ = + + + = ) 
the expected value of the lottery is the sum of money  
( )1 1 2 2$ ... n nx p x p x p+ + + . 
For example, the expected value of the lottery 
1 2 2
5 5 5
$5 $15 $25 
 
 
 is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 25 5 5$ 5 15 25 $ 1 6 10 $17 + + = + + =   and the expected value of the lottery 
1 2
3 3
$9 $9 − 
 
 
 is $3. We call lotteries whose outcomes are sums of money, money 
lotteries. 
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Definition 3.8.  A player is defined to be risk neutral if she considers a money 
lottery to be just as good as its expected value. Hence a risk neutral person 
ranks money lotteries according to their expected value. 
For example, consider the following money lotteries: 1 1 2 2
5 5 5
$5 $15 $25
L
 
=  
 
,  
2
$16
1
L
 
=  
 
 and 3 5 1 1
8 8 4
$0 $32 $48
L
 
=  
 
. The expected value of 1L  is $17 and the 
expected value of both 2 3 and L L  is $16. Thus a risk-neutral player would have 
the following ranking: 1 2 3L L L≻ ∼ , that is, she would prefer 1L  to 2L  and be 
indifferent between 2L  and 3L .  
For a selfish and greedy player who is risk neutral we can take the expected value of 
a money lottery as the utility of that lottery. For example, if we make the 
assumption that, in the extensive form of Figure 3.17, Adele and Ben are selfish, 
greedy and risk neutral then we can associate a strategic-form game to it as shown in 
Table 3.18. Note that inside each cell we have two numbers: the first is the utility 
(= expected  value) of the underlying money lottery as perceived by Adele and the 
second number is the utility (= expected value) of the underlying money lottery as 
perceived by Ben.  
BB 3 −3 −3 3 3 −3 −3 3
BR 3 −3 9 −9 −9 9 −3 3
RB 3 −3 −9 9 9 −9 −3 3
RR 3 −3 3 −3 −3 3 −3 3
RB RR
Ben
Adele
BB BR
 
Figure 3.18 
The strategic form of the game of Figure 3.17 when the two players are 
selfish, greedy and risk neutral. The first element of Adele’s strategy is what 
she says if she sees a black card and the second element what she says if she 
sees a red card. The first element of Ben’s strategy is what he guesses if Adele 
says “Red”, the second element what he guesses if Adele says “Black”. 
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We conclude this section with one more example. 
Example 3.3.  There are three unmarked, opaque envelopes. One contains 
$100, one contains $200 and the third contains $300. They are shuffled well and 
then one envelope is given to Player 1 and another is given to Player 2 (the 
third one remains on the table). Player 1 opens her envelope and checks its 
content without showing it to Player 2. Then she either says “pass”, in which 
case each player gets to keep his/her envelope, or she asks Player 2 to trade his 
envelope for hers. Player 2 is not allowed to see the content of his envelope and 
has to say either Yes or No. If he says No, then the two players get to keep 
their envelopes. If Player 2 says Yes, then they trade envelopes and the game 
ends. Each player is selfish, greedy and risk neutral. 
This situation is represented by the extensive-form game shown in Figure 3.19, 
where (100,200) means that Player 1 gets the envelope with $100 and Player 2 
gets the envelope with $200, etc.; P stands for “pass” and T for “suggest a 
trade”; Y for “Yes” and N for “No”. 
P
2
NATURE
100
200 100
300
200
100
200
300
300
200
300
100
Y Y Y Y
YN N N N N
(all choices have an equal
probability of 1/6)
P
P
P
P
P
T T T
T TT
Y
N
(1
00
,3
00
)
(10
0,2
00
) (300,100)
(2
0
0
,3
0
0
)
(300,200)
(2
0
0
,1
0
0
)
1 1 1
100
200
300
100
100
300
100
200
200
100
300
100
200
300
300
200
200
100
300
200
200
300
100
300  
Figure 3.19 
The extensive-form game of Example 3.3 
In this game Player 1 has eight strategies. One possible strategy is: “if I get $100 I 
will pass, if I get $200 I will propose a trade, if I get $300 I will pass”: we will use the 
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shorthand PTP for this strategy. Similarly for the other strategies. Player 2 has only 
two strategies: Yes and No. The strategic form associated with the game of Figure 
3.19 is shown in Table 3.20, where the Nash equilibria are highlighted. 
 
 
 
P 
l 
a 
y 
e 
r 
 
1 
Player 2 
 Y N 
PPP 200 , 200 200 , 200 
PPT 150 , 250 200 , 200 
PTP 200 , 200 200 , 200 
PTT 150 , 250 200 , 200 
TPP 250 , 150 200 , 200 
TPT 200 , 200 200 , 200 
TTP 250 , 150 200 , 200 
TTT 200 , 200 200 , 200 
 
Table 3.20 
The strategic form of the game of Figure 3.19 
How did we get those payoffs? Consider,  for example, the first cell. Given the 
strategies PPP and Y, the outcomes are ($100,$200) with probability 1/6, 
($100,$300) with probability 1/6, ($200,$100) with probability 1/6, ($200,$300) 
with probability 1/6, ($300,$100) with probability 1/6, ($300,$200) with 
probability 1/6. Being risk neutral,  Player 1  views his corresponding money 
lottery as equivalent to getting its expected value  $(100 + 100 + 200 + 200 + 300 
+ 300) (1/6) = $200. Similarly for Player 2 and for the other cells. 
Since the game of Figure 3.19 has no proper subgames, all the Nash equilibria are 
also subgame-perfect equilibria. Are some of the Nash equilibria more plausible 
than others? For Player 1 all the strategies are weakly dominated, except for TPP 
and TTP.  Elimination of the weakly dominated strategies leads to a game where Y 
is strictly dominated for Player 2. Thus one could argue that (TPP, N) and (TTP, 
N) are the most plausible equilibria; in both of them Player 2 refuses to trade. 
  This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced in 
this section, by going through the exercises in Section 3.E.5 of Appendix 3.E at the 
end of this chapter. 
 
GAME THEORY – Giacomo Bonanno 
132 
Appendix 3.E: Exercises 
3.E.1 .  Exercises  for  Section 3 .1 :  Imperfect information 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this chapter. 
Exercise 3.1. Amy and Bill simultaneously write a bid on a piece of paper. The bid 
can only be either $2 or $3. A referee then looks at the bids, announces the amount 
of the lowest bid (without revealing who submitted it) and invites Amy to pass or 
double her initial bid. If Amy’s final bid and Bill’s bid are equal then Bill gets the 
object (and pays his bid), otherwise Amy gets the object (and pays her bid). 
Represent this situation by means of two alternative extensive frames. Note: (1) 
when there are simultaneous moves we have a choice as to which player we select as 
moving first: the important thing is that the second player does not know what the 
first player did; (2) when representing, by means of information sets, what a player 
is uncertain about, we typically assume that a player is smart enough to deduce 
relevant information, even if that information is not explicitly given to her.  
Exercise 3.2. Consider the following situation. An incumbent monopolist decides 
at date 1 whether to build a small plant or a large plant. At date 2 a potential entrant 
observes the plant built by the incumbent and decides whether or not to enter. If 
she does not enter then her profits are 0 while the incumbent’s profits are $25 
million with a small plant and $20 million with a large plant. If the potential entrant 
decides to enter, she pays a cost of entry equal to $K million and at date 3 the two 
firms simultaneously decide whether to produce high output or low output. The 
profits of the firms are as follows (these figure do not include the cost of entry for 
the entrant; thus you need to subtract that cost for the entrant). In each cell, the 
first number is the profit of the entrant in millions of dollars and the second is the 
profit of the incumbent. 
  incumbent   incumbent 
 
 
Entrant 
 low 
output 
high 
output  
 
Entrant 
 low 
output 
high 
output 
low 
output 
10 , 10 7 , 7 
low 
output 
10 , 7 5 , 9 
high 
output 
7 , 6 4 , 3 
high 
output 
7 , 3 4 , 5 
If incumbent has small plant If incumbent has large plant 
Draw an extensive form that represents this situation. 
GAME THEORY – Giacomo Bonanno 
133 
3.E.2 .  Exercises  for  Section 3 .2 :  Strategies  
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this chapter. 
Exercise 3.3. Write the strategic-form game-frame of the extensive form of Exercise 
3.1 (that is, instead of writing payoffs in each cell you write the outcome). Verify 
that the strategic forms of the two possible versions of the extensive form are 
identical.  
Exercise 3.4. Consider the extensive-form game of Exercise 3.2.  
(a) Write down in words one of the strategies of the potential entrant. 
(b) How many strategies does the potential entrant have? 
(c) Write the strategic-form game associated with the extensive-form game.  
(d) Find the Nash equilibria for the case where K = 2. 
 
 
3.E.3 .  Exercises  for  Section 3 .3 :  Subgames 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this chapter. 
Exercise 3.5. How many proper subgames does the extensive form of Figure 3.3 
have? 
Exercise 3.6. How many proper subgames does the extensive game of Figure 3.5 
have? 
Exercise 3.7. (a) How many proper subgames does the extensive game of Figure 2.3 
(Chapter 2) have?    (b) How many of those proper subgames are minimal? 
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3.E.4 .  Exercises  for  Section 3 .4 :  Subgame-perfect equilibrium 
Exercise 3.8. Find the Nash equilibria and the subgame-perfect equilibria of the 
following game. 
A
1
2
3
B
C D
F FE E
0
2
1
2
3
0
3
3
0
0
0
2
1
4
3
 
Exercise 3.9. Find the Nash equilibria and the subgame-perfect equilibria of the 
following game.  
G H G H
E F
A
B
C
D
1
2
3
2 1
4
3
4
3
2
2
2
4
2
0
1
4
5
3
0
6
0
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Exercise 3.10. Find the subgame-perfect equilibria of the following extensive-form 
game. 
G G
3
1 2
3
C E
D
F F F
G
H H H
1
0
0
5
2
0
1
1
1
2
1
0
0
1
2
3
2
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
2
3
2
1
2
1
5
1
0
6
0
0
4
1
1
L
M
R
P
R
A
Player 1's payoff
Player 2's payoff
Player 3's payoff
P
B
2
 
 
3.E.5. Exercises for Section 3.5: Games with chance moves  
Exercise 3.11. Modify the game of Example 3.3 as follows: Player 2 is allowed to 
secretly check the content of his envelope before he decides whether or not to 
accept Player 1’s proposal. 
(a) Represent this situation as an extensive-form game. 
(b) List all the strategies of Player 1 and all the strategies of Player 2. 
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Exercise 3.12. Three players, Avinash, Brian and John, play the following game. 
Two cards, one red and the other black, are shuffled well and put face down on the 
table. Brian picks the top card, looks at it without showing it to the other players 
(Avinash and John) and puts it back face down on the table. Then Brian whispers 
either “Black” or “Red” in Avinash’s ear, making sure that John doesn’t hear. 
Avinash then tells John either “Black” or “Red”. Finally John announces either 
“Black” or “Red” and this exciting game ends. The payoffs are as follows: if John’s 
final announcement matches the true color of the card Brian looked at, then Brian 
and Avinash give $2 each to John. In every other case John gives $2 each to Brian 
and Avinash. 
(a) Represent this situation as an extensive-form game. 
(b) Write the corresponding strategic form (or normal form) assuming that the 
players are selfish, greedy and risk neutral. 
Exercise 3.13. Consider the following highly simplified version of Poker. There are 
three cards, marked  A, B and C.  A beats B and C,  B beats C. There are two 
players, Yvonne and Zoe. Each player contributes $1 to the pot before the game 
starts. The cards are then shuffled and the top card is given, face down, to Yvonne 
and the second card (face down) to Zoe. Each player looks at, and only at, her own 
card: she does not see the card of the other player nor the remaining card. 
Yvonne, the first player, may pass, or bet $1. If she passes, the game ends, the cards 
are turned and the pot goes to the high-card holder (recall that A beats B and C, B 
beats C). If Yvonne bets, then Zoe can fold, in which case the game ends and the pot 
goes to Yvonne, or see by betting $1. If Yvonne sees the game ends, the cards are 
turned and the pot goes to the high-card holder. Both players are selfish, greedy and 
risk neutral. 
(a) Draw the extensive-form game.  
(b) How many strategies does Yvonne have? 
(c)  How many strategies does Zoe have? 
(d) Consider the following strategies.   For Yvonne: If A pass, if B pass, if C bet. 
For Zoe: if Yvonne bets and I get an A I will fold, if Yvonne bets and I get a 
B I will fold, if Yvonne bets and I get a C I will fold. Calculate the 
corresponding payoffs. 
(e) Redo the same with the following strategies. For Yvonne: If A pass, if B 
pass, if C bet.  For Zoe: see always (that is, no matter what card she gets). 
(f) Now that you have understood how to calculate the payoffs, represent the 
entire game as a normal form game, assigning the rows to Yvonne and the 
columns to Zoe.  [This might take you the entire night, but at your age 
sleep is not that important and also it will keep you out of trouble.] 
(g) What strategies of Yvonne are weakly dominated? What strategies of Zoe 
are weakly dominated? 
(h) What do you get when you apply the procedure of iterative elimination of 
weakly dominated strategies? 
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◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊ 
Exercise 3.14: Challenging Question. In an attempt to reduce the deficit, the 
government of Italy has decided to sell a 14
th 
century palace near Rome. The palace is in 
disrepair and is not generating any revenue for the government. From now on we’ll call the 
government Player G. A Chinese millionaire has offered to purchase the palace for $p. 
Alternatively, Player G can organize an auction among n interested parties (n ≥ 2). The 
participants to the auction (we’ll call them players) have been randomly assigned labels 
1,2,…,n. Player i is willing to pay up to $pi for the palace, where pi is a positive integer. For 
the auction assume the following: (1) it is a simultaneous, sealed-bid second-price auction, (2) 
bids must be non-negative integers, (3) each player only cares about his own wealth, (4) the 
tie-breaking rule for the auction is that the palace is given to that player who has the lowest 
index (e.g. if the highest bid was submitted by Players 3, 5 and 12 then the palace is given to 
Player 3). All of the above is commonly known among everybody involved, as is the fact 
that for every , {1,..., }i j n∈  with , i ji j p p≠ ≠ . We shall consider four different 
scenarios. In all scenarios you can assume that the pi‘s are common knowledge. 
Scenario 1. Player G first decides whether to sell the palace to the Chinese millionaire 
or make a public and irrevocable decision to auction it.  
(a) Draw the extensive form of this game for the case where n = 2 and the only 
possible bids are $1 and $2. [List payoffs in the following order: first G then 1 then 
2.] 
(b) For the general case where n ≥ 2 and every positive integer is a possible bid, find a 
pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game. What are the players’ 
payoffs at the equilibrium?  
Scenario 2. Here we assume that n = 2, and p1 > p2 + 1 > 2 . First Player G decides 
whether to sell the palace to the Chinese or make a public and irrevocable decision to 
auction it. In the latter case he first asks Player 2 to publicly announce whether or not 
he is going to participate in the auction. If Player 2 says Yes then he has to pay $1 to 
Player G  as a participation fee, which is non-refundable. If he says No then she is out 
of the game. After player 2 has made his announcement (and paid his fee if he decided 
to participate) Player 1 is asked to make the same decision (participate and pay a non-
refundable fee of $1 to Player G or stay out); Player 1 knows player 2’s decision when 
he makes his own decision. After both players have made their decisions, player G 
proceeds as follows: (1) if both 1 and 2 said Yes then he makes them play a 
simultaneous second-price auction, (2) if only one player said Yes then he is asked to 
put an amount $x of his choice in an envelope (where x is a  positive integer) and give 
it to Player G in exchange for the palace, (3) if both 1 and 2 said No then G is no 
longer bound by his commitment to auction the palace and he sells it to the Chinese. 
(c) Draw the extensive form of this game for the case where the only possible bids are 
$1 and $2 and also x ∈ {1,2} [List payoffs in the following order: first G then 1 
then 2.] 
(d) For the general case where all possible bids are allowed (subject to being positive 
integers) and x can be any positive integer, find a pure-strategy subgame-perfect 
equilibrium of this game. What are the players’ payoffs at the equilibrium?  
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Scenario 3. Same as Scenario 2; the only difference is that if both Players 1 and 2 
decide to participate in the auction then Player G gives to the loser the fraction a (with 
0 < a < 1) of the amount paid by the winner in the auction (note that player G still 
keeps 100% of the participation fees). This is publicly announced at the beginning and 
is an irrevocable commitment. 
(e) For the general case where all possible bids are allowed (subject to being positive 
integers) find a subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game. What are the players’ 
payoff at the equilibrium?  
Scenario 4. Player G tells the Chinese millionaire the following:  
“First you (= the Chinese) say Yes or No; if you say No I will sell you the 
palace for the price that you offered me, namely $100 (that is, we now 
assume that p = 100); if you say Yes then we play the following perfect 
information game. I start by choosing a number from the set {1,2,3}, then 
you (= the Chinese) choose a number from this set, then I choose again, 
followed by you, etc. The first player who brings the cumulative sum of all 
the numbers chosen (up to and including the last one) to 40 wins. If you 
win I will sell you the palace for $50, while if I win I will sell you the 
palace for $200.”  Thus there is no auction in this scenario. Assume that 
the Chinese would actually be willing to pay up to $300 for the palace. 
(f) Find a pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game.  
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Appendix 3.S: Solutions to exercises  
Exercise 3.1.  One possible extensive frame is as follows, where Amy moves 
first. Note that we have only one non-trivial information set for Amy, while 
each of the other three consists of a single node. The reason is as follows: if 
Amy initially bids $3 and Bill bids $2 then the referee announces “the lowest 
bid was $2”; this announcement does not directly reveal to Amy that Bill’s bid 
was $2, but she can figure it out from her knowledge that her own bid was $3; 
similarly, if the initial two bids are both $3 then the referee announces “the 
lowest bid was $3”, in which case Amy is able to figure out that Bill’s bid was 
also $3. If we included those two nodes in the same information set for Amy, 
we would not show much faith in Amy’s reasoning ability! 
AMY
BILL
$2 $3
$2 $3 $2 $3
AMY AMY AMY
$4 $4 $6 $6
Amy wins
and pays $6
pass pass pass pass
Bill wins
and pays $2
Amy wins
and pays $6
Bill wins
and pays $3
Amy wins
and pays $4
Bill wins
and pays $3
Amy wins
and pays $4
Amy wins
and pays $3
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Another possible extensive frame is as follows, where Bill moves first. 
BILL
AMY
$2 $3
$2 $3 $2 $3
AMY
$4
$4
$6
$6
Amy wins
and pays $4
Amy wins
and pays $6
pass
pass
pass
pass
AMY
AMY
Amy wins
and pays $3
Bill wins
and pays $3
Bill wins
and
pays $3
Amy wins
and
pays $6
Amy wins
and 
pays $4
Bill wins
and
pays $2
 
Exercise 3.2.  The extensive form is as follows. 
INCUMBENT
INCUMBENT
INCUMBENT
ENTRANT
ENTRANT
ENTRANT
ENTRANT
small
plant
in
large
plant
out
out
in
25
0
20
0
low
output
low
output
low
output
low
output
low
output
low
output
high
output
high
output
high
high
outputhigh high
output
10 - K
7
10 - K
10
4 - K
3
7 - K
6
7 - K
7
7 - K
3
5 - K
9
4 -K
5  
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Exercise 3.3.  Amy’s strategy (x,y,w,z) means: at the beginning I bid $x, at the 
non-trivial information set on the left I choose y, at the singleton node in the 
middle I choose w and at the singleton node on the right I choose z. The 
numbers are bid amounts and P stands for “Pass”. 
                                                                               BILL 
  bid $2 bid $3 
 $2, P, P, $P Bill wins pays 2 Bill wins pays 3 
 2 , P, P, 6 Bill wins pays 2 Bill wins pays 3 
 2, P, 6, P Bill wins pays 2 Bill wins pays 3 
 2, P, 6, 6 Bill wins pays 2 Bill wins pays 3 
A 2, 4, P, P Amy wins pays 4 Amy wins pays 4 
M 2, 4, P, 6 Amy wins pays 4 Amy wins pays 4 
Y 2, 4, 6, P Amy wins pays 4 Amy wins pays 4 
 2, 4, 6, 6 Amy wins pays 4 Amy wins pays 4 
 3, P, P, P Amy wins pays 3 Bill wins pays 3 
 3 , P, P, 6 Amy wins pays 3 Amy wins pays 6 
 3, P, 6, P Amy wins pays 6 Bill wins pays 3 
 3, P, 6, 6 Amy wins pays 6 Amy wins pays 6 
 3, 4, P, P Amy wins pays 3 Bill wins pays 3 
 3, 4, P, 6 Amy wins pays 3 Amy wins pays 6 
 3, 4, 6, P Amy wins pays 6 Bill wins pays 3 
 3, 4, 6, 6 Amy wins pays 6 Amy wins pays 6 
 
Exercise 3.4.  (a) The potential entrant has four information sets, hence a 
strategy has to say what she would do in each of the four situations. A possible 
strategy is: “if the incumbent chooses a small plant I stay out, if the incumbent 
chooses a large plant I enter, if small plant and I entered then I choose low 
output, if large plant and I entered then I choose high output”.  
(b) The potential entrant has 2
4
 = 16  strategies. 
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(c) The strategic form is as follows. 
    INCUMBENT   
  SLL SLH SHL SHH LLL LLH LHL LHH 
 OOLL 0 , 25 0 , 25 0 , 25 0 , 25 0 , 20 0 , 20 0 , 20 0 , 20 
 OOLH 0 , 25 0 , 25 0 , 25 0 , 25 0 , 20 0 , 20 0 , 20 0 , 20 
 OOHL 0 , 25 0 , 25 0 , 25 0 , 25 0 , 20 0 , 20 0 , 20 0 , 20 
 OOLH 0 , 25 0 , 25 0 , 25 0 , 25 0 , 20 0 , 20 0 , 20 0 , 20 
E OILL 0 , 25 0 , 25 0 , 25 0 , 25 10− K
, 7 
5− K, 
9 
10− K
, 7 
5− K, 
9 
N OILH 0 , 25 0 , 25 0 , 25 0 , 25 7− K, 
3 
4− K, 
5 
7− K, 
3 
4− K, 
5 
T OIHL 0 , 25 0 , 25 0 , 25 0 , 25 10− K
, 7 
5− K, 
9 
10− K
, 7 
5− K, 
9 
R OIHH 0 , 25 0 , 25 0 , 25 0 , 25 7− K, 
3 
4− K, 
5 
7− K, 
3 
4− K, 
5 
A IOLL 10− K, 
10 
10− K, 
10 
7− K, 7 7− K, 
7 
0 , 20 0 , 20 0 , 20 0 , 20 
N IOLH 10− K, 
10 
10− K, 
10 
7− K, 7 7− K, 
7 
0 , 20 0 , 20 0 , 20 0 , 20 
T IOHL 7− K, 6 7− K, 6 4− K,3 4− K,
3 
0 , 20 0 , 20 0 , 20 0 , 20 
 IOHH 7− K, 6 7− K, 6 4− K,3 4− K,
3 
0 , 20 0 , 20 0 , 20 0 , 20 
 IILL 10− K, 
10 
10− K, 
10 
7− K, 7 7− K, 
7 
10− K
, 7 
5− K, 
9 
10− K
, 7 
5− K, 
9 
 IILH 10− K, 
10 
10− K, 
10 
7− K, 7 7− K, 
7 
7− K, 
3 
4− K, 
5 
7− K, 
3 
4− K, 
5 
 IIHL 7− K, 6 7− K, 6 4− K,3 4− K,
3 
10− K
, 7 
5− K, 
9 
10− K
, 7 
5− K, 
9 
 IIHH 7− K, 6 7− K, 6 4− K,3 4− K,
3 
7− K, 
3 
4− K, 
5 
7− K, 
3 
4− K, 
5 
 
(d) For the case where K =2 the Nash equilibria are highlighted in the above 
table.  
Exercise 3.5.  None. 
Exercise 3.6.  None. 
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Exercise 3.7. The game under consideration is the following: 
b
yx
1
3
a
g h
2 2
c d e f
0 32
1 0
1 0 1
02
0 2 0
11  
(a) There are three proper subgames: one starting from node x,  one starting 
from node y  and one starting at the node of Player 3. 
(b) Two: the one starting from node x and the one starting at the decision node 
of Player 3. In a perfect-information game a minimal proper subgame is one 
that starts at a decision node followed only by terminal nodes. 
Exercise 3.8.  The Nash equilibria are (B,C,E) and (B,D,F). There are no 
subgame-perfect equilibria since the proper subgame has no Nash equilibria. 
Exercise 3.9.  The strategic form is as follows: 
A
B
2, 2, 4 2, 2, 4 2, 0, 1 2, 0, 1
1, 4, 3 4, 3, 2 1, 4, 3 4, 3, 2
A
B
4, 5, 3 4, 5, 3 0, 6, 0 0, 6, 0
P
l
a
y
e
r
1
Player 2 Player 2
Player 3 chooses E Player 3 chooses F
GC          GD        HC        HD GC          GD        HC        HD
1, 4, 3 4, 3, 2 1, 4, 3 4, 3, 2
 
The Nash equilibria are: (A,(G,C),E) and (B,(H,C),F).  
The extensive-form game has two proper subgames. The one on the left has a 
unique Nash equilibrium, (G,E), and the one on the right has a unique Nash 
equilibrium, C. Hence the game reduces to: 
GAME THEORY – Giacomo Bonanno 
144 
B
1
A
2
2
4
1
4
3
 
where A is the unique optimal choice. Hence there is only one subgame-perfect 
equilibrium, namely (A,(G,C),E). 
Exercise 3.10. Consider first the subgame that starts at Player 2’s decision node 
coming after choice A of Player 1 (only the payoff of Players 2 and 3 are shown 
in the following table): 
 
 
 
Player  
2 
 
Player   3 
 F G H 
C 0 , 0 2 , 0 1 , 1 
D 1 , 0 1 , 2 2 , 1 
E 0 , 1 0 , 1  3 , 2.     
The unique Nash equilibrium is (E, H). 
Now consider the subgame that starts at Player 2’s decision node coming after 
choice B of Player 1  
 
 
Player  2 
 
Player   3 
 P R 
L  2  ,  1.  1  ,  0 
M 0  ,  0  1  ,  1.  
There are two Nash equilibria: (L, P) and (M, R). 
Thus there are two subgame-perfect equilibria of the entire game: 
(1) ( ), ( , ), (( , )A E L H P . Player 1’s strategy: A,  Player 2’s strategy: E if A and L 
if B, Player 3’s strategy: H if A and P if B:  
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(2) ( ), ( , ), (( , )B E M H R . Player 1’s strategy: B,  Player 2’s strategy: E if A and M 
if B, Player 3’s strategy: H if A and R if B. 
Exercise 3.11. (a) The game is as follows. 
1
NATURE
100
200 100
300
200
100
200
300
300
200
300
100
Y
Y
Y
YN
N
N
N
N
300
200
200
300
200
100
100
300
300
100
100
200
300
200
200
300
(all choices have an equal
           probability of 1/6)
P
P
P
P
P
P
T T
T
T TT
Y
100
200
200
100
2
2
(1
00
,3
00
)
2
1 1
(2
0
0
,1
0
0
) (2
0
0
,3
0
0
)
(300,100)
(300,200)
Y N
100
300
300
100
(10
0,2
00
)
 
(b) Player 1’s strategies are the same as in Example 3.3. Player 2 now has 8 
strategies. Each strategy has to specify how to reply to Player 1’s proposal 
depending on the sum he (Player 2) has. Thus one possible strategy is: if I 
have $100 I say No, if I have $200 I say Yes and if I have $300 I say No. 
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Exercise 3.12.  (a) The game is as follows. 
B
Nature
1/2
1/2
Red
Black
Brian
Brian
A
v
i
n
a
s
h
A
v
i
n
a
s
h
R B
R B
R
R
R
R
B
B
B
B
J
o
h
n
J
o
h
n
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
−2,−2,4
−2 ,−2,4
−2,−2,4
−2,−2,4
−2,−2,4
−2,−2,4−2 ,−2,4
−2 ,−2,4
2,2,−4
2,2,−4
2,2,−4
2,2,−4
2,2,−4
2,2,−4
2,2,−4
2,2,−4
 
(b) Each player has two information sets, two choices at each information set, 
hence four strategies. The strategic form is given by the following set of tables. 
   Avinash   
  if B, B, 
if R, R 
if B, B, 
if R, B 
if B, R, 
if R, R 
if B, R, 
if R, B 
 if B, B, 
if R, R 
− 2,− 2, 4 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 2, 2, − 4 
Brian if B, B, 
if R, B 
0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 
 if B, R, 
if R, R 
0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 
 if B, R, 
if R, B 
2, 2, − 4 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 − 2,− 2, 4 
John chooses: if B, B and if R, R  
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   Avinash   
  if B, B, 
if R, R 
if B, B, 
if R, B 
if B, R, 
if R, R 
if B, R, 
if R, B 
 if B, B, 
if R, R 
0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 
Brian if B, B, 
if R, B 
0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 
 if B, R, 
if R, R 
0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 
 if B, R, 
if R, B 
0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 
John chooses: if B, B and if R, B  
− −− −−− −−− −− −−− −− −− −−− −−− −− −−− −− −− −−− −−− −− −−− −− −  
 
   Avinash   
  if B, B, 
if R, R 
if B, B, 
if R, B 
if B, R, 
if R, R 
if B, R, 
if R, B 
 if B, B, 
if R, R 
0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 
Brian if B, B, 
if R, B 
0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 
 if B, R, 
if R, R 
0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 
 if B, R, 
if R, B 
0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 
John chooses: if B, R and if R, R  
− −− −−− −−− −− −−− −− −− −−− −−− −− −−− −− −− −−− −−− −− −−− −− −  
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   Avinash   
  if B, B, 
if R, R 
if B, B, 
if R, B 
if B, R, 
if R, R 
if B, R, 
if R, B 
 if B, B, 
if R, R 
2, 2, − 4 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 − 2,− 2, 4 
Brian if B, B, 
if R, B 
0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 
 if B, R, 
if R, R 
0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 
 if B, R, 
if R, B 
− 2,− 2, 4 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 2, 2, − 4 
John chooses: if B, R and if R, B  
How can we fill in the payoffs without spending more than 24 hours on this 
problem? There is a quick way of doing it.  First of all, when John’s strategy is 
to guess Black, no matter what Avinash says, then he has a 50% chance of being 
right and a 50% chance of being wrong. Thus his expected payoff is 
1 1
2 2
(4) ( 4) 0+ − =  and, similarly, the expected payoff of each of the other two 
players is 1 1
2 2
(2) ( 2) 0+ − = . This explains why the second table is filled with the 
same payoff vector, namely (0,0,0). The same reasoning applies to the case 
where when John’s strategy is to guess Red, no matter what Avinash says 
(leading to the third table, filled with the same payoff vector (0,0,0)).  
For the remaining strategies of John’s, one can proceed as follows. Start with 
the two colors, B and R. Under B write T (for true) if Brian’s strategy says “if B 
then B” and write F (for false) if Brian’s strategy says “if B then R”; similarly, 
under R write T (for true) if Brian’s strategy says “if R then R” and write F (for 
false) if Brian’s strategy says “if R then B”. In the next row, in the B column 
rewrite what is in the previous row if  Avinash’s strategy says “if B then B” and 
change a T into an F or an F into a T if Avinash’s strategy says “if B then R”. 
Similarly for the R column. Now repeat the same for John (in the B column a 
T remains a T and an F remains an F is John’s strategy is “if B then B”, while a 
T is changed into an F and an F is changed into a T if John’s strategy is “if B 
then R”). Now in each column the payoffs are (− 2, − 2, 4) if the last row has a T 
and (2, 2, − 4) if the last row has an F. The payoffs are then given by 1
2
 the 
payoff in the left column plus 1
2
 the payoff in the right column.   For example, 
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for the cell in the second row, third column of the third table we have the 
following. 
 B R  
Brian’s strategy: 
if B, B  and if R, B 
T F 
 
Avinash’s 
strategy: 
if B, R  and if R, 
R 
F T 
 
John’s strategy: 
if B, R  and if R, 
R 
F T 
Payoffs: 
Payoffs (2, 2, − 4) (− 2, − 2, 4)  1
2
(2, 2, − 4) + 1
2
(− 2, − 2, 4) = (0, 0, 
0) 
 
Exercise 3.13.  (a) The extensive-form representation of the simplified poker 
game is as follows (the top number is Yvonne’s net take in dollars and the 
bottom number is Zoe’s net take). 
ABC (1/6)
CBA (1/6)
CAB (1/6)
BCA (1/6)
BAC (1/6)
ACB (1/6)
Y YY
Pass PassPassPassPass
Pass
1
-1 1
-1
1
-1
-1
1
-1
1
-1
1
Zoe
Fold
See
Fold See
1
-1
-2
2
1
-1
2
-2
Zoe
Fold See Fold
See
1
-1
1
-1
2
-2
2
-2
Bet
Bet
Zoe
Fold
S F
See
1
-1
1
-1
-2
2
-2
2
Bet
Bet
NATURE
Bet
Bet
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(b) and (c) Each player has eight strategies (three information sets, two choices 
at each information set, thus 2 × 2 × 2 = 8 possible strategies). 
(d) Yvonne uses the strategy “If A pass, if B pass, if C bet” and Zoe uses the 
strategy “If A fold, if B fold, if C fold”). We calculate the expected net payoff 
for Yvonne. Zoe’s expected net payoff is the negative of that. 
 
Possible 
Cases 
Top card is A 
Second is B 
A 
C 
B 
A 
B 
C 
C 
A 
C 
B  
Sum Probability 
of each 
Expected 
payoff 
Y’s payoff 1 1 −1 1 1 1 4 
1
6   
4
6   
Explain pass pass pass pass bet + 
fold 
bet + 
fold 
   
 
 
 
(e) Yvonne uses the strategy “If A pass, if B pass, if C bet” and Zoe uses the 
strategy “see with any card”. Once again, we calculate the expected net 
payoff for Yvonne. Zoe’s expected net payoff is the negative of that. 
 
Possible 
Cases 
Top card is A 
Second is B 
A 
C 
B 
A 
B 
C 
C 
A 
C 
B  
Sum Probability 
of each 
Expected 
payoff 
Y’s payoff 1 1 −1 1 −2 −2 −2 
1
6   −
2
6   
Explain pass pass pass pass bet + 
see 
bet + 
see 
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(f) The strategic form is as follows. 
    
ZOE 
    
 If A fold, 
If B fold, 
If C fold 
If A see, 
If B see, 
If C see 
If A see, 
If B fold, 
If C fold 
If A fold, 
If B see, 
If C fold 
If A fold, 
If B fold, 
If C see 
If A see, 
If B see, 
If C fold 
If A see, 
If B fold, 
If C see 
If A fold, 
If B see, 
If C see 
If A pass, 
if B pass 
if C pass 
0,  0 0,  0 0,  0 0,  0 0,  0 0,  0 0,  0 0,  0 
If A bet, 
if B bet 
if C bet 
1,  − 1 0,   0 0,   0 4/6, − 4/6 8/6, − 8/6 − 2/6, 2/6 2/6, − 2/6 1, − 1 
If A bet, 
 if B pass 
if C pass 
0,  0 2/6, − 2/6 0,  0 1/6, − 1/6 1/6, − 1/6 1/6, − 1/6 1/6, − 1/6 2/6, − 2/6 
If A pass, 
if B bet 
if C pass 
2/6, − 2/6 0,  0 − 1/6, 1/6 2/6, − 2/6 3/6, − 3/6 − 1/6, 1/6 0,  0 3/6, − 3/6 
If A pass, 
if B pass 
if C bet 
4/6, − 4/6 − 2/6, 2/6 1/6, − 1/6 1/6, − 1/6 4/6, − 4/6 − 2/6, 2/6 1/6, − 1/6 1/6, − 1/6 
If A bet, 
if B bet 
if C pass 
2/6, − 2/6 2/6, − 2/6 − 1/6, 1/6 3/6, − 3/6 4/6, − 4/6 0,  0 1/6, − 1/6 5/6, − 5/6 
If A bet, 
if B pass 
if C bet 
4/6, − 4/6 0,  0 1/6, − 1/6 2/6, − 2/6 5/6, − 5/6 − 1/6, 1/6 2/6, − 2/6 3/6, − 3/6 
if A Pass, 
If B or C, 
Bet, 
1,  − 1 − 2/6, 2/6 0,  0 3/6, − 3/6 7/6, − 7/6 − 3/6, 3/6 1/6, − 1/6 4/6, − 4/6 
(g) Let  denote weak dominance, that is, a  b means that a weakly 
dominates b. 
FOR YVETTE (row player):  3
rd
 row  1
st
 row,     6
th
  4
th
,  7
th
  4
th
,    7
th
  
5
th
,   2
nd
  8
th
. 
FOR ZOE (column player):   3
rd
 col  1
st 
col,    3
rd
  4
th
,   3
rd
  5
th
,    3
rd
  7
th
,    
3
rd
  8
th
, 2
nd
  8
th
,    4
th
  5
th
,    4
th
  8
th
,    6
th
  2
nd
,    6
th
  4
th
,     6
th
  
5
th
,     
6
th
  7
th
,    6
th
  8
th
, 7
th
  4
th
,     7
th
  5
th
,    7
th
  8
th
. 
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(h) Eliminating rows 1, 4, 5 and 8 and all columns except 3 and 6 we are left 
with: 
   Zoe 
  See only if 
A 
See with A or 
B 
 Bet always 0,   0 −2/6, 2/6 
Y If A, Bet, 
otherwise 
pass 
0,  0 1/6, −1/6 
 If A or B, 
Bet, 
if C Pass 
−1/6, 1/6 0,  0 
 If A or C, 
Bet, 
if B Pass 
1/6, −1/6 −1/6, 1/6 
In the above table, the second row dominates the first and the third. 
Eliminating them we have the following, which is a remarkable simplification 
of the original strategic form: 
   Zoe 
  See only if 
A 
See with A or 
B 
Y If A, Bet, 
otherwise 
pass 
0,  0 1/6, −1/6 
 If A or C, 
Bet, 
if B Pass 
1/6, −1/6 −1/6, 1/6 
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Exercise 3.14.  (a) The extensive form is as follows: 
1
2
G
auction
$1 $2
$1 $2 $1 $2
p
0
0
1
p1−1
0
G
pl. 1
pl. 2
1
p1−1
0
1
0
p2−1
2
p1−2
0
sell to Chinese
 
(b) In the auction subgame for every player it is a weakly dominant strategy to 
bid his own value. Let { }
1,...,
maxj i
i n
p p
=
=  be the highest value and 
{ }
1,...,
maxk i
i n
i j
p p
=
≠
= be the second highest value. Then the auction, if it takes 
place, will be won by Player j and he will pay kp . Hence there are three 
cases. Case 1: kp p> . In this case Player G will sell to the Chinese (and the 
strategy of Player i in the subgame is to bid ip ), G’s payoff is p and the 
payoff of Player i is 0. Case 2: kp p< . In this case Player G announces the 
auction, the strategy of Player i in the subgame is to bid ip , the winner is 
Player j and he pays kp , so that the payoff of G is kp , the payoff of player j 
is j kp p−  and the payoff of every other player is 0.  
Case 3: kp p= . In this case there are two subgame-perfect equilibria: one as 
in Case 1 and the other as in Case 2 and G is indifferent between the two.  
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(c) The game is as follows: 
1
2
$1 $2
$1 $2 $1 $2
3
p1−2
−1
G
pl. 1
pl. 2
3
p1−2
−1
3
−1
p2−2
4
p1−3
−1
1
Yes
No
2 $1
$2
Yes
2
0
p2−2
3
0
p2−3
2NoNo
1
G
p
0
0auction
sell to Chinese
1
$1
$22
p1−2
0
Yes
3
p1−3
0
p
0
0
 
(d) In the simultaneous subgame after both players have said Yes, the 
participation fee paid is a sunk cost and for every player bidding the true 
value is a weakly dominant strategy. Thus the outcome there is as follows: 
Player 1 bids p1, gets the palace by paying p2, G’s payoff is (p2 + 2), 1’s 
payoff is (p1 −  p2 − 1) and Player 2’s payoff is − 1. In the subgames where one 
player said No and the other said Yes the optimal choice is obviously x = 1, 
with payoffs of 2 for Player G, 0 for the player who said No and pi − 2 for 
the player who said Yes. Thus the game reduces to the one shown in Figure 
A below: 
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1
Yes
No
Yes
2NoNo
1
G
p
0
0auction
sell to Chinese
Yes
p
0
0
p2+2
p1−p2−1
−1
2
0
p2−2
G
pl. 1
pl. 2
2
p1−2
0
 
Yes
2No
G
p
0
0
auction
2
p1−2
0
sell to Chinese
p2+2
p1−p2−1
−1  
Figure A Figure B 
By assumption, p1 > p2 + 1 > 2, so that p1 −  p2 −  1 > 0 and p1 −  2 > 0. 
Thus at the bottom node and at the left node player 1 prefers Yes to No.  
Thus the game reduces to the one shown in Figure B. 
Hence Player 2 will say No. Thus the subgame-perfect equilibrium is as 
follows:  
(1) if p > 2 then player G will sell to the Chinese (and the choices off the 
equilibrium path are as explained above) and the payoffs are (p, 0 , 0);  
(2) if p < 2  then G chooses to auction, 2 says No, 1 says Yes and then 
offers $1 and the payoffs are (2, p1 − 2,0) (and the choices off the equilibrium 
path are as explained above); 
(3) if p = 2 then there are two equilibria: one as in (1) and the other as in (2). 
(e) When the loser is given the fraction a of the amount paid by the winner 
(that is, the loser is given the fraction a of his own bid), it is no longer true 
that bidding one’s true value is a dominant strategy. In fact, ( )1 2,p p  is 
not even a Nash equilibrium any more. To see this, imagine that Player 1’s 
true value is 10 and Player 2’s true value is 6 and a = 50%. Then if Player 1 
bids 10 and 2 bids 6, Player 2 ends up losing the auction but being given $3, 
while if he increased his bid to 8 then he would still lose the auction but 
receive $4. This shows that there cannot be a Nash equilibrium where 
Player 2 bids less than Player 1. Now there are several Nash equilibria of 
the auction, for example, all pairs ( )1 2,b b  with  1 2b b b= =  and 2 1p b p≤ <   
provided that 1 ( 1)p b a b− ≥ − , that is, 
1
1
p a
b
a
+
≤
+
  (but there are more: for 
example all pairs ( )1 2,b b  with  1 2b b b= =  and 2b p<   provided that 
1 ( 1)p b a b− ≥ −  and 2ab p b≥ − ). Thus to find a subgame-perfect 
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equilibrium of the game one first has to select a Nash equilibrium of the 
auction game and then apply backward induction to see if the players 
would want to say Yes or No to the auction, etc. 
(f) Let us start by considering the perfect-information game that is played if the 
Chinese says Yes. This is a game similar to the one discussed in Example 2.2 
(Chapter 2, Section 2.5). We first determine the losing positions. Whoever 
has to move when the sum is 36 cannot win. Thus 36 is a losing position. 
Working backwards, the losing positions are 32, 28, 24, 20, 16, 12, 8, 4 and 
0. Thus the first player (= player G) starts from a losing position: whatever 
his initial choice, he can be made to choose the second time when the sum is 
4, and then 8, etc. Hence the second player (= the Chinese) has a 
winning strategy, which is as follows: if Player G just chose n, then choose 
(4 − n). If the Chinese says Yes and then follows this strategy he can 
guarantee that he will buy the palace for $50. Thus the subgame-perfect 
equilibrium of this game is: the Chinese says Yes and uses the winning 
strategy in the ensuing game, while for Player G we can pick any arbitrary 
choices. 
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Expected Utility 
4.1 Money lotteries and attitudes to risk 
t the end of Chapter 3 we showed how to incorporate random events 
in extensive-form games by means of chance moves. The introduction 
of chance moves gives rise to probabilistic outcomes, which we called 
lotteries. In Chapter 3 we restricted attention to lotteries whose outcomes are 
sums of money (money lotteries) and to one possible way of ranking such 
lotteries, based on the notion of risk neutrality. In this section we will continue 
to focus on money lotteries and define other possible attitudes to risk.
1
 
Throughout this chapter we will restrict attention to finite lotteries. Recall that 
a money lottery is a probability distribution of the form  
1 2
1 2
$ $ ... $
...
n
n
x x x
p p p
 
 
 
    ( 1 20 1,   1, 2,...,  ... 1i np i n p p p≤ ≤ = + + + =for all and ) 
and that (Definition 3.13, Chapter 3) its expected value is the number 
( )1 1 2 2 ... n nx p x p x p+ + + . If L is a money lottery, we will denote by [ ]LE  the 
expected value of L. Thus, for example, if 
51 1
3 9 9
$30 $45 $90
L
 
=  
 
 then [ ]LE = 
51 1
3 9 9
(30) (45) (90)+ + = 45. Recall also (Definition 3.14, Chapter 3) that a 
person is said to be risk neutral if she considers a money lottery to be just as 
good as its expected value. For example, a risk-neutral person would consider 
getting $45 with certainty to be just as good a playing lottery 
                                                 
1 In the next section we will consider more general lotteries, where the outcomes need not be 
sums of money, and also introduce the theory of expected utility which will then be used in 
the context of games in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Chapter 
4 
A 
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51 1
3 9 9
$30 $45 $90
L
 
=  
 
. We can now consider different attitudes to risk, besides 
risk neutrality. 
Definition 4.1.  Let L be a money lottery and consider the choice between L 
and the degenerate lottery 
$ [ ]
1
L 
 
 
E
 (that is, the choice between facing the 
lottery L or getting the expected value of L with certainty). Then 
• An individual who prefers $ [ ]LE  for certain to L is said to be risk 
averse. 
• An individual who is indifferent between $ [ ]LE  for certain and L is said 
to be risk neutral. 
• An individual who prefers L to $ [ ]LE  for certain is said to be risk 
loving. 
Note the following: if an individual is risk neutral, has transitive preferences 
over money lotteries and prefers more money to less, then we can tell how that 
individual ranks any two money lotteries. For example, how would such an 
individual rank the two lotteries 1 51 1
3 9 9
$30 $45 $90
L
 
=  
 
 and 2 3 2
5 5
$5 $100
L
 
=  
 
? 
Since 1[ ] 45L =E  and the individual is risk neutral, 1 $45L ∼ ; since  2[ ] 43L =E  
and the individual is risk neutral, 2$43 L∼ ; since the individual prefers more 
money to less, $45 $43≻ ; thus, by transitivity, 1 2L L≻ . On the other hand, 
knowing that an individual is risk averse, has transitive preferences over money 
lotteries and prefers more money to less is not sufficient to predict how she will 
choose between two arbitrary money lotteries. For example, as we will see later 
(Exercise 4.11), it is possible that one such individual will prefer 3
$28
1
L
 
=  
 
 
(whose expected value is 28) to 4 1 1
2 2
$10 $50
L
 
=  
 
 (whose expected value is 27), 
while another such individual will prefer 4L   to 3L . Similarly, knowing that an 
individual is risk loving, has transitive preferences over money lotteries and 
prefers more money to less is not sufficient to predict how she will choose 
between two arbitrary money lotteries. 
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Remark 4.1.  Note that “rationality” does not and cannot dictate whether an 
individual should be risk neutral, risk averse or risk loving: an individual’s 
attitude to risk is merely a reflection of that individual’s preferences. It is a 
generally accepted principle that de gustibus non est disputandum (in matters of 
taste, there can be no disputes). According to this principle, there is no such 
thing as an irrational preference and thus there is no such thing as an irrational 
attitude to risk. As a matter of fact, most people reveal through their choices 
(e.g. the decision to buy insurance) that they are risk averse, at least when the 
stakes are high. 
As noted above, with the exception of risk-neutral individuals, even if we 
restrict attention to money lotteries we are not able to say much about how an 
individual would choose among lotteries. What we need is a theory of 
“rational” preferences over lotteries that is general enough to cover lotteries 
whose outcomes are not just sums of money and is capable of accounting for 
different attitudes to risk in the case of money lotteries. One such theory is the 
theory of expected utility, to which we now turn. 
 Test your understanding of the concepts introduced in this section, by going 
through the exercises in Section 4.E.1 of Appendix 4.E at the end of this chapter. 
 
 
4.2 Expected utility: theorems 
The theory of expected utility was developed by the founders of game theory, 
namely John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, in their 1944 book 
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. In a rather unconventional way, we 
shall first (in this section) state the main result of the theory (which we split 
into two theorems) and then (in the following section) explain the assumptions 
(or axioms) behind that result. The reader who is not interested in 
understanding the conceptual foundation of expected utility theory, but wants 
to understand what the theory says and how it can be used, can thus study this 
section and skip the next. First we review the notation. 
Let O be a set of basic outcomes. Note that a basic outcome need not be a sum of 
money: it could be the state of an individual’s health, or whether the individual 
under consideration receives an award, or whether it will rain on the day of her 
planned outdoor party, etc. Let ( )OL  be the set of simple lotteries (or 
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probability distributions) over O. We will assume throughout that O is a finite 
set: 1 2{ , ,..., )mO o o o= . Thus an element of ( )OL  is of the form  
1 2
1 2
...
...
m
m
o o o
p p p
 
 
 
 with 1 20 1,   1,2,...,  ... 1i mp i m p p p≤ ≤ = + + + =for all and .  
We will use the symbol L (with or without subscript) to denote an element of 
( )OL , that is, a simple lottery. Lotteries are used to represent situations of 
uncertainty. For example, if m = 4 and the individual faces the lottery 
1 2 3 4
2 1 2
5 5 5
0
o o o o
L
 
=  
 
 then she knows that, eventually, the outcome will be one 
and only one of 1 2 3 4, , ,o o o o , but does not know which one; furthermore, she is 
able to quantify her uncertainty by assigning probabilities to these outcomes. 
We take these probabilities either as objectively obtained from relevant past 
data or as subjective estimates by the individual. For example, an individual 
who is considering whether or not to insure her bicycle against theft for the 
following 12 months, knows that there are two relevant basic outcomes: either 
the bicycle will be stolen or it will not be stolen. Furthermore, she can look up 
data about past bicycle thefts in her area and use the proportion of bicycles that 
was stolen as an “objective” estimate of the probability that her bicycle will be 
stolen; alternatively, she can use a more subjective estimate: for example she 
might use a lower probability of theft than suggested by the data because she 
knows herself to be very conscientious and – unlike other people – to always 
lock her bicycle when left unattended.  
The assignment of zero probability to a particular basic outcome is taken to be 
an expression of belief not of impossibility: the individual is confident that the 
outcome will not arise, but she cannot rule out that outcome on logical 
grounds or by appealing to the laws of nature. 
Among the elements of ( )OL  there are the degenerate lotteries that assign 
probability 1 to one basic outcome: for example, if m = 4 one degenerate 
lottery is 1 2 3 4
0 0 1 0
o o o o 
 
 
. To simplify the notation we will often denote 
degenerate lotteries as basic outcomes, that is, instead of writing 
1 2 3 4
0 0 1 0
o o o o 
 
 
 we will simply write 3o . Thus, in general, the degenerate 
lottery  1 1 1
... ...
0 0 0 1 0 0 0
i i i mo o o o o− + 
 
 
 will be denoted by io . As another 
simplification, we will often omit those outcomes that are assigned zero 
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probability. For example, if m = 4, the lottery 1 2 3 4
1 2
3 3
0 0
o o o o 
 
 
 will be 
written more simply as 1 3
1 2
3 3
o o 
 
 
. 
Throughout this chapter we shall call the individual under consideration the 
Decision-Maker, or DM for short. The theory of expected utility assumes that 
the DM has a complete and transitive ranking  of the elements of ( )OL  
(indeed, this is one of the axioms listed in the next section). By completeness, 
given any two lotteries L  and L′ , either L L′≻  (the DM prefers L  to L′ ) or 
L L′ ≻  (the DM prefers L′  to L ) or L L′∼  (the DM is indifferent between L  
and L′ ). Furthermore, by transitivity, for any three lotteries 1 2 3,   L L Land , if 
1 2L L  (the DM considers 1L  to be at least as good as 2L ) and  2 3L L  then 
1 3L L .  Besides completeness and transitivity, a number of other “rationality” 
constraints are postulated on the ranking  of the elements of ( )OL ; these 
constraints are the so-called Expected Utility Axioms and are discussed in the 
next section.  
Definition 4.2.  A ranking  of the elements of ( )OL  that satisfies the 
Expected Utility Axioms is called a von Neumann-Morgenstern ranking. 
The following two theorems are the key results in the theory of expected 
utility. 
Theorem 4.1 [von Neumann-Morgenstern, 1944].  Let { }1 2, ,..., mO o o o=  be a 
set of basic outcomes and ( )OL  the set of lotteries over O. If    is a von 
Neumann-Morgenstern ranking of the elements of ( )OL  then there exists a 
function :U O → R ,  called a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, that 
assigns a number (called utility) to every basic outcome and is such that, for any 
two lotteries 1 2
1 2
...
...
m
m
o o o
L
p p p
 
=  
 
 and 1 2
1 2
...
...
m
m
o o o
L
q q q
 
′ =  
 
,  
L L′≻   if and only if  [ ( )] [ ( )]U L U L′>E E   and 
L L′∼   if and only if  [ ( )] [ ( )]U L U L′=E E  
where 
 1 2
1 2
( ) ( ) ... ( )
( )
...
m
m
U o U o U o
U L
p p p
 
=  
 
, 1 2
1 2
( ) ( ) ... ( )
( )
...
m
m
U o U o U o
U L
q q q
 
′ =  
 
, 
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[ ( )]U LE  is the expected value of the lottery ( )U L  and [ ( )]U L′E  is the expected 
value of the lottery ( )U L′ , that is,  
1 1 2 2[ ( )] ( ) ( ) ... ( )m mU L pU o p U o p U o= + + +E  
1 1 2 2[ ( )] ( ) ( ) ... ( )m mU L qU o q U o q U o′ = + + +E . 
[ ( )]U LE  is called the expected utility of lottery L  (and [ ( )]U L′E  the expected 
utility of lottery L′ ).  
We say that any function :U O → R  that satisfies the property that, for any 
two lotteries   L L′and , L L′  if and only if [ ( )] [ ( )]U L U L′≥E E  represents the 
preferences (or ranking) .  
Before we comment on Theorem 4.1 we give an example of how one can use of 
it. Theorem 4.1 sometimes allows us to predict an individual’s choice between 
two lotteries C and D if we know how that individual ranks two different 
lotteries A and B.  For example, suppose  we observe that Susan is faced with 
the choice between lotteries A and B below and she says that she prefers A to B 
A  =  1 2 3
0 0.25 0.75
o o o 
 
 
                    B  = 1 2 3
0.2 0 0.8
o o o 
 
 
 . 
With this information we can predict which of the following two lotteries C 
and D she will choose, if she has von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences: 
C  =  1 2 3
0.8 0 0.2
o o o 
 
 
                    D  = 1 2 3 2
0 1 0
o o o
o
 
= 
 
 . 
Applying the theorem, let U be a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function 
whose existence is guaranteed by Theorem 4.1. Let U(o1) = a, U(o2) = b and 
U(o3) = c (where a, b and c are numbers). Then, since Susan prefers A to B, the 
expected utility of A must be greater than the expected utility of B:  
0.25b+0.75c > 0.2a+0.8c. This inequality is equivalent to  0.25b > 0.2a + 0.05c  
or, dividing both sides by 0.25,  b > 0.8a+0.2c. It follows from this and 
Theorem 4.1 that Susan prefers D to C, because the expected utility of D is b 
and the expected utility of C is 0.8a+0.2c. Note that, in this example, we 
merely used the fact that a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function exists, 
even though we don’t know what the values of this function are.  
Theorem 4.1 is an example of a representation theorem and is a generalization of 
a similar result for the case of the ranking of a finite set of basic outcomes O. It 
is not difficult to prove that if  is a complete and transitive ranking of O then 
there exists a function :U O → R , called a utility function (see Chapter 1), such 
that, for any two basic outcomes ,o o O′∈ , ( ) ( )U o U o′≥  if and only if o o′ . 
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Now, it is quite possible that an individual has a complete and transitive 
ranking of O, is fully aware of her ranking  and yet she is not able to answer 
the question “what is your utility function?”, perhaps because she has never 
heard about utility functions. A utility function is a tool that we use to 
represent her ranking, nothing more than that. The same applies to von 
Neumann-Morgenstern rankings: Theorem 4.1 tells us that if an individual has 
a von Neumann-Morgenstern ranking of the set of lotteries ( )OL  then there 
exists a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function that we can use to 
represent her preferences, but it would not make sense for us to ask the 
individual “what is your von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function?” (indeed 
this was a question that could not even be conceived before von Neumann and 
Morgenstern stated and proved Theorem 4.1 in 1944!). Theorem 4.1 tells us 
that such a function exists. The next theorem can be used to actually construct 
such a function by asking the individual to answer a few questions, formulated 
in a way that is fully comprehensible to her (that is, without using the word 
‘utility’). 
The next theorem says that, although there are many utility functions that 
represent a given von Neumann-Morgenstern ranking, once you know one 
function you know them all, in the sense that there is a simple operation that 
takes you from one function to the other. 
Theorem 4.2 [von Neumann-Morgenstern, 1944].  Let    be a von 
Neumann-Morgenstern ranking of the set of basic lotteries ( )OL , where 
{ }1 2, ,..., mO o o o= . Then the following are true. 
(A) If :U O → R  is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function that 
represents  , then, for any two real numbers a and b with a > 0, the 
function :V O → R  defined by ( ) ( )i iV o aU o b= +  (i = 1,2,…,m) is also a 
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function that represents  . 
 (B) If :U O → R  and :V O → R  are two von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
functions that represent  , then there exist two real numbers a and b with  
a > 0 such that ( ) ( )i iV o aU o b= +  ( i = 1,2,…,m). 
Proof. The proof of (A) of Theorem 4.2 is very simple. Let a and b be two 
numbers, with a > 0. The hypothesis is that :U O → R  is a von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function that represents , that is, that, for any two 
lotteries 1
1
...
...
m
m
o o
L
p p
 
=  
 
 and 1
1
...
...
m
m
o o
L
q q
 
′ =  
 
,  
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1 1 1 1
                     
( ) ... ( ) ( ) ... ( )m m m m
L L
pU o p U o qU o q U o
′
+ + ≥ + +
if  and only if
                     (♣) 
Multiplying both sides of the above inequality by a > 0 and adding 
( )1 ... mp p b+ +  to both sides we obtain  
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
( ) ... ( ) ( ) ... ( )
( ) ... ( ) ( ) ... ( )
m m m m
m m m m
pU o p U o qU o q U o
p aU o b p aU o b q aU o b q aU o b
+ + ≥ + +
+ + + + ≥ + + + +
if  and only if      
(♦) 
Defining ( ) ( )i iV o aU o b= + , it follows from (♣) and (♦) that  
1 1 1 1
                     
( ) ... ( ) ( ) ... ( )m m m m
L L
pV o p V o qV o q V o
′
+ + ≥ + +
if  and only if
 
That is, the function V is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function that 
represents the ranking  .  
The proof of Part (B) will be given later, after introducing some more notation 
and some observations.   
Since among the lotteries there are the degenerate ones that assign probability 1 
to a single basic outcome, this implies that the DM has a complete and 
transitive ranking of the basic outcomes. We shall write besto  for a best basic 
outcome, that is, a basic outcome which is at least as good as any other 
outcome ( ,  besto o o O∈for every ) and worsto  for a worst basic outcome, that is, 
a basic outcome such that every other outcome is at least as good as it 
( ,  worsto o o O∈for every ). Note that there may be several best outcomes (then 
the DM would be indifferent among them) and several worst outcomes. We 
shall assume throughout that the DM is not indifferent among all the 
outcomes, that is, we shall assume that best worsto o≻ . 
We now show that, in virtue of Theorem 4.2, among the von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility functions that represent a given von Neumann-
Morgenstern ranking  of ( )OL , there is one that assigns the value 1 to the 
best basic outcome(s) and the value 0 to the worst basic outcome(s). To see this, 
consider an arbitrary von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function :F O → R  
that represents  and define :G O → R  as follows: for every o O∈ , 
( ) ( ) ( )worstG o F o F o= − . Then, by Theorem 4.5, G is also a utility function that 
represents  and, by construction, ( ) ( ) ( ) 0worst worst worstG o F o F o= − = ; note also 
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that, since best worsto o≻ , it follows that ( ) 0bestG o > . Finally, define :U O → R  as 
follows: for every o O∈ , 
( )
( )
( )best
G o
U o
G o
=  . Then, by Theorem 4.2, U is a utility 
function that represents  and, by construction, ( ) 0worstU o =  and ( ) 1bestU o = .  
For example, if there are six basic outcomes and the ranking of the basic 
outcomes is 3 6 1 4 2 5o o o o o o∼ ≻ ≻ ≻ ∼ , then one can take as besto  either 3 6  o oor  
and as worsto  either 2 5  o oor ; furthermore, if F is given by 
1 2 3 4 5 6outcome
2 2 8 0 2 8
o o o o o o
F − −
 
  then G is the function  1 2 3 4 5 6
4 0 10 2 0 10
o o o o o o
  and U is the function  
1 2 3 4 5 6
0.4 0 1 0.2 0 1
o o o o o o
. 
Definition 4.3.  Let :U O → R  be a utility function that represents a given von 
Neumann-Morgenstern ranking  of the set of lotteries ( )OL . We say that U 
is the normalized utility function if ( ) 0worstU o =  and ( ) 1bestU o = . 
The transformations described above show how to normalize any given utility 
function. 
Armed with the notion of normalized utility function we can now complete 
the proof of Theorem 4.2. 
Proof of Part (B) of Theorem 4.2. Let :F O → R  and :G O → R  be two von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions that represent a given von Neumann-
Morgenstern ranking of ( )OL . Let :U O → R  be the normalization of F and  
:V O → R  be the normalization of G. First we show that it must be that U = 
V, that is, ( ) ( )U o V o=  for every o O∈ . Suppose, by contradiction,  that there 
is an oˆ O∈  such that ˆ ˆ( ) ( )U o V o≠ . Without loss of generality we can assume 
that ˆ ˆ( ) ( )U o V o> . Construct the following lottery: 
ˆ ˆ1
best worsto o
L
p p
 
=  − 
 with 
ˆ ˆ( )p U o= . Then  ˆ[ ( )] [ ( )] ( )U L V L U o= =E E . Hence, according to U it must be 
that oˆ L∼  (this follows from Theorem 4.1), while according to V it must be 
(again, by Theorem 4.1) that ˆL o≻  (since ˆ ˆ[ ( )] ( ) ( )V L U o V o= >E ). Then U and 
V cannot be two representations of the same ranking.  
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Now let 1
1
( ) ( )best worst
a
F o F o
=
−
  and 1
( )
( ) ( )
worst
best worst
F o
b
F o F o
= −
−
 . Note that 
1 0a > . Then it is easy to verify that,  o O∈for every , 1 1( ) ( )U o a F o b= + . 
Similarly let 2
1
( ) ( )best worst
a
G o G o
=
−
  and 2
( )
( ) ( )
worst
best worst
G o
b
G o G o
= −
−
; again, 
2 0a >  and, for every o O∈ , 2 2( ) ( )V o a G o b= + . We can invert the latter 
transformation and obtain that,  o O∈for every , 2
2 2
( )
( )
bV o
G o
a a
= − . Thus we 
can transform F into U, which − as proved above − is the same as V, and then 
transform V into G  as follows: ( ) ( )G o aF o b= +  where 1
2
0
a
a
a
= >  and 
1 2
2
b b
b
a
−
= .    
Remark 4.2.  Theorem 4.2 is often stated as follows: a utility function that 
represents a von Neumann-Morgenstern ranking  of ( )OL  is unique up to a 
positive affine transformation.
2
 Because of Theorem 4.2, a von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function is usually referred to as a cardinal utility function. 
Theorem 4.1 guarantees the existence of a utility function that represents a 
given von Neumann-Morgenstern ranking  of ( )OL  and Theorem 4.2 
characterizes the set of such functions. Can one actually construct a utility 
function that represents a given ranking? The answer is affirmative: if there are 
m basic outcomes one can construct an individual’s von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility function by asking her at most ( 1)m −  questions. The first question is 
“what is your ranking of the basic outcomes?”. Then we can construct the 
normalized utility function by first assigning the value 1 to the best outcome(s) 
and the value 0 to the worst outcome(s). This leaves us with at most ( 2)m −  
values to determine. For this we appeal to one of the axioms discussed in the 
next section, namely the Continuity Axiom, which says that, for every basic 
outcome io  there is a probability [0,1]ip ∈  such that the DM is indifferent 
between io  for certain and the lottery that gives a best outcome with 
probability ip  and a worst outcome with probability ( )1 ip− :  
1
best worst
i
i i
o o
o
p p
 
 − 
∼ . Thus, for each basic outcome io  for which a utility has not 
                                                 
2 An affine transformation is a function :f →R R  of the form ( )f x ax b= +  with ,a b∈R . The 
affine transformation is positive if  a > 0. 
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been determined yet, we should ask the individual to tell us the value of ip  
such that 
1
best worst
i
i i
o o
o
p p
 
 − 
∼ ; then we can then set ( )i i iU o p= , because the 
expected utility of the lottery  
1
best worst
i i
o o
p p
 
 − 
 is ( )( ) 1 ( )i i best i i worstpU o p U o+ − =  
( )(1) 1 0i i ip p p+ − = .  
Example 4.1.  Suppose that there are five basic outcomes, that is, 
{ }1 2 3 4 5, , , ,O o o o o o=  and the DM, who has von Neumann-Morgenstern 
preferences, tells us that her ranking of the basic outcomes is as follows:  
2 1 5 3 4o o o o o≻ ∼ ≻ ∼ . 
Then we can begin by assigning utility 1 to the best outcome 2o  and utility 0 to 
the worst outcomes 3 4  o oand :  
1 2 3 4 5
? 1 0 0 ?
o o o o o 
 
 
outcome
utility
. There is only 
one value left to be determined, namely the utility of  1o  (which is also the 
utility of 5o , since 1 5o o∼ ). To find this value, we ask the DM to tell us what 
value of p makes her indifferent between the lottery 2 3
1
o o
L
p p
 
=  − 
 and 
outcome 1o  with certainty. Suppose that her answer is: 0.4. Then her 
normalized von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is 
1 2 3 4 5
0.4 1 0 0 0.4
o o o o o 
 
 
outcome
utility
.  Knowing this, we can predict her choice 
among any set of lotteries over the five basic outcomes. 
 Test your understanding of the concepts introduced in this section, by going 
through the exercises in Section 4.E.2 of Appendix 4.E at the end of this chapter. 
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4.3 Expected utility: the axioms 
We can now turn to the list of “rationality” axioms proposed by von Neumann 
and Morgenstern. Let { }1 2, ,..., mO o o o=   be the set of basic outcomes and ( )OL  
the set of simple lotteries, that is, the set of probability distributions over O. 
Let  be a binary relation on ( )OL . We say that  is a von Neumann-
Morgenstern ranking of ( )OL  if it satisfies the following four axioms or 
properties. 
Axiom 1 [Completeness and transitivity].  is complete and transitive. 
As noted in the previous section, Axiom 1 implies that there is a complete and 
transitive ranking of the basic outcomes. Recall that besto  denotes a best basic 
outcome and worsto  denotes a worst basic outcome and that we are assuming 
that best worsto o≻ , that is, that the DM is not indifferent among all the basic 
outcomes. 
Axiom 2 [Monotonicity]. 
1 1
best worst best worsto o o o
p p q q
   
   − −   
  if and only if p ≥ q. 
Axiom 3 [Continuity]. For every basic axioms io  there is a [0,1]ip ∈  such that 
1
best worst
i
i i
o o
o
p p
 
 − 
∼ .  
Before we introduce the last axiom we need one more definition.  
Definition 4.1.  A compound lottery is a lottery of the form 1 2
1 2
...
...
r
r
x x x
p p p
 
 
 
 
where each ix  is either an element of O or an element of ( )OL . Given a 
compound lottery 1 2
1 2
...
...
r
r
x x x
p p p
 
=  
 
C  the corresponding simple lottery 
1 2
1 2
...
( )
...
m
m
o o o
L
q q q
 
=  
 
C  is defined as follows. First of all, for i = 1,…,m and j 
= 1,…,r, define  
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1 1 1
1 1 12
1 if 
( ) 0 if  with 
... ...
if 
... ...
j i
i j j k
i i i m
i j
i i i m
x o
o x x o k i
o o o o o
s x
s s s s s
− +
− +


=

= = ≠
   =    
. 
Then 
1
( )
r
i j i j
j
q p o x
=
= ∑ . 
For example, let m = 4. Then 1 2 3 4
2 1 2
5 5 5
0
o o o o
L
 
=  
 
 is a simple lottery (an 
element of ( )OL ), while 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 31 1 1 1 1 1
3 6 3 6 5 5 5
0
1 1 1
2 4 4
o o o o o o o o
o
    
    
    =
 
 
 
C  is a 
compound lottery (with r = 3).  The compound lottery C  can be viewed 
graphically as a tree, as shown in Figure 4.1. 
o
1
o
1
o
1
o o
2 3
o
3
o
4
o
4
1
2
1
4
1
4
1
3 1
3
1
6
1
6
1
5
1
5
3
5
 
Figure 4.1 
The compound lottery C . 
Then 1 11 1 1 2 1 33 5( ) , ( ) 1 and ( )o x o x o x= = =  so that ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 11 2 3 4 4 5(1)+q = + = 2860 . 
Similarly, ( ) ( ) 51 1 1 1 12 2 6 4 4 12 60(0)+ 0q = + = = ,  ( ) ( ) 131 1 1 1 13 2 3 4 4 5 60(0)+q = + =  and 
( ) ( )31 1 1 1 144 2 6 4 4 5 60(0)+q = + = .  These numbers correspond to multiplying the 
probabilities along the edges of the tree of Figure 4.1 leading to an outcome, as 
shown in Figure 4.2 (a) and then adding up the probabilities of each outcome, 
as shown in Figure 4.2 (b). Thus the simple lottery ( )L C  that corresponds to 
C  is 1 2 3 4
28 5 13 14
60 60 60 60
( )
o o o o
L
 
=  
 
C , namely the lottery shown in Figure 4.2 (b).  
GAME THEORY – Giacomo Bonanno 
171 
 
o
1
o
1
o
1
o o
2 3
o
3
o
4
o
4
1
4
1
6 1
6
1
12
1
12 1
20
1
20
3
20
 
(a) Simplification of Figure 4.1 obtained by condensing paths into simple edges 
and associating with the simple edges the products of the probabilities along the 
path. 
o
1
o o
2 3
o
4
13
60
28
60
5
60
14
60
 
(b) Simplification of Part (a) obtained by adding, for each outcome,  
the probabilities of that outcome. 
Figure 4.2 
Axiom 4 [Independence or substitutability]. Consider an arbitrary basic 
outcome io  and an arbitrary simple lottery 
1 1 1
1 1 1
... ...
... ...
i i i m
i i i m
o o o o o
L
p p p p p
− +
− +
 
=  
 
. If Lˆ  is a simple lottery such that ˆio L∼  
then L M∼  where M is the simple lottery corresponding to the compound 
lottery 1 1 1
1 1 1
ˆ... ...
... ...
i i m
i i i m
o o L o o
p p p p p
− +
− +
 
=   
 
C  (Definition 4.9) obtained by 
replacing io  with Lˆ  in L. 
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We can now prove the first theorem of the previous section. 
Proof of Theorem 4.1. To simplify the notation, throughout this proof we 
will assume that we have renumbered the basic outcomes in such a way that  
1besto o=  and worst mo o= . 
First of all, for every basic outcome io , let [0,1]iu ∈  be such that 
1
1
m
i
i i
o o
o
u u
 
 − 
∼ .                                              
The existence of such values 'iu s  is guaranteed by the Continuity Axiom 
(Axiom 3); clearly 1 1 and 0mu u= = .  Now consider an arbitrary lottery 
1
1
1
...
...
m
m
o o
L
p p
 
=  
 
. First we show that 
1
1
1 1
1
m
m m
i i i i
i i
o o
L
p u p u
= =
 
 
 − 
 
∑ ∑
∼                                             († ) 
This is done through a repeated application of the Independence Axiom 
(Axiom 4), as follows: consider the compound lottery 
1
1 3
2 22
1 2 3
...
1
...
m
m
m
o o
o o o
u u
p p p p
  
  −=   
 
 
C  obtained by replacing 2o  in lottery 1L   
with the lottery 1
2 21
mo o
u u
 
 − 
 that the DM considers to be just as good as 2o . 
The simple lottery corresponding to 2C  is 
1 3 1
2
1 2 2 3 1 2 2
...
... (1 )
m m
m m
o o o o
L
p p u p p p p u
−
−
 
=  + + − 
. Note that 2o  is assigned 
probability 0 in 2L  and thus we have omitted it. By Axiom 4, 1 2L L∼ .  Now 
apply the same argument to 2L : let 
1
1
3 33
1 2 2 3 2 2
...
1
... (1 )
m
m
m
o o
o o
u u
p p u p p p u
  
  −=   
 + + − 
C  whose corresponding 
simple lottery is 
1
3
1 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3
...
... (1 ) (1 )
m
m
o o
L
p p u p u p p u p u
 
=  + + + − + − 
. 
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Note, again, that  3o  is assigned probability zero in 3L . By Axiom 4, 2 3L L∼ ; 
thus, by transitivity (since  1 2L L∼  and 2 3L L∼ ) we have that 1 3L L∼ . 
Repeating this argument we get that 1 1mL L −∼ , where 
1
1
1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1... (1 ) ... (1 )
m
m
m m m m m
o o
L
p p u p u p p u p u
−
− − − −
 
=  + + + + − + + − 
. 
Since 1 1u =  and 0mu = ,   
1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1
1
... ...
m
m m m m m m i i
i
p p u p u p u p u p u p u p u− − − −
=
+ + + = + + + + = ∑  
and 
1
1
1 1
2 2 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
1
1 1
since 1
1 2 1since 1and 0
(1 ) ... (1 )
1
m
im
i
m m m m
m m m i i i i i i
i i i i
m m m
i i i m m i i
u
i i ipu
p u p u p p p u p p p u p
p p u p u p u p u
=
− −
− −
= = = =
−
=
= = ===
− + + − + = − = + − −
− − − −
∑
= =
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
 
Thus 
1
1
1 1
1
m
m m
m
i i i i
i i
o o
L
p u p u
−
= =
 
 =  − 
 
∑ ∑
, which proves († ).  
Now define the following utility function { }1: ,..., [0,1]mU o o → : ( )i iU o u= , 
where, as before, for every basic outcome io ,  [0,1]iu ∈  is such that 
1
1
m
i
i i
o o
o
u u
 
 − 
∼ . Consider two arbitrary lotteries 1
1
...
...
m
m
o o
L
p p
 
=  
 
 and 
1
1
...
...
m
m
o o
L
q q
 
′ =  
 
. We want to show that L L′  if and only if 
[ ] [ ]( ) ( )U L U L′≥E E , that is, if and only if 
1 1
m m
i i i i
i i
p u q u
= =
≥∑ ∑ . By († ), L M∼ , 
where  
1
1 1
1
m
m m
i i i i
i i
o o
M
p u p u
= =
 
 =  − 
 
∑ ∑
 and also L M′ ′∼ , where  
1
1 1
1
m
m m
i i i i
i i
o o
M
q u q u
= =
 
 ′ =  − 
 
∑ ∑
. Thus, by transitivity of ,  L L′  if and only if 
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M M ′ ; by the Monotonicity Axiom (Axiom 2), M M ′  if and only if 
1 1
m m
i i i i
i i
p u q u
= =
≥∑ ∑ .   
The following example, known as the Allais paradox,
3
 suggests that one should 
view expected utility theory as a prescriptive or normative theory (that is, as a 
theory about how rational people should choose) rather than as a descriptive 
theory (that is, as a theory about the actual behavior of individuals). In 1953 the 
French economist Maurice Allais published a paper regarding a survey he had 
conducted in 1952 concerning a hypothetical decision problem. Subjects “with 
good training in and knowledge of the theory of probability, so that they could 
be considered to behave rationally” were asked to rank the following pairs of 
lotteries: 
89 11
100 100
$5 million $0
A
 
=  
 
  versus  
90 10
100 100
$1 million $0
B
 
=  
 
 
and 
89 10 1
100 100 100
$5 million $1 million $0
C
 
=  
 
  versus  
$1 million
1
D
 
=  
 
. 
Most subjects reported the following ranking:  
A B≻  and D C≻ . 
Such ranking violates the axioms of expected utility. To see this, let 
{ }1 2 3, ,O o o o=  with 1 $5 o = million ,  2 $1 o = million  and 3 $0o = . Let us assume 
that the individual in question prefers more money to less: 1 2 3o o o≻ ≻  and has 
a von Neumann-Morgenstern ranking of the lotteries over O .  Let 2 (0,1)u ∈  is 
such that 
2 2
$5 million $0
1
D
u u
 
 − 
∼  (the existence of such 2u  is guaranteed by 
the Continuity Axiom). Then, since D C≻ , by transitivity  
2 2
$5 $0
1
C
u u
 
 − 
≻
million
                                          (♣) 
                                                 
3 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allais_paradox . 
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Let C′  be the simple lottery corresponding to the compound lottery 
2 2
89 10 1
100 100 100
$5 $0
$5 $0
1u u
  
  −  
 
 
million
million
. Then 
( )89 10 89 102 2100 100 100 100
$5 $0
1
C
u u
 
′ =  + − + 
million
. 
By the Independence Axiom, C C′∼  and thus, by (♣) and transitivity,  
( )89 10 89 102 2100 100 100 1002 2
$5 $0$5 $0
11 u uu u
  
   + − +−   
≻
millionmillion
 
Hence, by the Monotonicity Axiom, 89 102 2100 100u u> + , that is,  
2
89
90
u >                                                                   (♦) 
Let B′  be the simple lottery corresponding to the compound lottery 
2 2
90 10
100 100
$5 $0
$0
1u u
  
  −  
 
 
million
. Then 
90 90
2 2100 100
$5 $0
1
B
u u
 
′ =  − 
million
. By the 
Independence Axiom, B B′∼ ; thus, since A B≻ , by transitivity A B′≻  and 
therefore, by the Monotonicity Axiom, 89 90 2100 100 u> , that is, 
89
2 90
u < , 
contradicting (♦).  Thus, if one finds the expected utility axioms compelling as 
axioms of rationality, then one cannot consistently express a preference for A 
over B  and also a preference for D over C.  
Another well-known paradox is the Ellsberg paradox. Suppose you are told that 
an urn contains 30 red balls and 60 other balls that are either blue or yellow. 
You don't know how many blue or how many yellow balls there are, but the 
number of blue balls plus the number of yellow ball equals 60 (they could be all 
blue or all yellow or any combination of the two). The balls are well mixed so 
that each individual ball is as likely to be drawn as any other. You are given a 
choice between the bets A and B, where 
A = you get $100 if you pick a red ball and nothing otherwise, 
B = you get $100 if you pick a blue ball and nothing otherwise. 
Many subjects in experiments state a strict preference for A over B: A B≻ .  
Consider now the following bets: 
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C = you get $100 if you pick a red or yellow ball and nothing otherwise, 
D = you get $100 if you pick a blue or yellow ball and nothing otherwise. 
Do the axioms of expected utility constrain your ranking of C and D? Many 
subjects in experiments state the following ranking: A B≻  and D C . All 
such people violate the axioms of expected utility. The fraction of red balls in 
the urn is 30 1
90 3
=  Let 2p  be the fraction of blue balls and 3p  the fraction of 
yellow balls (either of these can be zero: all we know is that 60 22 3 90 3p p+ = =  ). 
Then A, B, C and D can be viewed as the following lotteries: 
1
2 33
$100 $0
A
p p
 
=  + 
 
1
2 33
$100 $0
B
p p
 
=  + 
 
1
3 23
$100 $0
C
p p
 
=  + 
 
2 1
2 3 3 3
$100 $0
D
p p
 
=  + = 
 
Let U be the normalized von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function that 
represents the individual’s ranking; then ($100) 1U =  and (0) 0U = . Thus 
[ ] 13( )U A =E , [ ] 2( )U B p=E , [ ] 1 33( )U C p= +E  and [ ] 22 3 3( )U D p p= + =E . 
Hence, A B≻  if and only if 1 23 p> , which implies that 
1
3 3
p > , so that 
[ ] [ ]1 233 3( ) ( )U C p U D= + > =E E  and thus C D≻  (similarly, B A≻  if and only 
if 1 23 p< , which implies that [ ] [ ]( ) ( )U C U D<E E  and thus D C≻ ). 
 
 Test your understanding of the concepts introduced in this section, by going 
through the exercises in Section 4.E.3 of Appendix 4.E at the end of this chapter. 
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Appendix 4.E: Exercises 
4.E.1 .  Exercises  for  Section 4 .1 :   
Money lotteries and attitudes to risk. 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this 
chapter. 
Exercise 4.1. What is the expected value of the lottery: 
1 2 1 2
6 6 6 6
24 12 48 6 
 
 
? 
Exercise 4.2. Consider the following lottery:  1 2 3
1 1 1
4 2 4
o o o 
 
 
, where  
o1 = you get an invitation to have dinner at the White House 
o2 = you get (for free) a puppy of your choice 
o3 = you get $600.   
What is the expected value of this lottery? 
Exercise 4.3. Consider the following money lottery 
3 3 31 2
12 12 12 12 12
$10 $15 $18 $20 $25 $30 $36
0 0
L
 
=  
 
. 
(a) What is the expected value of the lottery? 
(b) Ann says that, between getting $20 for certain and playing the above 
lottery, she would prefer the $20 for certain. What is her attitude to risk? 
(c) Bob prefers more money to less and has transitive preferences. He says 
that, given the same choice as Ann, he would prefer playing the lottery. 
What is his attitude to risk? 
Exercise 4.4. Sam has a debilitating illness and has been offered two mutually 
exclusive courses of action: (1) take some well-known drugs which have been 
tested for a long time and (2) take a new experimental drug. If he chooses (1) 
then for certain his pain will be reduced to a bearable level. If he chooses (2) 
then he has a 50% chance of being completely cured and a 50% chance of no 
benefits from the drug and possibly some harmful side effects. He chose (1). 
What is his attitude to risk? 
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4.E.2 .  Exercises for Section 4.2: Expected utility theory. 
Exercise 4.5. Ben is offered a choice between the following two money 
lotteries:  A = 
$4,000 $0
0.8 0.2
 
 
 
    and    B = 
$3,000
1
 
 
 
. He says he strictly 
prefers B to A. Which of the following two lotteries, C and D, will Ben choose 
if he satisfies the axioms of expected utility and prefers more money to less? 
C = 
$4,000 $0
0.2 0.8
 
 
 
            D = 
$3,000 $0
0.25 0.75
 
 
 
 
Exercise 4.6. There are three basic outcomes, 1 2 3,   o o oand . Ann satisfies the 
axioms of expected utility and her preferences over lotteries involving these 
three outcomes can be represented by the following von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function: 2 1 3( ) ( ) ( ) .V o a V o b V o c= = => >  Normalize 
the utility function. 
Exercise 4.7. Consider the following lotteries: 
L1 = 15
66
$3000 $2000 $1000 $500
0 0
 
  
 
,   L2 = 12
33
$3000 $2000 $1000 $500
0 0
 
  
 
 
L3 = 1 11 1
4 44 4
$3000 $2000 $1000 $500 
 
 
,   L4 = 1 1
2 2
$3000 $2000 $1000 $500
0 0
 
 
 
 
Jennifer says that she is indifferent between lottery L1 and getting $2,000 for 
certain. She is also indifferent between lottery L2 and getting  $1,000 for 
certain. Finally, she says that between L3 and L4 she would choose L3.  Is she 
rational according to the theory of expected utility? [Assume that  she prefers 
more money to less.] 
Exercise 4.8. Consider the following basic outcomes: o1 = a Summer internship 
at the White House,  o2 = a free 1-week vacation in Europe,  o3 = $800,  o4 = a 
free ticket to a concert. Rachel says that her ranking of these outcomes is 
1 2 3 4o o o o≻ ≻ ≻ . She also says that (1) she is indifferent between 
2
1
o 
 
 
 and 
1 4
4 1
5 5
o o 
 
 
 and (2) she is indifferent between 3
1
o 
 
 
 and 1 4
1 1
2 2
o o 
 
 
. If she satisfies 
the axioms of expected utility theory, which of the two lotteries 
1 2 3 4
1 31 2 2
8 8 8 8
o o o o
L
 
=  
 
  and 1 2 32 31 1
5 5 5
o o o
L
 
=  
 
  will she choose? 
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Exercise 4.9. Consider the following lotteries: 
1 2 1 1 2 4
10 10 10 10 10
$30 $28 $24 $18 $8
L
 
=  
 
  and  2 51 4
10 10 10
$30 $28 $8
L
 
=  
 
. 
(a) Which lottery would a risk neutral person choose?  
(b) Paul’s von Neumann-Morgenstern utility-of-money function is U(m) = 
ln(m), where ln denotes the natural logarithm. Which lottery would Paul 
choose? 
Exercise 4.10. There are five basic outcomes. Jane has a von Neumann-
Morgenstern ranking of the set of lotteries over the set of basic outcomes that 
can be represented by either of the utility functions U or V given below: 
1 2 3 4 5
: 44 170 10 26 98
: 32 95 5 23 59
o o o o o
U
V
 
 − 
 
 
. 
(a) Show how to normalize each of U and V and verify that you get the same 
normalized utility function. 
(b) Show how to transform U into V with a positive affine transformation of 
the form x ax b+֏  with ,a b∈R  and a > 0. 
Exercise 4.11. Consider the following lotteries: 3
$28
1
L
 
=  
 
,  4 1 1
2 2
$10 $50
L
 
=  
 
.  
(a) Ann has the following von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function: 
( )AnnU m m= . How does she rank the two lotteries? 
(b) Bob has the following von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function: 
4
3
( ) 2
100
Bob
m
U m m= − . How does he rank the two lotteries? 
(c) Verify that both Ann and Bob are risk averse, by determining what they 
would choose between lottery 4L  and its expected value for certain. 
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4.E.2 .  Exercises  for  Section 4 .3 :  Expected utility axioms. 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this 
chapter. 
Exercise 4.12. Let { }1 2 3 4, , ,O o o o o= . Find the simple lottery corresponding to 
the following compound lottery  
1 2 3 4 1 3 4 2 3
23 32 1 1 1 1 1 2
5 10 10 5 5 5 5 3 3
1 1 1 1
8 4 8 2
o o o o o o o o o
o
      
      
      
 
 
 
 
Exercise 4.13. Let { }1 2 3 4, , ,O o o o o= . Suppose that the DM has a von 
Neumann-Morgenstern ranking of ( )OL  and states the following indifference: 
2 4
1 31
4 4
o o
o
 
 
 
∼   and 3 42 3 2
5 5
o o
o
 
 
 
∼ . Find a lottery that the DM considers just as good 
as 1 2 3 4
1 2 1 1
3 9 9 3
o o o o
L
 
=  
 
.  
◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊ 
Exercise 4.14: Challenging Question. 
Would you be willing to pay more in order to reduce the probability of dying 
within the next hour from one sixth to zero or from four sixths to three sixths? 
Unfortunately, this is not a hypothetical question: you accidentally entered the 
office of an Italian mad scientist and have been overpowered and tied to a chair. 
The mad scientist has put six glasses in front of you, numbered 1 to 6, and tells 
you that one of them contains a deadly poison and the other five a harmless 
liquid. He says that he is going to roll a die and make you drink from the glass 
whose number matches the number that shows up from the rolling of the die. 
You beg to be exempted and he asks you “what is the largest amount of money 
that you would be willing to pay to replace the glass containing the poison 
with one containing a harmless liquid?”. Interpret this question as “what sum of 
money x makes you indifferent between (1) leaving the poison in whichever 
glass contains it and rolling the die, and (2) reducing your wealth by $x and 
rolling the die after the poison has been replaced by a harmless liquid”. Your 
answer is: $X. Then he asks you “suppose that instead of one glass with poison 
there had been four glasses with poison (and two with a harmless liquid); what 
is the largest amount of money that you would be willing to pay to replace one 
glass with poison with a glass containing a harmless liquid (and thus roll the die 
with 3 glasses with poison and 3 with a harmless liquid)?”. Your answer is: $Y.  
Show that if X Y>  then you do not satisfy the axioms of Expected Utility 
Theory. [Hint: think about what the basic outcomes are; assume that you do 
not care about how much money is left in your estate if you die and that, when 
alive, you prefer more money to less.] 
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Appendix 4.S: Solutions to exercises  
Exercise 4.1.  The expected value of the lottery  
1 2 1 2
6 6 6 6
24 12 48 6 
 
 
  is  
1 2 1 2
(24) (12) (48) (6) 18
6 6 6 6
+ + + =  
Exercise 4.2.  This was a trick question! There is no expected value because the 
basic outcomes are not numbers. 
Exercise 4.3. (a) The expected value is 
3 3 31 2
12 12 12 12 12
263
[ ] (10) (15) (0)(18) (20) (25) (0)(30) (36) $21.917
12
L = + + + + + + = =E
 
(b) Presumably Ann prefers more money to less, so that she prefers $21.917 to 
$20. She said that she prefers $20 to the lottery L. Thus, assuming that her 
preferences are transitive, she prefers $21.917 to L. Hence she is risk averse. 
(c) The answer is: we cannot tell. First of all, since Bob prefers more money to 
less, he prefers $21.917 to $20. Bob could be risk neutral, because a risk 
neutral person would be indifferent between L and $21.917; since Bob 
prefers $21.917 to $20 and has transitive preferences, if risk neutral he 
would prefer L to $20 for certain. However, Bob could also be risk loving: a 
risk-loving person prefers L to $21.917 and we know that he prefers $21.917 
to $20; thus, by transitivity, if risk loving, he would prefer L to $20 for 
certain.  But Bob could also be risk averse: he could consistently prefer 
$21.917 to L and L to $20 (for example, he could consider L to be just as 
good as $20.50). 
Exercise 4.4.  Just like Exercise 4.2, this was a trick question! Here the basic 
outcomes are not sums of money but states of health. Since the described 
choice is not one between money lotteries, the definitions of risk 
aversion/neutrality/love are not applicable. 
Exercise 4.5.  Since Ben prefers B to A, he must prefer D to C. 
Proof:  Let  U  be a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function that represents 
Ben's preferences. Let U($4,000) = a, U($3,000) = b and U($0) = c. Since Ben 
prefers more money to less, a > b > c.  Now, 
( ) 0.8 ($4,000) 0.2 ($0)EU A U U= +  0.8 0.2a c= +  and ( ) ($3,000)EU B U b= = . 
Since Ben prefers B to A, it must be that 0.8 0.2b a c> + .  Let us now compare 
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C and D: ( ) 0.2 0.8EU C a c= +  and ( ) 0.25 0.75EU D b c= + . Since 
0.8 0.2b a c> + , 0.25 0.25(0.8 0.2 )b a c> + = 0.2 0.05a c+  and thus, adding 0.75c  
to both sides, we get that 0.25 0.75 0.2 0.8b c a c+ > + , that is, EU(D) > EU(C), 
so that .D C≻   
Exercise 4.6.  Define the function U as follows: 
U(x)  =  
1 ( )
( )
c V x c
V x
a c a c a c
−
− =
− − −
  . 
Then U represents the same preferences as V (note that, by hypothesis, a > c 
and thus 1 0
a c− > ). Then 
2
2
( )
( )
V o c
U o
a c
−
=
−
 = 
a c
a c
−
−
 = 1,   11
( )
( )
V o c b c
U o
a c a c
− −
= =
− −
 ,   and 
3
3
( )
( ) 0
V o c c c
U o
a c a c
− −
= = =
− −
.   
Note that, since a b c> > ,  0 1
b c
a c
−
< <
−
. 
Exercise 4.7.  Suppose that there is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
function U that represents Jennifer’s preferences. We can normalize it so that  
U($3000) = 1 and U($500) = 0.  Since Jennifer is indifferent between L1 and 
$2000,  U($2000) = 
 5 
 6 .  Since she is indifferent between L2 and $1000,  
U($1000) = 
 2 
 3 .  Thus EU(L3) = 
 
 1 
 4  (1)+
 1 
 4  




 5 
 6 +
 1 
 4 




 2 
 3 + 
 1 
 4 (0) = 
 5 
 8     and   EU(L4) = 0(1)+
 1 
 2 




 5 
 6 +
 1 
 2 




 2 
 3 
+0(0) = 
 3 
 4  . Since  
 3 
 4  > 
 5 
 8 ,  Jennifer should prefer L4 over L3.  Hence she is 
not rational according to the theory of expected utility. 
Exercise 4.8.  Normalize her utility function so that U(z1) = 1 and U(z4) = 0. 
Then, since Rachel is indifferent between 2
1
o 
 
 
 and 1 4
4 1
5 5
o o 
 
 
, we have that 
U(o2) = 
4
5
. Similarly, since she is indifferent between 3
1
o 
 
 
 and 1 4
1 1
2 2
o o 
 
 
,  
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U(o3) = 
1
2
. Then the expected utility of 1 2 3 41 31 2 2
8 8 8 8
o o o o
L
 
=  
 
  is  
31 2 4 1 2
8 8 5 8 2 8
(1) ( ) ( ) (0)+ + + =  41
80
=  0.5125 , while the expected utility of 
1 2 3
2 31 1
5 5 5
o o o
L
 
=  
 
  is  31 4 1 1
5 5 5 5 2
(1) ( ) ( )+ + = .  39
50
0.78= . Hence she prefers L2  
to L1. 
Exercise 4.9.  (a) The expected value of L2 is 
51 4
10 10 10
(30) (28) 8 18.2+ + = . The 
expected value of L1 is 
2 1 1 2 4
10 10 10 10 10
(30) (28) (24) (18) (8) 18+ + + + = . Hence a risk-
neutral person would prefer L2 to L1. 
(b) The expected utility of L2 is 
1
10
ln 30( )⋅
2
5
ln 28( )⋅+
1
2
ln 8( )⋅+ 2.713=   while the 
expected utility of  L1 is 
1
5
ln 30( )⋅
1
10
ln 28( )⋅+
1
10
ln 24( )⋅+
1
5
ln 18( )⋅+
2
5
ln 8( )⋅+ 2.741= . 
Thus Paul prefers L1 to L2. 
Exercise 4.10.  (a) To normalize U first add 10 to each value and then divide by 
180. Denote the normalization of U by U . Then 
1 2 3 4 5
54 180 0 36 108
180 180 180 180 180
: 0.3 1 0 0.2 0.6
o o o o o
U
 
 = = = = = 
.  
To normalize V first subtract 5 from each value and then divide by 100. Denote 
the normalization of V by V . Then  
1 2 3 4 5
27 90 0 18 54
90 90 90 90 90
: 0.3 1 0 0.2 0.6
o o o o o
V
 
 = = = = = 
. 
(b) The transformation is of the form ( ) ( )V o aU o b= + . To find the values of a 
and b plug in two sets of values and solve the system of equations 
44 32
170 95
a b
a b
+ =

+ =
.  The solution is 1
2
, 10a b= = . Thus 1
2
( ) ( ) 10V o U o= + . 
Exercise 4.11.  (a) Ann prefers 3 4  L Lto . In fact, [ ]3( ) 28 5.2915AnnU L = =E  
while  [ ] 1 14 2 2( ) 10 50 5.1167AnnU L = + =E . 
(b) Bob prefers 4 3  L Lto . In fact, [ ]
4
3 3
28
( ) 2(28) 55.38534
100
BobU L = − =E  while  
[ ]
4 4
4 3 3
1 10 1 50
( ) 2(10) 2(50) 56.87
2 100 2 100
BobU L
   
= − + − =   
   
E . 
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(c) The expected value of lottery 4L  is $30; thus a risk-averse person would 
strictly prefer $30 with certainty to the lottery 4L . We saw in part (a) that 
for Ann the expected utility of lottery 4L  is 5.1167; the utility of $30 is 
30 5.47723= . Thus Ann would indeed choose $30 for certain over the 
lottery 4L . We saw in part (b) that for Bob the expected utility of lottery 
4L  is 56.87; the utility of $30 is 
4
3
30
2(30) 59.19
100
− =  . Thus Bob would 
indeed choose $30 for certain over the lottery 4L . 
Exercise 4.12.  The simple lottery is 1 2 3 4
18 103 95 24
240 240 240 240
o o o o 
 
 
.  For example, the 
probability of 2o  is computed as follows: ( ) ( ) 1031 1 1 1 1 18 10 4 8 2 3 240(1) (0)+ + + = .  
Exercise 4.13.  Using the stated indifference, use lottery L to construct the 
compound lottery 
3 42 4
3 433 21
5 54 4
1 2 1 1
3 9 9 3
o oo o
o o
   
   
    
 
 
, whose corresponding simple 
lottery is 1 2 3 4
1 11 121
12 45 180
0
o o o o
L
 
′ =  
 
. Then, by the Independence Axiom, L L′∼ .  
Exercise 4.14. Let W be your initial wealth. The basic outcomes are: 
1. you do not pay any money, don’t die and live to enjoy your wealth W 
(denote this outcome by A0), 
2. you pay $Y, don’t die and live to enjoy your remaining wealth W −Y (call 
this outcome AY), 
3. you pay $X, don’t die and live to enjoy your remaining wealth W −X (call 
this outcome AX), 
4. you die (call this outcome D); this could happen because (a) you do not pay 
any money, roll the die and drink the poison or (b) you pay $Y, roll the die 
and drink the poison; we assume that you are indifferent between these two 
outcomes. 
Since, by hypothesis, X Y> , your ranking of these outcomes must be 
0 Y XA A A D≻ ≻ ≻ . If you satisfy the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms, then 
your preferences can be represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
function U defined on the set of basic outcomes. We can normalize your utility 
function by setting 0( ) 1U A =  and ( ) 0U D = . Furthermore, it must be that  
( ) ( )Y XU A U A>      (♥) 
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The maximum amount p that you are willing to pay is that amount that makes 
you indifferent between (1) rolling the die with the initial number of poisoned 
glasses and (2) giving up $p and rolling the die with one less poisoned glass. 
Thus − based on your answers − you are indifferent between the two lotteries 
0
51
6 6
D A 
 
 
  and  
1
XA 
 
 
 and you are indifferent between the two lotteries: 
0
4 2
6 6
D A 
 
 
 and 
3 3
6 6
YD A 
 
 
.  Thus 
5 51
6 6 6
51
06 6
0 1
( ) ( ) ( )XU D U A U A
= + =
+ =

 and 
4 2 2 3 3
6 6 6 6 6
3 34 2
06 6 6 6
0 1 0 ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Y
Y
U A
U D U A U D U A
= + = = +
+ = +
 
. Hence 5
6
( )XU A =  and 
2 4
3 6
( )YU A = = , so 
that ( ) ( )X YU A U A> , contradicting (♥). 
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Mixed Strategies in  
Strategic-Form Games 
5.1 Strategic-form games with cardinal payoffs 
t the end of Chapter 3 we discussed the possibility of incorporating 
random events in extensive-form games by means of chance moves. 
The introduction of chance moves gives rise to probabilistic outcomes 
and thus to the issue of how a player might rank such outcomes. Random 
events can also occur in strategic-form games, as the following example 
illustrates.  
Example 5.1. Consider the following, very simple, first-price auction. Two 
players simultaneously submit a bid for a painting. Only two bids are possible: 
$100 and $200. If one player bids $200 and the other $100 then the high bidder 
wins the painting and has to pay her own bid. If the two players bid the same 
amount then a fair coin is tossed and if the outcome is Heads the winner is 
Player 1 (who then has to pay her own bid) while if the outcome is Tails the 
winner is Player 2 (who then has to pay her own bid). Define the following 
basic outcomes: 
1
2
3
4
:
:
:
:
o
o
o
o
Player 1 gets the painting and pays $100
Player 2 gets the painting and pays $100
Player 2 gets the painting and pays $200
Player 1 gets the painting and pays $200
 
Then this situation can be represented by means of the game-frame in strategic 
form shown in Table 5.1. 
Chapter 
5 
A 
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bid 
$100
bid
$200
Player 2
bid $100 bid $200
Player 1
3o
4o
1 2
1 1
2 2
o o 
 
 
3 4
1 1
2 2
o o 
 
 
 
where 
1
2
3
4
:
:
:
:
o
o
o
o
Player 1 gets the painting and pays $100
Player 2 gets the painting and pays $100
Player 2 gets the painting and pays $200
Player 1 gets the painting and pays $200
 
Table 5.1 
A game-frame in strategic form representing Example 5.1 
Suppose that Player 1 ranks the basic outcomes as follows: 1 4 2 3o o o o≻ ≻ ∼ , 
that is, she prefers winning to not winning; conditional on winning, she prefers 
to pay less and, conditional on not winning, she is indifferent as to how much 
Player 2 pays. Suppose also that Player 1 believes that Player 2 is going to 
submit a bid of $100 (perhaps she has been informed of this by somebody 
spying on Player 2). What should we expect Player 1 to do? Knowing her 
ranking of the basic outcomes is of no help, because we need to know how she 
ranks the probabilistic outcome 1 2
1 1
2 2
o o 
 
 
 relative to the basic outcome 4o .  
The theory of expected utility introduced in Chapter 4 provides one possible 
answer to the question of how players rank probabilistic outcomes. With the 
aid of expected utility theory we can now generalize the definition strategic-
form game. First we generalize the notion of game-frame in strategic form 
(Definition 1.1, Chapter 1) by allowing probabilistic outcomes, or lotteries, to 
be associated with strategy profiles.  In the following definition, the bulleted 
items coincide with the first three items of Definition 1.1 (Chapter 1); the 
modified item is the last one, preceded by the symbol ♦. 
GAME THEORY – Giacomo Bonanno 
188 
 
Definition 5.1.  A game-frame in strategic form is a quadruple ( ), , ,i i II S O f∈  
where: 
●   I = {1,…,n} is a set of players (n ≥ 2). 
●  For every Player i I∈ , iS  is the set of strategies (or choices) of Player i. As 
before, we denote by 1 ... nS S S= × ×  the set of strategy profiles. 
●  O is a set of basic outcomes.  
♦  : ( )f S O→ L  is a function that associates with every strategy profile s a 
lottery over the set of basic outcomes O (as in Chapter 4, we denote by 
( )OL  the set of lotteries, or probability distributions, over O). 
If,  for every s S∈ , ( )f s  is a degenerate lottery (that is, a basic outcome) then 
we are back to Definition 1.1 (Chapter 1). 
From a game-frame one obtains a game by adding, for every player i I∈  , a von 
Neumann-Morgenstern ranking i  of the elements of ( )OL . It is more 
convenient to represent such a ranking by means of a von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function :iU O →R . We denote by [ ( ( ))]iU f sE  the 
expected utility of lottery ( ) ( )f s O∈L  for Player i.  The following definition 
mirrors Definition 1.2 of Chapter 1. 
Definition 5.2.  A game in strategic form with cardinal payoffs is a quintuple 
( ) ( ), , , ,i ii I i II S O f∈ ∈  where: 
●   ( ), , ,i i II S O f∈  is a game-frame in strategic form (Definition 5.1) and 
●   for every Player i I∈ ,  i  is a von Neumann-Morgenstern ranking of the 
set of lotteries ( )OL . 
If we represent each ranking  i  by means of a von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility function iU   and define :i Sπ → R  by ( ) [ ( ( ))]i is U f sπ = E , then the 
triple ( ) ( )1 1, , ..., , , ...,n nI S S π π  is called a reduced-form game in strategic form 
with cardinal payoffs (‘reduced-form’ because some information is lost, namely 
the specification of the possible outcomes). The function :i Sπ → R  is called 
the von Neumann-Morgenstern payoff  function of Player i. 
For example, consider the first-price auction of Example 5.1 whose game-frame 
in strategic form was shown in Table 5.1.  Let 1 2 3 4{ , , , }O o o o o=  and suppose 
that Player 1 has a von Neumann-Morgenstern ranking of ( )OL  that is 
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represented by the following von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function 1U  
(note that the implied ordinal ranking of the basic outcomes is indeed 
1 4 2 3o o o o≻ ≻ ∼ ): 
1 2 3 4
1 : 4 1 1 2
o o o
U
ooutcome :
  
Then, for Player 1, the expected utility of lottery 1 2
1 1
2 2
o o 
 
 
 is 2.5 and the 
expected utility of lottery 3 4
1 1
2 2
o o 
 
 
 is 1.5. Suppose also that Player 2 has 
(somewhat spiteful) preferences represented by the following von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function 2U : 
1 2 3 4
2 : 1 6 4 5
o o o
U
ooutcome :
 
Thus, for Player 2, the expected utility of lottery 1 2
1 1
2 2
o o 
 
 
 is 3.5 and the 
expected utility of lottery 3 4
1 1
2 2
o o 
 
 
 is 4.5. Then we can represent the game in 
reduced form as shown in Table 5.2. 
$100 2.5 3.5 1 4
$200 2 5 1.5 4.5
Player 2
$100 $200
Player 1
 
Table 5.2 
A cardinal game in reduced form based on the game-frame of Table 5.1 
The game of Table 5.2 does not have any Nash equilibria. However, we will 
show in the next section that if we extend the notion of strategy, by allowing 
players to choose randomly, then the  game of Table 5.2 does have a Nash 
equilibrium. 
 Test your understanding of the concepts introduced in this section, by going 
through the exercises in Section 5.E.1 of Appendix 5.E at the end of this chapter. 
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5.2 Mixed strategies 
Definition 5.3.  Consider a game in strategic form with cardinal payoffs and 
recall that 
iS  denotes the set of strategies of Player i. From now on, we shall 
call 
iS  the set of pure strategies of Player i. We assume that iS  is a finite set (for 
every i I∈ ). A mixed strategy of Player i is a probability distribution over the 
set of pure strategies 
iS . The set of mixed strategies of Player i is denoted by iΣ .  
Remark 5.1.  Since among the mixed strategies of Player i there are the 
degenerate strategies that assign probability 1 to a pure strategy, the set of 
mixed strategies includes the set of pure strategies (viewed as degenerate 
probability distributions).  
For example, one possible mixed strategy for Player 1 in the game of Table 5.2 
is 
1 2
3 3
$100 $200 
 
 
. The traditional interpretation of a mixed strategy is in terms 
of objective randomization: the player, instead of choosing a pure strategy 
herself, delegates the choice to a random device.
4
 For example, Player 1 
choosing the mixed strategy 
1 2
3 3
$100 $200 
 
 
 is interpreted as a decision to let, 
say, a die determine whether she will bid $100 or $200: Player 1 will roll a die 
and if the outcome is 1 or 2 then she will bid $100, while if the outcome is 3, 4, 
5 or 6 then she will bid $200. Suppose that Player 1 chooses this mixed strategy 
and Player 2 chooses the mixed strategy 
3 2
5 5
$100 $200 
 
 
. Since the players rely 
on independent random devices, this pair of mixed strategies gives rise to the 
following probabilistic outcome: 
1 2 3 4
3 41 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
3 3 3 61 1 2 2 2 2 2 4
3 5 15 3 5 15 3 5 15 3 5 15
($100,$100) ($100,$200) ($200,$100) ($200,$200)
o o o o
o o
 
 
    
         = = = = 
strategy profile
outcome
probability
  
                                                 
4 An alternative interpretation of mixed strategies in terms of beliefs will be discussed in a later 
chapter. 
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If the two players have von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences, then - by the 
Compound Lottery Axiom (Chapter 4) – they will view the above as the 
following lottery: 
1 2 3 4
3 3 8 16
30 30 30 30
o o o o 
 
 
outcome
probability
. 
Using the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions postulated above, 
namely 
1 2 3 4
1
2
: 4 1
: 6
1
4
2
1 5U
U
o o o ooutcome :
 , the lottery 1 2 3 4
3 3 8 16
30 30 30 30
o o o o 
 
 
 has an 
expected utility of 3 3 8 16 55
30 30 30 30 30
4 1 1 2+ + + =  for Player 1 and 
3 3 8 16 133
30 30 30 30 30
1 6 4 5+ + + =  for Player 2.  Thus we can define the payoffs of the 
two players from this mixed strategy profile by 
31 2 2
3 3 5
1
5
$100 $200 $100 $200 55
0
,
3
    
=    
    
Π  and 
31 2 2
3 3 5
2
5
$100 $200 $100 $200
,
133
30
    
=    
  
Π
 
. 
Note that we can calculate these payoffs in a different − but equivalent − way 
by using the reduced-form game of Table 5.2, as follows.  
3 3 3 61 1 2 2 2 2 2 4
3 5 15 3 5 15 3 5 15 3 5 15
2
($100,$100) ($100,$200) ($200,$100) ($200,$200)
( , ) ( , ) ( ,3.5 4 5 4.5 1 2 .5, )5) (1.
 
 
 
 = = = = 
strategy profile
expected utilities
probability
 
so that the expected payoff of Player 1 is 3 6 552 4
15 15 15 15 30
(2.5) (1) (2) (1.5)+ + + =  and 
the expected payoff of Player 2 is 3 6 1332 4
15 15 15 15 30
(3.5) (4) (5) (4.5)+ + + = .  
The above example motivates the following definition. First some notation. Let 
i iσ ∈Σ  be a mixed strategy of player i; then, for every pure strategy i is S∈  of 
Player i, we denote by ( )i isσ  the probability that iσ  assigns to is .
5
 Let Σ  be 
the set of mixed-strategy profiles, that is, 1 ... nΣ = Σ × × Σ . Consider a mixed-
strategy profile 1( ,..., )nσ σ σ= ∈Σ  and a pure-strategy profile 1( ,..., )ns s s S= ∈ ; 
                                                 
5 In the above example, if 
1 1 2
3 3
$100 $200
σ
 
=  
 
 then 2
1 3
($200)σ = . 
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then we denote by ( )sσ  the product of the probabilities ( )i isσ , that is, 
1 1
1
( ) ( ) ( ) ... ( )
n
i i n n
i
s s s sσ σ σ σ
=
= = × ×∏ .
6
 
Definition 5.4.  Consider a reduced-form game in strategic form with cardinal 
payoffs ( ) ( )1 1, ,..., , , ...,n nG I S S π π=  (Definition 5.2), where, for every Player 
i I∈ , the set of pure strategies iS  is finite. Then the mixed-strategy extension of 
G is the reduced-form game in strategic form ( ) ( )1 1, , ..., , ,...,n nI Σ Σ Π Π  where, 
for every Player i I∈ , 
●  
iΣ  is the set of mixed strategies of Player i in G (that is, iΣ  is the set of 
probability distributions over iS ).  
●   The payoff function :iΠ Σ →R  is defined by ( ) ( ) ( )i i
s S
s sσ σ π
∈
Π = ∑ .
7
 
Definition 5.5.  Fix a reduced-form game in strategic form with cardinal 
payoffs ( ) ( )1 1, ,..., , , ...,n nG I S S π π=  (Definition 5.3), where, for every i I∈ , 
the set of pure strategies iS  is finite. A Nash equilibrium in mixed-strategies of G 
is a Nash equilibrium of the mixed-strategy extension of G. 
For example, consider the reduced-form game of Table 5.2, which is 
reproduced in Table 5.3 below with all the payoffs multiplied by 10 (this 
corresponds to representing the preferences of the players with different utility 
functions that are a obtained from the ones used above by multiplying them by 
10). Is 1 2( , )σ σ σ=  with 1 1 2
3 3
$100 $200
σ
 
=  
 
 and 2 3 2
5 5
$100 $200
σ
 
=  
 
 a mixed-strategy 
Nash equilibrium of this game? 
                                                 
6 In the above example, if 
1 2( , )σ σ σ=  with 1 1 2
3 3
$100 $200
σ
 
=  
 
 and 
2 3 2
5 5
$100 $200
σ
 
=  
   
then 
2
1 3
($200)σ = , 32 5($100)σ =  and thus ( ) 3 623 5 15($200,$100)σ = = . 
7 In the above example,  if  
1 1 2
3 3
$100 $200
σ
 
=  
 
 and 
2 3 2
5 5
$100 $200
σ
 
=  
   
then 
1 1 2( , )σ σΠ =  
3 6 552 4
15 15 15 15 30
(2.5) (1) (2) (1.5)+ + + = . 
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$100 25 35 10 40
$200 20 50 15 45
Player 2
$100 $200
Player 1
 
Table 5.3 
The game of Table 5.2 with the payoffs multiplied by 10 
The payoff of Player 1 is 3 6 552 41 1 2 15 15 15 15 3( , ) (25) (10) (20) (15)σ σΠ = + + + =  
18.33= . If Player 1 switched from 1 1 2
3 3
$100 $200
σ
 
=  
 
 to 1
$100 $200
ˆ
1 0
σ
 
=  
 
, that is, to 
the pure strategy $100, then Player 1’s payoff would be larger: 
3 2
1 1 2 5 5
ˆ( , ) (25) (10) 19σ σΠ = + = . Thus 1 2( , )σ σ  is not a Nash equilibrium.  
John Nash, who shared the 1994 Nobel prize in economics with John Harsanyi 
and Reinhard Selten, proved the following theorem. 
Theorem 5.1 [Nash, 1951].  Every reduced-form game in strategic form with 
cardinal payoffs ( ) ( )1 1, , ..., , ,...,n nI S S π π  (Definition 5.2), where, for every 
Player i I∈ , the set of pure strategies iS  is finite, has at least one Nash 
equilibrium in mixed-strategies. 
We will not give the proof of this theorem, since it is rather complex (it 
requires the use of fixed-point theorems).  
Going back to the game of Table 5.3, let us verify that, on the other hand, 
( )* * *1 2,σ σ σ=  with * *1 2 1 1
2 2
$100 $200
σ σ
 
= =  
 
 is a Nash equilibrium in mixed 
strategies. The payoff of Player 1 is 
* * 701 1 1 1
1 1 2 4 4 4 4 4
( , ) (25) (10) (20) (15) 17.5σ σΠ = + + + = = . 
Could Player 1 obtain a larger payoff with some other mixed strategy 
1
$100 $200
1p p
σ
 
=  − 
 for some 1
2
p ≠ ? Fix an arbitrary [0,1]p∈  and let us compute 
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Player 1’s payoff if she uses the strategy 1
$100 $200
1p p
σ
 
=  − 
 against Player 2’s 
mixed strategy 
*
2 1 1
2 2
$100 $200
σ
 
=  
 
: 
( ) ( )
1 1 1 1
1 2 2 2 21 1
2 2
351 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2
$100 $200$100 $200
, (25) (10) (1 )(20) (1 )(15)
1
25 10 (1 ) 20 15 17.5
p p p p
p p
p p
   
Π = + + − + − =   −    
+ + − + = =
 
Thus if  Player 2 uses the mixed strategy *2 1 1
2 2
$100 $200
σ
 
=  
 
, then Player 1 gets the 
same payoff no matter what mixed strategy she employs. It follows that any mixed 
strategy of Player 1 is a best reply to *2 1 1
2 2
$100 $200
σ
 
=  
 
; in particular, 
*
1 1 1
2 2
$100 $200
σ
 
=  
 
 is a best reply to 
*
2 1 1
2 2
$100 $200
σ
 
=  
 
. It is easy to verify that the 
same applies to Player 2: any mixed strategy of Player 2 is a best reply to Player 
1’s mixed strategy *1 1 1
2 2
$100 $200
σ
 
=  
 
. Hence ( )* * *1 2,σ σ σ=  is indeed a Nash 
equilibrium in mixed strategies.  
We will see in the next section that this “indifference” phenomenon is true in 
general. 
Remark 5.2.  Since, among the mixed strategies of Player i there are the 
degenerate strategies that assign probability 1 to a pure strategy (Remark 5.5), 
every Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is also a Nash equilibrium in mixed 
strategies. That is, the set of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria includes the set of 
pure-strategy Nash equilibria. 
 Test your understanding of the concepts introduced in this section, by going 
through the exercises in Section 5.E.2 of Appendix 5.E at the end of this chapter. 
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5.3 Computing the mixed-strategy Nash equilibria 
How can we find the mixed-strategy equilibria of a given game? The first 
important observation is that if a pure strategy is strictly dominated by another 
pure strategy then it cannot be played with positive probability at a Nash 
equilibrium. Thus, for the purpose of finding Nash equilibria, one can delete all 
the strictly dominated strategies and focus on the resulting game. But then the 
same reasoning applies to the resulting game and one can delete all the strictly 
dominated strategies in that game, and so on. Thus we have the following 
observation. 
Remark 5.3.  In order to find the mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of a game one 
can first apply the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies (IDSDS: 
Section 1.5.1, Chapter 1) and then find the Nash equilibria of the resulting 
game (which can then be viewed as Nash equilibria of the original game where 
all the pure strategies that were deleted are assigned zero probability). Note, 
however, that – as we will see in Section 5.4 - one can perform more deletions 
than allowed by the IDSDS procedure. 
For example, consider the game of Table 5.4. 
Player 2
A 2 4 3 3 6 0
B 4 0 2 4 4 2
C 3 3 4 2 3 1
D 3 6 1 1 2 6
Player 
1
E F G
 
Table 5.4 
A reduced-form game with cardinal payoffs 
In this game there are no pure-strategy Nash equilibria; however, by Nash’s 
theorem there will be at least one mixed-strategy equilibrium. To find it we can 
first note that, for Player 1, D is strictly dominated by B; deleting D we get a 
smaller game where, for Player 2, G is strictly dominated by F. Deleting G we 
are left with a smaller game where A is strictly dominated by C. Deleting A we 
are left with the game shown in Table 5.5. 
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B 4 0 2 4
C 3 3 4 2
Player 
1
E F
Player  2
 
Table 5.5 
The result of applying the IDSDS procedure to the game of Table 5.4. 
We will see below that the game of Table 5.5 has a unique Nash equilibrium in 
mixed strategies given by 
1 4 2 1
5 5 3 3
,
B C E F    
    
    
. Thus the game of Table 5.4 has 
a unique  Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies given by 
1 4 2 1
5 5 3 3
,
0 0 0
A B C D E F G    
    
    
. 
Once we have simplified the game as suggested in Remark 5.3, in order to find 
the mixed-strategy Nash equilibria we can use the following result. First we 
recall some notation that was introduced in Chapter 1. Given a mixed-strategy 
profile 1( ,..., )nσ σ σ=  and a Player i, we denote by 1 1 1( ,..., , ,..., )i i i nσ σ σ σ σ− − +=  
the profile of strategies of the players other than i and use ( ),i iσ σ −  as an 
alternative notation for σ; furthermore, ( ),i iτ σ −  denotes the result of replacing 
    i iσ τ σwith in , that is,  ( ),i iτ σ − = 1 1 1( ,..., , , ,..., )i i i nσ σ τ σ σ− + . 
Theorem 5.2.  Consider a reduced-form game in strategic form with cardinal 
payoffs. Suppose that * * *1( ,..., )nσ σ σ=  is a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. 
Consider an arbitrary Player i. Let * *( )i i σΠ = Π  be the payoff of Player i at this 
Nash equilibrium and let ,ij ik is s S∈  be two pure strategies of Player i  such that 
*( ) 0i ijsσ >  and 
*( ) 0i iksσ > , that is, ijs  and iks  are two pure strategies to which 
the mixed strategy *iσ  of Player i assigns positive probability. Then 
( ) ( )* * *( , ) ( , )i ij i i ik i is sσ σ− −Π = Π = Π . In other words, when the other players use 
the mixed-strategy profile *iσ − , Player i gets the same payoff no matter whether 
she plays the mixed strategy *iσ  or the pure strategy ijs  or the pure strategy iks . 
The details of the proof of Theorem 5.2 will be omitted, but the idea is simple: 
if ijs  and iks  are two pure strategies to which the mixed strategy 
*
iσ  of Player i 
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assigns positive probability and ( ) ( )* *( , ) ( , )i ij i i ik is sσ σ− −Π > Π , then Player i can 
increase her payoff from * *( )i i σΠ = Π  to a larger number by reducing the 
probability of iks  to zero and adding that probability to 
*( )i ijsσ , that is, by 
switching from *iσ  to the mixed strategy ˆiσ  obtained as follows: ˆ ( ) 0i iksσ = , 
* *ˆ ( ) ( ) ( )i ij i ij i iks s sσ σ σ= +  and, for every other i is S∈ , 
*ˆ ( ) ( )i i i is sσ σ= . But this 
would contradict the hypothesis that * * *1( ,..., )nσ σ σ=  is a Nash equilibrium. 
Let us now go back to the game of Table 5.5, reproduced below, and see how 
we can use Theorem 5.2 to find the Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. 
B 4 0 2 4
C 3 3 4 2
Player 
1
E F
Player  2
 
We want to find values of p and q, strictly between 0 and 1, such that 
,
1 1
B C E F
p p q q
    
    − −    
 is a Nash equilibrium. By Theorem 5.2, if Player 1 
played the pure strategy B against 
1
E F
q q
 
 − 
  she should get the same payoff as if 
she were to play the pure strategy C. The former would give her a payoff of 
4 2(1 )q q+ −  and the latter a payoff of 3 4(1 )q q+ − . Thus we need q to be such 
that 4 2(1 )q q+ − = 3 4(1 )q q+ − , that is, 2
3
q = . When 2
3
q = , both B and C give 
Player 1 a payoff of 10
3
 and thus any mixture of B and C would also give the 
same payoff of 10
3
. In other words, Player 1 is indifferent among all her mixed 
strategies and thus any mixed strategy is a best response to 
2 1
3 3
E F 
 
 
. Similar 
reasoning for Player 2 reveals that, by Theorem 5.2, we need p to be such that 
0 3(1 )p p+ − = 4 2(1 )p p+ − , that is, 1
5
p = . Against 
1 4
5 5
B C 
 
   
any mixed strategy 
of Player 2 gives him the same payoff of 12
5
; thus any mixed strategy of Player 2 
is a best reply to 
1 4
5 5
B C 
 
 
. It follows that 
1 4 2 1
5 5 3 3
,
B C E F    
    
    
 is a Nash 
equilibrium.  
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Remark 5.4.  It follows from Theorem 5.2, and was illustrated in the above 
example, that at a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium where Player i plays two or 
more pure strategies with positive probability, Player i does not have an 
incentive to use that mixed strategy: she would get the same payoff if, instead of 
randomizing, she played with probability 1 one of the pure strategies in the 
support of her mixed strategy (that is, if she increased the probability of any 
pure strategy from a positive number to 1).
8
 The only purpose of randomizing is 
to make the other player indifferent among two or more of his own pure strategies. 
Theorem 5.2 provides a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a mixed-
strategy profile to be a Nash equilibrium. To see that the condition is not 
sufficient, consider the game of Table 5.6 and the mixed-strategy profile 
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
,
0
A B C D E    
    
    
. 
A 3 0 0 2
Player 1 B 0 2 3 0
C 2 0 2 1
D E
Player 2
 
Table 5.6 
A reduced-form game with cardinal payoffs 
Given that Player 2 plays the mixed strategy 1 1
2 2
D E 
 
 
, Player 1 is indifferent 
between the two pure strategies that are in the support of her own mixed 
strategy, namely A and B: the payoff from playing A is 1.5 and so is the payoff 
from playing B (and 1.5 is also the payoff associated with the mixed strategy 
under consideration). However, the profile 
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
,
0
A B C D E    
    
    
 is not a Nash 
equilibrium, because Player 1 could get a payoff of 2 by switching to the pure 
strategy C.  We know from Theorem 5.1 that this game does have a mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium. How can we find it?  
                                                 
8 The support of a mixed strategy is the set of pure strategies that are assigned positive 
probability by that mixed strategy. 
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Let us calculate the best response of Player 1 to every possible mixed strategy 
1
D E
q q
 
 − 
 of Player 2 (with [0,1]q∈ ). For Player 1 the payoff from playing A 
against 
1
D E
q q
 
 − 
 is 3q , the payoff from playing B is 3 3q−  and the payoff from 
playing C is constant and equal to 2. These functions are shown in Figure 5.7.   
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
A q( )
B q( )
C q( )
1
3
2
3
q
 
 
Figure 5.7 
Player 1’s payoff from each pure strategy against an arbitrary  
mixed strategy of Player 2. 
The red upward-sloping line plots the function ( ) 3A q q= , the blue downward-
sloping  line plots the function ( ) 3 3B q q= −  and the horizontal green dotted 
line the function ( ) 2C q = . The blue and green lines intersect when 1
3
q =  and 
the red and green lines intersect when 2
3
q = . The maximum payoff is given by 
the blue line up to 1
3
q = , then by the green line up to 2
3
q =  and then by the 
red line. Thus the best reply function of Player 1 is as follows: 
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1
3
1
3
1 2
3 3
2
3
2
3
if 0
 for any [0,1] if 
1
if Player1's best reply =
 for any [0,1] if 
1
if 1
B q
B C
p q
p p
C q
A C
p q
p p
A q
≤ <

  ∈ =  − 

< <
  ∈ =  − 

< ≤
 
Hence if there is a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium it is either of the form 
1 2
3 3
,
0 1
D EA B C
p p
   
   −    
 or of the form 
2 1
3 3
,
0 1
D EA B C
p p
   
   −    
. The 
latter cannot be a Nash equilibrium for any p, because when Player 1 plays B 
with probability 0, E strictly dominates D for Player 2 and thus Player 2’s 
mixed strategy 
2 1
3 3
D E 
 
 
 is not a best reply (E is the unique best reply). Thus the 
only candidate for a Nash equilibrium is of the form 
1 2
3 3
,
0 1
D EA B C
p p
   
   −    
. In this case, by Theorem 5.11, we need p to be such 
that Player 2 is indifferent between D and E, that is, we need 2 1p p= − , that is, 
1
3
p = . Hence the Nash equilibrium is 
1 2 1 2
3 3 3 3
,
0
A B C D E    
    
    
.  
In games where the number of strategies or the number of players are larger 
than in the examples we have considered, finding the Nash equilibria involves 
lengthier calculations.  However, computer programs have been developed that 
can be used to compute all the Nash equilibria of a finite game in a relatively 
short time. 
 Test your understanding of the concepts introduced in this section, by going 
through the exercises in Section 5.E.3 of Appendix 5.E at the end of this chapter. 
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5.4 Strict dominance and rationalizability  
We remarked in the previous section that a pure strategy that is strictly 
dominated by another pure strategy cannot be played with positive probability 
at a Nash equilibrium. Thus, when looking for a Nash equilibrium, one can 
first simplify the game by applying the IDSDS procedure (Section 1.5.1, 
Chapter 1). When payoffs are cardinal (von Neumann-Morgenstern payoffs) it 
turns out that, in a two-person game, a pure strategy cannot be a best response to 
any mixed-strategy of the opponent not only when it is strictly dominated by 
another pure strategy but also when it is strictly dominated by a mixed strategy.  
To see this, consider the game of Table 5.8 below.  
A 0 1 4 0
Player 1 B 1 2 1 4
C 2 0 0 1
D E
Player 2
 
Table 5.8 
A strategic-form game with cardinal payoffs. 
The pure strategy B of Player 1 is not strictly dominated by another pure 
strategy and yet it cannot be a best reply to any mixed strategy of Player 2. To 
see this, consider an arbitrary mixed strategy 
1
D E
q q
 
 − 
 of Player 2 with 
[0,1]q∈  . If Player 1 plays B against it, she gets a payoff of 1; if, instead, she 
plays the mixed strategy  1 2
3 3
0
A B C 
 
 
 then her payoff is 
1 2 4
4(1 ) 2 1
3 3 3
q q− + = > .   
Theorem 5.3 [Pearce, 1984].  Consider a two-player reduced-form game in 
strategic form with cardinal payoffs, an arbitrary Player i and a pure strategy is  
of Player i. Then there is no mixed-strategy  of the opponent to which is  is a 
best response, if and only if is  is strictly dominated by a mixed strategy iσ  of 
Player i (that is, there is a i iσ ∈Σ  such that ( , ) ( , )i i j i i jsσ σ σΠ > Π , for every 
j jσ ∈Σ ). 
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Note that, since the set of mixed strategies includes the set of pure strategies, 
strict dominance by a mixed strategy includes as a sub-case strict dominance by 
a pure strategy.  
When the number of players is 3 or more, the generalization of Theorem 5.3 
raises some subtle issues: see Exercise 5.14.  However, we can appeal to the 
intuition behind Theorem 5.3 (see Remark 5.5 below) to refine the IDSDS 
procedure (Section 1.5.1, Chapter 1) for general n-player games with cardinal 
payoffs as follows. 
Definition 5.6 [Cardinal IDSDS]. The Cardinal Iterated Deletion of Strictly 
Dominated Strategies is the following algorithm. Given a finite n-player (n ≥ 2) 
strategic-form game with cardinal payoffs G, let G
1
 be the game obtained by 
removing from G, for every Player i, those pure strategies of Player i (if any) 
that are strictly dominated in G by some mixed strategy of Player i; let G
2
 be 
the game obtained by removing from G
1
, for every Player i, those pure 
strategies of Player i (if any) that are strictly dominated in G
1  
by some mixed 
strategy of Player i, and so on. Let G∞  be the output of this procedure. Since 
the initial game G is finite, G∞  will be obtained in a finite number of steps. For 
every Player i, the pure strategies of Player i  in G∞ are called her rationalizable 
strategies. 
Figure 5.9 illustrates this procedure as applied to the game in Panel (i).  
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A 3 4 2 1 1 2
B 0 0 1 3 4 1
C 1 4 1 4 2 6
F
Player
1
Player  2
D E
 
(i) The game G
0
 = G 
A 3 4 2 1
B 0 0 1 3
Player 
1
Player 2
D E
 
(iii) The game G
2
 after Step 2 
 
 
A 3 4 2 1 1 2
B 0 0 1 3 4 1
Player 2
Player 
1
D E F
 
 
(ii) The game G
1
  after Step 1 
Player 1 A 3 4 2 1
Player 2
D E
 
 
Player 1 A 3 4
D
Player 2
 
(iv) The game G
3
 at the top.  
The game 4G = G∞ at the bottom 
Figure 5.9 
Application of the cardinal IDSDS procedure. 
In the first step, the pure strategy C of Player 1 is deleted, because it is strictly 
dominated by the mixed strategy 
1 1
2 2
A B 
 
 
  thus yielding game G
1
 shown in 
Panel (ii).  In the second step, the pure strategy F of Player 2 is deleted, because 
it is strictly dominated by the mixed strategy 
1 1
2 2
D E 
 
 
  thus yielding game G
2
 
shown in Panel (iii).  In the third step, B is deleted because it is strictly 
dominated by A thus yielding game G
3
 shown in the top part of Panel (iv). In 
the final step, E is deleted because it is strictly dominated by D so that the final 
output is the strategy profile (A,D). Hence the only rationalizable strategies are 
A for Player 1 and D for Player 2. 
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Note that, in the game of Figure 5.9 (i), since the only rationalizable strategy 
profile is (A,D), it follows that (A,D) is also the unique Nash equilibrium. 
As noted in Chapter 1 (Section 1.5.1) the significance of the output of the 
IDSDS procedure is as follows. Consider game G in Panel (i) of Figure 5.9. 
Since, for Player 1, C is strictly dominated, if Player 1 is rational she will not 
play C. Thus, if Player 2 believes that Player 1 is rational then he believes that 
Player 1 will not play C, that is, he restricts attention to game 1G ; since, in 1G , 
F is strictly dominated for Player 2, if Player 2 is rational he will not play F. It 
follows that if Player 1 believes that Player 2 is rational and that Player 2 
believes that Player 1 is rational, then Player 1 restricts attention to game 2G  
where rationality requires that Player 1 not play B, etc.  
Remark 5.5. Define a player to be rational if her chosen pure strategy is a best 
reply to her belief about what the opponent will do. In a two-player game a 
belief of Player 1 about what Player 2 will do can be expressed as a probability 
distribution over the set of pure strategies of Player 2; but this is the same 
object as a mixed strategy of Player 2. Thus, by Theorem 5.3, a rational Player 
1 cannot choose a pure strategy that is strictly dominated by one of her own 
mixed strategies. The iterated reasoning outlined above can be captured by 
means of the notion of common belief of rationality. Indeed, it will be shown 
in a later chapter that if the players are rational and there is common belief of 
rationality then only rationalizable strategy profiles can be played.  In a game 
with more than two players a belief of Player i about her opponents is no 
longer the same object as a mixed-strategy profile of the opponents, because a 
belief can allow for correlation in the behavior of the opponents, while the 
notion of  mixed-strategy profile rules out such correlation (see Exercise 5.14).  
Remark 5.6. The iterated reasoning outlined above requires that the von 
Neumann-Morgenstern preferences of both players be common knowledge between 
them. For example, if Player 2 believes that Player 1 is rational but only knows 
her ordinal ranking of the outcomes, then Player 2 will not be able to deduce 
that it is irrational for Player 1 to play C and thus it cannot be irrational for 
him to play F. Expecting a player to know the von Neumann-Morgenstern 
preferences of another player is often (almost always?) very unrealistic! Thus 
one should be aware of the implicit assumptions that one makes (and one 
should question the assumptions made by others in their analyses).  
 Test your understanding of the concepts introduced in this section, by going 
through the exercises in Section 5.E.4 of Appendix 5.E at the end of this chapter. 
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Appendix 5.E: Exercises 
5.E.1 .  Exercises  for  Section 5 .1 :   
         Strategic-form games with cardinal payoffs  
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this 
chapter. 
Exercise 5.1. Consider the following game-frame in strategic form, where 
1 2 3 4, ,  and o o o o  are basic outcomes: 
a
b
Player 2
c d
Player 1
1o 2o
3o 4o
 
Both players satisfy the axioms of expected utility. The best outcome for Player 
1 is 3o ; she is indifferent between outcomes 1 4  o oand  and ranks them both as 
worst; she considers 2o  to be worse than 3o  and better than 4o ; she is 
indifferent between 2o  with certainty and the lottery 
3 1
0.25 0.75
o o 
 
 
. The best 
outcome for Player 2 is 4o , which he considers to be just as good as 1o ; he 
considers 2o  to be worse than 1o  and better than 3o ; he is indifferent between 
2o  with certainty and the lottery 
1 3
0.4 0.6
o o 
 
 
. 
Find the normalized von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions for the two 
players and write the corresponding reduced-form game. 
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Exercise 5.2. Consider the following game-frame, where 1 4,...,o o  are basic 
outcomes. 
A
B
Player 2
C D
Player 1
3o
1 4
31
4 4
o o 
 
 
3 4
32
5 5
o o 
 
 
1 2
1 1
2 2
o o 
 
 
 
Both players have von Neumann-Morgenstern rankings of the basic outcomes. 
The ranking of Player 1 can be represented by the following von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function 
1 2 3 4
1
outcome:
: 12 10 6 16
o o o o
U
 
and the ranking of Player 2 can be represented by the following von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function 
1 2 3
2
4o
: 6 14 8 10
utcome: o o o
U
o
. 
Write the corresponding reduced-form game. 
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5.E.2 .  Exercises  for  Section 5 .2 :  Mixed strategies .  
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this 
chapter. 
Exercise 5.3. Consider the following reduced-form game with cardinal payoffs: 
Player 2
A 0 1 6 3
Player 1 B 4 4 2 0
C 3 0 4 2
D E
 
(a) Calculate the player’s payoffs from the mixed strategy 
31 1 1
4 4 2 2
0
A B C D E   
   
   
. 
(b) Is 
31 1 1
4 4 2 2
0
A B C D E   
   
   
 a Nash equilibrium? 
Exercise 5.4. Consider the following reduced-form game with cardinal payoffs: 
Player 2
A 2 3 8 5
B 6 6 4 2
D E
Player 1
 
Prove that 
2 1 1 1
3 3 2 2
A B D E   
   
   
 is a Nash equilibrium. 
5.E.3 .  Exercises  for  Section 5 .3 :   
Computing the mixed-strategy Nash equilibria. 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this 
chapter. 
Exercise 5.5. (a) Find the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the game  
of Exercise 5.1.  (b) Calculate the payoffs of both players at the Nash 
equilibrium. 
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Exercise 5.6. Find the Nash equilibrium of the game of Exercise 5.2.  
Exercise 5.7. Find all the mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of the game  
of Exercise 5.4. Calculate the payoffs of both players at every Nash equilibrium 
that you find. 
Exercise 5.8. Find the mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of the following game: 
 
 
 
Player  1 
 Player   2 
 L R  
T 1 , 4 4 , 3  
C 2 , 0 1 , 2  
B 1 , 5 0 , 6  
 
Exercise 5.9. Consider the following two-player game, where z1, z2, …, z6 are 
basic outcomes. 
Player 2
d e
a z1 z2
Player 1 b z3 z4
c z5 z6
 
Player 1 ranks the outcomes as indicated by A below and Player 2 ranks the 
outcomes as indicated by B below (if outcome z is above outcome z′  then z is 
strictly preferred to z′ , and if z and z′  are written next to each other then the 
player is indifferent between the two). 
1
6
4 2
5
3
,
z
z
A z z
z
z
 
 
 
 =
 
 
 
 
               
3 4
2
1 5
6
,
,
z z
z
B
z z
z
 
 
 =
 
 
 
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(a) One player has a strategy that is strictly dominated. Identify the player and 
the strategy. 
[Hint: in order to answer the following questions, you can  make your life a lot 
easier if you simplify the game on the basis of your answer to part (a).]   
Player 1 satisfies the axioms of Expected Utility Theory and is indifferent 
between z6 and the lottery 
1 5
4 1
5 5
z z 
 
 
 and is indifferent between z2 and the 
lottery 6 5
1 1
2 2
z z 
 
 
.  
(b) Suppose that Player 1 believes that Player 2 is going to play d with 
probability 1
2
 and e with probability 1
2
. Which strategy should he play? 
Player 2 satisfies the axioms of Expected Utility Theory and is indifferent 
between z5 and the lottery 
2 6
31
4 4
z z 
 
 
.  
(c) Suppose that Player 2 believes that Player 1 is going to play a with 
probability 1
4
 and c with probability 3
4
. Which strategy should she play? 
(d) Find all the (pure- and mixed-strategy) Nash equilibria of this game. 
Exercise 5.10. Consider the following game (where the payoffs are von 
Neumann-Morgenstern payoffs): 
A x y 3 0
B 6 2 0 4
Player 2
C D
Player 1
 
(a) Suppose that x = 2 and y = 2. Find the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium 
and calculate the payoffs of both players at the Nash equilibrium.  
(b) For what values of x and y is 
31 4 1
5 5 4 4
,
A B C D    
    
   
 a Nash equilibrium? 
Exercise 5.11. Find the mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of the game of Exercise 
5.3. Calculate the payoffs of both players at every Nash equilibrium that you 
find. 
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5.E.4 .  Exercises  for  Section 5 .4 :  
Str ic t  dominance  and rational izabi l i ty 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this 
chapter. 
Exercise 5.12. In the following game, for each player, find all the rationalizable 
pure strategies (that is, apply the cardinal IDSDS procedure). 
  Player 2  
  L M R 
Player A 3  ,  5 2  ,  0 2  ,  2 
1 B 5  ,  2 1  ,  2 2  ,  1 
 C 9  ,  0 1  ,  5 3  ,  2 
Note: The next three exercises are more difficult than the previous ones. 
Exercise 5.13. Is the following statement true or false? (Either prove that it is 
true or give a counterexample.) 
“Consider a two-player strategic-form game with cardinal payoffs. Let A 
and B be two pure strategies of Player 1. Suppose that both A and B are 
rationalizable (that is, they survive the cardinal IDSDS procedure). Then 
any mixed strategy that attaches positive probability to both A and B and 
zero to every other strategy is a best reply to some mixed strategy of 
Player 2.” 
Exercise 5.14. Consider the following three-player game, where only the 
payoffs of Player 1 are shown. 
E F E F
A 3 0 A 0 0
B 0 3 B 3 0
C 0 0 C 0 3
D 2 0 D 0 2
Player 2
Player 3: H
Player
1
Player  
1
Player 2
Player 3: G  
(a) Show that if Player 1 assigns probability 12  to the event “Player 2 will play 
E and Player 3 will play G” and probability 12  to the event “Player 2 will 
play F and Player will play H”, then playing D is a best reply. 
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Next we want to show that there is no mixed-strategy profile 
1 ,
1 1
E F G H
p p q q
σ −
    
=     − −    
 of Players 2 and 3 against which D is a best 
reply for Player 1. We do this in steps. First define the following functions: 
1 1( , ) ( , )A p q A σ −= Π  (that is, ( , )A p q  is Player 1’s expected payoff if she plays 
the pure strategy A against 1σ − ), 1 1( , ) ( , )B p q B σ −= Π , 1 1( , ) ( , )C p q C σ −= Π  and 
1 1( , ) ( , )D p q D σ −= Π .  
(b) In the (p,q) plane (with 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ q ≤ 1) draw the curve 
corresponding to the equation ( , ) ( , )A p q D p q=  and identify the region 
where ( , ) ( , )A p q D p q> . 
(c) In the (p,q) plane draw the curve corresponding to the equation 
( , ) ( , )C p q D p q=  and identify the region where ( , ) ( , )C p q D p q> . 
(d) In the (p,q) plane draw the two curves corresponding to the equation 
( , ) ( , )B p q D p q=  and identify the region where ( , ) ( , )B p q D p q> . 
(e) Infer from parts (b)-(c) that there is no mixed-strategy profile of Players 2 
and 3 against which D is a best reply for Player 1. 
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◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊ 
Exercise 5.15: Challenging Question. A team of n professional swimmers  
(n ≥ 2) − from now on called players − are partying on the bank of the 
Sacramento river on a cold day in January. Suddenly a passerby shouts “Help! 
My dog fell into the water!”. Each of the swimmers has to decide whether or 
not to jump into the icy cold water to rescue the dog. One rescuer is sufficient: 
the dog will be saved if at least one player jumps into the water; if nobody does, 
then the dog will die. Each player prefers somebody else to jump in, but each 
player prefers to jump in himself if nobody else does.  Let us formulate this as a 
game. The strategy set of each player i = 1,…,n is { , }iS J J= ¬ , where J stands 
for ‘jump in’ and J¬   for ‘not jump in’. The possible basic outcomes can be 
expressed as subsets of the set {1,..., }I n=  of players: outcome N I⊆  is 
interpreted as ‘the players in the set N jump into the water’; if N = ∅  the dog 
dies, while if N ≠ ∅  the dog is saved. Player i has the following ordinal ranking 
of the outcomes: (1) N N ′∼ , for every ,N N ′≠ ∅ ≠ ∅  with  and i N i N ′∉ ∉ ,  
(2) N N ′≻  for every ,N N ′≠ ∅ ≠ ∅  with  and i N i N ′∉ ∈ , (3) { }i ∅≻ . 
(a) Find all the pure-strategy Nash equilibria. 
(b) Suppose that each player i has the following von Neumann-Morgenstern 
payoff function (which is consistent with the above ordinal ranking):  
if  and 
( ) if  and 
0 if 
i
v N i N
N v c N i N
N
π
≠ ∅ ∉

= − ≠ ∅ ∈
 = ∅
 with 0 c v< < . 
Find the symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (symmetric means 
that all the players use the same mixed strategy).  
(c) Assuming that the players behave according to the symmetric mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium of part (b), is it better for the dog if n (the 
number of players) is large or if n is small? Calculate the probability that 
the dog is saved at the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium as a function of n, 
for all possible values of c and v (subject to 0 c v< < ), and plot it for the case 
where  c = 10 and v = 12. 
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Appendix 5.S: Solutions to exercises  
Exercise 5.1.  The normalized von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions 
are: 
Player 1: 3
2
4
1
1
outcome
,
1
0.25
0
o
o
o o
U
                     Player 2: 1
2
2
4
3
outcome
, 1
0.4
0
o o
o
o
U
 
Thus the reduced-form game is as follows: 
a 0 1 0.25 0.4
b 1 0 0 1
Player 2
c d
Player 1
 
Exercise 5.2.  The expected utility of the lottery 1 4
31
4 4
o o 
 
 
 is 31
4 4
(12) (16) 15+ =  
for Player 1 and 31
4 4
(6) (10) 9+ =  for Player 2. The expected utility of the 
lottery 1 2
1 1
2 2
o o 
 
 
 is 11 for Player 1 and 10 for Player 2. The expected utility of 
the lottery 3 4
32
5 5
o o 
 
 
 is 12 for Player 1 and 9.2 for Player 2. Thus the reduced-
form game is as follows.  
A 15 9 11 10
B 6 8 12 9.2
Player 2
C D
Player 1
 
Exercise 5.3.  (a) 3 31 11 8 8 8 80 6 4 2 3Π = + + + =  and 
3 31 1
2 8 8 8 8
1 3 4 0 2Π = + + + = .  
(b) No, because if Player 1 switched to the pure strategy C then her payoff 
would be 1 1
2 2
3 4 3.5+ =  > 2. 
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Exercise 5.4.  Player 1’s payoff is  2 2 1 11 6 6 6 62 8 6 4 5Π = + + + = . If Player 1 
switches to any other mixed strategy 
1
A B
p p
 
 − 
, while Player 2’s strategy is 
kept fixed at 
1 1
2 2
C D 
 
 
, then her payoff is 1 11 2 22 8p pΠ = + +
1
2
(1 )6p− +  
1
2
(1 )4p− 5= . Thus any mixed strategy of Player 1 is a best response to 
1 1
2 2
C D 
 
 
. Similarly, Player 2’s payoff is 2 2 1 12 6 6 6 63 5 6 2 4Π = + + + = . If Player 2 
switches to any other mixed strategy 
1
C D
q q
 
 − 
, while Player 1’s strategy is 
kept fixed at 
2 1
3 3
A B 
 
 
, then her payoff is 2 22 3 33 (1 )5q qΠ = + − +
1
3
6q +  
1
3
(1 )2 4q− = . Thus any mixed strategy of Player 2 is a best response to 
2 1
3 3
A B 
 
 
. Hence 
2 1
3 3
A B 
 
 
 is a best reply to 
1 1
2 2
C D 
 
 
 and 
1 1
2 2
C D 
 
 
 is a best 
reply to 
2 1
3 3
A B 
 
 
, that is, 
2 1 1 1
3 3 2 2
,
A B C D    
    
   
 is a Nash equilibrium. 
Exercise 5.5.  (a) We have to find the Nash equilibrium of the following game.  
a 0 1 0.25 0.4
b 1 0 0 1
Player 2
c d
Player 1
 
To make calculations easier, let us multiply all the payoffs by 100 (that is, we 
re-scale the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions by a factor of 100): 
a 0 100 25 40
b 100 0 0 100
Player 2
c d
Player 1
 
There are no pure-strategy Nash equilibria. To find the mixed-strategy Nash 
equilibrium, let p be the probability with which Player 1 chooses a and q be the 
probability with which Player 2 chooses c. Then, for Player 1, the payoff from 
playing a against 
1
c d
q q
 
 − 
 must be equal to the payoff from playing b against 
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1
c d
q q
 
 − 
. That is, it must be that ( ) 05 1 102 qq =− , which yields 15q = .  
Similarly, for Player 2, the payoff from playing c against 
1
a b
p p
 
 − 
 must be 
equal to the payoff from playing d against 
1
a b
p p
 
 − 
. This requires 
100 40 100(1 )p p p= + − , that is, 5
8
p =  .  Thus the Nash equilibrium is 
5 3 1 4
8 8 5 5
,
a b c d    
    
    
.  (b) At the Nash equilibrium the payoffs are 20 for Player 1 
and 62.5 for Player 2. (If you worked with the original payoffs, then the Nash 
equilibrium payoffs would be 0.2 for Player 1 and 0.625 for Player 2.) 
Exercise 5.6.  We have to find the Nash equilibria of the following game. 
A 15 9 11 10
B 6 8 12 9.2
Player 2
C D
Player 1
 
For Player 2 D is a strictly dominant strategy, thus at a Nash equilibrium 
Player 2 must play D with probability 1. For Player 1, the unique best reply to 
D is B. Thus the pure-strategy profile (B,D) is the only Nash equilibrium.  
Exercise 5.7.  We have to find the Nash equilibria of the following game. 
Player2
A 2 3 8 5
B 6 6 4 2
D E
Player 1
 
(B,D) (with payoffs (6,6)) and (A,E) (with payoffs (8,5)) are both Nash 
equilibria. To see if there is also a mixed-strategy equilibrium we need to solve 
the following equations, where p is the probability of A and q is the probability 
of D: 2 8(1 ) 6 4(1 )q q q q+ − = + −  and 3 6(1 ) 5 2(1 )p p p p+ − = + − . The solution 
is 2
3
p =   and 1
2
q =   and indeed we verified in Exercise 5.4 that 
2 1 1 1
3 3 2 2
,
A B C D    
    
   
 is a Nash equilibrium. The payoffs at this Nash 
equilibrium are 5 for Player 1 and 4 for Player 2. 
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Exercise 5.8.  Since B is strictly dominated (by C), it cannot be assigned 
positive probability at a Nash equilibrium. Let p be the probability of T and q 
the probability of L. Then p must be such that 4p+0(1−p) = 3p+2(1 −p) and q 
must be such that q+4(1−q)=2q+(1 −q). Thus 32
3 4
 and p q= = . Hence there is 
only one mixed-strategy equilibrium, namely 
32 1 1
3 3 4 4
,
0
T C B L R    
    
   
. 
Exercise 5.9.  (a) Since Player 1 prefers z5 to z3 and prefers z6 to z4, strategy b  is 
strictly dominated by strategy c. Thus, at a Nash equilibrium, Player 1 will not 
play b with positive probability and we can simplify the game to 
d e
a z1 z2
c z5 z6
Player 2
Player 1
 
(b) Of the remaining outcomes, for Player 1  z1 is the best (we can assign utility 
1 to it) and z5 is the worst (we can assign utility 0 to it). Since he is 
indifferent between z6 and the lottery 
1 5
4 1
5 5
z z 
 
 
, the utility of z6 is 
4
5
. Hence 
the expected utility of  6 5
1 1
2 2
z z 
 
 
 is 1 4 1 2
2 5 2 5
( ) (0)+ =  and thus the utility of z2 
is also 2
5
. So, if Player 2 is going to play d with probability 1
2
 and e with 
probability 1
2
, then for Player 1 playing a gives a payoff of  71 1 2
2 2 5 10
(1) ( )+ = , 
while playing c gives a payoff of 1 1 4 4
2 2 5 10
(0) ( )+ = . Hence he should play a.   
[If you did not take the hint to simplify the analysis as was done above, 
then you can still reach the same answer, although in a lengthier way. You 
would still set 1( ) 1U z = . Then the expected payoff from playing a is  
                                    1 1 1 11 1 2 22 2 2 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )a U z U z U zΠ = + = +              (*) 
Since 2z  is as good as 
6 5
1 1
2 2
z z 
 
 
,  
                                               1 12 6 52 2( ) ( ) ( )U z U z U z= +                        (**) 
Since 6z  is as good as 
1 5
4 1
5 5
z z 
 
 
,  
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                                               4 16 55 5( ) ( )U z U z= +                               (***) 
Replacing (***) in (**) we get 322 55 5( ) ( )U z U z= +  and replacing this 
expression in (*) we get 7 31 510 10( ) ( )a U zΠ = + .  Similarly, 
( ) 61 1 1 1 4 1 41 5 6 5 5 52 2 2 2 5 5 10 10( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c U z U z U z U z U zΠ = + = + + = + . Now, 
1 1( ) ( )a cΠ Π>  if and only if 
7 3 64
5 510 10 10 10
( ) ( )U z U z+ > +  if and only if 
53 3 ( )U z>  if and only if 5( ) 1U z <  which is the case because 5z  is worse 
than 1z  and 1( ) 1U z = . Similar steps would be taken to answer (c) and (d).] 
(c) In the reduced game, for Player 2  z2 is the best outcome (we can assign 
utility 1 to it) and z6 is the worst (we can assign utility 0 to it). Thus, since 
she is indifferent between z5 and the lottery 
2 6
31
4 4
z z 
 
 
, the utility of z5 is 
1
4
 
and so is the utility of z1. Thus playing d gives an expected payoff of 
31 1 1 1
4 4 4 4 4
( ) ( )+ = , while playing e gives an expected utility of  31 1
4 4 4
(1) (0)+ = . 
Thus she is indifferent between playing d and playing e (and any mixture of 
d and e). 
(d) Using the calculations of parts (b) and (c) the game is as follows: 
1 2
4 5
1 4
4 5
1, ,1
0, ,0
d e
a
c
 
There is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. At a mixed-strategy Nash 
equilibrium, each player must be indifferent between his/her two strategies. 
From part (c) we already know that Player 2 is indifferent if Player 1 plays 
a with probability 1
4
 and c with probability 3
4
. Now let q be the probability 
with which Player 2 plays d. Then we need 2 4
5 5
(1 ) (1 )q q q+ − = − , hence 
2
7
q = . Thus the Nash equilibrium is 
3 51 2
4 4 7 7
0
a b c d e 
 
 
 which can be 
written more succinctly as 
3 51 2
4 4 7 7
a c d e 
 
 
. 
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Exercise 5.10.  (a) Let p be the probability of A and q the probability of B. 
Then, Player 1 must be indifferent between playing A and playing B: 
2 3(1 ) 6q q q+ − = . This gives 3
7
q = . Similarly, Player 2 must be indifferent 
between playing C and playing D: 2 4(1 )p= − . This gives 1
2
p = . Thus the 
Nash equilibrium is given by 
3 41 1
7 72 2
,
C DA B   
   
    
. The equilibrium payoffs are 
18
7
 = 2.57 for Player 1 and 2 for Player 2. 
(b) Player 1 must be indifferent between playing A and playing B: 
3 31
4 4 4
3 6x + = . Thus x = 5. Similarly, Player 2 must be indifferent between 
playing C and playing D: 1 4 4
5 5 5
2 4y + = . Thus y = 8. 
Exercise 5.11.  We have to find the Nash equilibria of the following game. 
Player 2
A 0 1 6 3
Player 1 B 4 4 2 0
C 3 0 4 2
D E
 
There are two pure-strategy equilibria, namely (B,D) and (A,E). To see if there 
is a mixed-strategy equilibrium we calculate the best response of Player 1 to 
every possible mixed strategy 
1
D E
q q
 
 − 
 of Player 2 (with [0,1]q∈ ). For Player 
1 the payoff from playing A against 
1
D E
q q
 
 − 
 is 6 6q− , the payoff from playing 
B is 4 2(1 ) 2 2q q q+ − = +  and the payoff from playing C is 3 4(1 ) 4q q q+ − = − .  
These functions are shown in the following diagram.   
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0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
2
4
6
A q( )
B q( )
C q( )
2
5
2
3
q
 
The red downward-sloping line plots the function where ( ) 6 6A q q= − , the 
blue upward-sloping line plots the function ( ) 2 2B q q= +  and the green dotted 
line the function ( ) 4C q q= − . It can be seen from the diagram that 
2
5
2
5
2 2
5 3
2
3
2
3
if 0
 for any [0,1] if 
1
if Player1's best reply =
 for any [0,1] if 
1
if 1
A q
A C
p q
p p
C q
B C
p q
p p
B q
≤ <

  ∈ =  − 

< <
  ∈ =  − 

< ≤
  
Thus if there is a mixed-strategy equilibrium it is either of the form 
32
5 5
,
1
D EA C
p p
   
   −    
 or of the form 
2 1
3 3
,
1
D EB C
p p
   
   −    
. In the first case, 
where Player 1 chooses B with probability zero, E strictly dominates D for 
Player 2 and thus 32
5 5
D E 
 
   
is not a best reply for Player 2, so that 
32
5 5
,
1
D EA C
p p
   
   −    
 is not a Nash equilibrium for any p. In the second case we 
need ( ) ( )D p E p= , that is, 4 2(1 )p p= − , which yields 1
3
p = . Thus the mixed-
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strategy Nash equilibrium is 
1 2 2 1
3 3 3 3
,
B C D E    
    
    
 with payoffs of 10
3
 for Player 
1 and 4
3
 for Player 2. 
Exercise 5.12.  For Player 1, B is strictly dominated by 
1 1
2 2
A C 
 
 
;  for Player 2, R 
is strictly dominated by 
1 1
2 2
L M 
 
 
.  Eliminating B and R we are left with 
  Player 2 
  L M 
Player A 3  ,  5 2  ,  0 
1 C 9  ,  0 1  ,  5 
In this game no player has a strictly dominated strategy. Thus for Player 1  
both A and C are rationalizable and for Player 2 both L and M  are 
rationalizable.  
Exercise 5.13.  The statement is false. Consider, for example, the following 
game: 
  Player 2 
  L R 
 A 3  ,  1 0  ,  0 
Player 1 B 0  ,  0 3  ,  1 
 C 2  ,  1 2  ,  1 
Here both A and B are rationalizable (indeed, they are both part of a Nash 
equilibrium; note that the cardinal IDSDS procedure leaves the game 
unchanged). However, the mixture 
1 1
2 2
A B 
 
 
  (which gives Player 1 a payoff of 
1.5, no matter what Player 2 does) cannot be a best reply to any mixed strategy 
of Player 2, since it is strictly dominated by C.  
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Exercise 5.14.  (a) if Player 1 assigns probability 12  to the event “Player 2 will 
play E and Player 3 will play G” and probability 12  to the event “Player 2 will 
play F and Player will play H”, then A gives Player 1 an expected payoff of 1.5, 
B an expected payoff of 0, C and expected payoff of 1.5 and D an expected 
payoff of 2. Thus D is a best reply to those beliefs. 
The functions are as follows: ( , ) 3A p q pq= , ( , ) 3(1 ) 3 (1 )B p q p q p q= − + − , 
( , ) 3(1 )(1 )C p q p q= − − , ( , ) 2 2(1 )(1 )D p q pq p q= + − − .  
(b) ( , ) ( , )A p q D p q=  at those points (p,q) such that 
2 2
2
p
q
p
−
=
−
. The set of such 
points is the red curve in the diagram below. The region where 
( , ) ( , )A p q D p q>  is the region above the red curve. 
(c) ( , ) ( , )C p q D p q=  at those points (p,q) such that 
1
1
p
q
p
−
=
+
. The set of such 
points is the blue curve in the diagram below. The region where 
( , ) ( , )C p q D p q>  is the region below the blue curve. 
(c) ( , ) ( , )B p q D p q=  at those points (p,q) such that 
2 5
5 10
p
q
p
−
=
−
 (for p ≠ 12 ). The 
set of such points is given by the two green curves in the diagram below. The 
region where ( , ) ( , )B p q D p q>  is the region between the two green curves. 
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0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
qA p( )
qC p( )
qB p( )
p
 
Thus in the region strictly above the red curve A is better than D, in the 
region strictly below the blue curve C is better than D and in the region on 
and between the red and blue curves B is better that D. Hence,  at every point 
in the (p,q) square there is a pure strategy of Player 1 which is strictly better 
than D. It follows that there is no mixed-strategy 1σ −  against which D is a best 
reply. 
Exercise 5.15.  (a) There are n pure-strategy Nash equilibria: at each 
equilibrium exactly one player jumps in. 
(b) Let p be the probability with which each player jumps into the water. 
Consider a Player i. The probability that none of the other players jump in 
is ( ) 11 np −−  and thus the probability that somebody else jumps in is 
( ) 11 1 np − − −  .  Player i’s payoff if he jumps in is v c− , while his expected 
payoff if he does not jump in is ( ) ( )1 11 1 0 1n nv p p− − − − + − =   
( ) 11 1 nv p − − −  .  Thus we need ( )
1
1 1
n
v c v p
− − = − −  , that is, 
1
1
1
nc
p
v
− = −  
 
 , which is strictly between 0 and 1 because c < v. 
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(c) At the Nash equilibrium the probability that nobody jumps in is 
( )
1
1
n
nn c
p
v
− − =  
 
; thus this is the probability that the dog dies. Hence the 
dog is rescued with the remaining probability 
1
1
n
nc
v
− −  
 
.  This is a 
decreasing function of n. Thus the larger the number of swimmers who are 
present, the more likely it is that the dog dies. The plot of this function 
when c = 10 and v = 12 is shown below. 
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Dynamic Games  
with Cardinal Payoffs 
6.1 Behavioral strategies in dynamic games 
he definition of dynamic (or extensive-form) game with cardinal 
payoffs is just like the definition of extensive form game with ordinal 
payoffs (Definition 3.1, Chapter 3), the only difference being that we 
postulate von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences instead of merely ordinal 
preferences.  
In Chapter 5 we generalized the notion of strategic-form frame by allowing for 
lotteries (rather than just simple outcomes) to be associated with strategy 
profiles. One could do the same for extensive-form frames, as shown in Figure 
6.1. 
e f
c d c d
1
2
1
1z 2z 3z
4z 5z
1 2
2 1
3 3
o o 
 
 
3o
4o 5o
a b
1 3 4
31 1
5 5 5
o o o 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 
An extensive frame with probabilistic outcomes.  
The iz ’s are terminal nodes and the io ’s are basic outcomes. 
Chapter 
6 
T 
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In Figure 6.1 { }1 2 5, ,...,z z z  is the set of terminal nodes and { }1 2 5, ,...,o o o  is the 
set of basic outcomes. Associated with 1z  is the lottery 
1 2
2 1
3 3
o o 
 
 
, while the 
lottery associated with 3z  is  
1 3 4
31 1
5 5 5
o o o 
 
 
, etc. 
However, as we saw at the end of Chapter 3, in extensive forms one can 
explicitly represent random events by means of chance moves (also called 
moves of Nature). Thus an alternative representation of the extensive-form 
frame of Figure 6.1 is the extensive form shown in Figure 6.2. 
Nature
e f
c c
d
2
1
3o 4o 5o
a b
2
3
1
3
1o 2o
d
1
1o 3o 4o
Nature
1
5
1
53
5
 
Figure 6.2 
An alternative representation of the extensive frame of Figure 6.1.  
The terminal nodes have not been labeled. The io ’s are basic outcomes.  
Hence we can continue to use the definition of extensive-form frame given in 
Chapter 3, but from now on we will allow for the possibility of chance moves. 
The notion of strategy remains, of course, unchanged: a  strategy for a player is 
a list of choices, one for every information set of that player (Definition 3.4, 
Chapter 3). For example, the set of strategies for Player 1 in the extensive frame 
of Figure 6.2 is 1 {( , ), ( , ), ( , ), ( , )}.S a e a f b e b f=  Thus mixed strategies can easily 
be introduced also in extensive frames. For example, in the extensive frame of 
Figure 6.2, the set of mixed strategies for Player 1, 1Σ , is the set of probability 
distributions over 1S :  
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( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
: , , [0,1] and 1
11
a e a f b e b f
p q r p q r
p q r p q r
  
= ∈ + + ≤  − − −  
Σ . 
However, it turns out that in extensive forms with perfect recall
9
 one can use  
simpler objects than mixed strategies, namely behavioral strategies. 
Definition 6.1. A behavioral strategy for a player in an extensive  form  is a list 
of probability distributions, one for every information set of that player; each 
probability distribution is over the set of choices at the corresponding 
information set. 
For example, the set of behavioral strategies for Player 1 in the extensive frame 
of Figure 6.2 is : , [0,1]
1 1
a b e f
p q
p p q q
  
∈  − −  
. A behavioral strategy is a 
simpler object than a mixed strategy: in this example, specifying a behavioral 
strategy for Player 1 requires specifying the values of two parameters (p and q), 
while specifying a mixed strategy requires specifying the values of three 
parameters (p, r and q). Can one then use behavioral strategies rather than 
mixed strategies? The answer is affirmative, as Theorem 6.2 below states. First 
we illustrate with an example based on the extensive form of Figure 6.3 (which 
is a simplified version of the extensive form of Figure 6.2, obtained by 
removing the moves of Nature; the iz ’s are terminal nodes and the outcomes 
have been omitted). 
e f
c d c d
2
1
1z 2z 3z
4z 5z
a b
1
 
Figure 6.3 
An extensive frame with the outcomes omitted. The iz ’s are terminal nodes. 
                                                 
9 The definition of perfect recall was included as part of Definition 3.1 (Chapter 3). 
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Consider the mixed-strategy profile ( )1 2,σ σ σ=  with  
1σ = 51 4 2
12 12 12 12
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )a e a f b e b f 
 
 
  and  2 1 2
3 3
c d
σ
 
=  
 
 
We can compute the probability of reaching every terminal node as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 51 1 4 11 1 2 1 2 12 3 12 3 36( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( )P z a e c a f cσ σ σ σ= + = + = , 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 101 2 4 22 1 2 1 2 12 3 12 3 36( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( )P z a e d a f dσ σ σ σ= + = + =  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )5 72 1 13 1 2 1 2 12 3 12 3 36( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( )P z b e c b f cσ σ σ σ= + = + =  
( ) ( )2 2 44 1 2 12 3 36( ) ( , ) ( )P z b e dσ σ= = =  
( ) ( )5 1025 1 2 12 3 36( ) ( , ) ( )P z b f dσ σ= = =  
That is, the mixed-strategy profile ( )1 2,σ σ σ=  gives rise to the following 
probability distribution over terminal nodes: 1 2 3 4 5
5 10 7 104
36 36 36 36 36
z z z z z 
 
 
. Now 
consider the following behavioral strategy of Player 1:  
5 7 52
12 12 7 7
a b e f 
 
 
. What 
probability distribution over the set of terminal nodes would it determine in 
conjunction with Player 2’s mixed strategy 2 1 2
3 3
c d
σ
 
=  
 
?  The calculations are 
simple ( ( )P x  denotes the probability of choice x for Player 1, according to the 
given behavioral strategy): 
( )5 511 2 12 3 36( ) ( ) ( )P z P a cσ= = = ,   ( )5 1022 2 12 3 36( ) ( ) ( )P z P a dσ= = =  
( )7 713 2 12 3 36( ) ( ) ( )P z P b cσ= = = ,  ( )( )7 2 2 44 2 12 3 7 36( ) ( ) ( ) ( )P z P b d P eσ= = =  
( )( )7 5 1025 2 12 3 7 36( ) ( ) ( ) ( )P z P b d P fσ= = = .  
Thus, against 2 1 2
3 3
c d
σ
 
=  
 
, Player 1’s behavioral strategy 
5 7 52
12 12 7 7
a b e f 
 
 
 and 
her mixed strategy 
51 4 2
12 12 12 12
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )a e a f b e b f 
 
 
 are equivalent, in the sense 
that they give rise to the same probability distribution 1 2 3 4 5
5 10 7 104
36 36 36 36 36
z z z z z 
 
 
 
over terminal nodes.  
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Theorem 6.1 [Kuhn, 1953]. In extensive forms with perfect recall, behavioral 
strategies and mixed strategies are equivalent, in the sense that, for every mixed 
strategy there is a behavioral strategy that gives rise to the same probability 
distribution over terminal nodes.
10
 
Without perfect recall, Theorem 6.1 does not hold. To see this, consider the 
one-player extensive form shown in Figure 6.4 and the mixed strategy 
1 1
2 2
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
0 0
a c a d b c b d 
 
 
 which induces the probability distribution 
1 2 3 4
1 1
2 2
0 0
z z z z 
 
 
 on the set of terminal nodes.  
c d c d
1
1
1z 2z 3z 4z
a b
 
Figure 6.4 
A one-player extensive frame without perfect recall.  
Consider an arbitrary behavioral strategy 
1 1
a b c d
p p q q
 
 − − 
, whose 
corresponding probability distribution over the set of terminal nodes is  
1 2 3 4
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 )
z z z z
pq p q p q p q
 
 − − − − 
. In order to have 2( ) 0P z =  it must be 
                                                 
10 A more precise statement is as follows. Consider an extensive form with perfect recall and a 
Player i. Let 
ix−  be an arbitrary profile of strategies of the players other than i, where, for 
every j i≠ , jx  is either a mixed or a behavioral strategy of Player j. Then, for every mixed 
strategy 
iσ  of Player i there is a behavioral strategy ib  of Player i such  that ( ),i ixσ −  and  
( ),i ib x−  give rise to the same probability distribution over the set of terminal nodes.  
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that either p = 0 or q = 1. If p = 0 then 1( ) 0P z =  and if q = 1 then 4( ) 0P z = . 
Thus the probability distribution 1 2 3 4
1 1
2 2
0 0
z z z z 
 
 
 cannot be achieved with a 
behavioral strategy. 
Since the focus of this book is on extensive-form games with perfect recall, by 
appealing to Theorem 6.3 from now on we can restrict attention to behavioral 
strategies. 
As usual, one goes from a frame to a game by adding preferences over 
outcomes. Let O  be the set of basic outcomes (recall that with every terminal 
node is associated a basic outcome) and ( )OL  the set of lotteries (probability 
distributions) over O . 
Definition 6.2. An extensive-form game with cardinal payoffs is an extensive 
frame (with, possibly, chance moves) together  with a von Neumann-
Morgenstern ranking i  of the set of lotteries ( )OL , for every Player i . 
As usual, it is convenient to represent a von Neumann-Morgenstern ranking by 
means of a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function and replace the 
outcomes with a vector of utilities, one for every player.  
For example, consider the extensive form of Figure 6.2 where the set of basic 
outcomes is 1 2 3 4 5{ , , , , }O o o o o o=  and suppose that Player 1 has a von 
Neumann-Morgenstern ranking of ( )OL  that is represented by the following 
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function:   
1
1 2 3 4 5
: 5 2 0 1 3
o o o o
U
o


outcome :
 
. Suppose also that Player 2 has preferences represented by the von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function   
2
1 2 3 4 5
: 3 6 4 5 0
o o o o
U
o


outcome :
.   
Then from the extensive frame of Figure 6.2 we obtain the extensive-form game 
with cardinal payoffs shown in Figure 6.5.  Since the expected utility of lottery 
1 2
2 1
3 3
o o 
 
 
 is 4 for both players, and the expected utility of lottery 1 3 4
31 1
5 5 5
o o o 
 
 
 
is 1.2 for Player 1 and 4 for Player 2, we can simplify the game by replacing the 
first move of Nature with the payoff vector (4,4) and the second move of 
Nature with the payoff vector (1.2, 4). The simplified game is shown in Figure 
6.6. 
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Nature
e f
c c
d
2
3o 4o 5o
a b
2
3
1
3
1o 2o
d
1
1o 3o 4o
Nature
5 2 0 5 0 1 1 3
3 6 4 3 4 5 5 0
1
3
5
1
5
1
5
 
Figure 6.5 
An extensive game based on the frame of Figure 6.2.  
The terminal nodes have not been labeled. The io ’s are basic outcomes.  
e f
c d c d
2
1
1z 2z 3z
4z 5z
a b
4 0 1.2
1 3
4 4 4
5 0
1
 
Figure 6.6 
A simplified version of the game of Figure 6.5. The iz ’s are terminal nodes. 
Note that this is a game based on the frame of Figure 6.3 
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Given an extensive game with cardinal payoffs, associated with every 
behavioral strategy profile is a lottery over basic outcomes and thus, using a 
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function for each player, a payoff for each 
player. For example,  the behavioral strategy profile 
5 7 52 1 2
12 12 7 7 3 3
,
a b e f c d    
    
    
 
for the extensive game of Figure 6.5 gives rise to the lottery 
1 2 3 4 5
71 25 213 81 150
540 540 540 540 540
o o o o o 
 
 
 (for instance, the probability of basic outcome 1o  is 
calculated as follows: 2 11 3 5( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )P o P a P c P b P c= + =  
5 7 711 2 1 1
12 3 3 12 3 5 540
+ = ). 
Using the utility function postulated above for Player 1, namely  
1 2 3 4 5
1 : 5 2 0 1 3
o o o o
U
ooutcome :
, we get a corresponding payoff of 71 25
540 540
5 2+ +  
213 81 150 936
540 540 540 540
0 1 3 1.733+ + = = . An alternative way of computing this payoff is 
by using the simplified game of Figure 6.6 where the behavioral strategy profile 
5 7 52 1 2
12 12 7 7 3 3
,
a b e f c d    
    
    
 yields the probability distribution over terminal 
nodes 1 2 3 4 5
5 10 7 104
36 36 36 36 36
z z z z z 
 
 
, which, in turn, yields the probability distribution 
5 10 7 104
36 36 36 36 36
4 0 1.2 1 3 
 
 
over utilities for Player 1. From the latter we get that the 
expected payoff for Player 1 is 5 10 7 10 9364
36 36 36 36 36 540
4 0 1.2 1 3 1.733+ + + + = = . The 
calculations for  Player 2 are similar (see Exercise 6.3).  
 Test your understanding of the concepts introduced in this section, by going 
through the exercises in Section 6.E.1 of Appendix 6.E at the end of this chapter. 
6.2 Subgame-perfect equilibrium revisited 
The notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium was introduced in Chapter 3 
(Definition 3.5) for extensive-form games with ordinal payoffs. When payoffs 
are ordinal, a subgame-perfect equilibrium might fail to exist because either the 
entire game or a proper subgame does not have any Nash equilibria. In the case 
of finite extensive-form games with cardinal payoffs, a subgame-perfect 
equilibrium always exists, because − by Nash’s theorem (Theorem 5.1, Chapter 
5) − every finite game has at least one Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. 
Thus, in the case of cardinal payoffs, the subgame-perfect equilibrium 
algorithm (Definition 3.6, Chapter 3) never halts and the output of the 
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algorithm is a subgame-perfect equilibrium.  
We shall illustrate this with the extensive-form game shown in Figure 6.7 
below.  
2 2
33
L R
A B E F
C D C G G HH
1
3
1
2
0
2
2
0
3
0
1
2
2
0
3
0
1
2
1
2
1
2
0
3
1
D
 
Figure 6.7 
An extensive-form game with cardinal payoffs. 
Let us apply the subgame-perfect equilibrium algorithm to this game. We start 
with the proper subgame that begins at Player 2’s decision node on the left, 
whose strategic form is shown in Table 6.8. Note that this subgame has no 
pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Thus if payoffs were merely ordinal payoffs the 
algorithm would halt and we would conclude that the game of Figure 6.7 has 
no subgame-perfect equilibria. However, we will assume that payoffs are 
cardinal (that is, that they are von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities). 
C D
Player A 3  ,  1 0  ,  2
2 B 0  ,  3 1  ,  2
Player 3
 
Table 6.8 
The strategic form of the proper subgame on the left in the game of Figure 6.7. 
To find the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the game of Table 6.8, let p be 
the probability of A and q the probability of C. Then we need q to be such that 
3 1q q= − , that is, 1
4
q = , and p to be such that 3(1 ) 2p p+ − = , that is,  1
2
p = .  
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Thus the Nash equilibrium of this proper subgame is 
31 1 1
2 2 4 4
,
A B C D    
    
    
, 
yielding the following payoffs: 3 31 1 1 1 1 1
2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
1 2 2 0+ + + = 1.125 for Player 1, 
3 31 1 1 1 1 1
2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
3 0 0 1 0.75+ + + =  for Player 2 and 3 31 1 1 1 1 1
2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
1 2 3 2 2+ + + =  for 
Player 3.
11
 Thus we can simplify the game of Figure 6.7 as follows: 
1
2
3
L R
E F
G G HH
2
0
3
0
1
2
1
2
1
2
0
3
1.125
0.75
2
 
Figure 6.9 
The game of Figure 6.7 after replacing the proper subgame on  
the left with the payoffs associated with its Nash equilibrium. 
Now consider the proper subgame of the game of Figure 6.9 (the subgame that 
starts at Player 2’s node). Its strategic form is shown in Table 6.10. 
G H
Player E 0  ,  3 1  ,  2
2 F 2  ,  1 0  ,  3
Player 3
 
Table 6.10 
The strategic form of the proper subgame of the game of Figure 6.9. 
                                                 
11 Note that, by Theorem 5.2 (Chapter 5) the Nash equilibrium payoff of Player 2 can be 
computed much more quickly as the expected payoff from the pure strategy A, namely 3
4
, 
and the payoff of Player 3 as the expected payoff from the pure strategy D, namely 2. 
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Again, there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. To find the mixed-strategy 
equilibrium let p be the probability of E and q the probability of G. Then we 
need q to be such that 1 2q q− = , that is, 1
3
q = , and p to be such that 
3 1 2 3(1 )p p p p+ − = + − , that is,  2
3
p = . Hence the Nash equilibrium is 
2 1 1 2
3 3 3 3
,
E F G H    
    
    
 yielding the following payoffs: 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 2
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
2 0 1 2 1+ + + =  
for Player 1, 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 2
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
0 1 2 0 0.67+ + + =  for Player 2 and 
2 1 2 2 1 1 1 2
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
3 2 1 3 2.33+ + + =  for Player 3.  
Thus we can simplify the game of Figure 6.9 as shown in Figure 6.11 below, 
where  the optimal choice for Player 1 is L. 
1
L R
1.125
0.75
2
1
0.67
2.33
 
Figure 6.11 
The game of Figure 6.9 after replacing the proper subgame 
with the payoffs associated with the Nash equilibrium. 
Hence the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game of Figure 6.7 (expressed in 
terms of behavioral strategies) is:  
31 1 2 1 1 1 2
2 2 3 3 4 4 3 3
, ,
1 0
A B E F C D G HL R     
     
      
 
We conclude this section with the following theorem, which is a corollary of 
Theorem 5.1 (Chapter 5). 
Theorem 6.2. Every finite extensive-form game with cardinal payoffs has at 
least one subgame-perfect equilibrium 
 Test your understanding of the concepts introduced in this section, by going 
through the exercises in Section 6.E.2 of Appendix 6.E at the end of this chapter. 
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6.3 Problems with the notion of subgame-
perfect equilibrium  
The notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium is a refinement of Nash 
equilibrium. As explained in Chapter 2, in the context of perfect-information 
games, the notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium eliminates some 
“unreasonable” Nash equilibria that involve incredible threats. However, not 
every subgame-perfect equilibrium can be viewed as a “rational solution”. To 
see this, consider the extensive-form game shown in Figure 6.12 below. This 
game has no proper subgames and thus the set of subgame-perfect equilibria 
coincides with the set of Nash equilibria. The pure-strategy Nash equilibria of 
this game are ( , , )a f c , ( , , )a e c , ( , , )b e c  and ( , , )b f d . It can be argued that 
neither ( , , )a f c  nor ( , , )b f d  can be considered “rational solutions”.  
Consider first the Nash equilibrium ( , , )a f c . Player 2’s plan to play f is 
rational only in the very limited sense that, given that Player 1 plays a, what 
Player 2 plans to do is irrelevant because it cannot affect anybody’s payoff; thus 
f is as good as e. However, if we take Player 2’s strategy as a “serious” plan 
specifying what Player 2 would actually do if she had to move, then −given that 
Player 3 plays c −e would give Player 2 a payoff of 2, while f would only give a 
payoff of 1. Thus e seems to be a better strategy than f, if Player 2 takes the 
contingency “seriously”.  
c d
1
a
b
c d
e
3
2
2
2
0
0
0
2
2
2
0
0
0
1
1
0
f
2
 
Figure 6.12 
An extensive-form game showing the insufficiency  
of the notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium. 
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Consider now the Nash equilibrium ( , , )b f d  and focus on Player 3. As before, 
Player 3’s plan to play d is rational only in the very limited sense that, given 
that Player 1 plays a and Player 2 plays f, what Player 3 plans to do is 
irrelevant, so that c is as good as d. However, if Player 3 did find himself having 
to play, it would not be rational for him to play d, since d is a strictly 
dominated choice: no matter whether he is making his choice at the left node 
or at the right node of his information set, c gives him a higher payoff than d. 
How can it be then that d can be part of a Nash equilibrium? The answer is 
that d is strictly dominated conditional on Player 3’s information set being 
reached but not as a plan formulated before the play of the game starts. In other 
words, d is strictly dominated as a choice but not as a strategy. 
The notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium is not strong enough to eliminate 
“unreasonable” Nash equilibria such as ( , , )a f c  and ( , , )b f d  in the game of 
Figure 6.12. In order to do that we will need a stronger notion. This issue is 
postponed to a later chapter. 
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Appendix 6.E: Exercises 
6.E.1 .  Exercises  for  Section 6 .1 :   
         Behavioral  s trategies  in  dynamic  games 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this 
chapter. 
Exercise 6.1. What properties must an extensive-form frame satisfy in order for 
it to be the case that, for a given player, the set of mixed strategies coincides 
with the set of behavioral strategies? [Assume that there are at least two choices 
at every information set.] 
Exercise 6.2. Suppose that, in a given extensive-form frame, Player 1 has four 
information sets: at one of them she has two choices and at each of the other 
three she has three choices.  
(a) How many parameters are needed to specify a mixed strategy of Player 1? 
(b) How many parameters are needed to specify a behavioral strategy of Player 
1? 
Exercise 6.3. From the behavioral strategy profile 
5 7 52 1 2
12 12 7 7 3 3
,
a b e f c d    
    
    
 
calculate the payoff of Player 2 in two ways: (1) using the game of Figure 6.5 
and (2) using the simplified game of Figure 6.6. 
Exercise 6.4. Consider the following extensive form, where 1 5,...,o o  are basic 
outcomes. 
c d
1
a
b
c d
e
f
2
3
Nature
1
2
1
2
3o1o 2o
2o
4o
5o
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Player 1’s ranking of O is 1 1 5 1 4 1 2 1 3o o o o o≻ ≻ ≻ ∼ ;  furthermore, she is 
indifferent between 5o  and the lottery 
1 2 3
6 1 1
8 8 8
o o o 
 
 
 and is also indifferent 
between 4o  and the lottery 
2 5
2 1
3 3
o o 
 
 
.  Player 2’s ranking of O is 
1 2 2 2 4 2 3 2 5o o o o o∼ ∼ ≻ ≻ ;  furthermore, he is indifferent between 3o  and the 
lottery 1 2 5
81 1
10 10 10
o o o 
 
 
. Finally, Player 3’s ranking of O is 
2 3 4 3 3 3 5 3 1o o o o o≻ ≻ ∼ ≻ ; furthermore, she is indifferent between 4o  and the 
lottery 1 2 3
1 1 1
4 2 4
o o o 
 
 
 and is also indifferent between 3o  and the lottery 
1 2
3 2
5 5
o o 
 
 
.   Write the corresponding extensive-form game. 
6.E.2 .  Exercises  for  Section 6 .2 :   
         Subgame-perfect  equi l ibrium revis i ted 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this 
chapter. 
Exercise 6.5. Consider the following extensive-form game with cardinal 
payoffs. 
1
2
1
U
D
l r
L R L R
1
5
3
2
2
4
0
3
1
1
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(a) Write the corresponding strategic-form game and find all the pure-
strategy Nash equilibria. 
(b) Find the subgame-perfect equilibrium.  
Exercise 6.6. Consider the following extensive form (where the basic outcomes 
are denoted by xj instead of oj, j = 1,…, 10). 
b
d e f d e f d e f
1
2
3
x2x1 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9
x10
u
d
a c
 
All the players satisfy the axioms of expected utility. They rank the outcomes 
as indicated below (if outcome w is above outcome y then w is strictly preferred 
to y, and if w and y are written next to each other then the player is indifferent 
between the two): 
7 9
1 2 4 5
10
3 6 8
,
, , ,
1:
, ,
x x
x x x x
Player
x
x x x
 
 
 
 
 
 
,    
1 3
4 5
2 7 8
6
9
,
,
2 : , ,
x x
x x
Player x x x
x
x
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
,     
2 7
8
1 4 9
3 5 6
,
3 :
, ,
, ,
x x
x
Player
x x x
x x x
 
 
 
 
 
 
.  
Furthermore, Player 2 is indifferent between x4 and the lottery 
1 2
1 1
2 2
x x 
 
 
 and 
Player 3 is indifferent between x1 and the lottery 
2 5
1 1
2 2
x x 
 
 
.  Although the 
above information is not sufficient to determine the von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility functions of the players, it is sufficient to compute the 
subgame-perfect equilibrium. Find the subgame-perfect equilibrium. 
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Exercise 6.7. Consider the following extensive-form game with cardinal 
payoffs. 
1
2 2
1 1
L R
A B C D
E F E F G H G H
2
0
0
6
0
2
4
1
1
4
2
0
4
3
1
2  
(a) Write the corresponding strategic-form game. 
(b) Find all the pure-strategy Nash equilibria. 
(c) Find the mixed-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium. 
Exercise 6.8. Consider the following extensive-form game with cardinal 
payoffs: 
x 0
x 1 x 2
x 3 x 4
1
2
3
L M
R
l
r
l r
1
0
0
player 1's payoff
player 3's payoff
player 2's payoff
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
2
2
1
0
0
0
a b a b
1
 
(a) Find all the pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Which ones are also subgame 
perfect? 
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(b) [This is a more challenging question] Prove that there is no mixed-strategy 
Nash equilibrium where Player 1 plays M with probability strictly between 0 
and 1. 
◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊ 
Exercise 6.9: Challenging Question. 
You have to go to a part of town where many people have been mugged 
recently. You consider whether you should leave your wallet at home or carry 
it with you. Of the four possible outcomes, your most preferred one is having 
your wallet with you and not being mugged. Being mugged is a very unpleasant 
experience, so your second favorite alternative is not carrying your wallet and 
not being mugged (although not having any money with you can be very 
inconvenient). If, sadly enough, your destiny is to be mugged, then you prefer 
to have your wallet with you (possibly with not too much money in it!) 
because you don't want to have to deal with a frustrated mugger. A typical 
potential mugger, on the other hand, does not care whether or not you are 
carrying a wallet, in case he decides not to mug you (that is, he is indifferent 
between the corresponding two outcomes). Of course his favorite outcome is 
the one where you have your wallet with you and he mugs you. His least 
preferred outcome is the one where he attempts to mug you and you don't 
have your wallet with you (he risks being caught for nothing). Denote the 
possible outcomes as follows: 
  Potential mugger 
Not  mug              Mug 
You Leave wallet at home z
1
 z
2
 
 Take wallet with you z3
 z
4
 
(a)  What is the ordinal ranking of the outcomes for each player? 
(b) Suppose now that both players have von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
functions. You are indifferent between the following lotteries: 
1 2 3 4
1 3 314
20 20 20
0
z z z z
L
 
=  
 
 and 1 2 3 42 1 1
2 2
0 0
z z z z
L
 
=  
 
;  furthermore, you are 
indifferent between 1 2 3 43 2 1
3 3
0 0
z z z z
L
 
=  
 
 and 1 2 3 44 1 1
2 2
0 0
z z z z
L
 
=  
 
.  The 
potential mugger is indifferent between the two lotteries 
1 2 3 4
5 1 1 1 1
4 4 4 4
z z z z
L
 
=  
 
 and 1 2 3 46 8 67 16 37
128 128 128 128
z z z z
L
 
=  
 
. For each player find 
the normalized von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function.  
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You have to decide whether or not to leave your wallet at home. Suppose that, 
if you leave your wallet at home, with probability p  (with 0 < p < 1) the 
potential mugger will notice that your pockets are empty and with probability 
(1−p) he will not notice. If the potential mugger does not notice that your 
pockets are empty then he will nevertheless be aware of the fact that you might 
have left the wallet at home and he simply cannot tell.  
(c)  Represent this situation as an extensive game with imperfect information. 
(d) Write the corresponding normal form. 
(e) Find all the subgame-perfect equilibria (including the mixed-strategy ones, if 
any). [Hint: your answer should distinguish between different values of p]. 
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Appendix 6.S: Solutions to exercises  
Exercise 6.1.  It must be the case that the player under consideration has only 
one information set. 
Exercise 6.2.  (a) 53. The number of pure strategies is 2 3 3 3 54× × × =  and thus 
53 probabilities are needed to specify a mixed strategy. (b) 7: one probability 
for the information set where she has two choices and two probabilities for 
each of the other three information sets. 
Exercise 6.3.  (1) The induced probability distribution on basic outcomes is 
1 2 3 4 5
71 25 213 81 150
540 540 540 540 540
o o o o o 
 
 
. Thus Player 2’s expected utility is 71 25 213
540 540 540
3 6 4+ + +  
81 150 1620
540 540 540
5 0 3+ = = .   (2) The induced probability distribution on terminal 
nodes is  1 2 3 4 5
5 10 7 104
36 36 36 36 36
z z z z z 
 
 
. Thus Player 2’s expected payoff is 
5 10 7 4
36 36 36 36
4 4 14 5+ + + +  10 108
36 36
0 3= = . Not surprisingly, the same number as in 
part (1). 
Exercise 6.4.  The normalized von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions are 
1 2 3 4 5
1
2
3
1 0 0 0.25 0.75
1 1 0.2 1 0
0 1 0.4 0.6 0.4
o o o o o
U
U
U
 
 
 
 
 
 
. Thus the extensive-form game is as follows: 
c d
1
a
b
c d
e
f
2
3
Nature
1
2
1
2
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0.2
0.4
0.25
1
0.6
0
1
1
0.75
0
0.4
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Or, in a simplified form obtained by removing the move of Nature, as follows: 
c d
1
a
b
c d
e
f
2
3
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0.2
0.4
0.25
1
0.6
0.375
0.5
0.7
 
Exercise 6.5.  (a) The strategic form is as follows. 
UL 1 5 1 5
UR 1 5 1 5
DL 3 2 0 3
DR 2 4 1 1
Player 1
Player  2
l r
 
The pure-strategy Nash equilibria are (UL,r) and  (UR,r). 
(b) The strategic form of the proper subgame that starts at Player 2’s node is: 
L 3 2 0 3
R 2 4 1 1
Player  2
l r
Player 1
 
This game has a unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium given by 
3 1 1 1
4 4 2 2
,
L R l r    
    
    
, yielding Player 1 an expected payoff of 1.5. Thus the 
unique subgame-perfect equilibrium, expressed as a behavioral-strategy profile, 
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is 
3 1 1 1
4 4 2 2
,
0 1
U D L R l r    
    
    
 or, expressed as a mixed-strategy profile,  
3 1 1 1
4 4 2 2
,
0 0
UL UR DL DR l r    
    
    
. 
Exercise 6.6.  There is only one proper subgame starting from Player 2’s node; 
its strategic-form frame is as follows: 
Player 3
d e f
a x1 x2 x3
Player 2 b x4 x5 x6
c x7 x8 x9
 
For Player 2 strategy c is strictly dominated by strategy b (she prefers x4 to x7, 
and x5 to x8 and x6 to x9) and for Player 3 strategy f is strictly dominated by 
strategy d (she prefers x1 to x3, and x4 to x6 and x7 to x9). Thus we can simplify 
the game to the following. 
Player 3
d e
Player a x1 x2
2 b x4 x5
 
Restricted to these outcomes the payers’ rankings are: 
1
4 5
2
2 : ,
x
Player x x
x
 
 
 
 
 
 ,  
2
1 4
5
3: ,
x
Player x x
x
 
 
 
 
 
. Let U be Player 2’s von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
function. The we can set 1 2( ) 1  ( ) 0U x U x= =and . Thus, since she is indifferent 
between x
4
 and x
5
 and also between  x
4
 and the lottery 1 2
1 1
2 2
x x 
 
 
, U(x
4
) = U(x
5
) 
= 1
2
. Let V  be Player 3’s von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. The we 
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can set 2 5( ) 1  ( ) 0V x V x= =and . Thus, since she is indifferent between x1 and x4 
and also between  x
1
 and the lottery 2 5
1 1
2 2
x x 
 
 
, V(x
1
) = V(x
4
) = 1
2
. Hence the 
above game-frame becomes the following game: 
d e
a
b
Player 2
Player 3
1
2
1,
1 1
2 2
, 12 ,0
0 ,1
 
There is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Let p be the probability of a and q 
the probability of d. Then for a Nash equilibrium we need  q = 1
2
  and  p = 1
2
. 
Hence in the subgame the outcome will be 1 2 4 5
1 1 1 1
4 4 4 4
x x x x 
 
 
. Since all of these 
outcomes are better than x10 for Player 1, Player 1 will play d. Thus the 
subgame-perfect equilibrium is 
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
, ,
0 01 0
a b c d e fd u     
     
      
. 
Exercise 6.7.  (a) The strategic form is as follows: 
  PLAYER  2 
  AC AD BC BD 
 
P 
L 
A 
Y 
E 
R 
 
1 
LEG 2 , 0 2 , 0 0 , 2 0 , 2 
LEH 2 , 0 2 , 0 0 , 2 0 , 2 
LFG 0 , 6 0 , 6 4 , 1 4 , 1 
LFH 0 , 6 0 , 6 4 , 1 4 , 1 
REG 1 , 4 4 , 3 1 , 4 4 , 3 
REH 2 , 0 1 , 2 2 , 0 1 , 2 
RFG 1 , 4 4 , 3 1 , 4 4 , 3 
RFH 2 , 0 1 , 2 2 , 0 1 , 2 
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(b) There are no pure-strategy Nash equilibria. 
(c) First let us solve the subgame on the left: 
 
 
Player  1 
 Player   2 
 A B 
E 2 , 0 0 , 2 
F 0 , 6 4 , 1 
There is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Let us find the mixed-strategy 
equilibrium. Let p be the probability assigned to E and q the probability 
assigned to A. Then p must be the solution to  6(1 −p)=2p+(1−p) and  q must 
be the solution to 2q=4(1−q). Thus 5
7
p =   and  2
3
q = . The expected payoff of 
Player 1 is 4
3
1.33= , while the expected payoff of player 2 is 12
7
1.714= .  
Next we solve the subgame on the right: 
 
 
 
Player  1 
 Player   2 
 C D 
G 1 , 4 4 , 3 
H 2 , 0 1 , 2 
There is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Let us find the mixed-strategy 
equilibrium. Let p be the probability assigned to G and q the probability 
assigned to C. Then p must be the solution to  4p = 3p + 2(1−p) and  q must be 
the solution to q+4(1−q) = 2q+(1−q). Thus 2
3
p =   and  3
4
q = . The expected 
payoff of Player 1 is 7
4
1.75= . Thus the game reduces to: 
1
L R
1.33
1.714
1.75
2.67
 
Hence the subgame-perfect equilibrium is: 
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5 32 2 1 2 1 1
7 7 3 3 3 3 4 4
,
0 1
L R E F G H A B C D    
    
    
 
Exercise 6.8.  (a) The strategic form is as follows: 
                        Player 2                          Player 2    
  l        r    l r 
 R 1  ,  0  ,  0 1  ,  0  ,  0  R 1  ,  0  ,  0 1  ,  0  ,  0 
Player M 0  ,  1  ,  1 2  ,  2  ,  1  M 0  ,  1  ,  0 0  ,  0  ,  0 
1 L 1  ,  1  ,  0 0  ,  0  ,  0  L 1  ,  1  ,  0 0  ,  0  ,  0 
         
                                Player 3 
chooses a 
  Player 3 chooses b 
The pure-strategy Nash equilibria are highlighted: (R,l,a), (M,r,a), (L,l,a), (R,l,b), 
(R,r,b) and (L,l,b).  They are all subgame perfect because there are no proper 
subgames. 
(b) Since, for Player 3, a strictly dominates b conditional on his information set 
being reached, he will have to play a if his information set is reached with 
positive probability. Now, Player 3’s information set is reached with positive 
probability if and only if player 1 plays M with positive probability. Thus when 
Pr(M) > 0 the game essentially reduces to 
x 0
x 1 x 2
x 3 x 4
1
2
3
L M
R
l
r
l r
1
0
0
player 1's payoff
player 3's payoff
player 2's payoff
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
2
2
1  
Now, in order for Player 1 to be willing to assign positive probability to M he 
must expect a payoff of at least 1 (otherwise R would be better) and the only 
way he can expect a payoff of at least 1 is if Player 2 plays r with probability at 
least 1
2
. Now if Player 2 plays r with probability greater than 1
2
, then M gives 
Player 1 a higher payoff than both L and R and thus he will choose M with 
probability 1, in which case Player 2 will choose r with probability 1 (and 
Player 3 will choose a with probability 1) and so we get the pure strategy 
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equilibrium (M,r,a). If Player 2 plays r with probability exactly 1
2
 then Player 1 
is indifferent between M and R (and can mix between the two), but finds L 
inferior and must give it probability 0. But then Player 2’s best reply to a mixed 
strategy of Player 1 that assigns positive probability to M and R and zero 
probability to L is to play r with probability 1 (if his information set is reached 
it can only be reached at node x2). Thus there cannot be a mixed-strategy 
equilibrium where Player 1 assigns to M probability p with 0 < p < 1 : it must 
be either Pr(M) =0 or Pr(M) = 1. 
Exercise 6.9.  (a) Your ranking is (best at the top, worst at the bottom) 
3
1
4
2
z
z
z
z
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
while the potential mugger’s ranking is 
4
1 3
2
,
z
z z
z
 
 
 
 
 
. 
(b)  Let U be your utility function. Let U(z
3
) = 1, U(z
1
) = a, U(z
4
) = b and 
U(z
2
) = 0, with 0 < b < a < 1. The expected utilities are as follows: 
3 3
1 20 20
( )EU L a= + , 12 2( )EU L b= ,  
1
3 3
( )EU L =  and 14 2( )EU L a= . From 
3 4( ) ( )EU L E L=  we get that 
2
3
a = . Substituting this into the equation 
1 2( ) ( )EU L EU L=  gives 
1
2
b = .  Thus U(z
3
) = 1, U(z
1
) = 2
3
, U(z
4
) = 1
2
 and U(z
2
) 
= 0.  Let V  be the mugger’s utility function. Let V(z
4
) = 1, V(z
1
) = V(z
3
) = c 
and V(z
2
) = 0 with 0 < c < 1. The expected utilities are as follows: 
1
5 4
( ) (2 1)EV L c= +  and 16 128( ) (24 37)EV L c= + . Solving 5 6( ) ( )EV L EV L=  gives 
c = 1
8
. Thus, V(z
4
) = 1, V(z
1
) = V(z
3
) = 1
8
 and V(z
2
) = 0. 
(c)  The extensive game is as follows: 
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You
NATURE
MuggerMugger
leave
take
notice
not notice
1-pp
not
mug
not mug mugnot
z z z z z z1 2 1 2 3 4
2/3 0 2/3 0 1 1/2
1/8 0 0 1/8 11/8  
(d) The strategic form is as follows (for the mugger’s strategy the first item 
refers to the left node, the second item to the information set on the right): 
NN NM MN MM
L 2/3 , 1/8 (2/3)p , (1/8)p 2/3(1-p) , 1/8 (1-p) 0 , 0
T 1 , 1/8 1/2 , 1 1 , 1/8 1/2 , 1
Potential Mugger
You
 
(e) At a subgame-perfect equilibrium the mugger will choose not to mug when 
he notices your empty pockets. Thus the normal form can be simplified as 
follows: 
NN NM
L 2/3 , 1/8 (2/3)p , (1/8)p
T 1 , 1/8 1/2 , 1
You
Potential Mugger
 
• If p < ¾  then Take is a strictly dominant strategy for you and 
therefore there is a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium given by (Take, 
(Not mug,Mug)).  
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• If p = ¾  then there is a continuum of equilibria where the Mugger 
chooses (Not mug,Mug) with probability 1 and you choose L with 
probability q and T with probability (1−q) for any q with 0 ≤ q ≤ 28
29
 
(obtained from 3 1
32 8
1 )q q+ − ≥  
• If p > ¾  then there is no pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium. 
Let q be the probability that you choose L and r the probability that the 
mugger chooses NN. Then the unique mixed strategy equilibrium is 
given by the solution to: 2 2 1
3 3 2
(1 ) (1 )r p r r r+ − = + −  and 
1 1
8 8
(1 )pq q= + −  which is 
7
8
q
p
=
−
 and 
4 3
4 1
p
r
p
−
=
−
. Thus the unique 
subgame-perfect equilibrium is: 
7 1 4 3 2
0 0
8 8 4 1 4 1
L T NN NM MN MM
p p
p p p p
 
 − −  − − − − 
. 
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PART III 
 
 
 
Advanced Topics  I 
 
Knowledge,  
Common Knowledge,   
Belief 
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Knowledge and  
Common Knowledge 
7.1 Individual knowledge 
n extensive-form games with imperfect information we use information sets to 
represent what the players, when it is their turn to move, know about past 
choices. An information set of Player i is a collection of nodes in the tree where 
it is Player i ’s turn to move and the interpretation is that Player i knows that she is 
making her choice at one of those nodes, but she does not know which of these 
nodes has actually been reached. In this chapter we extend the notion of 
information set to more general settings. 
We start with an example. After listening to her patient’s symptoms, a doctor 
reaches the conclusion that there are only five possible causes: (1) a bacterial 
infection, (2) a viral infection, (3) an allergic reaction to a drug, (4) an allergic 
reaction to food and (5) environmental factors. The doctor decides to do a lab test. 
If the lab test turns out to be positive then the doctor will be able to rule out causes 
(3)-(5), while a negative lab test will be an indication that causes (1) and (2) can be 
ruled out. To represent the doctor’s possible states of information and knowledge 
we can use five states: a, b, c, d, and e. Each state represents a possible cause, as 
shown in Figure 7.1. We can partition the set { , , , , }a b c d e  into two sets: the set 
{ , }a b , representing the state of knowledge of the doctor if she is informed that the 
lab test is positive, and the set { , , }c d e , representing the state of knowledge of the 
doctor if she is informed that the lab test is negative. 
Chapter 
7 
I 
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a b c d e
positive lab test negative lab test
viral
infection
bacterial
infection
drug
allergy
food
allergy
environment
 
Figure 7.1 
Consider the proposition “the cause of the patient’s symptoms is either an infection 
or environmental factors”. We can think of this proposition as the set of states 
{ , , }a b e  where the proposition is in fact true; furthermore, we can ask the question 
“after receiving the result of the lab test, at which state would the doctor know the 
proposition represented by the set { , , }a b e ?”. If the true state is a, then −  after 
viewing the result of the lab test − the doctor will think that it is possible that the 
state is either a or b and in either case it is indeed the case that the cause of the 
patient’s symptoms is either an infection or environmental factors, so that the 
doctor will know this; the same is true if the true state is b. On the other hand, if 
the true state is e then the doctor will consider c, d and e as possibilities and thus will 
not be able to claim that she knows that the cause of the patient’s symptoms is 
either an infection or environmental factors. Thus the answer to the question “after 
receiving the result of the lab test, at which state would the doctor know the 
proposition represented by the set { , , }a b e ?” is “at states a and b”.  We can now 
turn to the general definitions. 
Definition 7.1.  Let W be a finite set of states, where each state is to be 
understood as a complete specification of the relevant facts about the world. An 
information partition is a partition I of W (that is, a collection of subsets of W 
that (1) are pairwise disjoint and (2) whose union covers the entire set W); the 
elements of the partition are called information sets. For every w W∈  we 
denote by ( )I w  the information set that contains state w. 
In the example of the doctor, { , , , , }W a b c d e=  and { }{ , },{ , , }a b c d e=I ; 
furthermore, ( ) ( ) { , }I a I b a b= =  and ( ) ( ) ( ) { , , }I c I d I e c d e= = = .  
Definition 7.2.  Let W be a set of states. We will call the subsets of W  events.  
Let I  be a partition of W, E an event (thus E W⊆ ) and w W∈  a state.  We say 
that at w the agent knows E if and only if the information set to which w 
belongs is contained in E, that is, if and only if ( )I w E⊆ .  
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In the example of the doctor, where { , , , , }W a b c d e=  and { }{ , },{ , , }a b c d e=I , 
let { , , , }E a b d e= ; then at a and b the doctor knows E because ( )I a =  
( )I b = { , }a b E⊆ , but at d it is not true that the doctor knows E because 
( ) { , , }I d c d e E= ⊈  (since ( )c I d∈  but c E∉ ) and, for the same reason, also at 
c and e it is not true that the doctor knows E. 
Note that it is possible that there is no state where the agent knows a given 
event. In the doctor example, if we consider event { , }F a c=  then there is no 
state where the doctor knows F. 
Definition 7.3.  Using Definition 7.2, we can define a knowledge operator K on 
events that, given as input any event E,  produces as output the event KE 
defined as the set of states at which the agent knows E. Let 2W  denote the set of 
events, that is the set of subsets of W.
1
 Then the knowledge operator is the 
function : 2 2W WK →  defined as follows: for every E W⊆ , 
{ }: ( )KE w W I w E= ∈ ⊆ .   
In the example of the doctor, where { , , , , }W a b c d e=  and { }{ , },{ , , }a b c d e=I , 
let { , , , }E a b d e=  and { , }F a c= ; then { , }KE a b=  and KF = ∅ . 
Given an event G W⊆  we denote by G¬  the complement of G, that is, the set 
of states that are not in G. For example, if { , , , , }W a b c d e=  and { , , }G a b d=  
then { , }G c e¬ = . Thus while KG is the event that the agent knows G, KG¬  is 
the event that the agent does not know G. Note the important difference 
between event KG¬  and event K G¬ : if w KG∈¬  then at state w the agent 
does not know G but she might not know G¬  either, that is, it may be that 
she considers G possible ( ( )I w G∩ ≠ ∅ ) and she also considers G¬  possible 
( ( )I w G∩ ¬ ≠ ∅ ).2 On the other hand, if w K G∈ ¬  then at state w the agent 
knows that G is not true, because every state that she considers possible is in 
G¬  ( ( )I w G⊆ ¬ ). Thus K G KG¬ ⊆ ¬  but the converse inclusion does not 
                                                 
1 If W contains n elements, then there are 2n  subsets of W, hence the notation 2W .   For 
example, if { , , }W a b c=  then { }2 ,{ },{ },{ },{ , },{ , },{ , },{ , , }W a b c a b a c b c a b c= ∅ . 
2
 In the example of the doctor, where { , , , , }W a b c d e=  and { }{ , },{ , , }a b c d e=I , if { , }F a c=  (so 
that { , , }F b d e¬ = ) then KF = ∅  and K F¬ = ∅ ; for instance, if the true state is a then the 
doctor considers F possible (because her information set is ( ) { , }I a a b=  and 
( ) { }I a F a∩ = ≠ ∅ ) but she also considers F¬  possible (because ( ) { }I a F b∩ ¬ = ≠ ∅ ). 
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hold. In the example of the doctor, where { , , , , }W a b c d e=  and 
{ }{ , },{ , , }a b c d e=I , again let { , , , }E a b d e=  (so that { }E c¬ = ) and { , }F a c=  
(so that { , , }F b d e¬ = ); then { , }KE a b= , { , , }KE c d e¬ = , K E¬ = ∅ , KF = ∅ , 
KF W¬ =  and K F¬ = ∅ . 
Note the interesting fact that, since we can apply the knowledge operator to 
any event, we can also compute the event that the agent knows that she knows 
E (that is, the event ( )K KE , which we will denote more simply as KKE ) and 
the event that the agent knows that she does not know E (that is, the event 
K KE¬ ).  Continuing the example of the doctor, where { , , , , }W a b c d e= , 
{ }{ , },{ , , }a b c d e=I  and  { , , , }E a b d e=  KKE  is the set of states where the 
agent knows event { , }KE a b= ; thus { , }KKE a b= . Furthermore, since 
{ , , }KE c d e¬ = , { , , }K KE c d e¬ = . As noted in the following remark, this is not 
a coincidence. 
Remark 7.1.  The knowledge operator : 2 2W WK →  satisfies the following 
properties (which you are asked to prove in Exercise 7.5): for every event 
E W⊆ ,  
• KE E⊆  
• KKE KE=  
• K KE KE¬ = ¬  
 
 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced in 
this section, by going through the exercises in Section 7.E.1 of Appendix 7.E at the 
end of this chapter. 
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7.2 Interactive knowledge 
We can now extend our analysis to the case of several agents and talk about not 
only what an individual knows about relevant facts but also about what she 
knows about what other individuals know and what they know about what she 
knows, etc. There is an entertaining episode of the TV series Friends in which 
Phoebe and Rachel reason about whether Chandler and Monica know that 
they (=Phoebe and Rachel) know that Chandler and Monica are having an 
affair. Search for the string “Friends-They Don't Know That We Know They 
Know We Know” on www.youtube.com or point your browser to 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LUN2YN0bOi8 
Again we start with a set of states W, where each state represents a complete 
description of the relevant facts. Let there be n individuals. To represent the 
possible states of mind of each individual we use an information partition: iI  
denotes the partition of individual i ∈ {1,…,n}. As before, we call the subsets of 
W events. Using Definition 7.3 we can define a knowledge operator for every 
individual. Let iK  be the knowledge operator of individual i; thus, for every 
event E W⊆ , { : ( ) }.i iK E w W I w E= ∈ ⊆  Now consider an event E and an 
individual, say Individual 1; since 1K E  is an event (it is the set of states where 
Individual 1 knows event E), we can compute the event 2 1K K E , which is the 
event that Individual 2 knows event 1K E , that is, the event that 2 knows that 1 
knows E. But there is no need to stop there: we can also compute the event 
3 2 1K K K E  (the event that 3 knows that 2 knows that 1 knows E) and the event 
1 3 2 1K K K K E  (the event that 1 knows that 3 knows that 2 knows that 1 knows 
E), etc. A few examples will be useful. 
We begin with an abstract example, without interpreting the states in terms of 
specific facts. Let the set of states be W = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h}. There are three 
individuals, Ann, Bob and Carol, with the information partitions shown in Figure 
7.2. 
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Ann
Bob
Carol
a b c d e f g h
a b c d e f g h
a b c d e f g h
 
Figure 7.2 
Consider the event E = {a, b, c, f, g}. Let us compute the following events: KAnnE  
(the event that Ann knows E ),  KBobE,  KCarolE,  KCarol KAnnE  (the event that Carol 
knows that Ann knows E ), KBobKCarol KAnnE and   KAnn ¬KBobKCarolE (the event that 
Ann knows that Bob does not know that Carol knows E ). All we need to do is 
apply Definition 7.3. First of all, 
• { , , }AnnK E a b c=  
(for example, Annb K E∈  because ( ) { , }AnnI b b c=  and  { , }b c E⊆ , while Annf K E∉  
because ( ) { , , }AnnI f e f g=  and { , , }e f g  is not a subset of E ). Similarly, 
•  { , , }BobK E a b f= ,  and 
• { , , , }CarolK E b c f g= . 
To compute Carol AnnK K E  we need to find the set of states where Carol knows event 
{ , , }a b c , since { , , }AnnK E a b c= . Thus 
• 
{ , , }
{ , }Carol Ann
a b c
K K E b c
=
=

. 
Hence 
{ , }
Bob Carol Ann
b c
K K K E
=
= ∅

, that is, there is no state where Bob knows that Carol 
knows that Ann knows E. To compute Ann Bob CarolK K K E¬  first we start with 
CarolK E , which we have already computed: { , , , }CarolK E b c f g= ; then we compute 
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{ , , , }
Bob Carol
b c f g
K K E
=

, which is { }f : { }Bob CarolK K E f= ; then we take the complement of 
this: { , , , , , , }Bob CarolK K E a b c d e g h¬ =  and finally we compute AnnK  of this event: 
• 
{ , , , , , , }
{ , , , , }Ann Bob Carol
a b c d e g h
K K K E a b c d h
=
¬ =

. 
Thus, for example, at state a it is true that Ann knows that Bob does not know that 
Carol knows E, while at state e this is not true.  
Next we discuss a concrete example. The professor in a game theory class calls three 
students to the front of the room, shows them a large transparent box that contains 
many hats, some red and some white (there are no other colors) and tells them the 
following: 
“I will blindfold you and put a hat on each of you, then I will 
remove the box from the room and, after that, I will remove 
your blindfolds, so that each of you can see the color(s) of the 
hats worn by the other two students, but you will not be able 
to see the color of your own hat. Then I will ask you 
questions starting with Student 1 then Student 2 then Student 
3 then back to Student 1 and so on.” 
After having placed the hats and removed the blindfolds, the professor asks Student 
1 “do you know the color of your own hat?”. She replies “No”. Then he asks 
Student 2 the same question: “do you know the color of your own hat?”. Student 2 
says “No”. Then he asks Student 3 and she says “No”. Then he asks the same 
question again to Student 1 and again the answer is “No”, and so on. After asking 
the same question over and over and always hearing the answer “No” he gets tired 
and tells them “I’ll give you a piece of information: I did not pick three white 
hats”.  He then resumes the questioning: first he asks Student 1 “do you know the 
color of your own hat?”. She replies “No”. Then he asks Student 2 the same 
question: “do you know the color of your own hat?”. Student 2 says “No”. Then he 
asks Student 3 and she says “Yes I do!” What color hat does she have? What color 
hats do Students 1 and 2 have? 
To answer these questions, we begin by defining the set of possible states. We can 
think of a state as a triple ( )1 2 3, ,C C C , where { ,  }iC R W∈  is the color of the hat of 
Student i (R means Red and W means White). Thus, for example, ( ), ,R W R   is the 
state where Students 1 and 3 have a red hat, while Student 2 has a white hat. The 
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possible states of information of the three students before the professor announces that 
he did not pick three white hats are represented by the information partitions shown 
in Figure 7.3, where we have connected with a line states that are in the same 
information set. Whatever the state (that is, whatever hats the professor picks), each 
student is only uncertain about the color of her own hat: she can see, and thus 
knows, the colors of the hats of the other two students. Thus each information set 
contains only two elements.  
(W,W,W)   (W,W,R)   (W,R,W)   (W,R,R)   (R,R,R)   (R,R,W)   (R,W,R)   (R,W,W)
Student 1: (W,W,W)   (W,W,R)   (W,R,W)   (W,R,R)   (R,R,R)   (R,R,W)   (R,W,R)   (R,W,W)
Student 2: (W,W,W)   (W,W,R)   (W,R,W)   (W,R,R)   (R,R,R)   (R,R,W)   (R,W,R)   (R,W,W)
Student 3:  
Figure 7.3 
Consider a particular state, say the state where all three hats are red: ( ), ,R R R . At 
that state, obviously, each student knows that not all hats are white: he/she can 
actually see two red hats. Furthermore, each student knows that every other 
student knows that not all hats are white.
3
 Take, for example, Student 1. She sees 
that the hats of the other two students are red and thus she reasons that Student 2 
also sees that the hat of Student 3 is red and hence Student 2 knows that not all hats 
are white (similarly, she reasons that Student 3 knows that not all hats are white). 
But does Student 1 know that Student 2 knows that Student 3 knows that not all 
hats are white? The answer is No. Seeing two red hats, Student 1 must consider it 
possible that her own hat is white, in which case Student 2 would, like Student 1, 
see a red hat on Student 3 but (unlike Student 1) would also see a white hat on 
                                                 
3
 It is unfortunate that many people would use, incorrectly, the expression “all hats are not 
white” to mean that “it is not the case that all hats are white”. The latter expression is 
equivalent to “at least one hat is red (possibly one, possibly two, possibly all three)”, while 
the former is equivalent to “every hat is not white”, that is, in this context, “every hat is red”.  
[It is also unfortunate that when asked “how are you?” most people answer “I am good”, 
instead of “I am well” or “I am fine”!] 
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Student 1; thus Student 2 would have to consider the possibility that her own hat is 
white in which case, putting herself in the shoes of Student 3, would reason that 
Student 3 would see two white hats and consider it possible that his own hat was 
also white, that is, consider it possible that all hats were white. We can see this more 
clearly by using the information partitions and the associated knowledge operators. 
To simplify matters, let us assign names to the states and rewrite the information 
partitions using these names, as shown in Figure 7.4. 
(W,W,W)   (W,W,R)   (W,R,W)   (W,R,R)   (R,R,R)   (R,R,W)   (R,W,R)   (R,W,W)
a            b          c          d         e          f           g         h
 
Student 1’s partition:  { }{ , },{ , },{ , },{ , }a h b g c f d e  
Student 2’s partition:  { }{ , },{ , },{ , },{ , }a c b d e g f h  
Student 3’s partition:  { }{ , },{ , },{ , },{ , }a b c d e f g h  
 Figure 7.4 
The proposition “not all hats are white” corresponds to event 
{ , , , , , , }E b c d e f g h=  (the set of all states, excluding only state a). Using Definition 
7.3 we get the following events: 
1
2
3
1 2 2 1
1 3 3 1
2 3 3 2
{ , , , , , },
{ , , , , , },
{ , , , , , }
{ , , , },
{ , , , },
{ , , , }
K E b c d e f g
K E b d e f g h
K E c d e f g h
K K E K K E b d e g
K K E K K E c d e f
K K E K K E e f g h
=
=
=
= =
= =
= =
 
Note that the intersection of all these events is the singleton set { }e . Thus at state e 
(where all the hats are red), and only at state e,  everybody knows that not all hats 
are white and everybody knows that everybody knows that not all hats are white. 
Proceeding one step further, we have that 
1 2 3 1 3 2 2 1 3 2 3 1 3 1 2 3 2 1K K K E K K K E K K K E K K K E K K K E K K K E= = = = = = ∅ . 
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Thus there is no state (not even e) where a student knows that another student 
knows that the third student knows that not all hats are white. 
Let us now continue with the formal analysis of the story of the three hats. At 
some stage the professor makes the public announcement “I did not choose three 
white hats” (that is, he announces event { , , , , , , }E b c d e f g h= ). This 
announcement makes it commonly known that state a is to be ruled out. Thus, 
after the announcement, the information partitions are reduced to the ones shown 
in Figure 7.5, obtained from Figure 7.3 by deleting the state ( ), ,W W W . 
(W,W,W)   (W,W,R)   (W,R,W)   (W,R,R)   (R,R,R)   (R,R,W)   (R,W,R)   (R,W,W)
Student 1: (W,W,W)   (W,W,R)   (W,R,W)   (W,R,R)   (R,R,R)   (R,R,W)   (R,W,R)   (R,W,W)
Student 2: (W,W,W)   (W,W,R)   (W,R,W)   (W,R,R)   (R,R,R)   (R,R,W)   (R,W,R)   (R,W,W)
Student 3:
 
Figure 7.5 
Note that, at this stage, if the true state is ( ), ,R W W  Student 1 knows that her hat is 
red (she sees two white hats and, having been informed that the professor did not 
choose three white hats, she can deduce that hers must be red). Similarly, if the true 
state is ( ), ,W R W , Student 2 knows that her own hat is red and, if the true state is 
( ), ,W W R ,  Student 3 knows that her own hat is red. According to the story, after 
announcing that not all hats are white, the professor first asks Student 1 if she 
knows the color of her hat and she answers No. From this answer everybody can 
deduce that the state is not ( ), ,R W W  and thus this state can be deleted and the 
information partitions reduce to the ones shown in Figure 7.6. 
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(W,W,W)   (W,W,R)   (W,R,W)   (W,R,R)   (R,R,R)   (R,R,W)   (R,W,R)   (R,W,W)
Student 1: (W,W,W)   (W,W,R)   (W,R,W)   (W,R,R)   (R,R,R)   (R,R,W)   (R,W,R)   (R,W,W)
Student 2: (W,W,W)   (W,W,R)   (W,R,W)   (W,R,R)   (R,R,R)   (R,R,W)   (R,W,R)   (R,W,W)
Student 3:
 
Figure 7.6 
Now, according to the story, Student 2 is asked whether she knows the color of 
her hat. Let us see what the possibilities are.  
1. Student 2 will answer Yes if state is either ( ), ,W R W  (in fact, in this 
case, she knew even before hearing Student 1’s answer) or ( ), ,R R W  (in 
this case, before hearing Student 1’s answer, she thought the state might 
be either ( ), ,R R W  or ( ), ,R W W  but then, after hearing Student 1’s 
answer, she was able to eliminate ( ), ,R W W  as a possibility). In either of 
these two states Student 2’s hat is red and thus she knows that her hat is 
red. Furthermore, upon hearing Student 2 say Yes, Student 3 learns that 
the state is either ( ), ,W R W  or ( ), ,R R W  and in both of these states his 
hat is white, thus he acquires the knowledge that his own hat is white. 
2. In each of the remaining states, namely ( ), ,W W R , ( ), ,W R R , ( ), ,R R R  
and ( ), ,R W R , Student 2 will answer No. Then everybody learns that 
the state is neither  ( ), ,W R W  nor ( ), ,R R W  and thus the information 
partitions reduce to the ones shown in Figure 7.7. 
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(W,W,W)   (W,W,R)   (W,R,W)   (W,R,R)   (R,R,R)   (R,R,W)   (R,W,R)   (R,W,W)
Student 1: (W,W,W)   (W,W,R)   (W,R,W)   (W,R,R)   (R,R,R)   (R,R,W)   (R,W,R)   (R,W,W)
Student 2: (W,W,W)   (W,W,R)   (W,R,W)   (W,R,R)   (R,R,R)   (R,R,W)   (R,W,R)   (R,W,W)
Student 3:
 
Figure 7.7 
Note that each of the remaining states is now a singleton information 
set for Student 3 and thus, upon hearing Student 2 say No, he learns 
what the state is: in particular he learns that his own hat is red (at each 
of these states Student 3’s hat is red). In the original story, Students 1 
and 2 answered No and Student 3 answered Yes and thus we fall in this 
second case.   
Now consider a blindfolded witness, who cannot see the color of anybody’s 
hat, but knows that they are either red or white and hears the professor’s 
announcement and subsequent questions, as well as the answers by the three 
students. What would the blindfolded witness learn about the true state? The 
initial information set of the witness would consist of the set of all states; then, 
(1) after the announcement of the professor, he would be able to eliminate state 
( ), ,W W W , (2) after the negative answer of Student 1 he would be able to 
eliminate state ( ), ,R W W  and (3) after the negative answer of Student 2 he 
would be able to eliminate states ( ), ,W R W  and ( ), ,R R W . The affirmative 
answer of Student 3 is not informative, because in each of these states Student 3 
knows that the color of her own hat is red. Thus at the end of the exchange the 
witness’s information set is 
{ }( , , ), ( , , ), ( , , ), ( , , )W W R W R R R R R R W R . 
Hence all the witness knows is that the hat of Student 3 is red (on the other 
hand, Student 3 knows the color of all the hats, because she has figured out the 
color of her own hat and can see the hats of the other two students). 
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Let us now focus on state ( ), ,R R R  where all hats are red. Initially, before the 
professor makes the announcement, no student is ever able to figure out the color 
of her own hat, no matter how many times the students are asked. However, as we 
saw, once the professor announces that not all hats are white, then after Students 1 
and 2 reply negatively to the question whether they know the color of their own 
hat, Student 3 is able to deduce that her hat is red. Thus the professor’s 
announcement provides crucial information. This, however, seems puzzling, 
because the professor merely tells the students what they already knew: each student, 
seeing two red hats, knows that not all hats are white (furthermore, as we saw 
above, each student also knows that every other students knows this). So how can 
giving the students a piece of information that they already possess make any 
difference? The answer is that the professor’s public announcement makes it a 
matter of common knowledge that not all hats are white. Indeed, we saw above that 
−  at the beginning −  if the true state is ( ), ,R R R , although everybody knows that 
not all hats are white and also everybody knows that everybody knows that not all 
hats are white, it is not the case that Student 1 knows that Student 2 knows that 
Student 3 knows that not all hats are white. Thus it is not common knowledge that 
not all hats are white.  The notion of common knowledge is discussed in the next 
section. 
 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced in 
this section, by going through the exercises in Section 7.E.2 of Appendix 7.E at the 
end of this chapter. 
7.3 Common knowledge 
Common knowledge is the strongest form of interactive knowledge: an event E is 
common knowledge if everybody knows E and everybody knows that everybody 
knows E and everybody knows that everybody knows that everybody knows E, 
and so on. For example, in the case of two individuals, we say that at state w event 
E is common knowledge if  
1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 ...w K E K E K K E K K E K K K E K K K E∈ ∩ ∩ ∩ ∩ ∩ ∩  
We denote by CKE  the event that (that is, the set of states where) event E is 
common knowledge. Thus, in the case of two individuals, 
1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 ...CKE K E K E K K E K K E K K K E K K K E= ∩ ∩ ∩ ∩ ∩ ∩  
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Given the definition of common knowledge, it may seem impossible to check if an 
event is common knowledge, because it requires checking an infinite number of 
conditions. We will see that, on the contrary, it is very easy to determine if an event 
is common knowledge at any state. We begin with an example. 
Example 7.1. Abby proposes the  following to Bruno and Caroline. 
“Tomorrow I will put you in two separate rooms, so 
that there will be no possibility of communication 
between you. I will then pick randomly an even 
number from the set {2,4,6}. Let n be that number. 
Then I will write the number n − 1 on a piece of paper 
and the number n + 1 on another piece of paper, shuffle 
the two pieces of paper and hand one to Bruno and the 
other to Caroline. For example, if I happen to pick the 
number 6, then I will write 5 on a piece of paper and 7 
on another piece of paper, shuffle and give one piece of 
paper to each of you. After seeing the number handed 
to you, each of you will then write a pair of numbers 
on your piece of paper and return it to me. If  
(1) you write the same pair of numbers and (2) at least 
one of the two numbers is equal to the number that was 
actually given to Bruno then I will give $1,000 to each 
of you, otherwise each of you will give me $1,000.” 
Should Bruno and Caroline accept to play this game? They can agree today on how 
they should act tomorrow under various contingencies, bearing in mind that they 
will be unable to communicate with each other tomorrow. 
We will see that Bruno and Caroline should indeed accept, because they have a 
strategy that guarantees that they will each get $1,000 from Abby. The first step is to 
represent the set of possible states and the information partitions. We will describe a 
state by a triple abc, where a is the number picked by Abby, b is the number given 
to Bruno and c is the number given to Caroline. Bruno only observes b and 
Caroline only observes c. Thus the information partitions are as shown in Figure 
7.8. 
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Bruno: 2 2 3 4 31 531 4 5 3 6 5 7 6 7 5
2 2 3 4 31 531 4 5 3 6 5 7 6 7 5Caroline:
 
Figure 7.8 
Let us see if the following would be a successful strategy for Bruno and Caroline: “if 
Bruno gets a 1 or a 3 we will write the pair (1,3) and if Bruno gets a 5 or a 7 we will 
write the pair (5,7)”.  Consider the event “Bruno gets a 1 or a 3”; call this event E. 
Then { }213, 231, 435E = .  If this event occurs (e.g. because the actual state is 213), 
will it be common knowledge between Bruno and Caroline that it occurred? It is 
straightforward to check that (B stands for Bruno and C for Caroline) BK E E= ,  
{231}CK E =  and thus B CK K E = ∅ . Hence, while Bruno, of course, will know if 
he gets a 1 or a 3, Caroline might know (if the state is 231) or she might not know 
(that happens if the state is 213 or 435), but Bruno will never know that Caroline 
knows. Thus event E is far from being common knowledge, if it occurs. It is easy to 
check that the same is true of the event “Bruno gets a 5 or a 7”. In order to be 
successful, a coordination strategy must be based on events that, when they occur, 
are commonly known.  
Let us now consider an alternative strategy, namely 
“if Bruno gets a 1 or a 5 let us write the pair (1,5)  
and if Bruno gets a 3 or a 7 let us write the pair (3,7)” 
(♦) 
Let F be the event “Bruno gets a 1 or a 5”, that is, {213, 453, 657}F = . Then 
BK F F=  and CK F F= , so that B C
F
K K F F
=
= , 
C B
F
K K F F
=
= ,  B C B
F
K K K F F
=
=

,  
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C B C
F
K K K F F
=
=

 and so on. Hence CKF F= , that is, if event F occurs then it is 
common knowledge between Bruno and Caroline that it occurred. Similarly, 
letting {231, 435, 675}G =  be the event “Bruno gets a 3 or a 7” we have that 
CKG G= . Hence strategy (♦) will be a successful coordination strategy, since the 
conditioning events, when they occur, are common knowledge between Bruno and 
Caroline. 
In the above example we were able to show directly that an event was common 
knowledge at a given state (for example, we showed that for every w F∈ , 
w CKF∈ ). We now show a faster method for computing, for every event E,  the 
event CKE . The crucial step is to derive from the individuals’ information 
partitions a new partition of the set of states which we call the common knowledge 
partition.  
Definition 7.4.  Consider a set of states W and n partitions 1 2, ,..., nI I I  of W. 
As usual, if w is a state, we denote by ( )iI w  the element (information set) of the 
partition iI  that contains w. Given two states ,w w W′∈ , we say that  
• w′  is reachable from w in one step if there exists an {1,..., }i n∈  such that 
( )iw I w′∈ .  
• w′  is reachable from w in two steps if there exists  a state x W∈  such that 
x is reachable from w in one step and w′  is reachable from x in one 
step.
4
  
• In general, w′  is reachable from w in m steps (m ≥ 1) if there is a sequence 
of states 1 2, ,..., mw w w  such that (1) 1w w= , (2) mw w′=  and (3) for 
every 2,...,k m= ,  kw  is reachable from 1kw −  in one step.  
Finally, we say that w′  is reachable from w if, for some m ≥ 1, w′  is reachable 
from w in m steps. 
                                                 
4 Thus w′  is reachable from w  in two steps if there exist x W∈  and , {1,..., }i j n∈  such that 
( )
i
x I w∈  and ( )jw I x′∈ .  
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Definition 7.5.  Consider a set of states W and n partitions 1 2, ,..., nI I I  of W. 
Given a state w, the common knowledge information set that contains w, denoted by 
( )CKI w , is the set of states reachable from w. The common knowledge information 
partition is the collection of common knowledge information sets. 
Example 7.1 continued. Let us go back to Example 7.1, where there are two 
individuals, Bruno and Caroline, with the following information partitions: 
Bruno: 2 2 3 4 31 531 4 5 3 6 5 7 6 7 5
2 2 3 4 31 531 4 5 3 6 5 7 6 7 5Caroline:
 
Applying Definition 7.5 we have that (213) (453)CK CKI I= = (657)CKI =  
{213,453,657}
5
 and (231) (435)CK CKI I= = (675)CKI =  {231,435,675}. Thus the 
common knowledge partition is as shown in Figure 7.9 
2
1
3
2
3
1
4
3
5
4
5
3
6
5
7
6
7
5
 
Figure 7.9 
                                                 
5 In fact, 213 is reachable from itself in one step (through either Bruno or Caroline), 453 is 
reachable in one step from 213 (through Bruno) and 657 is reachable in two steps from 213 
(the first step −  to 453 − through Caroline and the second step −  from 453 − through Bruno). 
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As a second example, consider the information partitions of Figure 7.2, reproduced 
below: 
Ann
Bob
Carol
a b c d e f g h
a b c d e f g h
a b c d e f g h
 
The corresponding common knowledge partition is shown in Figure 7.10. 
a b c d e f g h
 
Figure 7.10 
The following theorem states that, determining whether an event E is common 
knowledge at a state w, is equivalent to determining whether an individual whose 
information partition coincided with the common knowledge partition would 
know E at w. 
Theorem 7.1.  At state w W∈  event E W⊆  is common knowledge (that is, 
w CKE∈ ) if and only if ( )CKI w E⊆ . Thus the we can define the common 
knowledge operator : 2 2W WCK →  as follows: { : ( ) }CKCKE w W I w E= ∈ ⊆ . 
Example 7.1 continued. Let us go back to Example 7.1 about Bruno and Caroline. 
Let F be the event that Bruno gets a 1 or a 5: {213, 453, 657}F = . Then, using 
Theorem 7.1, CKF F=  because (213) (453)CK CKI I= = (657)CKI =  
{213,453,657} ; thus −  confirming what we found in Example 7.1 −  at any state 
where Bruno gets a 1 or a 5 it is common knowledge between Bruno and Caroline 
that Bruno got a 1 or a 5.  
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Now let H be the event “Bruno did not get a 5”, that is, {213,231, 435,675}H = . 
Then, using Theorem 7.1 we have that {231,435,675}CKH = . Thus while at state 
231 Bruno does not get a 5 and this is common knowledge between Bruno and 
Caroline, at state 213 Bruno does not get a 5 but this is not common knowledge 
between Bruno and Caroline (in fact 213 {231,435,675}CarolineK H∉ = ). 
As a last example, consider again the information partitions of Figure 7.2, whose 
common knowledge partition was shown in Figure 7.10 and is reproduced below: 
a b c d e f g h
 
Let E = {a,b,c,d,e,f}. Then CKE = {a,b,c,d}.  Let F = {a,b,f,g,h}}. Then CKF = 
∅. The smallest event that is common knowledge at state a is 
( ) { , , , }CKI a a b c d=  and the smallest event that is common knowledge at state g 
is ( ) { , , , }CKI g e f g h= . 
 
 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced in 
this section, by going through the exercises in Section 7.E.3 of Appendix 7.E at the 
end of this chapter. 
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Appendix 7.E: Exercises 
7.E.1 .  Exercises  for  Section 7 .1 :  Individual knowledge 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this chapter. 
Exercise 7.1. You are in a completely dark room, where you cannot see anything. 
You open a drawer that you know to contain individual socks, all of the same size 
but of different colors. You know that 5 are blue and 7 are white.  
(a) First use your intuition to answer the following question. What is the smallest 
number of socks you need to take out in order to know (that is, to be 
absolutely certain) that you have a matching pair (i.e. either a pair of blue socks 
or a pair of white socks)?   
(b) Now represent this situation using states and information sets. Do this to  
(1) represent the situation after you have taken out one sock, (2) represent the 
situation after you have taken out two socks and (3) represent the situation after 
you have taken out three socks. Remember that a state should encode a 
complete description of the relevant aspects of the situation; in particular, the 
state should tell us how many socks you have taken out and the color of each 
sock that you have taken out (thus the set of states changes over time as you 
take out more socks). 
Exercise 7.2. Consider the situation described in Exercise 7.1: the room is dark and 
you have taken out three socks. Consider the following alternative scenarios. 
(a) Somebody tells you the color of the third sock (but you still don’t know 
the color of the other two socks). Represent your state of knowledge by 
means of an information set. 
(b) Somebody tells you the color of the matching pair (but you don’t know 
what socks you picked). Represent your state of knowledge by means of an 
information set. 
Exercise 7.3. Let the set of states be W = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, k, m, n} and the 
information partition of an individual be {{a,b,c}, {d}, {e, f, g, h}, {k,m}, {n}}. 
Consider the following event: E = {a,b,d,k,n}. 
(a) Does the individual know E at state a? 
(b) Does the individual know E at state c? 
(c) Does the individual know E at state d? 
(d) Does the individual know E at state h? 
(e) Does the individual know E at state k? 
(f) Let KE denote the event that the individual knows E (that is, the set of 
states where the individual knows E). What is KE? 
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(g) [Recall that, given an event, say F, denote by ¬F be the complement of F, 
that is, the set of states that are not in F.]  Once again, let E = {a,b,d,k,n}. 
What is the event ¬KE, that is the event that the individual does not know 
E? What is the event K¬KE, that is, the event that the individual knows 
that she does not know E? 
Exercise 7.4. The famous pirate Sandokan has captured you and put you in 
front of three chests containing coins. Chest number 1 is labeled “gold,” chest 
number 2 is labeled “bronze,” and chest number 3 is labeled “gold or silver.” 
One chest contains gold coins only, another contains silver coins only, and the 
third bronze coins only. 
(a) Represent the set of possible states in the case where the labels might or 
might not be correct (a state must describe the label and content of each 
box). 
(b) Let E  be the event “Box number 1 is mislabeled” (that is, what the label 
says is false). What states are in event E? 
(c) Let F be the event “Box number 2 is mislabeled”. What states are in event F? 
(d) What is the event “both boxes 1 and 2 are mislabeled”? 
(e) Suppose now that Sandokan tells you that all the chests are falsely labeled, 
that is, what the label says is false (for example, if it says “gold” then you 
can be sure that the chest does not contain gold coins). If you correctly 
announce the content of all the chests you will be given a total of $1,000. If 
you make a mistake (e.g. state that a chest contains, say, gold coins while in 
fact it contains bronze coins) then you don’t get any money at all. You can 
open any number of chests you like in order to inspect the content. 
However, the first time you open a chest, you have to pay $500, the second 
time $300, the third time $100.  (e.1) What is the set of possible states 
(assuming that Sandokan told you the truth)?  (e.2) What is the maximum 
amount of money you can be absolutely certain to make? 
Exercise 7.5. Prove each of the following properties of the knowledge 
operator. The proofs are straightforward applications of Definition 7.2. 
Truth:  KE ⊆ E, that is, if at a state w  one knows E, then E 
is indeed true at w. 
Consistency:  KE ∩ K¬E = ∅, that is, one never simultaneously 
knows E and also ¬E (¬E denotes the complement 
of E). 
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Positive introspection: KE ⊆ KKE, that is, if one knows E then one knows 
that one knows E (one is fully aware of what one 
knows). [Note that it follows from this and Truth 
that KE = KKE, because from Truth we get that 
KKE ⊆ KE.] 
Negative Introspection: ¬KE ⊆ K¬KE, that is, if one does not know E, then 
one knows that one does not know E (one is fully 
aware of what one does not know). [Note that it 
follows from this and Truth that ¬KE = K¬KE, 
because from Truth we get that K¬KE ⊆ ¬KE.] 
Monotonicity:  If E ⊆ F, then KE ⊆ KF, that is, if E implies F then if 
one knows E then one knows F. 
Conjunction:  KE ∩ KF = K(E ∩ F), that is, if one knows E and 
one knows F, then one knows E and F, and vice 
versa. 
 
7.E.2 .  Exercises  for  Section 7 .2 :  Interactive knowledge 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this chapter. 
Exercise 7.6. Let the set of states be W = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h}. There are three 
individuals with the following information partitions: 
Ann
Bob
Carol
a b c d e f g h
a b c d e f g h
a b c d e f g h
 
Consider the event E = {a,b,c,f,g}. Find the following events. 
(a) KAnnE  (the event that Ann knows E).       (b)  KBobE,        (c) KCarolE, 
(d) KCarol KAnnE  (the event that Carol knows that Ann knows E),   
(e) KBobKCarol KAnnE,        (f) KAnn ¬KBobKCarolE (the event that Ann knows that Bob 
does not know that Carol knows E). 
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Exercise 7.7.  Dan is at the airport. He calls his office and leaves a voice 
message that says: “My flight was cancelled and I am waiting to see if they can 
re-route me through Los Angeles or San Francisco. I will call one of you at 
home tonight at 8:00 sharp to let that person know whether I am in San 
Francisco or Los Angeles.” Dan’s office staff, consisting of Ann, Barb and 
Carol, were out for lunch. When they come back they listen to the message 
together. They leave the office at 5:00 pm and each goes to her home. 
(a) Using information partitions, represent the possible states of knowledge of 
Ann, Barb and Carol concerning Dan’s whereabouts at 8:15 pm, after Dan’s 
call (there has been no communication among Ann, Barb and Carol after 
they left the office). 
(b) Let E be the event that Dan calls either Barb or Carol. What states are in E? 
(c) For the event E of part (b), find AK E  (Ann knows E), B AK K E  (Barb knows 
that Ann knows E) and CK E¬  (Carol does not know E or it is not the case 
that Carol knows E). 
(d)  For the event E of part (b), find a state x where all of the following are true:  
(1) at x Ann knows E, (2) at x Barb knows that Ann knows E, (3) at x it is 
not the case that Carol knows E. 
Exercise 7.8.  A set of lights is controlled by two switches, each of which can be in 
either the Up position or in the Down position. One switch is in room number 1, 
where Ann is; the other switch is in room number 2, where Bob is. The lights are 
in room number 3, where Carla is. There are two lights: one red and one green. 
The red light is on if the two switches are in different positions (one up and the 
other down: it doesn’t matter which is up and which is down), while the green light 
is on if the two switches are in the same position (both up or both down). All this is 
common knowledge among Ann, Bob and Carla. 
(a) Represent the possible states (you need to specify the position of each 
switch and which light is on). 
(b) Represent the possible states of information of Ann, Bob and Carla by 
means of information partitions. 
(c) Let G be the event “the green light is on”. Find the events G,  KAG (Ann 
knows G),  KBG (Bob knows G),  KCG (Carla knows G). 
(d) Let L be the event “either the green light is on or the red light is on”.  
Find the events L,  KAL (Ann knows L),  KBL (Bob knows L),  KCL (Carla 
knows L). 
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7.E.3 .  Exercises  for  Section 7 .3 :  Common knowledge 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this chapter. 
Exercise 7.9.  In Exercise 7.6,  
(a) find the common knowledge partition, 
(b) find the event CKE (that is, the event that E is common knowledge; recall that  
E = {a,b,c,f,g}) 
(c) Letting F = {a,b,c,d,e,g}, find CKF, that is, the event that F is common 
knowledge. 
Exercise 7.10.  In Exercise 7.7,  
(a) find the common knowledge partition, 
(b) find the event CKE (where E is the event that Dan calls either Barb or Carol). 
Exercise 7.11.  In Exercise 7.8,  
(a) find the common knowledge partition, 
(b) find the event CKG (where G is the event “the green light is on”), 
(c) find the event CKL (where L is the event “either the green light is on or the red  
     light is on”). 
Exercise 7.12.  The set of states is W = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g , h}. There are four 
individuals with the following information partitions: 
Individual 1: { {a, b} , {c} , {d} , {e, f} , {g} , {h} } 
Individual 2: { {a} , {b, c} , {d , e} , { f} , {g} , {h} } 
Individual 3: { {a, c} , {b} , {d} , {e} , {g} , {f , h} } 
Individual 4: { {a} , {b , c} , {d , e} , { f , g} , {h} } 
(a) Let E = {a, c, d, e}. Find the following events: K1E,   K2E,   K3E,   K4E  and  
K1 K2 ¬ K3E (Recall that ¬  denotes the complement of a set, that is, ¬F is 
the set of all states that are not in F). 
(b) Find the common knowledge partition. 
(c) At what states is event E = {a, c, d, e} common knowledge? 
(d) Let F ={a, b, c, d, g, h}. Find the event that F is common knowledge, that is, 
find CKF. 
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Exercise 7.13.  Amy, Beth and Carla are now in Room 1. They are asked to 
proceed, one at a time, to Room 3 through Room 2. In Room 2 there are two large 
containers, one with many red hats and the other with many white hats. They have 
to choose one hat, put it on their head and then go and sit in the chair in Room 3 
that has their name on it. 
room 1 room 2
AmyBethCarla
red
hats
white 
hats
room 3
 
Amy goes first, then Beth then Carla. The chairs are turned with the back to the door. 
Thus a person entering Room 3 can see whomever is already seated there, but cannot 
be seen by them.  Beth and Carla don’t know how many hats there were in each box.  
(a) Use information partitions to represent the possible states of knowledge of Amy, 
Beth and Carla after they are seated in Room 3. 
(b) Suppose that Amy chose a white hat, Beth a red hat and Carla a white hat. Find 
the smallest event that is common knowledge among them. Give also a verbal 
description of this event. 
(c) Repeat Parts (a) and (b) for the modified setting where there is a mirror in Room 3 
that allows Amy to see the hat of Carla (but not that of Beth). 
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◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊ 
Exercise 7.14.  Challenging Question. 
Pete and his three daughters Elise, Andrea and Theresa are in the same room. 
Pete gives a sealed envelope to Elise and tells her (in a loud voice, so that 
everybody can hear) “in this envelope I put a sum of money; I don’t remember 
how much I put in it, but I know for sure that it was either $4 or $8 or $12. 
Now, my dear Elise, go to your room by yourself and open it. Divide the 
money into two equal amounts, put the two sums in two different envelopes, 
seal them and give one to Andrea and one to Theresa”. Unbeknownst to her 
sisters,  Elise likes one of them more than the other and decides to disobey her 
father : after dividing the sum into two equal parts, she takes $1 from one 
envelope and puts it in the other envelope. She then gives the envelope with 
more money to her favorite sister and the envelope with the smaller amount to 
the other sister. Andrea and Theresa go to their respective rooms and privately 
open their envelopes, to discover, to their surprise, an odd number of dollars. 
So they realize that Elise did not follow their father’s instructions. Neither 
Andrea nor Theresa suspect that Elise kept some money for herself; in fact, it is 
common knowledge between them that Elise simply rearranged the money, 
without taking any for herself. Of course, neither Andrea nor Theresa know in 
principle how much money Elise took from one envelope (although in some cases 
they might be able to figure it out). Thus it is not common knowledge between 
Andrea and Theresa that Elise took only $1 from one of the two envelopes. 
Your answers should reflect this. 
(a) Use states and information partitions to represent the possible states of 
knowledge of Andrea and Theresa 
(b) Let E be the event that Andrea is Elise’s favorite sister. Find the events 
KAE (the event that Andrea knows it), KTE (the event that Theresa 
knows it), KAKTE  and  KTKAE. 
(c) Find the common knowledge partition. 
(d) Is there a state at which it is common knowledge between Andrea and 
Theresa that Elise’s favorite sister is Andrea? 
(e) The night before, Pete was looking through his digital crystal ball and 
saw what Elise was planning to do. However the software was not 
working properly (the screen kept freezing) and he could not tell 
whether Elise was trying to favor Andrea or Theresa. He knew he 
couldn’t stop Elise and wondered how much money he should put in 
the envelope to make sure that the mistreated sister (whether it be 
Andrea or Theresa) would not know that she had been mistreated. How 
much money should he put in the envelope? 
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Appendix 7.S: Solutions to exercises  
Exercise 7.1.  (a) The answer is that you need to take out three socks.  
(b) Describe a state by the number of socks you have taken out and the color of 
each sock that you have taken out.   
After you have taken out only one sock :   1
B
1
W
  (the information set 
captures the fact that you cannot see the color of the sock because it is dark) 
After you have taken out two socks:  
2
B
B
2
B
W
2
W
B
2
W
W
 
After you have taken out three socks: 
3
B
B
B
3
B
B
W
3
B
W
B
3
B
W
W
3
W
B
B
3
W
B
W
3
W
W
B
3
W
W
W
 
Now at every state there are (at least) two socks of the same color, thus you 
know that you have a matching pair, even though you don’t know what state 
you are in and hence you don’t know the color of the matching pair. 
An alternative (and equivalent) way to proceed would be to describe the state as 
a quadruple of numbers as follows: 
1
2
3
4
#  
# 
#  
# 
x
x
x
x
of blue socks in drawer
of white socks in drawer
of blue socks in your hand
of white socks in your hand
 
Clearly, it must always be that  x1 + x3 = 5 and x2 + x4 = 7.  The initial state is x1 
= 5, x2 = 7, x3 = x4 = 0. Taking one sock from the drawer will modify the state 
as follows: 
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5
7
0
0
4
7
1
0
5
6
0
1
take blue
sock
take white sock
 
 
 
Since it is dark and you don’t know what 
color sock you took, you cannot distinguish 
between the two states and we have 
represented this by enclosing the two states in 
a dashed rectangle, representing an 
information set.  
Now taking a second sock will modify the state as follows. 
4
7
1
0
5
6
0
1
3
7
2
0
4
6
1
1
5
5
0
2
take blue
take
  white
take
blue
take white
 
Since you could not distinguish 
between the two initial states, 
you cannot now distinguish 
among the three states that 
represent all the possibilities. 
In two of the states you have a 
matching pair, but you cannot 
be certain that you have a 
matching pair because you 
might be in the middle state 
where you have one blue sock 
and one white sock. 
Now taking a third sock will lead to: 
3
7
2
0
4
6
1
1
5
5
0
2
2
7
3
0
3
6
2
1
4
5
1
2
5
4
0
3
take blue
take blue take blue
take
  white
take
  white
take
  white
 
Now you know that you have a matching pair because in every possible state you 
have at least 2 socks of the same color. Thus the answer is indeed that you need to 
take out three socks.  
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Exercise 7.2.  
(a)   
3
B
B
B
3
W
W
B
3
W
B
B
3
B
W
B
3
B
B
W
3
B
W
W
3
W
W
W
3
W
B
W
 
(b)   
3
B
B
B
3
W
B
B
3
B
W
B
3
B
W
W
3
W
W
W
3
W
B
W
3
B
B
W
3
W
W
B
you have a blue
matching pair
you have a white
matching pair
 
Exercise 7.3.   (a) No, because the information set containing a is {a,b,c} which 
is not contained in E = {a,b,d,k,n}. 
(b) No, because the information set containing c is {a,b,c} which is not 
contained in E = {a,b,d,k,n}. 
(c) Yes, because the information set containing d is {d} which is contained in E 
= {a,b,d,k,n}. 
(d) No, because the information set containing h is {e,f,g,h} which is not 
contained in E = {a,b,d,k,n}. 
(e) No, because the information set containing k is {k,m} which is not 
contained in E = {a,b,d,k,n}. 
(f) KE = {d,n}. 
(g) ¬KE = { a,b,c,e,f,g,h,k,m }.   K¬KE = { a,b,c,e,f,g,h,k,m } = ¬KE. 
Exercise 7.4.  
 (a) Describe a state by a triple ( )1 1 2 2 3 3( , ), ( , ), ( , )x y x y x y  where xi is the label on 
box number i (i = 1,2,3) and yi is the content of box number i. Then the 
set of possible states is  
z
1
 = ((G,B),(B,G),(G or S,S)) ,  z
2
 = ((G,B),(B,S),(G or S,G)),   
z
3
 = ((G,G),(B,B),(G or S,S)) ,  z
4
 = ((G,G),(B,S),(G or S,B)), 
z
5
 = ((G,S),(B,B),(G or S,G)) ,  z
6
 = ((G,S),(B,G),(G or S,B)). 
Thus, for example, state z
4
 is one where box number 1 (which is labeled 
‘gold’) in fact contains gold coins, box number 2 (which is labeled 
‘bronze’) as a matter of fact contains silver coins, and box number 3 
(which is labeled ‘gold or silver’) as a matter of fact contains bronze 
coins. More simply, we could write a state as a triple 1 2 3( , , )y y y  denoting 
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the content of each box (since we are told what the labels are). In this 
simpler notation the states are:  
z
1
 = (B,G,S),  z
2
 = (B,S,G),  z
3
 = (G,B,S),   
z
4
 = (G,S,B),  z
5
 = (S,B,G),  z
6
 = (S,G,B). 
(b) E = {(B,G,S), (B,S,G), (S,B,G), (S,G,B)} (recall that the label says “gold”). 
(c) F = {(B,G,S), (B,S,G), (G,S,B), (S,G,B)} (recall that the label says 
“bronze”). 
(d) E ∩ F = {(B,G,S), (B,S,G), (S,G,B)}. 
(e) Of all the states listed above, only state z6 is such that all the labels are 
false. Hence Sandokan’s statement reduces the set of states to only one:  
z
6
 = (S,G,B). This is because the label “gold or silver” must be on the 
chest containing the bronze coins. Hence we are only left with gold and 
silver. Then silver must be in the chest labeled “gold”. Hence gold must 
be in the chest labeled “bronze”.  Thus, by looking at the labels you can 
correctly guess the content without opening any chests: you know that 
the true state is (S,G,B). So your expected payoff is $1,000 (you are not 
guessing at random, you are deducing by reasoning). 
Exercise 7.5.  
Truth: KE ⊆ E. Consider an arbitrary w ∈ KE. We have to show that w ∈ E. 
Since  
w ∈ KE, by Definition 7.2  I(w) ⊆ E. Since w ∈ I(w), it follows that w ∈ E. 
Consistency: KE ∩ K¬E = ∅. Suppose that w ∈ KE ∩ K¬E for some w and 
some E. Then, by Definition 7.2,  I(w) ⊆ E (because w ∈ KE) and I(w) ⊆ ¬E 
(because w ∈¬E) and thus  I(w) ⊆ E ∩ ¬E. Since E ∩ ¬E = ∅, this implies that 
I(w) = ∅, which is not true because w ∈ I(w). 
Positive introspection: KE ⊆ KKE. Consider an arbitrary w ∈ KE. We need to 
show that w ∈ KKE, that is, that I(w) ⊆ KE which means that w′ ∈ KE for 
every w′ ∈ I(w).  Since w ∈ KE, by Definition 7.2,  I(w) ⊆ E. Consider an 
arbitrary w′ ∈ I(w). By definition of partition, I(w′) = I(w). Thus I(w′) ⊆ E, that 
is, by Definition 7.2,  w′ ∈ KE. 
Negative Introspection: ¬KE ⊆ K¬KE. Consider an arbitrary w ∈ ¬KE. We 
need to show that w ∈ K¬KE, that is, that I(w) ⊆ ¬KE. By Definition 7.2,  
since I(w) ⊆ ¬KE, I(w) ∩ ¬E ≠ ∅. Consider an arbitrary w′ ∈ I(w); then, since 
(by definition of partition) I(w′) = I(w), I(w′) ∩ ¬E ≠ ∅ so that w′ ∈ ¬KE. 
Thus we have shown that, for every w′ ∈ I(w), w′ ∈ ¬KE, that is, I(w) ⊆ ¬KE 
which, by Definition 7.2,  yields w ∈ K¬KE. 
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Monotonicity: if E ⊆ F, then KE ⊆ KF. Consider an arbitrary w ∈ KE. We 
need to show that w ∈ KF. Since w ∈ KE, by Definition 7.2,  I(w) ⊆ E. Hence, 
since − by hypothesis −  E ⊆ F, I(w) ⊆ F, that is, by Definition 7.2, w ∈ KF. 
Conjunction: KE ∩ KF = K(E ∩ F). Let w ∈ KE ∩ KF. Then w ∈ KE and w ∈ 
KF; by Definition 7.2,  the former implies that I(w) ⊆ E and the latter that I(w) 
⊆ F, so that I(w) ⊆ E ∩ F and hence, by Definition 7.2,  w ∈ K(E ∩ F). 
Conversely, suppose that w ∈ K(E ∩ F). Then, by Definition 7.2,  I(w) ⊆ E ∩ F 
and thus I(w) ⊆ E and I(w) ⊆ F so that, by Definition 7.2,  w ∈ KE and w ∈ KF; 
hence w ∈ KE ∩ KF. 
Exercise 7.6.   (a) KAnnE = {a,b,c},      (b)  KBobE = {a,b,f},       (c) KCarolE = 
{b,c,f,g},    
(d) KCarol KAnnE = KCarol{a,b,c} = {b,c},        (e) KBobKCarol KAnnE = KBob{b,c} = ∅  
(f)  KAnn ¬KBobKCarolE = KAnn ¬KBob{b,c,f,g} = KAnn ¬{f} = KAnn{a,b,c,d,e,g,h} = 
{a,b,c,d,h}. 
Exercise 7.7.  (a) We can represent a state as a pair (x,y) where x is the city 
where Dan is (SF for San Francisco or LA for Los Angeles) and y is the person 
that Dan called (A for Ann, B for Barb and C for Carol). The information 
partitions are as follows: 
(LA,C)ANN
BARB
CAROL
(SF,A) (LA,A) (SF,B) (LA,B) (SF,C)
(LA,C)(SF,A) (LA,A) (SF,B) (LA,B) (SF,C)
(LA,C)(SF,A) (LA,A) (SF,B) (LA,B) (SF,C)
 
(b) E = {(SF,B), (LA,B), (SF,C), (LA,C)}.  
(c) KAnnE = E,   KBarbKAnnE = {(SF,B), (LA,B)} and KCarolE = {(SF,C), (LA,C)} so 
that  ¬ KCarolE = {(SF,A), (LA,A), (SF,B), (LA,B)}.  
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(d) We want a state x such that ,  Ann Barb Annx K E x K K E∈ ∈  and Carolx K E∈¬  
(that is, Carolx K E∉ ). There are only two such states: (SF,B) and (LA,B). 
Thus either x = (SF,B) or x = (LA,B). 
Exercise 7.8.  (a) We can represent a state as a triple  
x
y
z
  where x is the position 
of the switch in room 1 (Up or Down), y is the position of the switch in room 
2 and z is the light which is on (Green or Red):  
U
U
G
U
D
R
D
U
R
D
D
G  
(b) 
U
U
G
U
D
R
D
U
R
D
D
G
Ann
U
U
G
U
D
R
D
U
R
D
D
G
Bob
U
U
G
U
D
R
D
U
R
D
D
G
Carla
 
(c) 
U D
G U D
G G
 
 
=  
 
 
.  , , .A B C
U D
K G K G K G U D
G G
 
 
= = =  
 
 
∅ ∅  
(d) L is the set of all states. Hence .A B CK L K L K L L= = =  
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Exercise 7.9.  (a) The common knowledge partition is: 
a b c d e f g h
 
(b) CKE = ∅ (where E = {a,b,c,f,g}).  
(c) CKF = {a,b,c,d} (where F = {a,b,c,d,e,g}). 
Exercise 7.10.  (a) The common knowledge partition is: 
(LA,C)(SF,A) (LA,A) (SF,B) (LA,B) (SF,C)
 
(b) CKE = ∅. 
Exercise 7.11.  (a) The common knowledge partition is: 
U
U
G
U
D
R
D
U
R
D
D
G  
(b) .CKG = ∅  
(c) .CKL L=  
Exercise 7.12.  (a) Let E = {a, c, d, e}. Then: K1E = {c, d},  K2E = {a, d, e},   
K3E = {a, c, d, e},   K4E = {a, d, e} and  K1K2 ¬ K3E = {g , h}  [in fact, ¬K3E =  
{b, f, g, h}, so that K2 ¬ K3E = { f, g, h} and K1K2 ¬ K3E = {g , h}]. 
(b) The common knowledge partition is { {a , b , c} , {d, e,  f , g , h} } 
(c) At no state is event E = {a, c, d, e} common knowledge: CKE = ∅. 
(d) CKF ={a,b,c}  (where F ={a, b, c, d, g, h}). 
Exercise 7.13.  (a) Represent the state as a triple of letters, where the top letter 
denotes the color of Amy’s hat, the second letter the color of Beth’s hat and the 
bottom letter the color of Carla’s hat. Each of them knows which hat she 
chose; furthermore, Beth can see Amy’s hat and Carla can see everything. Thus 
the partitions are as follows. 
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Amy 
W
W
W
W
W
R
W
R
W
W
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
W
R
W
R
R
W
W
 
Beth 
W
W
W
W
W
R
W
R
W
W
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
W
R
W
R
R
W
W
 
Carla 
W
W
W
W
W
R
W
R
W
W
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
W
R
W
R
R
W
W
 
Common 
knowledge 
partition 
W
W
W
W
W
R
W
R
W
W
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
W
R
W
R
R
W
W
 
(b) When the true state is (W, R, W ), the smallest event that is common 
knowledge among them is the first information set of the common 
knowledge partition, that is, the fact that Amy has a white hat. 
(c) In the modified setting the information partitions are as follows: 
 
 
Amy 
W
W
W
W
W
R
W
R
W
W
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
W
R
W
R
R
W
W
 
 
 
Beth 
W
W
W
W
W
R
W
R
W
W
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
W
R
W
R
R
W
W
 
 
 
Carla WW
W
W
W
R
W
R
W
W
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
W
R
W
R
R
W
W
 
 
Common 
knowledge 
partition 
W
W
W
W
W
R
W
R
W
W
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
W
R
W
R
R
W
W
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The common knowledge partition is the same as before, hence the smallest 
event that is common knowledge among all three of them is that Amy has a 
white hat. 
Exercise 7.14 (Challenging Question).  (a) Describe the state by three 
numbers  where the top number is the amount of money that Dan put in the 
envelope, the middle umber is the amount given to Andrea and the bottom 
number is the amount given to Theresa. As a matter of fact, each sister can only 
find either $1 or $3 or $5 or $7 in the envelope. Thus the objectively possible 
states are: 
4 4 8 8 12
1 , 3 , 3 , 5 , 5
3 1 5 3 7
         
         
         
         
         
and
12
7
5
 
 
 
 
 
. However, besides these there are also 
subjectively possible states, namely 
8 8 12 12 12
1 , 7 , 1 , 11 , 3
7 1 11 1 9
         
         
         
         
         
and 
12
9
3
 
 
 
 
 
 (because 
Andrea and Theresa don’t know that Elise only transferred $1 from one 
envelope to the other). The information partitions are as follows: 
ANDREA:  
4 8 12 4 8 12 8 12 8 12 12
1 , 1 , 1 , 3 , 3 , 3 , 5 , 5 , 7 , 7 , 9
3 7 11 1 5 9 3 7 1 5 3
                     
                            
                                                                             
12
, 11
1
   
     
              
 
THERESA:
4 8 12 4 8 12 8 12 8 12 12
1 , 5 , 9 , 3 , 7 , 11 , 3 , 7 , 1 , 5 , 3
3 3 3 1 1 1 5 5 7 7 9
                     
                            
                                                                             
12
, 1
11
   
     
              
 
(b) The event that Andrea is Elise’s favorite sister is  
E =
4 8 8 12 12 12
3 , 5 , 7 , 7 , 9 , 11
1 3 1 5 3 1
            
            
                                    
.  
KAE = 
8 12 12 12
7 , 7 , 9 , 11
1 5 3 1
       
        
                       
,  KTE = 
4 8 12
3 , 7 , 11
1 1 1
     
      
                 
, KAKTE = 
12
11
1
 
  
     
,         
T AK K E = ∅ . 
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(c) The common knowledge partition is: 
4 8 12 8 12 12 4 8 12 8 12 12
1 , 1 , 1 , 5 , 9 , 5 , 3 , 3 , 3 , 7 , 11 , 7
3 7 11 3 3 7 1 5 9 1 1 5
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          





 
(d) At no state. In fact, CKE = ∅. 
(e)  Dan should put either $8 or $12 in the envelope. If he were to put $4, then 
one sister would end up with $1 and know that she was mistreated. In no 
other case does a mistreated sister know that she got less money than the 
other.  
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Adding Beliefs to Knowledge 
8.1 Probabilistic beliefs 
n information set contains all the states that an individual considers 
possible, that is, the states that the individual cannot rule out, given 
her information. However, of all the states that are possible, the 
individual might consider some to be more likely than others and might even 
dismiss some states as “extremely unlikely” or “implausible”. For example, 
suppose that there are only three students in a class: Ann, Bob and Carla. The 
professor tells them that in the last exam one of them got 95 points (out of 100), 
another 78 and the third 54. We can think of a state as a triple (a,b,c), where a is 
Ann’s score, b Bob’s score and c Carla’s score. Then, based on the information 
given by the professor, Ann must consider all of the following states as 
possible: (95,78,54), (95,54,78), (78,95,54), (78,54,95), (54,95,78) and (54,78,95). 
Suppose, however, that in almost all the past exams Ann and Bob always 
obtained a higher score than Carla and often Ann outperformed Bob.  Then 
she might consider states (95,78,54) and (78,95,54) much more likely than 
(78,54,95) and (54,78,95). To represent such judgments of relative likelihood we 
add to an information set a probability distribution over the states in the 
information set.6 The probability distribution expresses the individual’s beliefs,  
while the information set represents what the individual knows. In this 
                                                 
6
 Recall that a probability distribution over a finite set 1 2{ , ,..., }mx x x  is an assignment of a 
number ip  to every element ix  of the set satisfying two properties: (1) for every i ∈ 
{1,2,…,m}, 0 1ip≤ ≤   and  (2) 1 2 ... 1mp p p+ + + = .  
Chapter 
8 
A 
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example, Ann’s beliefs could be as shown in Table 8.1. 
9 4 2 1
16 16 16 16
(95, 78, 54) (95, 54, 78) (78, 95, 54) (54, 95, 78) (78, 54, 95) (54, 78, 95)
0 0
state
probability
  
Table 8.1 
According to the beliefs expressed by the probability distribution shown in 
Table 8.1, Ann considers it very likely that she got the highest score, is willing 
to dismiss the possibility that Carla received the highest score (she assigns 
probability 0 to the two states where Carla’s score is 95) and considers it much 
more likely that she, rather than Bob, received the highest score.  
Let W  be a set of states (which we can think of as an information set of an 
individual). A probability distribution on W is a function : [0,1]P W →  such that 
( ) 1
w W
P w
∈
=∑ .  As usual, we call the subsets of W events. The probability of event 
E  ⊆ W , denoted by ( )P E , is defined as the sum of the probabilities of the 
elements of E: ( ) ( )
w E
P E P w
∈
= ∑ . For instance, in the example of Table 8.1, the 
proposition “Ann received the highest score” corresponds to event E = 
{(95,78,54),(95,54,78)} and − according to Ann’s beliefs − the probability of that 
event is ( ) ( )( ) (95,78,54) (95,54,78)P E P P= + =  9 13416 16 16+ = ; on the other hand, 
event F = {(95,78,54),(78,95,54),(54,95,78)} corresponds to the proposition 
“Bob’s score was higher than Carla’s score” and − according to Ann’s beliefs − 
the probability of that event is 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) (95,78,54) (78,95,54) (54,95,78)P F P P P= + + =  9 2 116 16 16+ + = 31216 4= = 
75%. 
Definition 8.1.  We say that an individual is certain of event E if she attaches 
probability 1 to E, that is, if ( ) 1P E =  . 
In the above example, Ann is certain of event G = {(95,78,54), (95,54,78), 
(78,95,54), (54,95,78)}, corresponding to the proposition “Carla did not get the 
highest score”.  
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Remark 8.1.  Note the important difference between knowledge and certainty: 
if at a state w the individual knows an event E ( w KE∈ ) then at that state E is 
indeed true ( w E∈ ),
7
 that is, it is never the case that an individual knows 
something which is false;  on the other hand, an individual can be certain of 
something which is false, that is, it is possible that the individual assigns 
probability 1 to an event E even though the true state is not in E.
8
 
Continuing the example of the exam scores, suppose that Ann has the beliefs 
shown in Table 8.1 and now the professor makes a new announcement: “I was 
surprised to see that, unlike past exams, Ann did not get the highest score.” 
This new announcement by the professor informs the students that the true 
state is neither (95,78,54) nor (95,54,78). Thus we can view the effect of the new 
piece of information as shrinking Ann’s information set from {(95,78,54), 
(95,54,78), (78,95,54), (54,95,78), (78,54,95), (54,78,95)} to {(78,95,54), (54,95,78), 
(78,54,95), (54,78,95)}. How should Ann revise her beliefs in response to the 
new information? The answer cannot be that we simply drop states (95,78,54) 
and (95,54,78) from Table 8.1, because the result would be 
2 1
16 16
(78, 95, 54) (54, 95, 78) (78, 54, 95) (54, 78, 95)
0 0
state
probability
   
which is not a probability distribution, since the probabilities do not add up to 
1 (they add up to 3
16
).  The topic of belief revision is addressed in next section. 
 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced in 
this section, by going through the exercises in Section 8.E.1 of Appendix 8.E at the 
end of this chapter. 
 
                                                 
7 Indeed it was proved in Exercise 7.5  (Chapter 7) that, for every event E,  KE ⊆ E. 
8 In the above example, if the true state is (78,54,95) then it does not belong to event G, 
representing the proposition “Carla did not get the highest score” and yet Ann assigns 
probability 1 to G, that is, she is certain of G.  
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8.2 Conditional probability, belief updating, 
Bayes’ rule 
We start by reviewing the notion of conditional probability.  
Definition 8.2. Let W be a finite set of states and : [0,1]P W →  a probability 
distribution on W.  Let w W∈  be a state and E W⊆  an event such that 
( ) 0P E > .  Then the probability of w conditional  on E (or given E), denoted by 
( | )P w E , is defined as  
0 if 
( | )
( ) if 
( )
w E
P w E
P w w E
P E
∉

= 
∈

. 
For example, let { , , , , , , }W a b c d e f g=  and let P be as shown in Table 8.2. 
3 7 51 4
20 20 20 20 20
0 0
a b c d e f gstate
probability
 
Table 8.2 
Let { , , , }E a d e g= ; thus 3 5 91
20 20 20 20
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0P E P a P d P e P g= + + + = + + + = . 
Then ( | ) ( | ) ( | ) 0P b E P c E P f E= = =  (since each of these states does not 
belong to E), 
3
20 3
99
20
( | )P a E = = ,  
1
20 1
99
20
( | )P d E = = , 
9
20
0
( | ) 0P e E = =  and 
5
20 5
99
20
( | )P g E = = . Thus the operation of conditioning on event E yields the 
updated (on E) probability distribution shown in Table 8.3. 
3 51
9 9 9
0 0 0 0
a b c d e f gstate
probability
 
Table 8.3 
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Philosophers and logicians have argued that, when forming new beliefs in 
response to new information, the rational way to proceed is to modify the 
initial probabilities by using the conditional probability rule. Of course, this 
can only be done if the new information is not surprising, in the sense that it is 
represented by an event E that, given the initial beliefs, has positive probability 
( ( ) 0P E > ).9  
Definition 8.3. We use the expression ‘belief updating’  or ‘Bayesian updating’ to 
refer to the modification of initial beliefs (expressed by an initial probability 
distribution P ) obtained by applying the conditional probability rule; this 
assumes that  the belief change is prompted by the arrival of new information, 
represented by an event E such that P(E) > 0. 
Definition 8.4. The conditional probability formula can be extended from 
states to events as follows. Let A and B be two events, with P(B) > 0. Then the 
probability of A conditional on B (or given B), denoted by ( | )P A B   is defined by 
( )
( | )
( )
P A B
P A B
P B
∩
= . 
It is straightforward to check (the reader should convince himself/herself of 
this) that an equivalent way of defining ( | )P A B  is as follows: 
( | ) ( | )
w A B
P A B P w B
∈ ∩
= ∑ . 
For example, consider again the initial beliefs shown in Table 8.2, which is 
reproduced below.  
3 7 51 4
20 20 20 20 20
0 0
a b c d e f gstate
probability
 
As before, let { , , , }E a d e g=  and consider the event { , , , , }D a b c f g= . What is 
the probability of D given E ? First compute the intersection of D and E: 
{ , }D E a g∩ = ; thus 3 5 8
20 20 20
( ) ( ) ( )P D E P a P g∩ = + = + = . ( )P E  was computed 
before: ( )P E = 3 5 91
20 20 20 20
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0P a P d P e P g+ + + = + + + = . Thus, using the 
formula given in Definition 8.4, we obtain 
                                                 
9
 When P(E) = 0, P(w|E) is not well defined because division by zero has no meaning in 
arithmetics.  
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8
20 8
99
20
( )
( | ) 89%
( )
P D E
P D E
P E
∩
= = = ≃ . Thus, before receiving information E, the 
individual was assigning probability 
( ) ( )P D P a= + ( ) ( )P b P c+ + 3 7 5 194
20 20 20 20 20
( ) ( ) 0 95%P f P g+ = + + + + = =  to 
event D and, after receiving information E, she updates that probability to 89%. 
According to Definition 8.4, the probability of A conditional on B is given by  
( )
( | )
( )
P A B
P A B
P B
∩
= .    ( ♣) 
Similarly, the probability of B conditional on A is given by 
( )
( | )
( )
P B A
P B A
P A
∩
= , which [since A B B A∩ = ∩  and thus 
( ) ( )P A B P B A∩ = ∩ ] can be written as 
( ) ( | ) ( )P A B P B A P A∩ = .    (♦) 
From (♣) and (♦) we get that 
( | ) ( )
( | )
( )
P B A P A
P A B
P B
=  which is known as 
Bayes’ rule.   
Definition 8.5. Let E and F be two events, with ( ) 0P F > . Then Bayes’ rule 
says that the probability of E conditional on F is equal to the probability of F 
conditional on E times the probability of E, divided by the probability of F:  
( | ) ( )
( | )
( )
P F E P E
P E F
P F
= . 
As an example of the application of Bayes’ rule, suppose that you  are a doctor 
examining a middle-aged man who complains of lower-back pain. You know 
that 25% of men in your patient’s age group suffer from lower-back pain. There 
are various causes of lower back pain; one of them is chronic inflammation of 
the kidneys. This is not a very common disease: it affects only 4% of men in the 
age group you are considering. Among those who suffer from chronic 
inflammation of the kidneys, 85% complain of lower-back pain. What is the 
probability that your patient has chronic inflammation of the kidneys? 
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Let I denote inflammation of the kidneys and L denote lower-back pain. The 
information you have is that 4
100
( ) 4%P I = = , 25
100
( ) 25%P L = =  and 
85
100
( | ) 85%P L I = = . Thus, using Bayes’ rule we get that 
85 4
100 100
25
100
( | ) ( )
( | ) 0.136 13.6%
( )
P L I P I
P I L
P L
= = = = . This can also be seen as 
follows. Suppose there are 2,500 men in your patient’s age group; 4% (= 100) 
have inflammation of the kidneys and the remaining 96% (= 2,400) don’t: 
Lower-back
pain
No lower-
back pain
Total
Inflammation 100
No inflammation 2,400
2,500 Total  
We also know that 25% (= 625) of the population has lower-back pain and the 
remaining 75% (=1,875) don’t: 
Lower-back
pain
No lower-
back pain
Total
Inflammation 100
No inflammation 2,400
625 1,875 2,500 Total  
Of the 100 people with inflammation of the kidneys, 85% (= 85) suffer from 
lower-back pain and the remaining 15 don’t: 
Lower-back
pain
No lower-
back pain
Total
Inflammation 85 15 100
No inflammation 2,400
625 1,875 2,500 Total  
Thus we can fill in the highlighted cells by taking the differences:  
625 −85 = 540 and 1,875 − 15 = 1,860: 
Lower-back
pain
No lower-
back pain
Total
Inflammation 85 15 100
No inflammation 540 1,860 2,400
625 1,875 2,500 Total  
Thus the fraction of people, among those who suffer from lower-back pain, who 
have inflammation of the kidneys is 85
625
0.136 13.6%= = . 
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So far we have focused on belief updating. The next section deals with belief 
revision. 
 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced in 
this section, by going through the exercises in Section 8.E.2 of Appendix 8.E at the 
end of this chapter. 
 
8.3 Belief revision 
[Note: the material of this section will not be needed until Chapter 12. It is 
presented here for completeness on the topic of beliefs.] 
How should a “rational” individual revise her beliefs when receiving 
information that is surprising, that is, when informed of an event E to which 
her initial beliefs assigned zero probability ( ( ) 0P E = )? The best known theory 
of “rational” belief revision is the so-called AGM theory, which takes its name 
from its originators: Carlos Alchourrón (a legal scholar), Peter Gärdenfors (a 
philosopher) and David Makinson (a computer scientist); their pioneering 
contribution was published in 1985. Just like the theory of expected utility 
(Chapter 4), the AGM theory is an axiomatic theory: it provides a list of 
“rationality” axioms for belief revision and provides representation theorems.10 
Although the AGM theory was developed within the language of propositional 
logic, it can be restated in terms of a set of states and a collection of possible 
items of information represented as events. We first introduce the non-
probabilistic version of the theory and then add graded beliefs, that is, 
probabilities. 
Let W be a finite set of states and 2W⊆E  a collection of events (subsets of W ) 
representing possible items of information; we assume that W ∈E  and ∅ ∉E . 
To represent initial beliefs and revised beliefs we introduce a function 
2: Wf →E , which we call a belief revision function. 
                                                 
10 We will not list and discuss the axioms here. The interested reader can consult 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/formal-belief/ or, for a discussion which is closer to the 
approach followed in this section, see Bonanno (2009). 
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Definition 8.6. Let W be a finite set of states and E  a collection of events such 
that W ∈E  and ∅ ∉E . A belief revision function is a function 2: Wf →E that 
satisfies the following properties: for every E ∈E ,  (1) ( )f E E⊆  and  (2) 
( )f E ≠ ∅ . 
The interpretation of a belief revision function is as follows. First of all, ( )f W  
represents the initial beliefs, namely the set of states that the individual initially 
considers possible.
11
 Secondly, for every E ∈E , ( )f E  is the set of states that 
the individual would consider possible if informed that the true state belongs to 
E; thus ( )f E  represents the individual’s revised beliefs after receiving 
information E.
12
  
One of the implications of the AGM axioms for belief revision is the following 
condition, which is known as Arrow’s Axiom (proposed by the Nobel laureate 
Ken Arrow in the context of rational choice, rather than rational belief 
revision): 
 , ,    ( )     ( ) ( )E F E F E f F f E E f F∈ ⊆ ∩ ≠ ∅ = ∩if and thenE . 
Arrow’s Axiom says that if information E implies information F ( E F⊆ ) and 
there are states in E that would be considered possible upon receiving 
information F ( ( )E f F∩ ≠ ∅ ), then the states that the individual would 
consider possible if informed that E are precisely those that belong to both E 
and ( )f F  ( ( ) ( )f E E f F= ∩ ). Although necessary for a belief revision policy 
that satisfies the AGM axioms, Arrow’s Axiom is not sufficient. Before stating 
the necessary and sufficient condition for rational belief revision, we remind 
the reader of the notion of a complete and transitive relation on a set W 
                                                 
11 If the initial beliefs were to be expressed probabilistically, by means of a probability 
distribution P over W, then f(W) would be the support of P, that is, the set of states to which 
P assigns positive probability. Thus f(W ) would be the smallest event of which the individual 
would initially be certain: she would initially be certain of any event F such that f(W ) ⊆ F. 
12 If the revised beliefs after receiving information E were to be expressed probabilistically, by 
means of a probability distribution PE  over W, then f(E) would be the support of PE , that is, 
the set of states to which PE assigns positive probability. Thus f(E) would be the smallest 
event of which the individual would be certain after having been informed that E: according 
to her revised beliefs she would be certain of any event F such that f(E) ⊆ F. [Note that, since 
- by assumption -  f(E) ⊆ E, the individual is assumed to be certain of the information received 
(e.g. because she trusts the source of the information).] 
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(Remark 1.1, Chapter 1). In Chapter 1 the relation was denoted by  and was 
interpreted in terms of preference: o o′  was interpreted as “the individual 
considers outcome o  to be at least as good as outcome o′”. In the present 
context the relation will be denoted by ≾ and the interpretation is in terms of 
“plausibility”: w w′≾  is to be read as “the individual considers state w  to be at 
least as plausible as state w′” ( w w′≺  means that w  is considered to be more 
plausible than w′  and w w′∼  means that w  is considered to be just as plausible 
as w′ ).13 An alternative reading of w w′≾  is “w weakly precedes w′  in terms of 
plausibility”. 
Definition 8.7. A plausibility order on a set of states W is a binary relation ≾ 
on W that is complete (for every two states 
1w  and 2w , either 1 2w w≾  or 
2 1w w≾  or both) and transitive (if 1 2w w≾  and 2 3w w≾  then 1 3w w≾ ). We 
define w w′≺  as “ w w′≾  and w w′ /≾ ” and w w′∼  as “ w w′≾  and w w′≾ ”).  
Theorem 8.1 (Grove, 1988; Bonanno, 2009). Let W be a finite set of states, E  a 
collection of events (representing possible items of information), with W ∈E  
and ∅ ∉E , and 2: Wf →E  a belief revision function (Definition 8.6). Then the 
belief revision policy represented by the function f  is compatible with the 
AGM axioms of belief revision if and only if there exists a plausibility order ≾ 
on W that rationalizes f  in the sense that, for every E ∈E , ( )f E  is the set of 
most plausible states in E: { }( ) :   f E w E w w w E′ ′= ∈ ∈for every≾ .   
Definition 8.8. A belief revision function 2: Wf →E  which is rationalized by 
a plausibility order is called an AGM belief revision function. 
Remark 8.2. An AGM belief revision function satisfies Arrow’s Axiom (the 
reader is asked to prove this in Exercise 8.6). The converse is not true: it is 
possible for a belief revision function 2: Wf →E  to satisfy Arrow’s Axiom and 
yet fail to be rationalized by a plausibility order. 
                                                 
13 One reason for the reversal of notation is that, in this context, when representing the order 
≾  numerically, it will be convenient to assign lower values to more plausible histories. 
Another reason is that it is the standard notation in the extensive literature that deals with 
AGM belief revision (for a recent survey of this literature the reader is referred to the special 
issue of the  Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 40, Issue 2, April 2011). 
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Within the context of probabilistic beliefs, let P be the probability distribution 
on the set of states W that represents the initial beliefs and PE be the probability 
distribution representing the updated beliefs after receiving not surprising 
information E (not surprising in the sense that P(E) > 0). The support of a 
probability distribution P, denoted by Supp(P), is the set of states to which P 
assigns positive probability: ( )Supp P =  { }: ( ) 0w W P w∈ > .  The rule for 
updating beliefs upon receiving information E (Definition 8.2) implies the 
following:   
if ( )E Supp P∩ ≠ ∅  (that is, if ( ) 0P E > ) then ( ) ( )ESupp P E Supp P= ∩ . 
We call this the qualitative belief updating rule. It is easy to check that the 
qualitative belief updating rule is implied by Arrow’s Axiom.14 Thus, by 
Remark 8.2, an AGM belief revision function has incorporated in it the 
qualitative belief updating rule. In other words, belief updating is included in the 
notion of AGM belief revision. A belief revision function, however, goes beyond 
belief updating because it also encodes new beliefs after receipt of surprising 
information (that is, after being informed of an event E such that P(E) = 0). 
What is the probabilistic version of AGM belief revision? It turns out that in 
order to obtain probabilistic beliefs we only need to make a simple addition to 
an AGM belief revision function 2: Wf →E .  Let 0P  be any full-support 
probability distribution on W (that is, 0 ( ) 0P w > , for every w W∈ ) . Then, for 
every E ∈E  let EP  be the probability distribution obtained by conditioning 0P  
on f(E): 
( )
0
0
( )
0
( )
( )
if ( )
( ) | ( )
0 if ( )
w f E
E
P w
P w
w f E
P w P w f E
w f E
′∈
′
 ∈
= = 

∉
∑   
Then WP  gives the initial probabilistic beliefs and, for every other E ∈E , EP  
gives the revised probabilistic beliefs after receiving information E. The 
                                                 
14 For every event E  representing a possible item of information, let PE be the probability 
distribution on E representing the revised beliefs of the individual after receiving information 
E. Let P be the probability distribution on W representing the individual’s initial beliefs. 
Define the following belief revision function f : ( ) ( )f W Supp P=  and ( ) ( )Ef E Supp P= . 
Suppose that f satisfies Arrow’s Axiom. Then, for every event E, if ( )E f W∩ ≠ ∅  [that is, if 
( )E Supp P∩ ≠ ∅ ] then ( ) ( )f E E f W= ∩  [that is, ( ) ( )ESupp P E Supp P= ∩ ]. 
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collection { }E EP ∈E  of probability distributions on W so obtained gives the 
individual’s probabilistic belief revision policy (while the function 
2: Wf →E gives the qualitative probabilistic belief revision policy). 
Definition 8.9. Let W be a finite set of states and E  a collection of events such 
that W ∈E  and ∅ ∉E . A probabilistic belief revision policy is a collection 
{ }E EP ∈E  of probability distributions on W such that, for every E ∈E , 
( )ESupp P E⊆ . WP  represents the initial beliefs and, for every other E ∈E , EP  
represents the revised beliefs after receiving information E.   
The collection { }E EP ∈E  is called an AGM probabilistic belief revision policy if it 
satisfies the following properties:  
(1) there exists a plausibility order ≾ on W such that, for every E ∈E ,  
( )ESupp P  is the set of most plausible states in E, that is,  
( )ESupp P =  { }:   w E w w w E′ ′∈ ∈for every≾ ,15  and  
(2) there exists a full-support probability distribution 0P  on W such that,  
for every E ∈E , EP  is equal to the probability distribution obtained by 
conditioning 0P  on ( )ESupp P .   
As we will see in Part IV, belief revision is very important in dynamic (or 
extensive-form) games. In such games a player may find herself at an 
information set that, according to her initial beliefs, had zero probability of 
being reached and thus will have to form new beliefs reflecting the unexpected 
information. 
 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced in 
this section, by going through the exercises in Section 8.E.3 of Appendix 8.E at the 
end of this chapter. 
                                                 
15 This condition says that if one defines the function 2: Wf →E  by ( ) ( )Ef E Supp P=  then 
this function f  is an AGM belief revision function. 
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8.4 Harsanyi consistency of beliefs or like-mindedness 
[Note: the material of this section will not be needed until Chapter 13. It is 
presented here for completeness on the topic of beliefs.] 
We can easily extend the analysis to the case of two or more individuals. We 
already know how to model interactive knowledge by means of information 
partitions; the addition of beliefs is a simple step: we merely add, for every 
individual and for every information set, a probability distribution over the 
elements of that information set. A two-person example is shown in Figure 8.4 
below. 
a b c d e
1
4
1
4
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
3
1
3
2
3
2
3
1:
2: 1
 
Figure 8.4 
In this example, at every state, the two individuals hold different beliefs. For 
example, consider event E ={b,c} and state a. Individual 1 attaches probability 
1
2
 to E while Individual 2 attaches probability 1
3
 to E. Can two “equally 
rational” individuals hold different beliefs? The answer is: of course! In the 
above example it is not surprising that the two individuals assign different 
probabilities to the same event E, because they have different information. If 
the true state is a, then Individual 1’s information is that the true state is either 
a or b or c, while Individual 2 considers only a and b possible (Individual 2 
knows more than Individual 1). Is there a precise way of expressing the fact that 
two individuals assign different probabilities to an event precisely because they 
have different information? In the above example we could ask the hypothetical 
question: if Individual 1 had the same information as Individual 2, would he 
agree with Individual 2’s assessment that the probability of event E = {b,c} is 
1
3
? This is, of course, a counterfactual question. The answer to this 
counterfactual question is affirmative: imagine giving Individual 1 the 
information that the true state is either a or b; then - according to Definition 
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8.3 - he would update his beliefs from 
1 1 1
2 4 4
a b c 
 
 
 to 
2 1
3 3
a b 
 
 
 and thus have the 
same beliefs as Individual 2.  
We say that two individuals are like-minded if it is the case that they would 
have the same beliefs if they had the same information. It is not straightforward 
how to turn this into a precise definition. Consider, again, the example of 
Figure 8.4 and event E = {b,c}. Above we asked the question “what would 
Individual 1 believe if he knew as much as Individual 2?”. This is a simple 
question because we can imagine giving more information to Individual 1 and 
have him update his beliefs based on that information. However, we could also 
have asked the question “what would Individual 2 believe if he knew as little as 
Individual 1?”. In this case we would have to imagine “taking away 
information” from Individual 2, by increasing his information set from {a,b} to 
{a,b,c}. This is not the same as asking Individual 2 to update his beliefs based on 
information {a,b,c}, because updating on something you already know leaves 
your beliefs unchanged.  
There is a sense in which the beliefs of the two individuals of Figure 8.4 are “in 
agreement”: for example, they both consider state a  twice as likely as state b. 
One could try to use this condition to define like-mindedness: for every two 
states x and y,  whenever two individuals consider both x and y as possible 
(given their information) then they agree on the relative likelihood of x versus 
y. Unfortunately, this condition is too weak. To see this, consider the three-
individual example of Figure 8.5. 
a          b          c       1:
a          b          c       2:
a          b          c       3:
 
Figure 8.5 
No matter what the true state is, we cannot find two individuals and two states 
x and y   that both individuals consider possible. Thus any beliefs would make 
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the three individuals like-minded. For example, Individual 1 at his information 
set {b,c} could assign equal probability to b and c, Individual 2 at her 
information set {a,b} could assign probability 3
4
 to a and 1
4
 to b and Individual 
3 at his information set {a,c} could assign probability 1
4
 to a and 3
4
 to c. But 
then, putting together the beliefs of Individuals 1 and 2 we would have that a is 
judged to be three times more likely than c (according to Individual 1, a is three 
times more likely than b and, according to Individual 2, b is just as likely as c), 
while Individual 3 has the opposite judgment that c is three times more likely 
than a. 
In order to give a precise definition of like-mindedness we need to introduce 
some notation. Let there be n individuals (n ≥ 2). Let W be a set of states and let 
iI  be the information partition of individual i  (i ∈{1,…,n}). As usual, if w is a 
state, we denote by ( )iI w  the element (information set) of the partition iI  that 
contains w. Let ,i wP  be the beliefs of individual i at state w, that is, ,i wP  is a 
probability distribution over ( )iI w . Clearly, we can think of  ,i wP  as a 
probability distribution over the entire set of states W satisfying the property 
that if ( )iw I w′∉  then , ( ) 0i wP w′ = . Note that, for every individual i, there is 
just one probability distribution over ( )iI w  and thus if ( )iw I w′∈  then 
, ,i w i wP P′ = . 
Definition 8.10. A probability distribution P over W is called a common prior 
if, for every individual i and for every state w,  (1) ( )( ) 0iP I w >  and  (2) 
updating P  on ( )iI w  (see Definition 8.4) yields precisely ,i wP , that is, 
( ) ,| ( ) ( )i i wP w I w P w′ ′= , for every w W′∈ . 
When a common prior exists we say that the individuals are like-minded or that 
the individuals’ beliefs are Harsanyi consistent.16 
                                                 
16
 John Harsanyi, who in 1994 won the Nobel prize in Economics (together with Reinhardt 
Selten and John Nash), introduced the theory of games of incomplete information which will 
be the object of Part V. In that theory the notion of Harsanyi consistency plays a  crucial 
role. 
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For instance, in the example of Figure 8.4, reproduced below, a common prior 
exists and thus the two individuals are like-minded. 
a b c d e
1
4
1
4
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
3
1
3
2
3
2
3
1:
2: 1
 
A common prior is 
2 1 1 2 2
8 8 8 8 8
a b c d e 
 
 
 (the reader should convince 
himself/herself that, indeed, updating this probability distribution on each 
information set yields the probability distribution written inside that 
information set).  
How can we determine if a common prior exists? The issue of existence of a 
common prior can be reduced to the issue of whether a system of equations has 
a solution. To see this, let us go back to the example of Figure 8.4, reproduced 
above. A common prior would be a probability distribution 
a b c d e
a b c d e
p p p p p
 
 
 
 that satisfies the following conditions. 
1. Updating on information set {a,b,c} of Individual 1 we need 
1
4
b
a b c
p
p p p
=
+ +
 and 1
4
c
a b c
p
p p p
=
+ +
 
       Note that from these two the third condition follows, namely 
1
2
a
a b c
p
p p p
=
+ +
. 
2. Updating on information set {d,e} of Individual 1 we need 1
2
d
d e
p
p p
=
+
,  
from which it follows that 1
2
e
d e
p
p p
=
+
. 
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3. Updating on information set {a,b} of Individual 2 we need 2
3
a
a b
p
p p
=
+
, 
from which it follows that 1
3
b
a b
p
p p
=
+
. 
4. Updating on information set {c,d} of Individual 2 we need 1
3
c
c d
p
p p
=
+
,  
from which it follows that 2
3
d
c d
p
p p
=
+
. 
From the first we get b cp p= , from the second d ep p= , from the third 
2a bp p=  and from the fourth 2d cp p= . Adding to these three equalities the 
requirement that 1a b c d ep p p p p+ + + + = , we have a system of five equations 
in five unknowns, which admits a unique solution, namely 
2 1 1 2 2
8 8 8 8 8
a b c d e 
 
 
.  
It is not always the case that a common prior exists. For instance, if we add to 
the example of Figure 8.5 the beliefs shown in Figure 8.6, then we get a 
situation where the individuals’ beliefs are not Harsanyi consistent. 
a          b          c  
1:
a          b          c       2:
3: 1
4
3
4
1
2
1
2
a          b          c       1
2
1
2
 
Figure 8.6 
In this case, from the updating conditions of Individuals 1 and 2 one would get 
that a bp p=  and b cp p= , from which it follows that a cp p= ; however, from 
the updating condition for Individual 3 we get that 3a cp p= , yielding a 
contradiction. 
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 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced in 
this section, by going through the exercises in Section 8.E.4 of Appendix 8.E at the 
end of this chapter. 
 
8.5 Agreeing to disagree 
Can two rational and like-minded individuals agree to disagree? This question 
was raised in 1976 by Robert Aumann (who received the Nobel Prize in 
Economics in 2005, together with Thomas Schelling).  
As remarked above, it is certainly quite possible for two rational individuals to 
have different beliefs about a particular event, because they might have 
different information. Let us go back to the example of Figure 8.4, reproduced 
below in Figure 8.7, together with the common prior (showing that the 
individuals are like-minded). Suppose that the true state is a and consider what 
the two individuals believe about event E = {b,c}. Individual 1’s information 
set is {a,b,c} and, given his beliefs at that information set, he attaches 
probability 1 1 1
4 4 2
+ =  to E: let us denote this by “at state a, 11 2( )P E = ”. 
Individual 2’s information set is {a,b} and, given her beliefs at that information 
set, she attaches probability 1
3
 to E: let us denote this by “at state a, 12 3( )P E = ”. 
Thus the two individuals disagree about the probability of event E. 
Furthermore, they know that they disagree. To see this, let 11 2( )P E =  be the 
event that Individual 1 attaches probability 1
2
 to E; then 11 2( )P E =  = {a, b, c}. 
Similarly, let 12 3( )P E =  be the event that Individual 2 attaches probability 
1
3
 
to E; then 12 3( )P E =  = {a, b, c, d}. These are events and thus we can check at 
what states the two individuals know them. Using Definition 7.3 (Chapter 7), 
we have that  11 2 3( ) { , , }K P E a b c= =  and 
1
2 1 2
( ) { , }K P E a b= = . Hence 
1 1 1 1
1 2 1 2 2 12 3 3 2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )a P E P E K P E K P E∈ = ∩ = ∩ = ∩ =  
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a b c d e
1
4
1
4
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
3
1
3
2
3
2
3
1:
2:
2
8
2
8
2
8
1
8
1
8
"common
prior"
E = {b , c}
P1(E) = P1(E) = 0
1
2
P2(E) = 13 P2(E) =
1
3 P2(E) = 0
1
 
Figure 8.7 
Thus at state a not only do the individuals disagree, but they know that they 
disagree. However, their disagreement is not common knowledge. Indeed, 
1
1 2 1 2
( )K K P E = = ∅  and thus a ∉ 11 2 1 2( )K K P E = = ∅ , that is, at state a it is 
not the case that Individual 1 knows that Individual 2 knows that Individual 1 
assigns probability 1
2
 to event E.  As the following theorem states, the opinions 
of two like-minded individuals about an event E cannot be in disagreement and, 
at the same time, commonly known.  
The following theorem is proved in Appendix 8.A at the end of this chapter. 
Theorem 8.1 (Agreement Theorem; Aumann, 1976). Let W be a set of states 
and consider a knowledge-belief structure with two individuals, 1 and 2. Let E 
be an event and let p,q ∈ [0,1]. Suppose that at some state w it is common 
knowledge that Individual 1 assigns probability p to E and Individual 2 assigns 
probability q to E. Then, if the individuals’ beliefs  are Harsanyi consistent 
(Definition 8.10),  p = q. In other words, two like-minded individuals cannot 
agree to disagree about the probability of an event. Formally, if there exists a 
common prior and ( )1 2( ) ( )w CK P E p P E q∈ = ∩ =  then p = q. 
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Another way to think of this result is to imagine that the two individuals 
communicate their opinions to each other. Hearing that the other person has a 
different opinion is in itself a valuable piece of information, which ought to be 
incorporated (by updating) into one’s beliefs. Thus sequential communication 
leads to changing beliefs. If, at the end of this process, the beliefs become 
common knowledge, then they must be identical. We shall illustrate this with 
an example.  
Imagine two scientists who agree that the laws of Nature are such that the true 
state of the world must be one of  seven, call them a, b, c, d, e, f, g. They also 
agree on the relative likelihood of these possibilities, which they take to be as 
shown in Figure 8.8. 
 
a b c d e f g
4/32 2/32 8/32 5/32 7/32 2/32 4/32
 
Figure 8.8 
Experiments can be conducted to learn more. An experiment leads to a 
partition of the set of states. For example, if the true state is a and you perform 
an experiment then you might learn that the true state cannot be d or e or f or g 
but you still would not know which is the true state among the remaining 
ones. Suppose that the scientists agree that Scientist 1, from now on denoted by 
S1, will perform experiment 1 and Scientist 2, denoted by S2, will perform 
experiment 2. They also agree that each experiment would lead to a partition of 
the set of states as shown in Figure 8.9. 
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a b c d e f g
Experiment 1:
a b
c
d
e f g
Experiment 2:
 
Figure 8.9 
 
Suppose that the scientists are interested in establishing the truth of a 
proposition that is represented by the event  E = {a, c, d, e}.  Initially (given the 
shared probabilistic beliefs shown in Figure 8.8) they agree that the probability 
that E is true is 75%: 
8 5 7 34 24
32 32 32 32 32 4
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 75%.P E P a P c P d P e= + + + = + + + = = =  
Before they perform the experiments they also realize that, depending on what 
the true state is, after the experiment they will have an updated probability of 
event E conditional on what the experiment has revealed. For example, they 
agree that if one performs experiment 1 and the true state is b then the 
experiment will yield the information { , , }F a b c=  and ( | )P E F  is given by 
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( ) ( ) ( )
( | )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
P E F P a P c
P E F
P F P a P b P c
∩ +
= = =
+ +
 
84
32 32 612
14 784 2
32 32 32
+
= =
+ +
= 86%. 
[Note the interesting fact that sometimes experiments, although they are 
informative - that is, they reduce one’s state of uncertainty - might actually 
induce one to become more confident of the truth of something that is false: in 
this case one would increase one’s subjective probability that E is true from 
75% to 86%, although E is actually false if the true state is b, as we 
hypothesized).] 
We can associate with every cell of each experiment (that is, with every possible 
state of information yielded by the experiment) a new updated probability of 
event E, as shown in Figure 8.10.  
a b c d e f g
Experiment 1:
a b
c
d
e f g
Experiment 2:
Prob(E) = 12/14 Prob(E) = 12/14 Prob(E) = 0
Prob(E) =  15/21
Prob(E) = 9/11
 
Figure 8.10 
Suppose now that each scientist goes to her laboratory and performs the 
respective experiment (Scientist 1 experiment 1 and Scientist 2 experiment 2). 
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Assume also that the true state is f  . Suppose that the two scientists send 
each other an e-mail communicating their new subjective estimates of the truth 
of E. Scientist 1 writes that he now attaches probability 12
14
 to E, while Scientist 
2 says that she attaches probability 15
21
 to E. So their estimates disagree (not 
surprisingly, since they have performed different experiments and have 
collected different information). Should they be happy with these estimates? 
The answer is negative.  
Consider first S1 (Scientist 1). He hears that S2 has a revised probability of 1521  
(recall our assumption that the true state is f  ). What does he learn from this? 
He learns that the true state cannot be d (if it had been, then he would have 
received an e-mail from S2 saying “my new probability is 911 ”). S1’s new state of 
knowledge and corresponding probabilities after receiving S2’s e-mail are then 
as shown in Figure 8.11. 
a b c d e f g
Scientist 1 learns from 2's e-mail:
a b
c
d
e f g
Experiment 2:
Prob(E) = 4/6 Prob(E) = 7/9 Prob(E) = 0
Prob(E) =  15/21
Prob(E) = 9/11
true state
Prob(E)
 = 1
Prob(E) 
= 1
 
If g is the true state, 
then experiment 1 
reveals it. 
If either d, e or f is the 
true state then 
experiment 1 reveals 
{d,e,f}. With e or f  S2’s 
e-mail is “15/21”, with d 
it is “9/11”. Thus with e 
or f one can narrow 
down to {e,f} while 
with d one learns that 
the true state is d.  
If the true state is a, b or 
c then experiment 1 
reveals {a,b,c}. With a 
or b  S2 sends “9/11” 
while with c she sends 
“15/21”. Thus the e-
mail splits {a,b,c} into 
{a,b} and {c}. 
Figure 8.11 
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Consider now Scientist 2. From S1’s e-mail she learns that S1 has a new updated 
probability of 12
14
. What can she deduce from this? That the true state is not  g 
(if it had been g then she would have received an e-mail from S1 saying that her 
revised probability of E was zero). Thus she can revise her knowledge partition 
by eliminating g from her information set. A similar reasoning applies to the 
other states. S2’s new state of knowledge and corresponding probabilities after 
receiving S1’s e-mail are shown in Figure 8.12. 
 
a b c d e f g
Experiment 1:
a b
c
d
e f g
What scientist 2 learns from S1's first e-mail:
Prob(E) = 12/14 Prob(E) = 12/14 Prob(E) = 0
Prob(E) =  15/17
Prob(E) = 9/11
Prob(E) = 0
 
If either c, e, f or g is 
the true state then 
experiment 2 reveals 
{c,e,f,g}. With c, e or f 
S1’s e-mail is “12/14”, 
with g it is “0”. Thus 
with c, e or f  one can 
narrow down to 
{c,e,f} while with g 
one learns that the 
true state is g.  
If the true state is a, b 
or d then experiment 
2 reveals {a,b,d}. In 
all three cases S1’s e-
mail is “12/14” and 
therefore nothing is 
learned.  
Figure 8.12 
 
Thus the new situation after the first exchange of e-mails is as shown in Figure 
8.13 below. 
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a b c d e f g
Scientist 1:
a b
c
d
e f g
Scientist 2:
Prob(E) = 4/6 Prob(E) = 7/9 Prob(E) = 0
Prob(E) =  15/17
Prob(E) = 9/11
true state
Prob(E)
 = 1
Prob(E) 
= 1
Prob(E) = 0
 
Figure 8.13 
Now there is a second round of e-mails. S1 communicates “in light of your e-
mail, my new P(E) is 7/9”, while S2 writes “after your e-mail I changed my P(E) 
to 15/17”. While S1 learns nothing new from S2’s second e-mail, S2 learns that 
the true state cannot be c (the second e-mail would have been “P(E) = 1” if c 
had been the true state; in the hypothetical case where S2’s revised information 
was {a,b,d} then after S1’s second e-mail it would split into {a,b} and {d}). Thus 
the new situation is a shown in Figure 8.14.  
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a b c d e f g
Scientist 1:
Scientist 2:
Prob(E) = 4/6 Prob(E) = 7/9 Prob(E) = 0
true state
Prob(E)
 = 1
Prob(E) 
= 1
a b c d e f g
Prob(E) = 4/6 Prob(E) = 7/9 Prob(E) = 0
Prob(E)
 = 1
Prob(E) 
= 1
 
Figure 8.14 
Now they have reached complete agreement: P(E) = 7
9
. Further exchanges do 
not convey any new information. Indeed it has become common knowledge (at 
state f ) that both scientists estimate the probability of event E to be 7
9
 = 78%   
(before the experiments the probability of E was judged to be 24
32
 = 75%;  note, 
again, that with the experiments and the exchange of information they have 
gone farther from the truth than at the beginning!). 
Notice that before the last step it was never common knowledge between the 
two what probability each scientist attached to E. When one scientist 
announced his subjective estimate, the other scientist found that announcement 
informative and revised her own estimate accordingly. After the exchange of 
two e-mails, the further announcement by one scientist of his/her estimate of 
the probability of E would not make the other scientist change his/her own 
estimate: the announcement would reveal nothing new. 
 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced in 
this section, by going through the exercises in Section 8.E.5 of Appendix 8.E at the 
end of this chapter. 
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Appendix 8.A:  
Proof of the Agreement Theorem 
First we prove the following.  
Lemma.  Let W be a finite set of states, P a probability distribution on W and  
E,F ⊆ W two events. Let {F1, ..., Fm} be a partition of F (thus F = F1 ∪ ... ∪ Fm 
and any two Fj and Fk with j ≠ k are non-empty and disjoint). Suppose that 
P(E|Fj ) = q  for all j = 1, ..., m.  Then P(E|F) = q.   
Proof. By definition of conditional probability, 
( )
( | )
( )
j
j
j
P E F
P E F
P F
∩
= . Hence, 
since  P(E|Fj ) = q, we have that ( ) ( )j jP E F q P F∩ = . Adding over j, the left-
hand side becomes ( )P E F∩  [because E ∩ F = (E ∩ F
1
) ∪ … ∪  (E ∩ F
m
) and 
for any j and k with j ≠ k, (E ∩ F
j
) ∩ (E ∩ F
k
)= ∅, so that  P(E ∩ F) = P(E ∩ 
F
1
) + … + P(E ∩ F
m
)] and the right-hand side becomes qP(F). Hence 
( )
( | )
( )
P E F
P E F
P F
∩
= =  
( )
( )
q P F
q
P F
= .   
Proof of Theorem 8.1. Suppose that ( )1 2( ) ( )CK P E p P E q= ∩ = ≠ ∅ . Let P 
be a common prior. Select an arbitrary ( )1 2( ) ( )w CK P E p P E q∈ = ∩ =  and 
let I
CK
(w) be the cell of the common knowledge partition containing w. 
Consider Individual 1. I
CK
(w) is equal to the union of a collection of cells 
(information sets) of 1’s information partition. On each such cell 1’s 
conditional probability of E, using the common prior P, is p. Hence, by the 
above lemma, P(E|I
CK
(w)) = p. A similar reasoning for Individual 2  leads to 
P(E|I
CK
(w)) = q.  Hence  p = q.    
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Appendix 8.E: Exercises 
8.E.1 .  Exercises  for  Section 8 .1 :  Probabilistic beliefs 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this 
chapter. 
Exercise 8.1. Let the set of states be { , , , , , , , , }W a b c d e f g h i= . Amy’s initial 
beliefs are given by the following probability distribution: 
11 7 9 16 5 4 8
60 6060 60 60 60 60
0 0
a b c d e f g h istate
probability
 
(a) Let { , , , , }E a f g h i= . What is the probability of E? 
(b)  Find all the events that Amy is certain of. 
Exercise 8.2. Let W be a finite set of states and let A and B be two events. 
Recall that A B∪  is the union of A and B, that is, the set of states that belong 
to either A or B (or both) and A B∩  is the intersection of A and B, that is, the 
set of states that belong to both A and B.  Explain why 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )P A B P A P B P A B∪ = + − ∩ . 
  
8.E.2 .  Exercises  for  Section 8 .2 :   
            Conditional probability, belief updating, Bayes’ rule 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this 
chapter. 
Exercise 8.3.  In a remote rural clinic with limited resources, a patient arrives 
complaining of low-abdomen pain. Based on all the information available, the 
doctor thinks that there are only four possible causes: a bacterial infection (b), a 
viral infection (v), cancer (c), internal bleeding (i). Of the four, only the 
bacterial infection and internal bleeding are treatable at the clinic. In the past 
the doctor has seen 600 similar cases and they eventually turned out to be as 
follows: 
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Bacterial infection 
b 
Viral infection 
v 
Cancer 
c 
Internal 
bleeding i 
140 110 90 260 
Her probabilistic estimates are based on those past cases.  
(a) What is the probability that the patient has a treatable disease? 
There are two possible ways of gathering more information: a blood test and  
an ultrasound. A positive blood test will reveal that there is an infection, 
however it could be either a bacterial or a viral infection; a negative blood test 
rules out an infection (either bacterial or viral) and thus leaves cancer and 
internal bleeding as the only possibilities. The ultrasound, on the other hand, 
will reveal if there is internal bleeding. 
(b) Suppose that the patient gets an ultrasound and it turns out that there is no 
internal bleeding. What is the probability that he does not have a treatable 
disease? What is the probability that he has cancer? 
(c) If instead of getting the ultrasound he had taken the blood test and it had 
been positive, what would have been the probability that he had a treatable 
disease? 
(d) Now let us go back to the hypothesis that the patient only gets the 
ultrasound and it turns out that there is no internal bleeding. He then asks 
the doctor: “if I were to take the blood test too, how likely is it that it 
would be positive?”. What should the doctor’s answer be? 
(e) Finally, suppose that the patient gets both the ultrasound and the blood test 
and the ultrasound reveals that there is no internal bleeding, while the 
blood test is positive. How likely is it that he has a treatable disease? 
 
GAME THEORY – Giacomo Bonanno 
 
318 
 
Exercise 8.4. A and B are two events such that ( ) 0.2P A = , ( ) 0.5P B =  and 
( | ) 0.1P B A = .  Calculate ( | )P A B  using Bayes’ rule. 
Exercise 8.5. A lab technician was asked to mark some specimens with two 
letters, one from the set {A, B, C} and the other from the set {E,F,G}. For 
example, a specimen could be labeled as AE or BG, etc. He had a total of 220 
specimens. He has to file a report to his boss, consisting of the following table. 
LABEL number 
AE  
AF  
AG  
BE  
BF  
BG  
CE  
CF  
CG  
Unfortunately, he does not remember all the figures. He had written some 
notes to himself, which are reproduced below. Help him fill in the above table 
with the help of his notes and the conditional probability formula. Here are the 
technician’s notes: 
(a) Of all the ones that he marked with an E, one fifth were also marked with 
an A and one fifth were marked with a B.  
(b) He marked 36 specimens with the label CE. 
(c) Of all the specimens that he marked with a C, 12
33
 were marked with a G. 
(d) Of all the specimens, 23
55
  were marked with a C. 
(e) The number of specimens marked BG was twice the number of specimens 
marked BE. 
(f) Of all the specimens marked with an A, 3
20
 were marked  with an E. 
(g) Of all the specimens marked with an A, one tenth were marked  with a G. 
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8.E.3 .  Exercises  for  Section 8 .3 :  Belief revision  
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this 
chapter. 
Exercise 8.6.  Prove that an AGM belief revision function satisfies Arrow’s 
Axiom (Remark 8.2). 
 
Exercise 8.7. Let W = {a,b,c,d,e,g,h,k,m} and let ≾ be the following plausibility 
order on W  (we use the convention that if the row to which state w  belongs is 
above the row to which state w′  belongs then w w′≺ , and if w  and w′  belong  
to the same row then w w′∼ ). 
,
, ,
,
b g
c k m
d h
e
a
most plausible
least plausible
  
Let { }{ , },{ , , , },{ , , , },a e d e k m b d e k W=E . Find the belief revision function 
: 2Wf →E  that is rationalized by ≾. 
 
Exercise 8.8. As in Exercise 8.7, let W = {a,b,c,d,e,g,h,k,m} and 

{ , },{ , , , },{ , , , },
E F G
a e d e k m b d e k W
  
=  
  
 
E . Using the plausibility order of Exercise 
8.7, find a collection of probability distributions { }, , ,E F G WP P P P  that provides 
an AGM probabilistic belief revision policy (Definition 8.9). [There are many: 
find one.] 
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8.E.4 .  Exercises for Section 8.4: Harsanyi consistency of beliefs  
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this 
chapter. 
Exercise 8.9. Consider the following knowledge-belief structure: 
a b c d
a b c d
Player 1:
Player 2:
1/3 1/32/3 2/3
1/3 2/32/31/3
 
Are the individuals’ beliefs Harsanyi consistent? 
Exercise 8.10. Consider the following knowledge-belief structure: 
a        b        c        d        e        f 
a        b        c        d        e        f 1:
2:
3:
a        b        c        d        e        f 
1
2
1
2
1
3
1
4
1
5
1−pp
2
3
1
2
3
4
4
5
1
2
 
(a) Show that if 1
13
p =  then the beliefs are Harsanyi consistent. 
(b) Show that if 1
13
p ≠  then the beliefs are not Harsanyi consistent. 
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8.E.5 .  Exercises for Section 8.5: Agreeing to disagree  
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this 
chapter. 
Exercise 8.11. Consider the following knowledge-belief structure: 
a          b          c          d          e          f           g
a          b          c          d          e          f           g
1:
2:
2
3
1
3
2
3
1
6
2
6
1
4
2
4
1
3
3
6
2
3
4
7
3
7
1
4
1
3
 
(a) Find the common knowledge partition. 
(b) Find a common prior. 
(c) Let E = {b,d,f}. (c.1) Is the probability that Individual 1 assigns to E 
common knowledge?  (c.2) Is the probability that Individual 2 assigns to 
E common knowledge? 
(d) Let E = {b,d,f}. (d.1) At state b  does Individual 1 know what 
probability Individual 2 assigns to E?  (d.2) At state c  does Individual 1 
know what probability Individual 2 assigns to E? (d.3) At state f  does 
Individual 1 know what probability Individual 2 assigns to E? 
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◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊ 
Exercise 8.12. Challenging Question.  
[This is known as the Monty Hall problem.] 
You are a contestant in a show. You are shown three doors, numbered 1, 2 and 
3. Behind one of them is a new car, which will be yours if you choose to open 
that door. The door behind which the car was placed was chosen randomly 
with equal probability (a die was thrown, if it came up 1 or 2 then the car was 
placed behind door 1, if it came up 3 or 4 then the car was placed behind door 2 
and if it came up 5 or 6 then the car was placed behind door 3).  You have to 
choose one door. Suppose that you have chosen door number 1. Before the 
door is opened the show host tells you that he knows where the car is and, to 
help you, he will open one of the other two doors, making sure that he opens a 
door behind which there is no car; if there are two such doors, then he will 
choose randomly with equal probability. Afterwards he will give you a chance 
to change your mind and switch to the other closed, but you will have to pay 
$50 if you decide to switch. Suppose that (initially you chose door 1 and) the 
host opens door 3 to show you that the car is not there. Should you switch 
from door 1 to door 2? [Assume that, if switching increases the probability of 
getting the car, then you find it worthwhile to pay $50 to switch.] 
 
Let us approach this problem in two different ways. 
(a) Method 1. Draw (part of) an extensive form with imperfect information where 
Nature moves first and chooses where the car is, then you choose one door 
and then the host chooses which door to open (of course, the host’s choice is 
made according to the rules specified above). Reasoning about the information 
set you are in after you have pointed to door 1 and the host has opened door 3, 
determine if you should switch from door 1 to door 2.  
(b) Method 2. Let Dn denote the event that the car is behind door  
n ∈{1,2,3}. Let On denote the event that the host opens door n. The prior 
probabilities are 11 2 3 3( ) ( ) ( )P D P D P D= = = . Compute 1 3( | )P D O  using Bayes’ 
rule (if 1 3( | )P D O =
1
2
 then you should not switch, since there is a cost in 
switching).   
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Appendix 8.S: Solutions to exercises  
Exercise 8.1.   The probability distribution is 
11 7 9 16 5 4 8
60 6060 60 60 60 60
0 0
a b c d e f g h istate
probability
 
(a) Let { , , , , }E a f g h i= . Then ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )P E P a P f P g P h P i= + + + + =  
5 8 28 711 4
60 60 60 60 60 15
0+ + + + = = .   
(b) Amy is certain of all events that have probability 1, namely 
{ , , , , , , }a c d e f g h , { , , , , , , , }a b c d e f g h , { , , , , , , , }a c d e f g h i  and 
{ , , , , , , , , }a b c d e f g h i . 
Exercise 8.2. Since ( ) ( )
w A
P A P w
∈
= ∑  and ( ) ( )
w B
P B P w
∈
= ∑ , when adding ( )P A  to 
( )P B  the elements that belong to both A and B (that is, the elements of A B∩ ) 
are added twice and thus we need to subtract ( )
w A B
P w
∈ ∩
∑  from ( ) ( )P A P B+  in 
order to get ( )
w A B
P w
∈ ∪
∑ , which is equal to ( )P A B∪ . 
Exercise 8.3.  The probabilities are as follows: 
b v c i 
140 7
600 30
=  110 11
600 60
=  90 3
600 20
=  
260 13
600 30
=  
(a) The event that the patient has a treatable disease is {b,i}.  P({b,i}) = P(b) + 
P(i) = 7 13 2
30 30 3
+ = . 
(b) A negative result of the ultrasound is represented by the event {b,v,c}. A 
non-treatable disease is the event {v,c}. Thus  
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
311
60 20 10
177 311
30 60 20
{ , } { , , } { , }
{ , } |{ , , }
{ , , } { , , }
P v c b v c P v c
P v c b v c
P b v c P b v c
∩ +
= = = =
+ +
. 
( ) ( )
( )
3
20 9
347 311
30 60 20
|{ , , }
{ , , }
P c
P c b v c
P b v c
= = =
+ +
. 
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(c) A positive blood test is represented by the event {b,v}. A treatable disease is 
the event {b,i}. Thus  
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
7
30 14
257 11
30 60
{ , } { , }
{ , } |{ , }
{ , } { , }
P b i b v P b
P b i b v
P b v P b v
∩
= = = =
+
. 
(d) Here we want ( ) ( )
( )
7 11
30 60 25
347 311
30 60 20
{ , }
{ , } |{ , , }
{ , , }
P b v
P b v b v c
P b v c
+
= = =
+ +
. 
(e) The information is { , } { , , } { , }b v b v c b v∩ = . Thus we want ( ){ , } |{ , }P b i b v  
which was calculated in Part (c) as 14
25
. 
Exercise 8.4.  
( | ) ( ) (0.1)(0.2)
( | ) 0.04
( ) 0.5
P B A P A
P A B
P B
= = = . 
Exercise 8.5.  Let P(xy) be the fraction of the total number of specimens that 
were marked xy and P(x|y) be the number of specimens marked with an x as a 
fraction of the specimens that were marked with a y (this is like a conditional 
probability). This is how we can re-write the information contained in the 
technician’s notes: 
(a) P(A|E) = P(B|E) = 1
5
. It follows that the remaining three fifths were 
marked with a C, that is, P(C|E) = 3
5
. 
(b) The number of CEs is 36.  Thus P(CE) = 36
220
.  Thus  
( )
( | )
( )
P CE
P C E
P E
= . 
Using (a) we get 
36
2203
5
( )P E
= , that is, P(E) = 36 5 3
220 3 11
= . Hence the number of 
specimens marked with an E is 3
11
220 60.=  Furthermore, 
( )
( | )
( )
P AE
P A E
P E
= . Thus, using (a), 1
5 3
11
( )P AE
= , that is, P(AE) = 3
55
. Thus 
the number of specimens marked AE is 3
55
220= 12. The calculation for 
P(B|E) is identical; thus  the number of specimens marked BE is also 12. 
Thus, so far, we have: 
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LABEL number 
AE 12 
AF  
AG  
BE 12 
BF  
BG  
CE 36 
CF  
CG  
(c) 12
23
( | )P G C = . Thus 
( )
( | )
( )
P CG
P G C
P C
= , that is, 12
23
( )
( )
P CG
P C
= .  
(d) P(C) = 23
55
. Thus, using (c) we get 12
23 23
55
( )P CG
= , that is, P(CG) = 12
55
. Hence 
the number of specimens marked CG is 12
55
220 48.=  Since P(C) = 23
55
, the 
total number of specimens marked with a C is 23
55
220 = 92. Since 36 were 
marked CE and 48 were marked CG, it follows that the number of 
specimens marked CF is 92 −48 −36 = 8. Thus, so far, we have: 
 
LABEL number 
AE 12 
AF  
AG  
BE 12 
BF  
BG  
CE 36 
CF 8 
CG 48 
(e) The number of BGs is twice the number of BEs. Since the latter is 12, the 
number of BGs is 24.  
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(f) P(E|A) = 3
20
. Since 
( )
( | )
( )
P AE
P E A
P A
=  and, from (b), P(AE) = 3
55
, we have 
that 
3
553
20
( )P A
= . Hence 3 20 4
55 3 11
( )P A = = .  Thus the number of specimens 
marked with an A is 4
11
220 80= . Since P(A) = 4
11
 and (from (d)) P(C) = 23
55
, 
it follows that P(B) = 1 − 4
11
 − 23
55
 = 12
55
. Thus the number of specimens 
marked with a B is 12
55
220 = 48. Of these, 12 were marked BE and 24 were 
marked BG. Thus the number of specimens marked BF is 48 −12 −24 = 12. 
Thus, so far, we have: 
 
LABEL number 
AE 12 
AF  
AG  
BE 12 
BF 12 
BG 24 
CE 36 
CF 8 
CG 48 
(g) P(G|A) = 1
10
. 
( )
( | )
( )
P AG
P G A
P A
= . From (f) we have that P(A) = 4
11
. Thus 
1
10 4
11
( )P AG
= . Thus P(AG) = ( )1 4 410 11 110= .  Thus the number of specimens 
marked AG is 4
110
220 8= . Since the number marked with an A is 
4
11
220 80=  and those marked AE are 12 and those marked AG are 8, we get 
that the number of specimens marked AF is 80 −12 −8 = 60. Thus we have 
completed the table: 
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LABEL number 
AE 12 
AF 60 
AG 8 
BE 12 
BF 12 
BG 24 
CE 36 
CF 8 
CG 48 
 
Exercise 8.6.  Let 2: Wf →E  be an AGM belief revision function. Let ,E F ∈E  
be such that  E F⊆  and ( )E f F∩ ≠ ∅ . We need to show that 
( ) ( )f E E f F= ∩ . By definition of AGM belief revision function, 
 { }( ) :   f F w F w w w F′ ′= ∈ ∈for every≾    (1) 
and  
{ }( ) :   f E w E w w w E′ ′= ∈ ∈for every≾    (2) 
Choose an arbitrary ( )w E f F∈ ∩ . Then, by (1) and the fact that E F⊆ , 
w w′≾  for every w E′∈  and thus, by (2), ( )w f E∈ . Hence ( ) ( )E f F f E∩ ⊆ . 
Conversely, choose an arbitrary 1 ( )w f E∈ . Then, since ( )f E E⊆ , 1w E∈ . We 
want to show that 1 ( )w f F∈  [so that 1 ( )w E f F∈ ∩  and, therefore, 
( ) ( )f E E f F⊆ ∩ ]. Suppose not. Then, by (1), there exists a 2w F∈  such that 
2 1w w≺ . Select a 3 ( )w E f F∈ ∩  (recall that, by hypothesis, ( )E f F∩ ≠ ∅ ). 
Then, by (1) (since 2 3, ( )w w f F∈ ), 3 2w w≾ , from which it follows (by 
transitivity of ≾ and the fact that 2 1w w≺ ) that 3 1w w≺ . But then, since 
3w E∈ , it is not true that 1w w′≾  for every w E′∈ , contradicting - by (2) - the 
hypothesis that 1 ( )w f E∈ . 
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Exercise 8.7. We have that { }{ , },{ , , , },{ , , , },a e d e k m b d e k W=E  and the 
plausibility order is  
most plausible ,
, ,
,
least plausible
b g
c k m
d h
e
a
 
The belief revision function rationalized by this plausibility order is given by 
( ) ( ) ( ){ , } { }, { , , , } { , }, { , , , } { }f a e e f d e k m k m f b d e k b= = =  and ( ) { , }f W b g= . 
Exercise 8.8.  From Exercise 8.7 we get that { }, , ,E F G WP P P P  must be such that 
( ) { }ESupp P e= , ( ) { , }FSupp P k m= , ( ) { }GSupp P b=  and ( ) { , }WSupp P b g= . For 
every full support probability distribution 0P  on W, there is a corresponding 
collection { }, , ,E F G WP P P P . For example, if 0P  is the uniform distribution on W 
(that assigns probability 1
9
 to every state) then the corresponding 
{ }, , ,E F G WP P P P  is given by:  
1 1
2 2
1 1
2 2
state
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
E
F
G
W
a b c d e g h k m
P
P
P
P
  
If 0P  is the following probability distribution 
3 8 9 5 71 11 4 2
0 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
state a b c d e g h k m
P
 
then the corresponding { }, , ,E F G WP P P P  is given by: EP  and GP  the same as 
above, and FP  and WP  as follows: 
72
9 9
31
4 4
state
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F
W
a b c d e g h k m
P
P
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Exercise 8.9.  Yes. The following is a common prior: 
1 2 2 4
9 9 9 9
a b c d 
 
 
. 
Exercise 8.10.  (a) Assume that 1
13
p =  (so that 12
13
1 p− =  ). From the updating 
conditions for Individual 1 we get 2b ap p=  and e fp p= ;  from the updating 
conditions for Individual 2 we get 3c bp p=  and 4e dp p= ;  from the updating 
conditions for Individual 3 we get c dp p=  and 12f bp p= . All these equations 
have a solution, which constitutes a common prior, namely 
6 61 2 24 24
63 63 63 63 63 63
a b c d e f 
 
 
.  
(b) From the equations of part (a) we have that f ep p= ,  4e dp p= , d cp p=  
and 3c bp p= , from which it follows that 12f bp p= . Thus, updating on the 
information set {b,f} of Individual 3 we get that we must have 
12
13
12
(1 )
12
f b
b f b b
p p
p
p p p p
− = = =
+ +
  and thus 1
13
p = . Hence, if 1
13
p ≠  there is no 
common prior. 
Exercise 8.11.  (a) and (b) The common knowledge partition and the common 
prior are shown below. 
a          b          c          d          e          f           g
a          b          c          d          e          f           g
1:
2:
2
3
1
3
2
3
1
6
2
6
1
4
2
4
1
3
3
6
2
3
4
7
3
7
1
4
1
3
a          b          c          d          e          f           g
4
18
2
18
2
18
2
18
1
18
4
18
3
18
CK partition
and common
prior
 
(c.1) Individual 1 assigns probability 1
3
 to E  at every state. Thus his assessment 
of the probability of E is common knowledge at every state. 
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(c.2) At state a Individual 2 assigns probability 1
2
 to E, while at state b she 
assigns probability 2
3
 to E. Thus her assessment of the probability of E is 
not common knowledge at any state. 
(d.1) At state a Individual 1’s information set is {a,b}; since at a Individual 2 
assigns probability 1
2
 to E, while at b she assigns probability 2
3
 to E, it 
follows that at a it is not the case that Individual 1 knows Individual 2’s 
assessment of the probability of E.  
(d.2) At state c Individual 1’s information set is {c,d,e}; since at c Individual 2 
assigns probability 2
3
 to E, while at d she assigns probability 1
2
 to E, it 
follows that at c it is not the case that Individual 1 knows Individual 2’s 
assessment of the probability of E.  
(d.3) At state f  Individual 1’s information set is {f,g}; since at f  Individual 2 
assigns probability 1
2
 to E, while at g she assigns probability 0 to E, it 
follows that at f it is not the case that Individual 1 knows Individual 2’s 
assessment of the probability of E.  
Exercise 8.12 (Challenging question).   
(a)  The extensive form is as follows (‘cbn’ means ‘the car is behind door n’, 
‘chn’ means ‘you choose door n’). 
ch3
1/3
x y
NATURE
YOU
YOU
YOU
ch2
ch3
choose 1 choose 1
ch2
ch3
1/2
open 3
open 3 open 2open 2
1/2
HOST
HOST HOST
1/3
cb1
cb2 1/3
cb3
ch2
choose 1
 
The hypothesized sequence of events leads to either node x or node y (you 
first choose door 1 and then the host opens door 3). The prior probability 
of getting to x is 1 1 1
3 2 6
× =  while the prior probability of getting to y is 
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1 1
3 3
1× = . The information you have is {x,y} and, using the conditional 
probability rule, 
1
6 1
31 1
6 3
({ } { , }) ({ })
({ }|{ , })
({ , }) ({ , })
P x x y P x
P x x y
P x y P x y
∩
= = = =
+
. Thus 
you should switch. 
(b) By Bayes’ rule, 3 1 1
3
1 3
( | ) ( )
( )
( | )
P O D P D
P O
P D O = . We know that 1
1 3
( )P D =  and 
1
3 1 2
( | )P O D =  (when the car is behind door 1 then the host has a choice 
between opening door 2 and opening door 3 and he chooses with equal 
probability). Thus 
1 1 1
2 3 6
1 3
3 3
( | )
( ) ( )
P D O
P O P O
×
= = .                                  (♦) 
Thus we only need to compute P(O3). By Bayes’ rule, 
3 3 1 1 3 2 2 3 3 3( ) ( | ) ( ) ( | ) ( ) ( | ) ( )P O P O D P D P O D P D P O D P D= + + = 
1 1 1
3 1 3 2 3 33 3 3
( | ) ( | ) ( | )P O D P O D P O D+ + = 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 3 3 3 6 3 2
1 0× + × + × = + =  
because 13 1 3 2 3 32( | ) , ( | ) 1 ( | ) 0P O D P O D P O D= = =and .  Substituting 
1
2
 for 
P(O3) in (♦) we get that 11 3 3( | )P D O = . Hence the updated probability that 
the car is behind the other door (door 2) is 2
3
 and therefore you should 
switch.  
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Common Knowledge of Rationality  
9.1 Models of strategic-form games  
n Chapter 1 (Section 1.5) and Chapter 5 (Section 5.4) we discussed the 
procedure of iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies and 
claimed that it captures the notion of common knowledge of rationality in 
strategic-form games. We now have the tools to state this precisely. 
The epistemic foundation program in game theory aims to identify, for every 
game, the strategies that might be chosen by rational and intelligent players 
who know the structure of the game and the preferences of their opponents 
and who recognize each other’s rationality.  The two central questions are thus: 
(1) Under what circumstances is a player rational? and (2) What does ‘mutual 
recognition of rationality’ mean? A natural interpretation of the latter notion is 
in terms of ‘common knowledge of rationality’.17 Thus we only need to define 
what it means for a player to be rational. Intuitively, a player is rational if she 
chooses an action which is “best” given what she believes. In order to make this 
more precise we need to introduce the notion of a model of a game. We shall 
focus on strategic-form games with cardinal payoffs (Definition 5.2, Chapter 5). 
                                                 
17
 As pointed out in Chapter 7 (Remark 7.1), a defining characteristic of knowledge is truth: if, 
at a state, a player knows event E then, at that state, E must be true. A more general notion 
is that of belief, which allows for the possibility of mistakes: believing E is compatible with 
E being false. Thus a more appealing notion is that of common belief of rationality; however, 
in order to simplify the exposition, we shall restrict attention to the notions of knowledge 
and common knowledge developed in Chapter 7. For the analysis of common belief and an 
overview of the epistemic foundation program in game theory the reader is referred to 
Battigalli and Bonanno (1999). 
Chapter 
9 
I 
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The definition of a strategic-form game specifies the choices available to the 
players and what motivates those choices (their preferences over the possible 
outcomes); however, it leaves out an important factor in the determination of 
players’ choices, namely what they believe about the other players. Adding a 
specification of the players’ knowledge and beliefs determines the context in 
which a particular game is played; this can be done with the help of an 
interactive knowledge-belief structure.  
Recall that an interactive knowledge-belief structure consists of a set of states 
W, n partitions 1 2, ,..., nI I I  of W and a collection of probability distributions 
on W, one for each information set of each partition, whose support is a subset 
of that information set. The probability distributions encode the beliefs of the 
players in each possible state of knowledge. Recall also that if w  is a state we 
denote by ( )iI w  the element of the partition iI  that contains w, that is, the 
information set of Player i at state w  and by ,i wP  the probability distribution 
on ( )iI w , representing the beliefs of Player i at state w. 
Definition 9.1.  Let G be a n-player strategic-form game with cardinal payoffs. 
A model of G is an interactive knowledge-belief structure together with a 
function :i iW Sσ →  (for every i ∈{1,…,n}) that associates with every state a 
pure strategy of Player i (recall that Si  denotes the set of pure strategies of 
Player i).18 The interpretation of ( )i is wσ=  is that, at state w, Player i plays (or 
has chosen) strategy si. We impose the restriction that a player always knows 
what strategy she has chosen, that is, the function σi is constant on each 
information set of Player i: if ( )iw w′∈I  then ( ) ( )i iw wσ σ′ = . 
The addition of the functions σi  to an interactive knowledge-belief structure 
yields an interpretation of events in terms of propositions about what strategies 
the players choose, thereby giving content to players’ knowledge and beliefs. 
Figure 9.1 shows a strategic-form game and a model of it. 
                                                 
18
 In Chapter 5 we used the symbol σi  to denote a mixed strategy of Player i. Mixed strategies 
will play no role in this chapter and thus there will be no possibility of confusion. 
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  Player  2 
  L C R 
 
Player 
1 
T  4  ,  6 3  ,  2 8  ,  0 
M 0  ,  9 0  ,  0 4  , 12 
B 8  ,  3 2  ,  4 0  ,  0 
α          β          γ          δ
α          β          γ          δ
α          β          γ          δ
1
2
2
3
1:
2:
CK 
partition
B            B            M           M
C            L             L            R
σ  :
σ  :
1
2
1
2
0 1
1
3
 
Figure 9.1 
State β  in Figure 9.1 describes the following situation.  
• Player 1 plays B  ( 1( ) Bσ β = ) and Player 2 plays L  ( 2 ( ) Lσ β = ).  
• Player 1 (whose information set is {α,β }) is uncertain as to whether 
Player 2 has chosen to play C  ( 2 ( ) Cσ α = ) or L ( 2 ( ) Lσ β = ); 
furthermore, he attaches probability 1
2
 to each of these two possibilities. 
• Player 2 (whose information set is {β,γ }) is uncertain as to whether 
Player 1 has chosen to play B  ( 1( ) Bσ β = ) or M ( 1( ) Mσ γ = );  
furthermore, she attaches probability 2
3
 to Player 1 playing B and 1
3
 to 
Player 1 playing M. 
Are the two players’ choices rational at state β ?  
Consider first Player 1. Given his beliefs and his choice of B, his expected 
payoff is 1 1 1 11 12 2 2 2( , ) ( , ) (2) (8) 5B C B Lπ π+ = + = . Given his beliefs about Player 
2, could he obtain a higher expected payoff with a different choice? With M his 
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expected payoff would be 1 11 12 2( , ) ( , )M C M Lπ π+ =
1 1
2 2
(0) (0) 0+ = , while with 
T  his expected payoff would be 1 11 12 2( , ) ( , )T C T Lπ π+ =
1 1
2 2
(3) (4) 3.5+ = . 
Thus, given his beliefs, Player 1’s choice of B is optimal and we can say that 
Player 1 is rational at state β. 
Consider now Player 2. Given her beliefs and her choice of L, her expected 
payoff is 2 1 2 12 23 3 3 3( , ) ( , ) (3) (9) 5B L M Lπ π+ = + = . Given her beliefs about 
Player 1, could she obtain a higher expected payoff with a different choice? 
With C her expected payoff would be 2 12 23 3( , ) ( , )B C M Cπ π+ =  
82 1
3 3 3
(4) (0)+ = , while with R  her expected payoff would be 2 23 ( , )B Rπ +  
1 2 1
23 3 3
( , ) (0) (12) 4M Rπ = + = . Thus, given her beliefs, Player 2’s choice of L  is 
optimal and we can say that also Player 2 is rational at state β.  
One can view a strategic-form game as only a partial description of an 
interactive situation: it specifies who the players are, what actions they can take 
and how they rank the possible outcomes. A model of the game completes this 
description by also specifying what each player actually does and what she 
believes about what the other players are going to do. Once we know what a 
player does and what she believes then we are in a position to judge her choice 
to be either rational or irrational. 
The following definition says that at a state (of a model) a player is rational if 
her choice at that state is optimal, given her beliefs, that is, if there is no other 
pure strategy that would give her a higher expected payoff, given what she 
believes about the choices of her opponents.  
Given a state w  and a Player i, we denote by ( )i wσ −  the profile of strategies 
chosen at w by the players other than i : 
( )1 1 1( ) ( ),..., ( ), ( ),..., ( )i i i nw w w w wσ σ σ σ σ− − += . 
Furthermore, as in Chapter 8, we denote by ,i wP  the beliefs of individual i at 
state w, that is, ,i wP  is a probability distribution over ( )iI w  (although we can 
think of  ,i wP  as a probability distribution over the entire set of states W 
satisfying the property that if ( )iw I w′∉  then , ( ) 0i wP w′ = ). Note that, for every 
Player i, there is just one probability distribution over ( )iI w , that is, if 
( )iw I w′∈  then , ,i w i wP P′ = . 
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Definition 9.2.  Player i is rational at state w if, given her beliefs ,i wP , there is 
no pure strategy i is S′ ∈  of hers that yields a higher expected payoff than ( )i wσ  
(recall that ( )i wσ  is the strategy chosen by Player i at state w): 
( ) ( ), ,
( ) ( )
( ) ( ), ( ) ( ) , ( )
i i
i w i i i i w i i i
w I w w I w
P w w w P w s wπ σ σ π σ− −
′ ′∈ ∈
′ ′ ′ ′ ′× ×≥∑ ∑ ,  
for all i is S′ ∈ . 
Given a model of a game, using Definition 9.2 we can determine, for every 
player, the set of states where that player is rational. Let iR  be the event that 
(that is, the set of states at which) Player i is rational and let 1 ... n= ∩ ∩R R R  be 
the event that all players are rational.  
In the example of Figure 9.1 we have that 1 { , }α β=R . Indeed, it was shown 
above that 1β ∈R ; since Player 1’s choice and beliefs at α  are the same as at β, 
it follows that also 1α ∈R . On the other hand, Player 1 is not rational at state γ  
because he is certain (that is, attaches probability 1 to the fact) that Player 2 
plays R and his choice of M is not optimal against R (the unique best response 
to R is T ). The same is true of state δ.  For Player 2 we have that 
2 { , , , }α β γ δ=R , that is, Player 2 is rational at every state (the reader should 
convince himself/herself of this). Thus { , }α β=R . 
 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced in 
this section, by going through the exercises in Section 9.E.1 of Appendix 9.E at the 
end of this chapter. 
9.2 Common knowledge of rationality 
in strategic-form games 
Since we have defined the rationality of a player and the rationality of all the 
players as events, we can apply the knowledge operator and the common 
knowledge operator to these events; thus we can determine, for example, if 
there are any states where the rationality of all the players is common 
knowledge and see what strategy profiles are compatible with common 
knowledge of rationality. 
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REMARK 1.  Note that, for every player i, KiRi = Ri, that is, every player is 
rational if and only if she knows it (this is a consequence of the assumption that 
a player always knows what strategy she has chosen and knows her own beliefs: 
if ( )iw w′∈I  then ( ) ( )i iw wσ σ′ =  and , ,i w i wP P′ = ). Note also that CKR ⊆ R, that 
is, if it is common knowledge that all the players are rational, then they are 
indeed rational.19   
In Chapters 1 (for ordinal strategic-form games) and 5 (for cardinal strategic-
form games) we claimed that the iterated deletion of strictly dominated 
strategies corresponds to the notion of common knowledge of rationality. We 
are now able to state this precisely. The following two theorems establish the 
correspondence between the two notions for the case of strategic-form games 
with cardinal payoffs. A corresponding characterization holds for strategic-
form games with ordinal payoffs.20 The proofs of Theorems 9.1 and 9.2 are 
given in Appendix 9.A. 
Theorem 9.1.  Given a finite strategic-form game with cardinal payoffs G, the 
following is true: for any model of G and any state w in that model, if 
w CK∈ R  (that is, at w there is common knowledge of rationality) then the 
pure-strategy profile associated with w must be one that survives the iterated 
deletion of strictly dominated strategies (Definition 5.6, Chapter 5). 
Theorem 9.2.  Given a finite strategic-form game with cardinal payoffs G, the 
following is true: if s ∈ S is a pure-strategy profile that survives the iterated 
deletion of strictly dominated strategies, then there is a model of G and a state 
w in that model, such that w CK∈ R  and the strategy profile associated with w 
is s.  
As an application of Theorem 9.1 consider again the game of Figure 9.1, 
reproduced below in Figure 9.2. 
                                                 
19
 Indeed, the common knowledge operator, like the individual knowledge operators, satisfies 
the  Truth property (see Remark 7.1 and Exercise 7.5, Chapter 7). Note that, although  
CKR ⊆ R, the converse (that is, the inclusion R ⊆ CKR) is not true: it is possible for all the 
players to be rational at a state without this fact being common knowledge among them at 
that state. For example, this is the case at state α  in the model of Figure 9.1. 
20
 See Bonanno (2015). 
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  Player  2 
  L C R 
 
Player 
1 
T  4  ,  6 3  ,  2 8  ,  0 
M 0  ,  9 0  ,  0 4  , 12 
B 8  ,  3 2  ,  4 0  ,  0 
Figure 9.2 
In this game the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies leads to the 
following strategy profiles: (T, L), (T, C), (B, L) and (B, C).21 Thus these are the 
only strategy profiles that are compatible with common knowledge of 
rationality. Hence, by Theorem 9.1, at a state in a model of this game where 
there is common knowledge of rationality the players can play only one of 
these strategy profiles. Furthermore, by Theorem 9.2, any of these four 
strategy profiles can in fact be played in a situation where there is common 
knowledge of rationality. It is worth stressing that common knowledge of 
rationality does not imply that the players play a Nash equilibrium: indeed, 
none of the above four strategy profiles is a Nash equilibrium. However, since 
a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium always survives the iterated deletion of 
strictly dominated strategies, the pure-strategy Nash equilibria (if any) are 
always compatible with common knowledge of rationality. 
 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced in 
this section, by going through the exercises in Section 9.E.2 of Appendix 9.E at the 
end of this chapter. 
                                                 
21
 For Player 1, M is strictly dominated by any mixed strategy 
1
T B
p p
 
 − 
 with 1
2
p > . After 
deletion of M, for Player 2 R becomes strictly dominated by either of the other two 
strategies. 
GAME THEORY – Giacomo Bonanno 
 
339 
 
9.3 Common knowledge of rationality 
in extensive-form games 
So far we have only discussed the implications of common knowledge of 
rationality in strategic-form games, where the players make their choices 
simultaneously (or in ignorance of the other players’ choices). We now turn to 
a brief discussion of the issues that arise when one attempts to determine the 
implications of common knowledge of rationality in dynamic (or extensive-
form) games. 
How should a model of a dynamic game be constructed? One approach in the 
literature has been to consider models of the corresponding strategic-form. 
However, there are several conceptual issues that arise in this context. In the 
models considered in Section 9.1 the interpretation of ( )i is wσ=  is that at state 
w  player i “plays” or “chooses” strategy is . Now consider the perfect-
information game shown in Figure 9.3 below and a model of the strategic-form 
game associated with it. Let w be a state in that model where 1 1 3( ) ( , )w d aσ = . 
What does it mean to say that Player 1 “chooses” strategy 1 3( , )d a ? The first part 
of the strategy, namely 1d , can be interpreted as a description of Player 1’s 
actual behavior (what he actually does: he plays 1d ), but the second part of the 
strategy, namely 3a , has no such interpretation: if Player 1 in fact plays 1d  then 
he knows that he will not have to make any further choices and thus it is not 
clear what it means for him to “choose” to play 3a  in a situation that is made 
impossible by his decision to play 1d .  
1a 2a
2d1d
1 12
3a
3d
1
0
3
1
2
4
0
2
 
Figure 9.3 
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Thus it does not seem to make sense to interpret  1 1 3( ) ( , )w d aσ =  as ‘at state w  
Player 1 chooses 1 3( , )d a ’. Perhaps the correct interpretation is in terms of a 
more complex sentence such as ‘Player 1 chooses to play 1d  and if - contrary to 
this plan - he were to play 1a  and Player 2 were to follow with 2a , then Player 1 
would play 3a ’. Thus, while in a simultaneous game the association of a 
strategy of Player i to a state can be interpreted as a description of Player i’s 
actual behavior at that state, in the case of dynamic games this interpretation is 
no longer valid, since one would end up describing not only the actual behavior 
of Player i at that state but also his counterfactual behavior. Methodologically, 
this is not satisfactory: if it is considered to be necessary to specify what a 
player would do in situations that do not occur at the state under 
consideration, then one should model the counterfactual explicitly. But why 
should it be necessary to specify at state w (where Player 1 is playing 1d ) what 
he would do at the counterfactual node following actions 1a  and 2a ? Perhaps 
what matters is not so much what Player 1 would actually do in that situation 
but what Player 2 believes that Player 1 would do: after all, Player 2 might not 
know that Player 1 has decided to play 1d  and she needs to consider what to do 
in the eventuality that Player 1 actually ends up playing 1a . So, perhaps, the 
strategy of Player 1 is to be interpreted as having two components: (1) a 
description of Player 1’s behavior and (2) a conjecture in the mind of Player 2 
about what Player 1 would do. If this is the correct interpretation, then one 
could object – again from a methodological point of view - that it would be 
preferable to disentangle the two components and model them explicitly.22 
An alternative - although less common - approach in the literature dispenses 
with strategies and considers models of games where (1) states are described in 
terms of players’ actual behavior and (2) players’ conjectures concerning the 
actions of their opponents in various hypothetical situations are modeled by 
means of a generalization of the knowledge-belief structures considered in 
Section 9.1. The generalization is obtained by encoding not only the initial 
beliefs of the players (at each state) but also their  dispositions to revise those 
beliefs under various hypotheses.23 
                                                 
22 For an extensive discussion of these issues see Bonanno (forthcoming). 
23
 The interested reader is referred to Perea (2012). 
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A third approach has been to move away from static models (like the models 
considered in Section 9.1) and consider dynamic models where time is 
introduced explicitly into the analysis. These are behavioral models where 
strategies play no role and the only beliefs that are specified are the actual 
beliefs of the players at the time of choice. Thus players’ beliefs are modeled as 
temporal, rather than conditional, beliefs and rationality is defined in terms of 
actual choices, rather than hypothetical plans.24 
A discussion of the implications of common knowledge (or common belief) of 
rationality in dynamic games would require the introduction of several new 
concepts and definitions. For the sake of brevity, we shall not pursue this topic 
in this book. 
                                                 
24
 The interested reader is referred to Bonanno (2014). 
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Appendix 9.A: Proofs 
In order to prove Theorem 9.1 we will need the following extension of 
Theorem 5.3 (Chapter 5) to the case of an arbitrary number of players. A proof 
of Theorem 9.3 can be found in Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, Lemma 60.1, p. 
60). 
Theorem 9.3.    Consider a finite n-player game in strategic form with cardinal 
payoffs ( ) ( ), ,i ii I i II S π∈ ∈ . Select an arbitrary Player i and a pure strategy is  of 
Player i. For every Player j ≠ i, let j jS S′ ⊆  be a subset of j’s set of pure 
strategies and let 1 1 1... ...i i i nS S S S S− − +′ ′ ′ ′ ′= × × × × ×  be the Cartesian product of the 
sets jS′  (j ≠ i). Then the following are equivalent:  
(1) There is a belief of Player i on iS−′  (that is, a probability distribution 
: [0,1]iP S−′ → )  that makes is  a best response (that is, for every ix S∈ , 
( , ) ( )
i i
i i i i
s S
s s P sπ
− −
− −
′ ′∈
′ ′ ≥∑ ( , ) ( )
i i
i i i
s S
x s P sπ
− −
− −
′ ′∈
′ ′∑ ), 
(2) is  is not strictly dominated by a mixed strategy of Player i in the 
restriction of the game to the sets of pure strategies 1 1 1,..., , , ,i i i nS S S S S− +′ ′ ′ ′ . 
Given a finite strategic-form game with cardinal payoffs ( ) ( ), ,i ii I i IG I S π∈ ∈=  
we shall denote by iS
∞  the set of pure strategies of Player i that survive the 
iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies (Definition 5.6, Chapter 5) and 
by S∞  the corresponding set of strategy profiles (that is, 1 ... nS S S
∞ ∞ ∞= × × ). 
Proof of Theorem 9.1. Consider a finite strategic-form game G with cardinal 
payoffs and an epistemic model of G. Let w be a state in that model such that 
w CK∈ R . We want to show that ( )1( ) ( ),..., ( )nw w w Sσ σ σ ∞= ∈ . We shall prove 
the stronger claim that, for every Player i and for every ( )CKw I w′∈  (recall that 
( )CKI w  is the cell of the common knowledge partition that contains w) and for 
every m ≥ 0, ( ) mi iw Dσ ′ ∉ , where 
m
i iD S⊆  is the set of pure strategies of Player i 
that are strictly dominated in game mG   ( mG  is the subgame of G obtained at 
step m of the iterated deletion procedure; we define 0G  to be G  itself). Note 
that this is equivalent to stating that, for every ( )CKw I w′∈ , ( )w Sσ
∞′ ∈ . Since 
( )CKw I w∈ , it follows from this that ( )w Sσ
∞∈ . The proof is by induction. 
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1. BASE STEP (m = 0). Select an arbitrary ( )CKw I w′∈  and an arbitrary Player 
i. Since w CK∈ R ,  ( )CKI w ⊆ R  and thus w′∈R ; furthermore, since i⊆R R , 
iw′∈R . Thus ( )i wσ ′  is a best response to the beliefs of Player i at state w′ . 
Hence, by Theorem 9.3, 0( )i iw Dσ ′ ∉ . 
2. INDUCTIVE STEP: assuming that the statement is true for all k ≤ m (for 
some m ≥ 0)  we prove that it is true for k+1. The hypothesis is that, for every 
Player i and for every ( )CKw I w′∈ , ( )
k
i iw Dσ ′ ∉ ; that is, for every ( )CKw I w′∈ , 
1( ) ki w Sσ
+′ ∈ . Select an arbitrary ( )CKw I w′∈  and an arbitrary Player i. Since 
w CK∈ R , iw′∈R  and thus ( )i wσ ′  is a best reply to Player i’s beliefs at w′  
which, by hypothesis, attach positive probability only to strategy profiles of 
the other players that belong to 1kiS
+
−  (note that, since ( )CKw I w′∈ , 
( ) ( )CK CKI w I w′ =  and, by definition of common knowledge partition, 
( ) ( )i CKI w I w′ ′⊆ ). By Theorem 9.3, it follows that 
1( ) ki iw Dσ
+′ ∉ . 
Proof of Theorem 9.2. Given a strategic-form game with cardinal payoffs 
( ) ( ), ,i ii I i IG I S π∈ ∈= ,  construct the following epistemic model of G:  
W S∞=  and, for every player i and every s S∞∈ , { }( ) :i i iI s s S s s∞′ ′= ∈ =  (that 
is, the information set of Player i  that contains s consists of all the strategy 
profiles in S∞ that have the same strategy of Player i as in s); finally, let 
( )i is sσ = . Select an arbitrary s S
∞∈  and an arbitrary Player i. By definition of 
S∞ ,  it is not the case that is  is strictly dominated in the restriction of G to the 
sets of pure strategies 1 1 1,..., , , ,i i i nS S S S S
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
− − . Thus, by Theorem 9.3, there is a 
probability distribution over iS
∞
−  that makes ( )i is sσ=  a best reply. Choose 
one such probability distribution and let that probability distribution give 
Player i’s beliefs at s. Then is∈R . Since i was chosen arbitrarily, s∈R ; hence, 
since s S∞∈  was chosen arbitrarily, S∞=R . It follows that s CK∈ R  for every 
s S∞∈ .  
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Appendix 9.E: Exercises 
9.E.1 .  Exercises  for  Section 9 .1 :   
         Models  of  s trategic - form games 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this 
chapter. 
Exercise 9.1. Consider the following game (where the payoffs are von 
Neumann-Morgenstern payoffs) 
  Player  2 
  L M R 
Player 
1 
A 3  ,  5 2  ,  0 2  ,  2 
B 5  ,  2 1  ,  2 2  ,  1 
C 9  , 0 1  ,  5 3  ,  2 
and the following model of this game 
Player 1
Player 2
1/2
1's strategy: C C A
2's strategy: M L L
a b c
a b c
1/2
d
d
1/21/2
1/21/2
A
R  
(a) Find the event 1R  (that is, the set of states where Player 1 is rational). 
(b) Find the event 2R  (that is, the set of states where Player 2 is rational). 
(c) Find the event R  (that is, the set of states where both players are 
rational).  
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Exercise 9.2. Consider  the following three-player game and model of it. 
                              Player 2                 Player 2    
  
C D    C D 
Player A 2 , 3 , 2 1 , 0 , 4  A 0 , 0 , 3 2 , 9 , 7 
1 B 3 , 6 , 4 0 , 8 , 0  B 2 , 1 , 3 0 , 3 , 1 
                   Player 3 chooses E   Player 3 chooses F 
α          β          γ          δ          ε          ζ12 231:
2: α          β          γ          δ          ε          ζ
3: α          β          γ          δ          ε          ζ1
2
1
4
1
2
A          A           B          B           B           B
C          D           C          D           C           D
E           F            E           E            F            F
σ  :
σ  :
1
2
σ  :3
1
3
1
2
0 1
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
4
1
2
 
(a) Find the event 1R  (that is, the set of states where Player 1 is rational). 
(b) Find the event 2R  (that is, the set of states where Player 2 is rational). 
(c) Find the event 3R  (that is, the set of states where Player 3 is rational). 
(d) Find the event R  (that is, the set of states where all players are rational).  
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9.E.2 .  Exercises  for  Section 9 .2 :   
          Common knowledge of rationality 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this 
chapter. 
 
Exercise 9.3. (a) For the game and model of Exercise 9.1 find the following 
events:  (i) 1 2K R , (ii) 2 1K R , (iii) 2 1 2K K R ,  (iv) 1 2 1K K R ,  (v) 1CKR ,  (vi) 2CKR ,  
(vii) CKR .  
(b) Suppose that you found a model and a state w  in that model such that 
w CK∈ R . What strategy profile could you find at w?  
 
Exercise 9.4. (a) For the game and model of Exercise 9.2 find the following 
events:  (i) 1K R ,  (ii) 2K R ,  (iii) 3K R ,  (iv) 3CKR ,   (v) CKR . 
(b) Suppose that you found a model and a state w  in that model such that 
w CK∈ R . What strategy profile could you find at w?  
 
Exercise 9.5. For the game of Exercise 9.1 construct a model where there is a 
state at which there is common knowledge of rationality and the strategy 
profile played there is (C,L). [Hints: (1) four states are sufficient, (2) it is easiest 
to postulate degenerated beliefs where a player assigns probability 1 to a 
particular state in his information set.] 
 
Exercise 9.6. For the game of Exercise 9.2 construct a model where there is a 
state at which there is common knowledge of rationality. [Hint: think 
carefully, you don’t need many states!] 
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◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊ 
Exercise 9.7 (Challenging Question). Consider the following extensive-form 
game (where 1 2 3 4, ,   o o o oand  are the possible outcomes) 
1 2 3
d
a
D
A C
G
4
4
4
2
2
2
0
0
0
Player 1's payoff
Player 2's payoff
Player 3's payoff
1o 2o 3o
6
6
6
4o
 
(a) What is the backward-induction outcome?  
(b) Write the strategic-form game associated with the extensive-form game and 
find all the outcomes that are supported by a pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium.  
(c) Considering models of the strategic form, what strategy profiles are 
compatible with common knowledge of rationality? 
(d) Choose a strategy profile which is not a Nash equilibrium and construct a 
model of the strategic form where at a state there is common knowledge of 
rationality and the associated strategy profile is the one you selected. 
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Appendix 9.S: Solutions to exercises  
Exercise 9.1.   (a) 1 { , }a b=R . At states a and b Player 1 believes that Player 2 is 
playing either L or M with equal probability. Thus his expected payoff from 
playing A is 1 1
2 2
(3) (2) 2.5+ = , from playing B is 1 1
2 2
(5) (1) 3+ =  and from 
playing C is  1 1
2 2
(9) (1) 5+ = . Hence the best choice is C and this is indeed his 
choice at those two states. Thus 1,a b∈R .  At states c and d  Player 1 plays A 
with an expected payoff of 1 1
2 2
(3) (2) 2.5+ =  but he could get a higher expected 
payoff with C (namely 1 1
2 2
(9) (3) 6+ = ); thus 1,c d ∉R . Hence 1 { , }a b=R .     
(b) 2 { , , }a b c=R .       (c) { , }a b=R .    
Exercise 9.2.   (a) For each state let us calculate Player 1’s expected payoff 
(denoted by 1πE ) from playing A and from playing B. At states α and β, 
1
1 12
( ) ( , , )A A C Eπ π= +E 1 12 ( , , )A D Fπ =
1 1
2 2
(2) (2) 2+ = , 
1( )Bπ =E  1 12 ( , , )B C Eπ +  
1
12
( , , )B D Fπ = 1
2
(3) +  1
2
(0) = 1.5. 
Thus A is optimal and hence, since 1 1( ) ( ) Aσ α σ β= = , 1,α β ∈R .   
At states γ and δ, 1( )Aπ =E
52 1 2 1
1 13 3 3 3 3
( , , ) ( , , ) (2) (1)A C E A D Eπ π+ = + = and 
62 1 2 1
1 1 13 3 3 3 3
( ) ( , , ) ( , , ) (3) (0)B B C E B D Eπ π π= + = + =E . Thus B is optimal and 
hence, since 1 1( ) ( ) Bσ γ σ δ= = , 1,γ δ ∈R .  
At states ε and ζ,  Player 1 assigns probability 1 to (D,F ) against which A is the 
unique best reply and yet 1 1( ) ( ) Bσ ε σ ζ= = ; hence 1,ε ζ ∉R .  
Thus 1 { , , , }α β γ δ=R . 
(b) For each state let us calculate Player 2’s expected payoff (denoted by 2πE ) 
from playing C and from playing D. At states α, γ  and ε, 
1 1 1
2 2 2 23 3 3
( ) ( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )C A C E B C E B C Fπ π π π= + +E = 101 1 1
3 3 3 3
(3) (6) (1)+ + = , 
1 1 1
2 2 2 23 3 3
( ) ( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )D A D E B D E B D Fπ π π π= + +E = 1 1 1 11
3 3 3 3
(0) (8) (3)+ + = . 
Thus D is optimal and hence, since 2 2 2( ) ( ) ( ) Cσ α σ γ σ ε= = = , 2, ,α γ ε ∉R .   
At states β, δ  and ζ, 
1 1 1
2 2 2 23 3 3
( ) ( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )C A C F B C E B C Fπ π π π= + +E = 71 1 1
3 3 3 3
(0) (6) (1)+ + = , 
1 1 1
2 2 2 23 3 3
( ) ( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )D A D F B D E B D Fπ π π π= + +E = 201 1 1
3 3 3 3
(9) (8) (3)+ + = . 
Thus D is optimal and hence, since 2 2 2( ) ( ) ( ) Dσ β σ δ σ ζ= = = , 2, ,β δ ζ ∈R .   
Thus 2 { , , }β δ ζ=R . 
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(c) For each state let us calculate Player 3’s expected payoff (denoted by 3πE ) 
from playing E and from playing F. At states α, γ  and δ, 
1 1 1
3 3 3 34 2 4
( ) ( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )E A C E B C E B D Eπ π π π= + +E = 1 1 1
4 2 4
(2) (4) (0) 2.5+ + = , 
1 1 1
3 3 3 34 2 4
( ) ( , , ) ( , , ( , ,) , )F A C F B C F B D Fπ π π π= + + =E = 1 1 1
4 2 4
(3) (3) (1) 2.5+ + = . 
Thus both  E and F  are optimal and hence 3, ,α γ δ ∈R .   
At states β  and ε , 
1 1
3 3 32 2
( ) ( , , ) ( , , )E A D E B C Eπ π π= +E = 1 1
2 2
(4) (4) 4+ = , 
1 1
3 3 32 2
( ) ( , , ) ( , , ) ,F A D F B C Fπ π π= + =E = 1 1
2 2
(7) (3) 5+ = , 
Thus F  is optimal and hence, since 3 3( ) ( ) Fσ β σ ε= = ,  3,β ε ∈R .   
At state ζ  Player 3 knows that Players 1 and 2 play (B,D) and she is best 
replying with F. Thus 3ζ ∈R .   Hence 3 { , , , , , }α β γ δ ε ζ=R  
(d) 1 2 3 { , }β δ= ∩ ∩ =R R R R . 
Exercise 9.3. In Exercise 9.1 we determined that 1 { , }a b=R , 2 { , , }a b c=R  and 
{ , }a b=R . Thus  
(a)  (i) 1 2 { , }K a b=R , (ii) 2 1 { }K a=R , (iii) 2 1 2 { }K K a=R ,  (iv) 1 2 1K K = ∅R .  The 
common knowledge partition consists of a single information set containing all 
the states. Thus (v) 1CK = ∅R ,  (vi) 2CK = ∅R ,  (vii) CK = ∅R . 
(b) By Theorem 9.1, at a state at which there is common knowledge of 
rationality one can only find a strategy profile that survives the iterated 
deletion of strictly dominates strategies. In this game, for Player 1 strategy B is 
strictly dominated by the mixed strategy 
1 1
2 2
A C 
 
 
 ; after deleting B, for Player 
2 strategy R is strictly dominated by the mixed strategy 
1 1
2 2
L M 
 
 
. Thus the 
iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies yields the set of strategy 
profiles { }( , ), ( , ), ( , ), ( , )A L A M C L C M . Hence at a state where there is common 
knowledge of rationality one could only find one of these four strategy profiles. 
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Exercise 9.4.   (a) (i) 1K ∅R = ,  (ii) 2K ∅R = ,  (iii) 3K ∅R = .  The common 
knowledge partition consists of a single information set containing all the 
states. Thus (iv) 3 { , , , , , }CK α β γ δ ε ζ=R ,   (v) CK ∅R = . 
(b) By Theorem 9.1, at a state at which there is common knowledge of 
rationality one can only find a strategy profile that survives the iterated 
deletion of strictly dominated strategies. Since in this game there are no strictly 
dominated strategies, at such a state one could find any strategy profile. 
Exercise 9.5.   In the following model there is common knowledge of 
rationality at every state. At state α the strategy profile played is (C,L). 
α        β        γ        δ
α        β        γ        δ
1:
2:
1 0
0 0
C          A         A         C
L          L         M         M
1 :σ
2 :σ
01
11
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Exercise 9.6.   Whenever a game has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, a 
one-state model where that Nash equilibrium is played is such that there is 
common knowledge of rationality at that state. Thus the following  model 
provides a possible answer: 
α
α
α
1:
2:
3:
A
D
F
 
Exercise 9.7 (Challenging Question).    
(a) The backward induction outcome is 4o , with associated strategy profile 
(A,a,C) and payoffs (6,6,6). 
(b) The strategic form is as follows (the Nash equilibria have been highlighted): 
 
                        Player 2                          Player 2    
  d a    d a 
Player D 4  ,  4  ,  4 4  ,  4  ,  4  D 4  ,  4  ,  4 4  ,  4  ,  4 
1 A 2  ,  2  ,  2 0  ,  0  ,  0  A 2  ,  2  ,  2 6  ,  6  ,  6 
         
Player 3 chooses G   Player 3 chooses C 
GAME THEORY – Giacomo Bonanno 
 
352 
 
The Nash equilibria are: (D,d,G), (D,a,G), (D,d,C) and (A,a,C). Thus the 
only two outcomes sustained by a Nash equilibrium are 1o , with payoffs 
(4,4,4), and 4o , with payoffs (6,6,6). 
(c)  By Theorem 9.1, the outcomes that are compatible with common 
knowledge of rationality are those associated with strategy profiles that 
survive the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. Since no 
player has any strictly dominated strategies, all the outcomes are 
compatible with common knowledge of rationality. 
 (d)  In the following model at state α  the players choose (A, d, G), which is not 
a Nash equilibrium; furthermore, there is no Nash equilibrium whose 
associated outcome is 2o  (with payoffs (2,2,2)). In this model α ∈ CKR (in 
particular, Player 1’s choice of A is rational, given his belief that Player 2 
plays d and a with equal probability). 
1/21:
2:
σ :
3:
(A,d,G) (A,a,C)
α β
α
α
α βCK
partition
1/2
β
β
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PART IV 
 
 
 
Advanced Topics II: 
Refinements of  
Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium 
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A First Attempt: 
Weak Sequential Equilibrium 
10.1 Assessments and sequential rationality 
t the end of Chapter 6 (Section 6.3) we showed that, although the 
notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium is a refinement of Nash 
equilibrium, it is not strong enough to eliminate all “unreasonable” 
Nash equilibria. One reason for this is that a subgame-perfect equilibrium 
σ  allows a player’s strategy to include a strictly dominated choice at an 
information set that is not reached by the play induced by σ. In order to 
eliminate such possibilities we need to define the notion of equilibrium for 
dynamic games in terms of a more complex object than merely a strategy 
profile.  
Definition 10.1.  Given an extensive-form game G, an assessment for G is a pair 
( , )σ µ , where σ  is a profile of behavioral strategies and µ is a list of probability 
distributions, one for every information set, over the nodes in that information 
set. We call µ a system of beliefs.  
The system of beliefs µ  specifies, for every information set, the beliefs − about 
past moves − that the relevant player would have if informed that her 
information set had been reached. Consider, for example, the extensive-form 
game of Figure 10.1.  
Chapter 
10 
A 
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s
32
1
1
1
0
2
0
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
0
1
0
3
0
4
6
4
0
3
0
a b
f g f g h k h k
x y w z
t
1 2
ed
c
z
1
z
2
z
3
z
4
z
5
z
6
z
7
z
8
 
Figure 10.1 
A possible assessment for this game is ( ),σ µ  with 
3 31 4 1 1 4
8 8 8 4 4 5 5
1 0
a b c f g d e h k
σ
 
=  
 
 and 
2 1 1 1
3 3 2 2
x y w z
µ
 
=  
 
; note that, 
typically, we will not bother to include in µ the trivial probability distributions 
over singleton information sets.
1
 The interpretation of this assessment is that 
Player 1 plans to play a with probability 1
8
, b with probability 3
8
 and c with 
probability 4
8
; Player 2 plans to play f if her information set { , }x y  is reached 
and to mix between d and e with probabilities 3
4
 and 1
4
, respectively, if her 
decision node t is reached; Player 3 plans to mix between h and k with 
probabilities 1
5
 and 4
5
, respectively, if his information set { , }w z  is reached. 
Furthermore, Player 2 − if informed that her information set { , }x y  had been 
                                                 
1
 A complete specification of µ would be 
2 1 1 1
3 3 2 2
1 1
s t x y w z
µ
 
=  
 
 where s is the decision node 
of Player 1 (the root) and t is the decision node of Player 2 following choice c. 
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reached − would attach probability 2
3
 to Player 1 having played a (node x) and 
probability 1
3
 to Player 1 having played b (node y); Player 3 − if informed that 
his information set { , }w z  had been reached − would attach probability 1
2
 to 
node w (that is, to the sequence of moves cd) and  probability 1
2
 to node z (that 
is, to the sequence of moves ce). 
In order for an assessment (σ,µ ) to be considered “reasonable” we will impose 
two requirements:  
1. The choices specified by σ  should be optimal given the beliefs specified 
by µ. We call this requirement sequential rationality. 
2. The beliefs specified by µ should be consistent with the strategy profile 
σ . We call this requirement Bayesian updating. 
Before we give a precise definition of these concepts, we shall illustrate them 
with reference to the above assessment 
3 31 4 1 1 4
8 8 8 4 4 5 5
1 0
a b c f g d e h k
σ
 
=  
 
 
and 2 1 1 1
3 3 2 2
x y w z
µ
 
=  
 
 for the game of Figure 10.1. This assessment fails to 
satisfy sequential rationality, because, for example,  at Player 3’s information 
set {w,z} the planned mixed strategy 
1 4
5 5
h k 
 
 
 yields Player 3 − given her beliefs 
1 1
2 2
w z 
 
 
 − an expected payoff of 1 1 4 1 1 4 11
2 5 5 2 5 5 10
(3) (1) (0) (1)+ + + =        while she 
could get a higher expected payoff, namely 151 1
2 2 10
(3) (0)+ = , with the pure 
strategy h. This assessment also fails the rule for belief updating (Definition 8.3, 
Chapter 8); for example, given σ,  the prior probability that node x is reached is 
1
8
( )P x =  (it is the probability with which Player 1 plays a) and the prior 
probability that node y is reached is 3
8
( )P y =  (the probability with which 
Player 1 plays b), so that updating on information { , }x y  one gets 
1
8 1
431
8 8
( ) ( )
( |{ , })
({ , }) ( ) ( )
P x P x
P x x y
P x y P x P y
= = = =
+ +
 and  3
4
( |{ , })P y x y = . Thus, in 
order to be consistent with the rule for belief updating, Player 2’s beliefs should 
be  
31
4 4
x y 
 
 
. 
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Now we can turn to the formal definitions. First we need to introduce some 
notation. If σ  is a profile of behavior strategies and a is a choice of Player i (at 
some information set of Player i), we denote by ( )aσ  the probability that iσ  
(the strategy of Player i that is part of σ ) assigns to a.  For example, for the 
game of Figure 10.1, if 
3 31 4 1 1 4
8 8 8 4 4 5 5
1 0
a b c f g d e h k
σ
 
=  
 
 then 3
8
( )bσ = , 
( ) 0gσ = , 3
4
( )dσ = , etc. Similarly, if µ is a system of beliefs and x is a decision 
node, then we denote by ( )xµ  the probability that the relevant part of 
µ  assigns to x. For example, if 
2 1 1 1
3 3 2 2
1 1
s t x y w z
µ
 
=  
 
  or,  written more 
succinctly,  
2 1 1 1
3 3 2 2
x y w z
µ
 
=  
 
 then 1 1
3 2
( ) 1, ( ) , ( )s y wµ µ µ= = = , etc.   
Recall that Z denotes the set of terminal nodes and, for every Player i, 
:i Zπ → R  is the payoff function of Player i. Given a decision node x,  let 
( )Z x Z⊆  be the set of terminal nodes that can be reached starting from x. For 
example, in the game of Figure 10.1, { }5 6 7 8( ) , , ,Z t z z z z= . Given a behavior 
strategy profile σ and a decision node x, let ,x σP  be the probability distribution 
over ( )Z x  induced by σ, that is, if ( )z Z x∈  and 1,..., ma a  is the sequence of 
choices that leads from x to z then , ( )x zσP  is the product of the probabilities of 
those choices: , ( )x zσ =P  1 2( ) ( ) ... ( )ma a aσ σ σ× × × . For example, in the game of 
Figure 10.1, if σ is the strategy profile 
3 31 4 1 1 4
8 8 8 4 4 5 5
1 0
a b c f g d e h k
σ
 
=  
 
 and 
t is Player 2’s decision node after choice c of Player 1,  then 
( )3 31, 5 4 5 20( ) ( ) ( )t z d hσ σ σ= = =P . If H is an information set of Player i  we 
denoted by ( )| ,i Hπ σ µ  the expected payoff of Player i starting from 
information set H,  given the beliefs specified by µ at H and given the choices 
prescribed by σ at H and at the information sets that come after H, that is, 
( ) ,
( )
| , ( ) ( ) ( )i x i
x H z Z x
H x z zσπ σ µ µ π
∈ ∈
  
=   
   
∑ ∑ P . 
For example, in the game of Figure 10.1, if   
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3 31 4 1 1 4
8 8 8 4 4 5 5
1 0
a b c f g d e h k
σ
 
=  
 
  and  
2 1 1 1
3 3 2 2
x y w z
µ
 
=  
 
, 
then (as we computed above) 
( )3 { , }| ,w zπ σ µ =
( ) ( ), 5 3 5 , 6 3 6 , 7 3 7 , 8 3 8( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )w w z zw z z z z z z z z zσ σ σ σµ π π µ π π+ + + =P P P P  
1 1 4 1 1 4 11
2 5 5 2 5 5 10
(3) (1) (0) (1) .+ + + =        
Recall that if σ is a strategy profile and i is a player, then iσ −  denotes the 
profile of strategies of the players other than i and we often use ( , )i iσ σ − as an 
alternative way of denoting σ ; furthermore, if iτ  is a strategy of Player i¸ we 
denote by ( , )i iτ σ −  the strategy profile obtained from σ  by replacing iσ  with 
iτ  (and leaving everything else unchanged). 
Definition 10.2.  Fix an extensive-form game and an assessment ( , )σ µ . We say 
that Player i’s behavior strategy iσ  is sequentially rational if, for every 
information set H of Player i,  
( ) ( )| ( , ), | ( , ),i i i i i iH Hπ σ σ µ π τ σ µ− −≥ ,  
for every behavior strategy iτ  of Player i. 
We say that σ is sequentially rational if,  for every Player i, iσ  is sequentially 
rational. 
Note that for Player i’s strategy iσ  to be sequential rationality it is not 
sufficient (although it is necessary) that at every information set H of Player i 
the choice(s) at H  prescribed by iσ  be optimal (given the choices of the other 
players prescribed by iσ − ): we need to check if Player i could improve her 
payoff by changing her choice(s) at H and possibly also at information sets of hers 
that follow H. To see this, consider the game of Figure 10.2 below. 
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2s t
c
1
c
x y
1
1
2
0
0
d d
e f e f
a b
0
2
2
0
0
1
2
0  
Figure 10.2 
Let ( , )σ µ  be the assessment where σ  is the pure-strategy profile ( ), ( , )a c e  and 
1 0 0 1
s t x y
µ
 
=  
 
. For Player 2 e is rational at information set {x,y} because, 
given her belief that she is making her choice at node y,  e gives her a payoff of 
1 while f would give her a payoff of 0; furthermore, at information set {s,t} 
− given her belief that she is making her choice at node s and given her future 
choice of e at {x,y} − choice c is better than choice d because the former gives her 
a payoff of 1 while the latter a payoff of 0. However, the strategy (c,e) (while 
sequentially rational at {x,y}) is not sequentially rational at {s,t} because − given 
her belief that she is making her choice at node s − with (c,e) she gets a payoff of 
1 but if she switched to (d,f) she would get a payoff of 2; in other words, Player 
2 can improve her payoff by changing her choice at {s,t} from c to d and also 
changing her future planned choice at {x,y} from e to f.
2
  Note that the pure-
                                                 
2 It is possible to impose restrictions on the system of beliefs µ such that sequential rationality 
as defined in Definition 10.2 is equivalent to the weaker condition that, at every information 
set H, the corresponding player cannot increase her payoff by changing her choice(s) at H 
only. We will not discuss this condition here. The interested reader is referred to Hendon et 
al (1996) and Perea (2002). 
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strategy profile ( ), ( , )a c e  is not a Nash equilibrium: for Player 2 the unique 
best reply to a is (d,f). 
An example of a sequentially rational assessment for the game of Figure 10.3 
below is 
1 1
2 2
0 0 1 1 0
L M R A B c d
σ
 
=  
 
 and 3 31 1 1
4 4 5 5 5
x y u v w
µ
 
=  
 
.   
L M
x y
R
3
1
1
A B A B
u v w
4
5
0
1
2
5
3
6
2
0
3
1
3
0
2
6
4
2
4
2
2
d cc c dd
2
1
3
 
Figure 10.3 
Let us first verify sequential rationality of Player 3’s strategy. At her 
information set { , , }u v w , given her beliefs, c gives a payoff of 
31 1
5 5 5
(5) (1) (2) 2+ + = , while d gives a payoff of  31 1
5 5 5
(2) (2) (2) 2+ + = . Thus c is 
optimal (as would be d and any randomization over c and d ). Now consider  
Player 2: at his information set { , }x y , given his beliefs and given the strategy of 
Player 3, A gives a payoff of 31
4 4
(5) (3) 3.5+ =  and B gives a payoff of 
31
4 4
(2) (4) 3.5+ = ; thus any mixture of A and B is optimal, in particular, the 
mixture 
1 1
2 2
A B 
 
 
 is optimal.  Finally, at the root, R gives Player 1 a payoff of 3, 
L a payoff of 1 1
2 2
(4) (1) 2.5+ =  and M a payoff of 1 1
2 2
(0) (6) 3+ = ; thus R is 
optimal (as would be any mixture over M and R). 
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 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced in 
this section, by going through the exercises in Section 10.E.1 of Appendix 10.E at 
the end of this chapter. 
 
10.2 Bayesian updating at  reached   
 information sets. 
The second requirement for an assessment to be “reasonable” is that the beliefs 
encoded in µ  should be consistent with the behavior postulated by σ,  in the 
sense that the rule for belief updating (Definition 8.3, Chapter 8), should be 
used to form those beliefs, whenever it is applicable. We shall call this rule 
Bayesian updating.  
Let x be a node that belongs to information set H and let , ( )root xσP  be the 
probability that node x is reached (from the root of the tree) if σ  is 
implemented.
3
 Let , ,( ) ( )root root
y H
H yσ σ
∈
= ∑P P  be the probability that information 
set H is reached (that is, the probability that some node in H is reached). Then 
Bayesian updating requires that the probability that is assigned to x given the 
information that H has been reached be given by the conditional probability 
,
,
,
( )
( | )
( )
root
root
root
x
x H
H
σ
σ
σ
=
P
P
P
; of course, this conditional probability is well defined 
if and only if , ( ) 0root Hσ >P .  
Definition 10.3.  Consider an extensive-form game and a behavioral strategy 
profile σ.  We say that an information set H  is  reached by σ  if , ( ) 0root Hσ >P . 
                                                 
3
 That is, if 1,..., ma a  is the sequence of choices that leads from the root to x then 
, 1( ) ( ) ... ( )root mx a aσ σ σ= × ×P .  
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For example, in the game of Figure 10.1 partially reproduced below (we 
omitted the payoffs), if 
31 2 1
3 3 4 4
0 1 0 1 0
a b c f g d e h k
σ
 
=  
 
 then { , }x y  is 
reached by σ, while { , }w z  is not.4 
s
32
a b
f g f g h k h k
x y w z
t
1 2
ed
c
z z z z z z z z
 
Definition 10.4.  Given an extensive-form game and an assessment ( , )σ µ , we 
say that ( , )σ µ  satisfies Bayesian updating at reached information sets  if, for 
every information set H and every node x H∈ , if H  is  reached by σ  (that is, if 
, ( ) 0root Hσ >P )  then 
,
,
( )
( )
( )
root
root
x
x
H
σ
σ
µ =
P
P
. 
For example, in the game of Figure 10.1 partially reproduced above, the 
assessment 
5 3 31 1
9 9 9 4 4
0 1 1 0
a b c f g d e h k
σ
 
=  
 
, 
5 31 1
6 6 4 4
x y w z
µ
 
=  
 
 satisfies 
Bayesian updating at reached information sets. In fact, we have that 
1
, 9
( )root xσ =P , 
5
, 9
( )root yσ =P , 
5 61
, 9 9 9
({ , })root x yσ = + =P , ( )3 3 9, 9 4 36( )root wσ = =P , 
( )3 31, 9 4 36( )root zσ = =P  and 9 3 12, 36 36 36({ , })root w xσ = + =P . Thus 
                                                 
4
 1 2, ,3 3( ) , ( )root rootx yσ σ= =P P  and thus 
1 2
, 3 3
({ , }) 1root x yσ = + =P ; on the other hand, 
( )3, 4( ) ( ) ( ) 0 0root w c dσ σ σ= = =P  and ( )1, 4( ) ( ) ( ) 0 0root z c eσ σ σ= = =P , so that , ({ , }) 0root w zσ =P . 
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1
, 9 1
66
, 9
( )
( )
({ , })
root
root
x
x
x y
σ
σ
µ= = =
P
P
 and, similarly, 
5
, 9 5
66
, 9
( )
( )
({ , })
root
root
y
y
x y
σ
σ
µ= = =
P
P
, 
9
, 36 3
412
, 36
( )
( )
({ , })
root
root
w
w
w z
σ
σ
µ= = =
P
P
 and 
3
, 36 1
412
, 36
( )
( )
({ , })
root
root
z
z
w z
σ
σ
µ= = =
P
P
. 
Remark 10.1.  Note that the condition “Bayesian updating at reached 
information sets” is trivially satisfied at every information set H  that is not 
reached by σ,  that is, at every information set H such that  , ( ) 0root Hσ =P .
5
  
 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced in 
this section, by going through the exercises in Section 10.E.2 of Appendix 10.E at 
the end of this chapter. 
 
10.3 Weak sequential equilibrium 
Our objective is to find a refinement of subgame-perfect equilibrium that rules 
out “unreasonable” equilibria. Moving from strategy profiles to assessments 
allowed us to judge the rationality of a choice at an information set 
independently of whether that information set is reached by the strategy profile 
under consideration: the requirement of sequential rationality rules out choices 
that are strictly dominated at an information set. As a first attempt we define a 
notion of equilibrium based on the two requirements of sequential rationality 
and Bayesian updating at reached information sets. 
Definition 10.5.  A weak sequential equilibrium is an assessment ( , )σ µ  which 
satisfies two requirements: (1) sequential rationality and (2) Bayesian updating 
at reached information sets.  
                                                 
5 In logic a proposition of the form “if A then B” (A is called the antecedent and B is called the 
consequent ) is false only when A is true and B is false. Thus, in particular, the proposition “if 
A then B” is true whenever A is false (whatever the truth value of B). In our case the 
antecedent is  “
,
( ) 0
root
Hσ >P ”. 
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Before we discuss the properties of weak sequential equilibria we illustrate the 
type of reasoning that one needs to go through in order to find weak sequential 
equilibria. Consider first the game of Figure 10.4. 
ts DA
a b
Nature
B C
E F E
2
1 1
1
4
3
4
1
2
2
1
2
0
0
3
3
1
0
0
F
x y
 
Figure 10.4 
Let us see if there is a weak sequential equilibrium ( , )σ µ  where Player 1’s 
strategy in σ  is a pure strategy. The set of pure strategies of Player 1 is 
1 {( , ), ( , ), ( , ), ( , )}S A C B D B C A D=  
The strategy of Player 1 determines the beliefs of Player 2 at her information 
set { , }x y . Let us consider the four possibilities. 
• If Player 1’s strategy is (A,C ), then Player 2’s information set { , }x y  is 
reached with positive probability and the only beliefs that are consistent 
with Bayesian updating are 
0 1
x y 
 
 
, so that − by sequential rationality − 
Player 2 must choose E. However, if Player 2’s strategy is E then at node s  
it is not sequentially rational for Player 1 to choose A. Thus there is no 
weak sequential equilibrium where Player 1’s strategy is (A,C ). 
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• If Player 1’s strategy is (B,D), then Player 2’s information set { , }x y  is 
reached with positive probability and the only beliefs that are consistent 
with Bayesian updating are 
1 0
x y 
 
 
, so that − by sequential rationality − 
Player 2 must choose F. However, if Player 2’s strategy is F then at node s it 
is not sequentially rational for Player 1 to choose B. Thus there is no weak 
sequential equilibrium where Player 1’s strategy is (B,D). 
• If Player 1’s strategy is (B,C ), then Player 2’s information set { , }x y  is 
reached (with probability 1) and the only beliefs that are consistent with 
Bayesian updating are 
31
4 4
x y 
 
 
. Given these beliefs, Player 2’s payoff from 
playing E is  3 31
4 4 4
(0) (1)+ =  and her payoff from playing F is 
3 31
4 4 4
(3) (0)+ = . Thus any mixed strategy is sequentially rational for Player 
2, that is, for any [0,1]p∈ , 
1
E F
p p
 
 − 
 is sequentially rational. At node s 
choice B is sequentially rational for Player 1 if and only if the expected 
payoff from playing B is at least 1 (which is the payoff from playing A): 
2 0(1 ) 1p p+ − ≥ , that is, 1
2
p ≥ . At node t choice C is sequentially rational 
for Player 1 if and only if the expected payoff from playing C is at least 2 
(which is the payoff from playing D): 3 0(1 ) 2p p+ − ≥ , that is, 2
3
p ≥ . 
Hence, if 2
3
p ≥  then both B and C are sequentially rational. Thus we have 
an infinite number of weak sequential equilibria at which Player 1’s strategy 
is (B,C ):  for every 2
3
,1p∈    , ( , )σ µ  is a weak sequential equilibrium, 
where 
0 1 1 0 1
A B C D E F
p p
σ
 
=  − 
 ,  
31
4 4
x y
µ
 
=  
 
. 
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• If Player 1’s strategy is (A,D), then Player 2’s information set { , }x y  is not 
reached and thus, according to the notion of weak sequential equilibrium, 
any beliefs are allowed there. Let 
1
E F
p p
 
 − 
 be Player 2’s strategy. From 
previous calculations we have that both A and D are sequentially rational if 
and only if 1
2
p ≤ . One possibility is to set p = 0; this means that Player 2 
chooses the pure strategy F and this is sequentially rational if and only if her 
beliefs are 
1
x y
q q
 
 − 
 with 
payoff from payoff from 
3 0(1 ) 0 1(1 )
F E
q q q q+ − ≥ + −
 
 , that is, 1
4
q ≥ . Thus  
we have an infinite number of weak sequential equilibria: ( , )σ µ  is a weak 
sequential equilibrium, where 
0 1 1 0 0 1
A B C D E F
σ
 
=  
 
 ,  
1
x y
q q
µ
 
=  − 
,    for every [ ]14 ,1q∈ . 
Next consider the case where 1
2
0 p< ≤ , so that Player 2 uses a mixed 
strategy. This can be sequentially rational if and only if the payoff from E is 
equal to the payoff from F, that is (using the previous calculations) if and 
only if her beliefs are  
31
4 4
x y 
 
 
. Thus  we have an infinite number of weak 
sequential equilibria:  ( , )σ µ  is a weak sequential equilibrium, where 
0 1 1 0 1
A B C D E F
p p
σ
 
=  − 
 ,  
31
4 4
x y
µ
 
=  
 
,  for every 1
2
(0, ]p∈  
Next we consider the more complex game shown in Figure 10.5. 
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r t
1/5b
Nature
play play
1
1/5
c
3/5
a
2
play
3
2
e
G K
F H
3 3
2
0
1
2
3
2
2
3
2
0
4
3
1
2
0
1
3
6
R
LL R
1
2
2
A
AB B
2
3
2
2
3
2
2
3
2
4
0
2
0
0
0
  4
10
  4
5
0
5
pass
pass
pass
d e
d
zw
u v
x y
s
 
Figure 10.5 
For simplicity, let us limit the search to pure-strategy weak sequential 
equilibria. How should we proceed? The first thing to do is to see if the game 
itself can be simplified; in particular, one should check if there are any 
information sets where there is a strictly dominant choice: if there is such a 
choice then, no matter what beliefs the relevant player has at that information 
set, sequential rationality requires that choice to be selected. In the game of 
Figure 10.5 there is indeed such an information set, namely information set 
{ , }w z  of Player 2: here L is strictly better than R for Player 2 at both nodes, 
that is, R is strictly dominated by L as a choice. Thus we can simplify the game 
by (1) removing this information set, (2) converting nodes w and z into 
terminal nodes and (3) assigning to these newly created terminal nodes the 
payoffs associated with choice L. The simplified game is shown in Figure 10.6 
below. 
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r t
1/5b
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play play
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c
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a
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play
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0
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0
5
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x y
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2
3
2
0
4
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Figure 10.6 
Applying the same reasoning to the simplified game of Figure 10.6, we can 
delete the two singleton decision nodes of Player 3 and replace one with the 
payoff associated with choice F and the other with the payoff associated with 
choice H, thus obtaining the further simplification shown in Figure 10.7 below. 
In this game there are no more information sets with strictly dominant choices. 
Thus we have to proceed by trial and error. Note first that, at any weak 
sequential equilibrium, by Bayesian updating Player 1’s beliefs must be 
31 1
5 5 5
r s t 
 
 
.  
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Figure 10.7 
Let us see if in the simplified game of Figure 10.7 there is a pure-strategy weak 
sequential equilibrium where Player 1’s strategy is “play”. When Player 1 
chooses “play” then, by Bayesian updating, Player 2’s beliefs must be 
31
4 4
x y 
 
 
.  
• Let us first try the hypothesis that there is a weak sequential equilibrium 
where (Player 1’s strategy is “play” and) Player 2’s strategy is e. Then, by 
Bayesian updating, Player 3’s beliefs must be 
1 0
u v 
 
 
, making A the only 
sequentially rational choice at information set { , }u v . However, if Player 3’s 
strategy is A then Player 2, at her information set { , }x y , gets a payoff of 
3 161
4 4 4
(10) (2)+ =  from playing d  and a payoff of 3 151
4 4 4
(3) (4)+ =  from 
playing e. Thus e is not sequentially rational and we have reached a 
contradiction. 
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• Let us now try the hypothesis that there is a weak sequential equilibrium 
where (Player 1’s strategy is “play” and) Player 2’s strategy is d. Then, by 
Bayesian updating, Player 3’s beliefs must be 
1 1
2 2
u v 
 
 
; hence Player 3’s 
expected payoff from playing A is 1 1
2 2
(2) (4) 3+ =  and his expected payoff 
from playing B is 1 1
2 2
(0) (5) 2.5+ = . Thus A is the only sequentially rational 
choice at information set {u,v}. Hence, by the previous calculations for 
Player 2, d is indeed sequentially rational for Player 2. Thus it only remains 
to check if Player 1 indeed wants to choose “play”. Given the strategies d 
and A of Players 2 and 3, respectively, Player 1 gets a payoff of 2 from 
“pass” and a payoff of 31 1 11
5 5 5 5
(4) (4) (1) 2+ + = >  from “play”. Thus “play” is 
indeed sequentially rational. Thus we have found a pure-strategy weak 
sequential equilibrium of the game of Figure 10.7, namely 
0 1 1 0 1 0
pass play d e A B
σ
 
=  
 
 ,  
3 31 1 1 1 1
5 5 5 4 4 2 2
r s t x y u v
µ
 
=  
 
.  
This equilibrium can be extended to a weak sequential equilibrium of the 
original game of Figure 10.5 by adding the choices that led to the simplified 
game of Figure 10.7 and arbitrary beliefs at information set {w,z}: 
0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
pass play d e A B F G H K L R
σ
 
=  
 
, 
3 31 1 1 1 1
5 5 5 4 4 2 2
1
r s t x y u v w z
p p
µ
 
=  − 
,  for any [0,1]p∈  
Are there any other pure-strategy weak sequential equilibria? This question is 
addressed in Exercise 10.7.  
We now explore the relationship between the notion of weak sequential 
equilibrium and other equilibrium concepts. 
Theorem 10.1.  Given an extensive-form game with cardinal payoffs G,  
if ( , )σ µ  is a weak sequential equilibrium of G then σ  is a Nash equilibrium  
of G.  
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In general, not every Nash equilibrium can be part of a weak sequential 
equilibrium. To see this, consider the extensive-form game of Figure 10.8 that 
reproduces the game of Figure 6.12 (Chapter 6). The pure-strategy profile (b,f,d) 
is a Nash equilibrium, but it cannot be part of any weak sequential equilibrium, 
because − no matter what beliefs Player 3 has at her information set − choice d 
is not sequentially rational (it is strictly dominated by c at both nodes in that 
information set). 
c d
1
a
b
c d
e
3
2
2
2
0
0
0
2
2
2
0
0
0
1
1
0
f
2
 
Figure 10.8 
Thus weak sequential equilibrium is a strict refinement of Nash equilibrium. 
Does it also refine the notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium? Unfortunately, 
the answer is negative: it is possible for ( , )σ µ  to be a weak sequential 
equilibrium without σ  being a subgame-perfect equilibrium. To see this, 
consider the game of Figure 10.9, which reproduces Figure 10.1. 
GAME THEORY – Giacomo Bonanno 
 
372 
 
s
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1
0
1
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z
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z
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z
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z
6
z
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z
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Figure 10.9 
The assessment ( ), ( , ),b f e hσ =  with 
0 1 1 0
x y w z
µ
 
=  
 
 is a weak sequential 
equilibrium (the reader should verify this; in particular, note that information 
set {w,z} is not reached and thus Bayesian updating allows for arbitrary beliefs 
at that information set). However, ( ), ( , ),b f e h  is not a subgame-perfect 
equilibrium, because the restriction of this strategy profile to the proper 
subgame that starts at note t of Player 2, namely ( , )e h , is not a Nash 
equilibrium of that subgame: h is not a best reply to e.  
The relationship between the three notions of Nash equilibrium, subgame-
perfect equilibrium and weak sequential equilibrium is illustrated in the Venn 
diagram of Figure 10.10. 
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Subgame-perfect equilibria
Nash equilibria
Weak sequential 
equilibria
 
Figure 10.10 
• Every subgame-perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium. However, there 
are games in which there is a subgame-perfect equilibrium that is not part of 
any weak sequential equilibrium. For example, in the game of Figure 10.8, 
( , , )b f d  is a Nash equilibrium which is also subgame-perfect (because there 
are no proper subgames); however, choice d is strictly dominated and thus is 
not sequentially rational for Player 3, no matter what beliefs he has at his 
information set. Thus ( , , )b f d  cannot be part of a weak sequential 
equilibrium.  
• Every weak sequential equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium. However, as  
shown in the example of Figure 10.9, there are games in which there is a 
weak sequential equilibrium whose strategy is not a subgame-perfect 
equilibrium.  
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As we will see in Chapter 11, every sequential equilibrium (Definition 11.2) is a 
weak sequential equilibrium (Remark 11.1) and every finite extensive-form 
game with cardinal payoffs has at least one sequential equilibrium (Theorem 
11.2); hence the following theorem is a corollary of Remark 11.1 and Theorem 
11.2.  
Theorem 10.2.  Every finite extensive-form game with cardinal payoffs has at 
least one weak sequential equilibrium (possibly in mixed strategies).  
 
 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced in 
this section, by going through the exercises in Section 10.E.3 of Appendix 10.E at 
the end of this chapter. 
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Appendix 10.E: Exercises 
10.E.1 .  Exercises  for  Section 10.1 :              
          Assessments and sequential rationality 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this 
chapter. 
Exercise 10.1. For the game of Figure 10.1, reproduced below, check whether 
the assessment 
31 4
8 8 8
1 0 0 1 1 0
a b c h k d e f g
σ
 
=  
 
, 
1 2 1 1
3 3 2 2
x y w z
µ
 
=  
 
 is 
sequentially rational. 
s
32
1
1
1
0
2
0
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
0
1
0
3
0
4
6
4
0
3
0
a b
f g f g h k h k
x y w z
t
1 2
ed
c
z
1
z
2
z
3
z
4
z
5
z
6
z
7
z
8
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Exercise 10.2. Consider the following modification of the game of Figure 10.1 
obtained by replacing Player 3 with Player 1 at information set { , }w z  (note 
that in the game of Figure 10.1 the payoffs of Players 1 and 3 are identical): 
1 2
12
1
1
0
2
1
3
3
1
1
0
0
3
4
6
0
3
a b
c
ed
f g f g h k h k
x y w z
 
Is the assessment 
31 4
8 8 8
1 0 0 1 1 0
a b c h k d e f g
σ
 
=  
 
, 
1 2 1 1
3 3 2 2
x y w z
µ
 
=  
 
 
sequentially rational? 
Exercise 10.3. Consider the following game: 
2s t
c
1
c
x y
1
2
1
3
d d
e f e f
a b
2
1
0
0
0
2
r
2
0
0
2
2.5
0
0
0
12
0
0
4  
 Is the assessment 
32 1 2
5 5 3 3
0 0 1
a b r c d e f
σ
 
=  
 
,  
31 1 1
2 2 4 4
s t x y
µ
 
=  
 
 
sequentially rational? 
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10.E.2 .  Exercises  for  Section 10.2 :  
           Bayesian updating at reached information sets. 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this 
chapter. 
Exercise 10.4.  For the game of Figure 10.1 find a system of beliefs µ such that 
( , )σ µ  satisfies Bayesian updating  at reached information sets (Definition 10.4), 
where 
3 31 4 1 1 4
8 8 8 4 4 5 5
1 0
a b c f g d e h k
σ
 
=  
 
. 
Exercise 10.5.  In the following game, let 
72 1 1 2
10 10 10 3 3
1 0
a b r c d e f
σ
 
=  
 
. Find 
all the systems of beliefs which, combined with σ,  yield assessments that satisfy 
Bayesian updating at reached information sets. 
2s t
c
1
c
x y
1
2
1
3
d d
e f e f
a b
2
1
0
0
0
2
r
2
0
0
2
2.5
0
0
0
12
0
0
4  
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10.E.3 .  Exercises  for  Section 10.3 :   
           Weak Sequential Equilibrium. 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this 
chapter. 
Exercise 10.6.  Find all the pure-strategy weak sequential equilibria of the 
following game: 
DA
a b
Nature
B C
E F E
2
1 1
1
1
1
1
1
2
0
0
2
0
1
0
F
s t
x y
1
2
1
2
 
Exercise 10.7.  In the game of Figure 10.7, reproduced below, is there a pure-
strategy weak sequential equilibrium where Player 1 chooses “pass”? 
r t
1/5b
Nature
play play
1
1/5
c
3/5
a
2
play
3
e
1
2
2
A
AB B
2
3
2
2
3
2
2
3
2
4
0
2
0
0
0
  4
10
  4
5
0
5
pass
pass
pass
d e
d
u v
x y
s
2
3
2
0
4
3
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◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊ 
Exercise 10.8 (Challenging Question). 
Player 1 can take action C or L and Player 2 can take action c or f. The von 
Neumann-Morgenstern payoffs are as follows: 
c f
C 4 , 4 6 , 3
L 3 , 1 5 , 2
Player
1
Player  2
 
The game, however, is more complex than the above strategic form. Player 1 
moves first and chooses between C and L. He then sends an e-mail to Player 2 
telling her truthfully what choice he made. However, it is commonly known 
between the two that a hacker likes to intercept e-mails and change the text. 
The hacker is a computer program that, with probability (1−ε ), leaves the text 
unchanged and, with probability ε ,  changes the sentence “I chose C ” into the 
sentence “I chose L” and the sentence “I chose L” into the sentence “I chose C ”. 
This is commonly known. The value of ε  is also commonly known. Assume 
that ( )140,ε ∈ . 
(a) Draw the extensive-form game. 
(b) Find all the pure-strategy weak sequential equilibria. 
(c) Are there any weak sequential equilibria (pure or mixed) in which Player 2, 
when he receives a message from Player 1 saying “I chose L” plays f with  
probability 1? 
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Appendix 10.S: Solutions to exercises  
Exercise 10.1.  The assessment 
31 4
8 8 8
1 0 0 1 1 0
a b c h k d e f g
σ
 
=  
 
,  
1 2 1 1
3 3 2 2
x y w z
µ
 
=  
 
  is sequentially rational.  In fact,  
• at the root, a gives Player 1 a payoff of 0 and so do b and c (given the 
strategies of Players 2 and 3). Thus any mixture of a, b and c is sequentially 
rational; in particular,  
31 4
8 8 8
a b c 
 
 
; 
• at Player 2’s node t,  given Player 3’s strategy,  d gives Player 2 a payoff of  1 
while e gives a payoff of 2; thus e is sequentially rational; 
• given µ,  at information set {x,y}, f  gives Player 2 a payoff of   
1 2
3 3
(3) (3) 3+ =  while g  gives 1 2
3 3
(6) (0) 2+ = ; thus f  is sequentially rational; 
• given µ,  at information set {w,z}, h  gives Player 3 a payoff of   
1 1
2 2
(3) (0) 1.5+ = , while k gives 1; thus h is sequentially rational. 
Exercise 10.2.  It might seem that the answer is the same as in the previous 
exercise, because the calculations at the various information sets remain the 
same; however, in this game checking sequential rationality at the root involves 
checking whether, given the strategy of Player 2 (namely (f , e )), Player 1 can 
increase his payoff by changing his entire strategy, that is by changing his 
choices at both the root and at information set {w,z}. Indeed, if Player 1 
changes his strategy from 
31 4
8 8 8
1 0
a b c h k 
 
 
 to 
0 0 1 0 1
a b c h k 
 
 
 his payoff 
increases from 0 to 1. Hence 
31 4
8 8 8
1 0
a b c h k 
 
 
 is not sequentially rational at 
the root. 
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Exercise 10.3.  The game under consideration is the following: 
2s t
c
1
c
x y
1
2
1
3
d d
e f e f
a b
2
1
0
0
0
2
r
2
0
0
2
2.5
0
0
0
12
0
0
4  
The assessment 
32 1 2
5 5 3 3
0 0 1
a b r c d e f
σ
 
=  
 
,  
31 1 1
2 2 4 4
s t x y
µ
 
=  
 
 is 
sequentially rational, as the following calculations show. 
• At Player 3’s information set {x,y}, e gives Player 3 a payoff of 
3 1
4 4
(0) (12) 3+ =   and f  a payoff of 3 1
4 4
(4) (0) 3+ = ; thus both e and  f  are 
optimal and so is any mixture of e and f ; in particular, the mixture 
1 2
3 3
e f 
 
 
. 
• At Player 2’s information set {s,t }, c gives Player 2 a payoff of 
1 1
2 2
(2) (0) 1+ =   and (given the strategy of Player 3) d a payoff of 
1 1 2
2 3 3
(1) (0)+ +    ( )51 1 22 3 3 2(0) 1 + =  ; thus both c and  d  are optimal and so is 
any mixture of c and d;   in particular the mixture 
32
5 5
c d 
 
 
. 
• At the root, r gives Player 1 a payoff of 2 and (given the strategies of Players 
2 and 3) a gives a payoff of 32 1 2 4
5 5 3 3 5
(1) (2) (0)+ + =    and b a payoff of 
32 1 2 4
5 5 3 3 5
(0) (0) (2)+ + =   . Thus r  is sequentially rational. 
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Exercise 10.4. The game under consideration is 
s
32
1
1
1
0
2
0
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
0
1
0
3
0
4
6
4
0
3
0
a b
f g f g h k h k
x y w z
t
1 2
ed
c
z
1
z
2
z
3
z
4
z
5
z
6
z
7
z
8
 
The system of beliefs is 
3 31 1
4 4 4 4
x y w z
µ
 
=  
 
.  In fact, we have that 
1
, 8
( )root xσ =P , 
3
, 8
( )root yσ =P , 
31 4
, 8 8 8
({ , })root x yσ = + =P , ( )3 34, 8 4 8( )root wσ = =P , 
( )4 1 1, 8 4 8( )root zσ = =P  and 3 1 4, 8 8 8({ , })root w xσ = + =P . Thus  
1
, 8 1
44
, 8
( )
( )
({ , })
root
root
x
x
x y
σ
σ
µ = = =
P
P
 
3
, 8 3
44
, 8
( )
( )
({ , })
root
root
y
y
x y
σ
σ
µ = = =
P
P
, 
3
, 8 3
44
, 8
( )
( )
({ , })
root
root
w
w
w z
σ
σ
µ = = =
P
P
, 
1
, 8 1
44
, 8
( )
( )
({ , })
root
root
z
z
w z
σ
σ
µ = = =
P
P
. 
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Exercise 10.5.  The game under consideration is 
2s t
c
1
c
x y
1
2
1
3
d d
e f e f
a b
2
1
0
0
0
2
r
2
0
0
2
2.5
0
0
0
12
0
0
4  
Let 
72 1 1 2
10 10 10 3 3
1 0
a b r c d e f
σ
 
=  
 
. Since only information set { , }s t  is reached 
by σ, no restrictions are imposed on the beliefs at information set { , }x y . Thus, 
for every p  such that 0 1p≤ ≤ ,  the system of beliefs 
2 1
3 3
1
s t x y
p p
µ
 
=  − 
 
combined with σ yields an assessment that satisfies Bayesian updating at 
reached information sets. 
Exercise 10.6. The game under consideration is 
DA
a b
Nature
B C
E F E
2
1 1
1
1
1
1
1
2
0
0
2
0
1
0
F
s t
x y
1
2
1
2
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We restrict attention to pure strategies. First of all, note that − for Player 1 − A 
is sequentially rational no matter what strategy Player 2 chooses and, similarly, 
C  is sequentially rational no matter what strategy Player 2 chooses.  The 
strategy of Player 1 determines the beliefs of Player 2 at her information set 
{ , }x y . Let us consider the four possibilities (recall that 
1 {( , ), ( , ), ( , ), ( , )}S A C B D B C A D= ). 
• If Player 1’s strategy is (A,C ), then Player 2’s information set { , }x y  is 
reached with positive probability and the only beliefs that are consistent 
with Bayesian updating are 
0 1
x y 
 
 
, so that both E and F are sequentially 
rational for Player 2. By our preliminary observation it follows that 
( )( , ),A C E  with  beliefs 
0 1
x y 
 
 
 is a weak sequential equilibrium  and so is 
( )( , ),A C F  with  beliefs 
0 1
x y 
 
 
. 
• If Player 1’s strategy is (B,D), then Player 2’s information set { , }x y  is 
reached with positive probability and the only beliefs that are consistent 
with Bayesian updating are 
1 0
x y 
 
 
, so that − by sequential rationality − 
Player 2 must choose E. However, if Player 2’s strategy is E then at node t it 
is not sequentially rational for Player 1 to choose D. Thus there is no pure-
strategy weak sequential equilibrium where Player 1’s strategy is (B,D). 
• If Player 1’s strategy is (B,C), then Player 2’s information set { , }x y  is 
reached (with probability 1) and the only beliefs that are consistent with 
Bayesian updating are 
1 1
2 2
x y 
 
 
. Given these beliefs, E is the only 
sequentially rational choice for Player 2 (her payoff from playing E is  
1 1
2 2
(2) (0) 1+ = , while her payoff from playing F is 0). Thus ( )( , ),B C E  with 
beliefs 
1 1
2 2
x y 
 
 
 is a weak sequential equilibrium. 
• If Player 1’s strategy is (A,D), then Player 2’s information set { , }x y  is not 
reached and thus, according to the notion of weak sequential equilibrium, 
any beliefs are allowed there. In order for D to be sequentially rational for 
Player 1 it must be that Player 2’s pure strategy is F. In order for F to be 
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sequentially rational for Player 2, her beliefs must be 
0 1
x y 
 
 
.  Thus 
( )( , ),A D F  with beliefs 
0 1
x y 
 
 
 is a weak sequential equilibrium.  
Summarizing, there are four pure-strategy weak sequential equilibria: 
(1) ( )( , ),A C E  with  beliefs 
0 1
x y 
 
 
,        (2) ( )( , ),A C F  with  beliefs 
0 1
x y 
 
 
, 
(3) ( )( , ),B C E  with beliefs 
1 1
2 2
x y 
 
 
 and   (4) ( )( , ),A D F  with beliefs 
0 1
x y 
 
 
. 
Exercise 10.7.  The game under consideration is 
r t
1/5b
Nature
play play
1
1/5
c
3/5
a
2
play
3
e
1
2
2
A
AB B
2
3
2
2
3
2
2
3
2
4
0
2
0
0
0
  4
10
  4
5
0
5
pass
pass
pass
d e
d
u v
x y
s
2
3
2
0
4
3
 
When Player 1’s strategy is “pass” then it is much easier to construct a weak 
sequential equilibrium, because there are no restrictions on the beliefs at the 
information sets of Players 2 and 3. For example, we can choose beliefs 
0 1
x y 
 
 
 
for Player 2, which make e the only sequentially rational choice, and beliefs 
0 1
u v 
 
 
 for Player 3, which make B the only sequentially rational choice. It 
only remains to check sequential rationality of “pass”: if Player 1 chooses “pass” 
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he gets a payoff of 2, while if he chooses “play” he gets a payoff of 
31 1 2
5 5 5 5
(0) (2) (0) 2+ + = < , so that “pass” is indeed the better choice. Thus we 
have found the following weak sequential equilibrium (note, however, that 
there are several weak sequential equilibria): 
1 0 0 1 0 1
pass play d e A B
σ
 
=  
 
 ,  
31 1
5 5 5
0 1 0 1
r s t x y u v
µ
 
=  
 
. 
Exercise 10.8.  [Challenging question].  
(a)  The extensive form is as follows: 
12 2
Hacker
C
L
C
C
L
L
Hacker
(1−ε)
(1−ε)
ε
ε
4
4
4
4
6
3
6
3
3
1 3
1
5
2
5
2
c
c
c
f
f
f
f
c
 
(b) Let us consider the pure strategies of Player 1. If Player 1 plays L then 
Player 2 assigns probability 1 to the bottom node of each information set 
and responds with f with probability 1, but this makes Player 1 want to 
deviate to C  to get a payoff of 6.
6
 Thus there is no pure-strategy sequential 
                                                 
6
 In other words, if Player 1 plays L, then Bayesian updating requires Player 2 to assign 
probability 1 to the bottom node of each information set and then sequential rationality 
requires Player 2 to play f at each information set, so that (L,(f,f )) is the only candidate for a 
weak sequential equilibrium where Player 1 plays L. But L is not a best reply to (f,f ) and thus 
(L,(f,f )) is not a Nash equilibrium and hence cannot be part of a weak sequential equilibrium. 
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equilibrium where Player 1 plays L. On the other hand, if Player 1 plays C, 
then Player 2 assigns probability 1 to the top node of each information set 
and thus sequential rationality requires her to respond with c at each 
information set, which makes playing C optimal for Player 1. Thus 
(C,(c , c )), with beliefs that assign probability one to the top node of each 
information set, is the only pure-strategy weak sequential equilibrium. 
(c) Suppose that Player 2 plays f  after reading the message “I chose L”, that is, 
at her information set on the right. We know from the argument in part (b) 
that there are no equilibria of this kind in which Player 1 chooses a pure 
strategy, so Player 1 must be playing a mixed strategy. For him to be 
willing to do so, he must receive the same payoff from playing C or L. If we 
let p be the probability with which Player 2 plays c if she receives the 
message “I chose C ”, then 1 is indifferent when (the symbol ⇔  stands for 
‘if and only if’) 
[ ] [ ]
1 1( ) ( )
1
(1 ) 4 6(1 ) 6 3 5(1 ) (1 )5
2 4
C L
p p p p p
π π
ε ε ε ε
ε
= =
− + − + = + − + − ⇔ =
− 
 
Since ( )140,ε ∈ , ( )12 ,1p∈ , so Player 2 randomizes after reading “I chose 
C ”. For Player 2 to be willing to do this, she must be indifferent between c 
and f in this event. Let (0,1)q∈  be the probability with which Player 1 
plays C (so that 1 q−  is the probability of L); then Bayesian updating 
requires that Player 2 assign probability 
(1 )
(1 ) (1 )
q
q q
ε
ε ε
−
− + −
 to the top node 
of her information set on the left and probability 
(1 )
(1 ) (1 )
q
q q
ε
ε ε
−
− + −
 to the 
bottom node. Then, for Player 2, the expected payoff from playing c  at 
the information set on the left is 
2
(1 ) (1 )
( ) 4 1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
q q
c
q q q q
ε ε
π
ε ε ε ε
− −
= +
− + − − + −
 and the expected payoff 
from playing f is 2
(1 ) (1 )
( ) 3 2
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
q q
f
q q q q
ε ε
π
ε ε ε ε
− −
= +
− + − − + −
. Player 2 
is indifferent if these two are equal, that is if 
4 (1 ) (1 ) 3 (1 ) 2(1 )q q q qε ε ε ε− + − = − + − , which is true if and only if q ε= . 
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We have now specified behavior at all information sets. To ensure that the 
specified behavior is an equilibrium, we need to check that f is optimal for 
Player 2 if she receives the message “I chose L”. This will be true if 
2 2
 
2 2 2 2 1
2
( | "I chose L") ( | "I chose L")
4 1(1 )(1 ) 3 2(1 )(1 )
4 (1 ) 3 2(1 ) .
q
c f
q q q q
ε
π π
ε ε ε ε
ε ε ε ε ε
=
≤ ⇔
+ − − ≤ + − − ⇔
+ − ≤ + − ⇔ ≤
since
 
Since we have assumed that 1
4
ε < , Player 2 strictly prefers to play f after 
receiving the message “I chose L”. Thus we have constructed the following 
weak sequential equilibrium: 
• Behavior strategy of Player 1: 
1
C L
ε ε
 
 − 
.   
• Behavior strategy of Player 2: at the information set on the left 
(where she receives the message “I chose C ”): 1 1 4
2 4 2 4
c f
ε
ε ε
 
 −  
− − 
, 
at the information set on the right (where she receives the message 
“I chose L”): 
0 1
c f 
 
 
. 
• Player 2’s beliefs at the information set on the left assign 
probability 1
2
(1 )
(1 ) (1 )
ε ε
ε ε ε ε
−
=
− + −
 to the top node and probability 1
2
 
to the bottom node and her beliefs at the information set on the 
right assign probability 
2
2 2(1 )
ε
ε ε+ −
 to the top node and 
probability 
2
2 2
(1 )
(1 )
ε
ε ε
−
+ −
 to the bottom node. 
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Sequential Equilibrium 
 
11.1 Consistent assessments 
he stated goal at the beginning of Chapter 10 was to seek a refinement 
of the notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium that would rule out 
strictly dominated choices at unreached information sets.  The notion 
of weak sequential equilibrium  achieved the goal of ruling out strictly 
dominated choices, but turned out not to be a refinement of subgame-perfect 
equilibrium. As shown at the end of Section 10.3 (Chapter 10), it is possible for 
the strategy profile in a weak sequential equilibrium  not to be a subgame-
perfect equilibrium. The reason for this is that the only restriction on beliefs 
that is incorporated in the notion of weak sequential equilibrium is Bayesian 
updating at reached information sets. At an information set that is not reached 
by the strategy profile under consideration any beliefs whatsoever are allowed, 
even if those beliefs are at odds with the strategy profile.  
To see this, consider the game of Figure 11.1 and the assessment consisting of 
the pure-strategy profile ( , , )c d fσ =  (highlighted as double edges) and the 
system of beliefs that assigns probability 1 to node u : 
0 0 1
s t u 
 
 
. 
Chapter 
11 
T 
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e
c
2
1
d
a
b
f fg
ggf
3s t u
1
0
2
0
0
0
0
1
0
2
0
1
0
1
0
2
0
1
0
0
1
 
Figure 11.1 
Since Player 3’s information set {s,t,u} is not reached by σ,  Bayesian updating 
imposes no restrictions on beliefs at that information set. However, attaching 
probability 1 to node u is at odds with σ,  because in order for node u to be 
reached the play must have gone through Player 2’s node and there, according 
to σ,  Player 2 should have played d with probability 1, making it impossible 
for node u to be reached.  
Thus we need to impose some restrictions on beliefs to ensure that they are 
consistent with the strategy profile with which they are paired (in the 
assessment under consideration). At reached information sets this is achieved by 
requiring Bayesian updating, but so far we have imposed no restriction on 
beliefs at unreached information sets. We want these restrictions to be “just like 
Bayesian updating”. Kreps and Wilson (1982) proposed a restriction on beliefs 
that they called consistency. To motivate it, note that if σ  is a completely mixed 
strategy profile (in the sense that σ(a) > 0, for every choice a) then the issue 
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disappears, because every information set is reached with positive probability 
and Bayesian updating yields unique beliefs at every information set. For 
example, in the game of Figure 11.1, if Player 1 uses the completely mixed 
strategy 
1a b a b
a b c
p p p p
 
 − − 
 with , (0,1)a bp p ∈  and 1a bp p+ <  and Player 2 
uses the completely mixed strategy 
1d d
d e
p p
 
 − 
 with (0,1)dp ∈  then, by 
Bayesian updating, Player 3’s beliefs must be ( )
(1 )
a
a b d b d
p
s
p p p p p
µ =
+ + −
, 
( )
(1 )
b d
a b d b d
p p
t
p p p p p
µ =
+ + −
 and 
(1 )
( )
(1 )
b d
a b d b d
p p
u
p p p p p
µ
−
=
+ + −
.  
In the  case of a completely mixed strategy profile σ, it is clear what it means 
for a system of beliefs µ to be consistent with the strategy profile σ : µ must be 
the unique system of beliefs obtained from σ  by applying Bayesian updating. 
What about assessments ( , )σ µ  where σ  is such that some information sets are 
not reached? How can we decide, in such cases, whether µ is consistent with σ ? 
Kreps and Wilson (1982) proposed the following criterion: the assessment 
( , )σ µ  is consistent if there is a completely mixed strategy profile σ ′  which is 
arbitrarily close to σ and whose associated unique system of beliefs µ′  
(obtained by applying Bayesian updating) is arbitrarily close to µ. In 
mathematics “arbitrary closeness” is captured by the notion of limit. 
Definition 11.1.  Given an extensive game, an assessment ( , )σ µ  is consistent if 
there is a sequence of completely mixed strategy profiles 1 2, ,..., ,...nσ σ σ  such 
that:  
(1) the sequence converges to σ  as n tends to infinity, that is, lim n
n
σ σ
→∞
= , and  
(2) letting nµ  be the unique system of beliefs obtained from nσ  by using 
Bayesian updating, the sequence 1 2, ,..., ,...nµ µ µ  converges to µ  as n tends to 
infinity, that is, lim n
n
µ µ
→∞
= . 
For example, consider the extensive form of Figure 11.2 below and the 
following assessment: 
3 5
8 8
( , , ),
s t
c d fσ µ
 
= =  
 
. 
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c
1
d
a
b
f ggf
3s t
2
e
 
Figure 11.2 
The assessment 
3 5
8 8
( , , ),
s t
c d fσ µ
 
= =  
 
 is consistent. To see this, let 
3 5 8 1 1 1 11 1 1
n
n n n n n n n
a b c d e f g
σ
 
=  − − − 
. Then, as n tends to infinity, all of 
3 5 1, ,
n n n
 tend to 0 and both 81
n
−  and 11
n
−  tend to 1 so that lim n
n
σ
→∞
=  
0 0 1 1 0 1 0
a b c d e f g
σ
 
= 
 
. Furthermore, 
( )
3
3 5 51
3
( )
1 8
n
n
n n n n
sµ = =
+ − −
, which 
tends to 3
8
 as n tends to infinity and 
( )
( )
5 1 5
3 5 51
1 5
( )
1 8
n n n
n
n n n n
tµ
− −
= =
+ − −
, which tends to 
5
8
 as n tends to infinity, so that  
3 5
8 8
lim n
n
s t
µ µ
→∞
 
= = 
 
. 
GAME THEORY – Giacomo Bonanno 
 
393 
 
The notion of consistent assessment ( , )σ µ  was meant to capture an extension 
of the requirement of Bayesian updating that would apply also to information 
sets that have zero probability of being reached (when the play of the game is 
according to the strategy profile σ ).  Definition 11.1 is rather technical and not 
easy to apply. Showing that an assessment is consistent requires displaying an 
appropriate sequence and showing that it converges to the given assessment. 
This is relatively easy as compared to the considerably more difficult task of 
proving that an assessment is not consistent: this requires showing that every 
possible sequence that one could construct would not converge. To see the kind 
of reasoning involved, consider the extensive form of Figure 11.3. 
2
1
3
a
b c
d
T T
B B
e
f
RRRL L L
1
r s
t u v
 
Figure 11.3 
We want to show that the following assessment is not consistent: 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
a b c d T B e f L R
σ
 
=  
 
, 
1 1 1 2 2
2 2 5 5 5
r s t u v
µ
 
=  
 
. 
Suppose that ( , )σ µ  is consistent. Then there must be a sequence 
1,2,...n n
σ
=
 of 
completely mixed strategies that converges to σ , whose corresponding 
sequence of systems of beliefs 
1,2,...n n
µ
=
 (obtained by applying Bayesian 
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updating) converges to µ. Let the nth term of this sequence of completely mixed 
strategies be: 
n a b c d T B e f L R
n n n n n n n n n n
a b c d T B e f L R
p p p p p p p p p p
σ
 
=  
 
. 
Thus 1a b c d T B e f L Rn n n n n n n n n np p p p p p p p p p+ + + = + = + = + = , (0,1)
x
np ∈  for all 
{ , , , , , , , , , }x a b c d B T e f L R∈ , lim 0xn
n
p
→∞
=  for { , , , , , }x b c d B e R∈  and lim 1xn
n
p
→∞
=  
for { , , , }x a T f L∈ . Let us compute the corresponding system of beliefs nµ  
obtained by Bayesian updating:  b b
n n
b c b c
n n n n
r s
p p
p p p p
 
 
 
 + + 
  and 
b B c B f d
n n n n n n
b B c B f d b B c B f d b B c B f d
n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n
t u v
p p p p p p
p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
 
 
 
 + + + + + + 
 
Note that 
( )
( )
c
n n
b
n n
s p
r p
µ
µ
= . By hypothesis, 1
2
lim ( ) ( )n
n
s sµ µ
→∞
= =  and  
1
2
lim ( ) ( )n
n
r rµ µ
→∞
= =  and thus 
1
2
1
2
lim ( )( ) ( )
lim lim 1
( ) lim ( ) ( )
c
n
n n n
bn n
n n n
n
sp s s
p r r r
µµ µ
µ µ µ
→∞
→∞ →∞
→∞
= = = = = .  
On the other hand, 
( )
( )
c
fn n
nb
n n
u p
p
t p
µ
µ
= ,  so that  
( )
lim lim
( )
c
fn n
nbn n
n n
u p
p
t p
µ
µ→∞ →∞
 
=  
 
.  
By hypothesis, 2
5
lim ( ) ( )n
n
u uµ µ
→∞
= =  and 1
5
lim ( ) ( )n
n
t tµ µ
→∞
= = ,  
so that 
( )
lim
( )
n
n
n
u
t
µ
µ→∞
=
lim ( )
lim ( )
n
n
n
n
u
t
µ
µ
→∞
→∞
=  
( )
2
( )
u
t
µ
µ
= .  
However, ( )
0
1
lim lim lim
c c
f fn n
n nb bn n n
n n
p p
p p
p p→∞ →∞ →∞
=
=
   
= =   
   
(1)(0) 0= , yielding a 
contradiction.  
 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced in 
this section, by going through the exercises in Section 11.E.1 of Appendix 11.E at 
the end of this chapter. 
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11.2 Sequential equilibrium 
The notion of sequential equilibrium was introduced by Kreps and Wilson 
(1982).  
Definition 11.2.  Given an extensive game, an assessment ( , )σ µ  is a sequential 
equilibrium if it is consistent (Definition 11.1) and sequentially rational 
(Definition 10.2).  
For an example of a sequential equilibrium consider the extensive game of 
Figure 11.4 below. 
L M
x y
R
3
1
1
A B A B
u v w
4
5
0
1
2
5
3
6
2
0
3
1
3
0
2
6
4
2
4
2
2
d cc c dd
2
1
3
 
Figure 11.4 
Let us show  that the following assessment is a sequential equilibrium: 
1 1
2 2
0 0 1 1 0
L M R A B c d
σ
 
=  
 
 and 
3 3 31 1
4 4 7 7 7
x y u v w
µ
 
=  
 
.  Let us first verify 
sequential rationality of Player 3’s strategy: at her information set { , , }u v w , 
given her beliefs, c gives a payoff of 3 31
7 7 7
(5) (1) (2) 2+ + =  and d gives a payoff 
of 3 31
7 7 7
(2) (2) (2) 2+ + = . Thus c is optimal (as would be d and any 
randomization over c and d ). For Player 2, at his information set { , }x y , given 
his beliefs and given the strategy of Player 3, A gives a payoff of 
31
4 4
(5) (3) 3.5+ =  and B gives a payoff of 31
4 4
(2) (4) 3.5+ = ; thus any mixture of 
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A and B is optimal, in particular, the mixture 
1 1
2 2
A B 
 
 
 is optimal.  Finally, at 
the root, R gives Player 1 a payoff of 3, L a payoff of 1 1
2 2
(4) (1) 2.5+ =  and M a 
payoff of 1 1
2 2
(0) (6) 3+ = ; thus R is optimal (as would be any mixture of M and 
R).  
Next we show consistency. Consider the sequence of completely mixed 
strategies 
1,2,...n n
σ
=
 where 
31 4 1 1 1 1
2 2
1 1
n
n n n n n
L M R A B c d
σ
 
=  − − 
. Clearly 
lim n
n
σ σ
→∞
= . The corresponding sequence of systems of beliefs  
1,2,...n n
µ
=
 is 
given by the following constant sequence, which obviously converges to µ: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
31 1 131
2 23 3 31 1
4 4 7 7 73 3 3 3 3 31 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2
n n nn n
n n n n n n n n n n
x y u v w
µ
 
 
=  = = = = + + + + + + 
 
We now turn to the properties of sequential equilibria.  
Remark 11.1.  Since consistency implies Bayesian updating at reached 
information sets, every sequential equilibrium is a weak sequential equilibrium.  
Theorem 11.1 (Kreps and Wilson, 1982). Given an extensive game, if ( , )σ µ  is 
a sequential equilibrium then σ  is a subgame-perfect equilibrium. 
Theorem 11.2 (Kreps and Wilson, 1982). Every finite extensive-form game 
with cardinal payoffs has at least one sequential equilibrium . 
By Theorem 11.1, the notion of sequential equilibrium achieves the objective of 
refining the notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium. The relationship between 
the various solution concepts considered so far is shown in the Venn diagram of 
Figure 11.5. 
GAME THEORY – Giacomo Bonanno 
 
397 
 
Nash equilibria
Subgame-perfect equilibria
Weak sequential equilibria
Sequential
equilibria
 
Figure 11.5 
 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced in 
this section, by going through the exercises in Section 11.E.2 of Appendix 11.E at 
the end of this chapter. 
 
11.3 Is ‘consistency’ a good notion? 
The notion of consistency (Definition 11.1) is unsatisfactory in two respects.  
From a practical point of view, consistency is computationally hard to prove, 
since one has to construct a sequence of completely mixed strategies, calculate 
the corresponding Bayesian beliefs and take the limit of the two sequences. The 
larger and more complex the game, the harder it is to establish consistency. 
From a conceptual point of view, it is not clear how one should interpret, or 
justify, the requirement of taking the limit of sequences of strategies and beliefs. 
Indeed, Kreps and Wilson themselves express dissatisfaction with their 
definition of sequential equilibrium:  
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“We shall proceed here to develop the properties of 
sequential equilibrium as defined above; however, we 
do so with some doubts of our own concerning what 
‘ought’ to be the definition of a consistent assessment 
that, with sequential rationality, will give the ‘proper’ 
definition of a sequential equilibrium.” (Kreps and 
Wilson, 1982, p. 876.) 
In a similar vein, Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, p. 225) write  
“We do not find the consistency requirement to be 
natural, since it is stated in terms of limits; it appears to 
be a rather opaque technical assumption.” 
In the next chapter we will introduce a simpler refinement of subgame-perfect 
equilibrium which has a clear interpretation in terms of the AGM theory of 
belief revision: we call it Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. We will also show that 
one can use this notion to provide a characterization of sequential equilibrium 
that does not require the use of limits of sequences of completely mixed 
strategies. 
We conclude this chapter by observing that while the notion of sequential 
equilibrium eliminates strictly dominated choices at information sets (even if 
they are reached with zero probability), it is not strong enough to eliminate 
weakly dominated choices. To see this, consider the “simultaneous” game 
shown in Figure 11.6. 
CC D D
x y
A B
1
2
0
0
2
2
1
3
1
3
 
Figure 11.6 
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In this game there are two Nash (and subgame-perfect) equilibria: (A, D) and (B, 
C ). However, C is a weakly dominated strategy for Player 2. The only beliefs 
of Player 2 that rationalize choosing C is that Player 1 chose B with probability 
1 (if Player 2 attaches any positive probability, no matter how small, to Player 
1 choosing A, then D is the only sequentially rational choice). Nevertheless, 
both Nash equilibria are sequential equilibria. For example, it is 
straightforward to check that the “unreasonable” Nash equilibrium σ = (B, C ), 
when paired with beliefs 
0 1
x y
µ
 
 
 
, constitutes a sequential equilibrium. 
Consistency of this assessment is easily verified by considering the sequence 
1 1 1 11 1
n
n n n n
A B C D
σ
 
=  − − 
 whose associated beliefs are 
1 11
n
n n
x y
µ
 
=  − 
 and 
sequential rationality is clearly satisfied. 
Many game theorists feel that it is “irrational” to choose a weakly dominated 
strategy; thus further refinements beyond sequential equilibrium have been 
proposed. A stronger notion of equilibrium, which is a strict refinement of 
sequential equilibrium,  is the notion of trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. This 
notion, due to Reinhardt Selten (who also introduced the notion of subgame-
perfect equilibrium) precedes chronologically the notion of sequential 
equilibrium (Selten, 1975). Trembling-hand perfect equilibrium does in fact 
eliminate weakly dominated strategies. This topic is outside the scope of this 
book.
7
 
                                                 
7
 The interested reader is referred to van Damme (2002). 
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Appendix 11.E: Exercises 
11.E.1 .  Exercises  for  Section 11.1 :  Consistent 
assessments 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this 
chapter. 
Exercise 11.1. Consider the following extensive form. 
ba
c
t u x y
r s2
1
3 3v
d e ed
 
Consider the following (partial) behavior strategy profile 
3 31 1 1
5 5 5 4 4
a b c d e
σ
 
=  
 
.  
Find the corresponding system of beliefs obtained by Bayesian updating. 
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Exercise 11.2. Consider the following game. 
x
0
x
2
x
3
L
E
R
l r l r
-1
0
0
1
-1
1
1
2
player 1's payoff
player 2's payoff
x
10
10
W
1
2
2
t
b
-1
-1
1
1
 
(a) Write the corresponding strategic form. 
(b) Find all the pure-strategy Nash equilibria. 
(c) Find all the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria. 
(d) Which of the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria can be part of a 
consistent assessment? Give a proof for each of your claims. 
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11.E.2 .  Exercises  for  Section 11.2 :  Sequential 
equilibrium 
Exercise 11.3. Consider the following extensive-form game. For each pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium determine whether it is part of an assessment which 
is a sequential equilibrium. 
x 0
x 1 x 2
x 3 x 4
1
2
3
L M
R
l
r
l r
1
0
0
player 1's payoff
player 3's payoff
player 2's payoff
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
2
2
1
0
0
0
a b a b
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Exercise 11.4.  Consider the following game: 
1
1
1 2
2
3 zw
yx
A B
C D C D
E
F
G
H
L M L M
1
0
0
0
1
2
0
2
2
2
0
0 2
3
1
0
2
0
0
3
3
2
1
2
1
2
2
RL
 
(a) Find three subgame-perfect equilibria. [Use pure strategies wherever 
possible.] 
(b) For each of the equilibria you found in part (a),  explain if it can be written 
as part of a weak sequential equilibrium.  
(c) Find a sequential equilibrium. [Use pure strategies wherever possible.] 
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Exercise 11.5.  An electric circuit connects two switches and a light. One 
switch is in Room 1, the second switch is in Room 2 and the light is in Room 3. 
Player 1 is in Room 1, Player 2 in Room 2 and Player 3 in Room 3. The two 
switches are now in the Off position. The light in Room 3 comes on if and 
only if both switches are in the On position. Players 1 and 2 act simultaneously 
and independently: each is allowed only two choices, namely whether to leave 
her switch in the Off position or turn it to the On position; these decisions 
have to be executed within one minute. If the light comes on in Room 3 then 
the game ends and Players 1 and 2 get $100 each while Player 3 gets $300. If the 
light in Room 3 stays off after one minute, then Player 3 (not knowing what 
the other players did) has to make a guess as to what Players 1 and 2 did (thus, 
for example, one possible guess is “both players left their respective switches in 
the Off position”). The payoffs are as follows: (i) if Player 3’s guess turns out to 
be correct then each player gets $200, (ii) if Player 3 makes one correct guess 
but the other wrong (e.g. he guesses that both Player 1 and Player 2 chose 
“Off” and, as a matter of fact, Player 1 chose “Off” while Player 2 chose “On”), 
then Player 3 gets $50, the player whose action was guessed correctly gets $100 
and the remaining player gets nothing (in the previous example, Player 1 gets 
$100, Player 2 gets nothing and Player 3 gets $50) and (iii) if Player 3’s guess is 
entirely wrong then all the players get nothing. All the players are selfish and 
greedy (that is, each player only cares about how much money he/she gets and 
prefers more money to less) and risk neutral. 
(a) Represent this situation as an extensive-form game. 
(b) Write the corresponding strategic form, assigning the rows to Player 1, the 
columns to Player 2, etc. 
(c) Find all the pure-strategy Nash equilibria. 
(d) For at least one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium prove that it cannot be 
part of a sequential equilibrium. 
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◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊ 
Exercise 11.6. (Challenging Question). 
A buyer and a seller are bargaining over an object owned by the seller. The 
value of the object to the buyer is known to her but not to the seller. The 
buyer is drawn randomly from a population with the following characteristics: 
the fraction λ value the object at $H while the remaining fraction value the 
object at $L, with H > L > 0. The bargaining takes place over two periods. In 
the first period the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer (i.e. names the price) 
and the buyer accepts or rejects. If the buyer accepts, the transaction takes place 
and the game ends. If the buyer rejects, then the seller makes a new take-it-or-
leave-it offer and the buyer accepts or rejects. In either case the game ends. 
Payoffs are as follows: (1) if the seller’s offer is accepted (whether it was made in 
the first period or in the second period), the seller’s payoff is equal to the price 
agreed upon and the buyer’s payoff is equal to the difference between the value 
of the object to the buyer and the price paid; (2) if the second offer is rejected 
both players get a payoff of 0. Assume that both players discount period 2 
payoffs with a discount factor δ ∈ (0,1), that is, from the point of view of 
period 1, getting $x in period 2 is considered to be the same as getting $δx in 
period 1. For example, if the seller offers price p in the first period and the offer 
is accepted, then the seller’s payoff is p, whereas if the same price p is offered 
and accepted in the second period, then the seller’s payoff, viewed from the 
standpoint of period 1, is δp.  Assume that these payoffs are von Neumann-
Morgenstern payoffs.  
(a) Draw the extensive form of this game for the case where, in both periods, 
the seller can only offer one of two prices: $10 or $12; assume further that  
H = 20, L = 10, 3
4
δ =  and λ = 2
3
. Nature moves first and selects the value 
for the buyer; the buyer is informed, while the seller is not. It is common 
knowledge between buyer and seller that Nature will pick H with 
probability λ and L with probability (1−λ). 
(b) For the game of part (a) find a pure-strategy  sequential equilibrium. Prove 
that what you suggest is indeed a  sequential equilibrium. 
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Appendix 11.S:  Solutions to exercises  
Exercise 11.1.  The extensive form under consideration is 
ba
c
t u x y
r s2
1
3 3v
d e ed
 
The system of beliefs obtained, by Bayesian updating, from the (partial) 
behavior strategy profile 
3 31 1 1
5 5 5 4 4
a b c d e
σ
 
=  
 
 is as follows: 
 
31
5 5 31
4 43 31 1
5 5 5 5
( ) , ( )r sµ µ= = = =
+ +
, 
( )
( )
3 3
5 4 9
133 3 1
5 4 5
( ) ,xµ = =
+
 
( )
1
5 4
133 3 1
5 4 5
( ) ,yµ = =
+
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
5 4 1
73 31 1 1 1
5 4 5 4 5 4
( ) ,tµ = =
+ +
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
31
5 4 3
73 31 1 1 1
5 4 5 4 5 4
( )uµ = =
+ +
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
3 1
5 4 3
73 31 1 1 1
5 4 5 4 5 4
( )vµ = =
+ +
.   
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Exercise 11.2.  The game under consideration is 
x
0
x
2
x
3
L
E
R
l r l r
-1
0
0
1
-1
1
1
2
player 1's payoff
player 2's payoff
x
10
10
W
1
2
2
t
b
-1
-1
1
1
 
(a) The corresponding strategic form is as follows: 
   Player 2  
  tl tr bl br 
 L 0 , 10 0 , 10 0 , 10 0 , 10 
Player R 1 , 1 1 , 1 −1, −1 −1, −1 
1 W −1, 0 0 , 1 −1, 0 0 , 1 
 E −1, 1 1 , 2 −1, 1 1 , 2 
(b) The pure-strategy Nash equilibria are: (L, bl),  (R, tl),  (R, tr),  (E, tr),  (E, br). 
(c) There is only one proper subgame, namely the one that starts at node x1 ; in 
that subgame the unique Nash equilibrium is t.  Thus only the following are 
subgame-perfect equilibria: (R, tl ),  (R, tr ),  (E, tr ). 
(c) Each of the above subgame-perfect equilibria can be part of a consistent 
assessment. Let 2 3
1 1
2 2
( , ),
x x
R tlσ µ
 
= =  
 
; this assessment is consistent as the 
following sequences of completely mixed strategies and corresponding 
system of beliefs show ( 1, 2,...n = ):  
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31 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 1
n
n n n n n n n n
L W E R b t l r
σ
 
=  − − − 
 , 
2 3
1 1
1 1
2 21 1 1 1
n n n
n n n n
x x
µ
 
 =  = = + + 
. 
Clearly limn nσ σ→∞ =  and limn nµ µ→∞ = . 
Let 2 3
1 1
2 2
( , ),
x x
R trσ µ
 
= =  
 
; this assessment is consistent as the following 
sequences of completely mixed strategies and corresponding system of 
beliefs show: 
31 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 1
n
n n n n n n n n
L W E R b t l r
σ
 
=  − − − 
, 
 
2 3
1 1
1 1
2 21 1 1 1
n n n
n n n n
x x
µ
 
 =  = = + + 
.   Clearly limn nσ σ→∞ =  and limn nµ µ→∞ = . 
Let 2 3( , ),
0 1
x x
E tlσ µ
 
= =  
 
; this assessment is consistent as the following 
sequences of completely mixed strategies and corresponding beliefs show: 
31 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 1
n
n n n n n n n n
L W E R b t l r
σ
 
=  − − − 
, 
2 3
31
3 31 1
1
1 1
n n n
n n n n
x x
µ
 
 = − 
 + − + − 
. 
Clearly limn nσ σ→∞ =  and limn nµ µ→∞ = . 
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Exercise 11.3.  The game under consideration is the following: 
x 0
x 1 x 2
x 3 x 4
1
2
3
L M
R
l
r
l r
1
0
0
player 1's payoff
player 3's payoff
player 2's payoff
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
2
2
1
0
0
0
a b a b
 
(a) The corresponding strategic form is: 
                        Player 2                          Player 2    
  l r    l r 
 R 1  ,  0  ,  0 1  ,  0  ,  0  R 1  ,  0  ,  0 1  ,  0  ,  0 
Player M 0  ,  1  ,  1 2  ,  2  ,  1  M 0  ,  1  ,  0 0  ,  0  ,  0 
1 L 0  ,  1  ,  0 0  ,  0  ,  0  L 0  ,  1  ,  0 0  ,  0  ,  0 
         
                         Player 3 
chooses a 
  Player 3 chooses b 
(b) The pure-strategy Nash equilibria are: (R,l,a), (M,r,a), (R,l,b) and (R,r,b).  
They are all subgame perfect because there are no proper subgames.  (R,l,b) 
and (R,r,b) cannot be part of a sequential equilibrium because b is a strictly 
dominated choice at Player 3’s information set and, therefore, (R,l,b) and 
(R,r,b) would violate sequential rationality (with any system of beliefs). On 
the other hand, both (R,l,a) and (M,r,a) can be part of an assessment which 
is a sequential equilibrium.   
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First we show that σ = (R,l,a) together with the system of beliefs 
1 2 3 4
2 1
3 3
1 0
x x x x
µ
 
=  
 
 is a sequential equilibrium. Consider the sequence of 
completely mixed strategy profiles whose nth term is  
32 1 1 1 1 11 1 1
n
n n n n n n n
L M R l r a b
σ
 
=  − − − 
. Clearly lim n
n
σ σ
→∞
= . The 
corresponding Bayesian system of beliefs has nth term 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
1 2 3 4
1 1 1 12 1
2 1 1 1
3 32 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1
1 1
n n n n nn n
n n
n n n n n n n n n n n n
x x x x
µ
 
 
−=  = = = − = + + − + − + 
 
Clearly lim n
n
µ µ
→∞
= . Thus the assessment is consistent (Definition 11.1). 
Sequential rationality is easily checked: given the strategy profile and the 
system of beliefs,  
(1) for Player 3, a yields 1, while b yields 0, (2) for Player 2, l  yields 1, while r 
yields 2 1 2
3 3 3
(0) (2)+ =  and  (3) for Player 1, R yields 1, while L and M yield 0. 
Next we show that σ = (M,r,a) together with 1 2 3 4
0 1 0 1
x x x x
µ
 
=  
 
 is a 
sequential equilibrium. Consider the sequence of completely mixed strategy 
profiles whose nth term is  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2
1 1 1
n
n n n n n n n
L M R l r a b
σ
 
=  − − − 
. Clearly 
lim n
n
σ σ
→∞
= . The corresponding Bayesian system of beliefs has nth term 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
1 2 3 4
1 11
2 1 1 1 1
2 1 2 1 21 1 1 1 1
2
1
1 1
1 1 1
n nn n
n n n n
n n n n n
x x x x
µ
− −
 
 
−=  = − = −
 + − − + − 
 
Clearly lim n
n
µ µ
→∞
= . Thus the assessment is consistent (Definition 11.1). 
Sequential rationality is easily checked: given the strategy profile and the 
system of beliefs,  
(1) for Player 3,  a yields 1, while b yields 0, (2) for Player 2,  l  yields 1, while r 
yields 2 and  (3) for Player 1,  M yields 2, while R yields 1 and L yields 0. 
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Exercise 11.4.  The game under consideration is the following: 
1
1
1 2
2
3 zw
yx
A B
C D C D
E
F
G
H
L M L M
1
0
0
0
1
2
0
2
2
2
0
0 2
3
1
0
2
0
0
3
3
2
1
2
1
2
2
RL
 
(a) First we solve the subgame on the left, whose strategic form is: 
C D
A 1 , 0 0 , 1
B 0 , 2 2 , 0
Player
1
Player  2
 
There is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Let p be the probability of A and q 
the probability of C. Then at a Nash equilibrium it must be that q = 2(1−q) and 
2(1−p) = p. Thus there is a unique Nash equilibrium given by  
2 1 2 1
3 3 3 3
A B C D 
 
 
 
with an expected payoff of 2
3
 for both players.  
Next consider the subgame on the right. In this subgame the following are 
pure-strategy Nash equilibria: (F , H, M ) (where Player 1’s payoff is 1), (E , L , H ) 
(where Player 1’s payoff is 2), and (E , L , G ) (where Player 1’s payoff is 2).  
Thus the following are subgame-perfect equilibria: 
2 1 2 1
3 3 3 3
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
L R A B C D E F G H L M 
 
   
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2 1 2 1
3 3 3 3
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
L R A B C D E F G H L M 
 
   
2 1 2 1
3 3 3 3
0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
L R A B C D E F G H L M 
 
 
 
(b) 2 1 2 1
3 3 3 3
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
L R A B C D E F G H L M 
 
 
 cannot be part of a weak 
sequential equilibrium, because choice M is strictly dominated by L and 
thus there are no beliefs at Player 3’s information set that justify choosing 
M. 
2 1 2 1
3 3 3 3
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
L R A B C D E F G H L M 
 
 
 cannot be part of a weak 
sequential equilibrium, because – given that Player 3 chooses L −   H is not 
a sequentially rational choice for Player 2 at his singleton node. 
2 1 2 1
3 3 3 3
0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
L R A B C D E F G H L M 
 
 
 is a weak sequential 
equilibrium with the following system of beliefs: 2 1
3 3
1 0
x y w z 
 
 
. 
 
(c) 
2 1 2 1
3 3 3 3
0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
L R A B C D E F G H L M 
 
 
 together with beliefs 
2 2
3 3
1 0
x y w z
µ
 
=  
 
 is a sequential equilibrium. Consistency can be verified 
with the sequence of completely mixed strategies  
1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 3 3 3
1 1 1 1
n
n n n n n n n n
L R A B C D E F G H L M
σ
 
=  − − − − 
 
For example, 
( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1
( ) 1
1 1 1 1 1
n n
n
n n n n n n
wµ
− −
= = →
− − + − − +
 as n → ∞ . 
Sequential rationality is easily verified. 
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Exercise 11.5.  (a) The extensive form is as follows, where FF means 1Off-2Off, 
FN means 1Off-2On, etc. 
                1 
Off On Off On
2
3
FF NFFN FNFF NF FN NFFF
100
100
300
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
100
50
100
0
50
100
0
50
0
100
50
Off On
v w
x y z
 
(b) The corresponding strategic form is as follows: 
On Off
On 100 , 100 , 300 200 , 200 , 200
Off 0 , 0 , 0 0 , 100 , 50
On Off
On 100 , 100 , 300 0 , 0 , 0
Off 200 , 200 , 200 100 , 0 , 50
On Off
On 100 , 100 , 300 0 , 100 , 100
Off 100 , 0 , 50 200 , 200 , 200
Player 1
Player 3: both Off
Player 1
Player 2 
Player 2 
Player 2 
Player 1
Player 3: 1On-2Off
Player 3: 1Off-2On
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(c) The Nash equilibria are highlighted in the strategic form:  
(On, Off, 1On-2Off ), (Off, On, 1Off-2On), (On, On, both-Off ) and  
(Off, Off, both-Off ). 
(d) (On, On, both-Off ) cannot be part of a sequential equilibrium. First of 
all, for Player 3 ‘both-Off ’ is a sequentially rational choice only if Player 
3 attaches (sufficiently high) positive probability to node x. However, 
consistency does not allow beliefs with µ(x) > 0. To see this, consider a 
sequence of completely mixed strategies { },n np q  for Players 1 and 2, 
where np  is the probability with which Player 1 chooses On and nq  is 
the probability with which Player 2 chooses On and lim lim 0n n
n n
p q
→∞ →∞
= = . 
Then, by Bayesian updating, 
{ }( )
( ) ( )
| , ,
1 1
n n
n
n n n n n n
p q
P x x y z
p q p q q p
=
+ − + −
.                    (♦) 
If nq  goes to 0 as fast as, or faster than, np  (that is, if lim
n
n
n
q
p→∞
 is finite, 
then divide numerator and denominator of (♦) by np  to get 
{ }( )
( ) ( )
| , ,
1 1
n
n
n
n n n
n
q
P x x y z
q
q q p
p
=
+ − + −
. Taking the limit as n → ∞  
we get 
( )
0
0
0 1 lim 1n
n
n
q
p→∞
=
 
+ +  
 
. [If np goes to 0 as fast as or faster than nq  
then repeat the above argument by dividing by nq .] Thus a consistent 
assessment must assign zero probability to node x.  
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Exercise 11.6 (Challenging Question).  (a) The game is as follows, with p = $12 
and q = $10.: 
  
NATURE
yes yes
no no
no no
p =12p =12
yes yes
seller
yes
yes yes
no
nono
no
p p
q q
buyer buyer
buyer
buyer buyer
buyer
yes
buyer buyer
buyer
yes yes
yes yes
buyer
no
buyer
no
buyer
no
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
no
q q
p p
p = 12
L−p =  −2
1
3
1 λ− =
L=10H=20
q = 10q = 10
2
3
λ =
seller
p = 12
H−p = 8
q =10
L−q = 0
q = 10
H−q = 10
9pδ =
( ) 2.5L pδ − = −
9pδ =
( ) 6H pδ − =
7.5qδ =
seller
7.5qδ =
( ) 7.5H qδ − = ( ) 0L qδ − =
9pδ =
( ) 6H pδ − =
9pδ =
( ) 2.5L pδ − = −
7.5qδ =
( ) 7.5H qδ − =
7.5qδ =
( ) 0L qδ − =
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(b) The following assessment ( , )σ µ  is a  sequential equilibrium. The pure-
strategy profile σ  is as follows:   
The seller offers p = 12 in period 1 and, if his offer is rejected, he offers q = 
10 in period 2; furthermore, if the first-period offer had been q = 10 and it 
had been rejected then he would have offered q = 10 again in the second 
period. 
The H buyer (that is, the buyer at information sets that follow Nature’s 
choice of H) always says yes to any offer of the seller. 
The L buyer (that is, the buyer at information sets that follow Nature’s 
choice of L) always says no to an offer of p and always says yes to an offer 
of q. 
The system of beliefs is as follows (where TL means the left node of the top 
information set of the seller, TR the right node of that information set, ML 
means the left node of the middle information set of the seller, MR the right 
node of that information set, BL means the left node of the bottom 
information set of the seller, BR the right node of that information set): 
2 1
3 3
0 1 0 1
TL TR ML MR BL BR
µ
 
=  
 
.  
  Let us first check sequential rationality. The seller’s payoff is 
( ) ( )( )3 632 13 3 4 612 10+ =  which is greater than the payoff he would get if he 
offered q = 10, namely a payoff of 10. The H-type’s payoff is 20 −12 = 8, 
while if she said no to p = 12 and then yes to q = 10 in period 2 her payoff 
would be 3 15
4 2
(20 10) 7.5− = = . Furthermore, for the H type, at every node 
of hers, saying yes is always strictly better than saying no. The L-type’s 
payoff is 0, while if she said yes to p = 12 then her payoff would be −2. At 
every node of the L type after having been offered p = 12 saying no is 
strictly better than saying yes and at every node  after having been offered q 
= 10 saying no gives the same payoff as saying yes, namely 0. 
To check consistency, construct the following completely mixed strategy 
profile 
1,2,...n n
σ
=
 : (1) for the seller and for the L-buyer, any choice that has 
zero probability in σ is assigned probability 1
n
 in nσ  and any choice that 
has probability 1 in σ is assigned probability 11
n
−  in nσ , (2) for the H-
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buyer, any choice that has zero probability in σ is assigned probability 21n  
in nσ  and any choice that has probability 1 in σ is assigned probability 
2
11
n
−  in nσ . Let us compute the corresponding beliefs nµ  at the top and at 
the bottom information sets of the seller: 
( )
( ) ( )
2
2
1 1
1 1 1 1
1
( )
1
n n
n
n n nn
TL
n
µ = =
++
  and 
( )
( ) ( )2
1 1
11 1 1 1
1
( )
1
n n
n
nn n nn
TRµ = =
++
; thus lim ( ) 0 ( )n
n
TL TLµ µ
→∞
= =  and 
lim ( ) 1 ( )n
n
TR TRµ µ
→∞
= = ; 
( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
1 1
1
1 1 1 1
1
( )
1 1 1
n n
n n
n n n n
BLµ
−
= =
− + − −
  and 
( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
1 1
1
1 1 1 1
1 1
( ) 1
1 1 1
n n
n n
n n n n
BRµ
− −
== = −
− + − −
; thus lim ( ) 0 ( )n
n
BL BLµ µ
→∞
= =  and 
lim ( ) 1 ( )n
n
BR BRµ µ
→∞
= = . 
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Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 
12.1 Belief revision and AGM consistency 
ny attempt  to refine the notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium in 
extensive-form (or dynamic) games must deal with the issue of belief 
revision : how should a player revise her beliefs when informed that 
she has to make a choice at an information set to which she initially assigned 
zero probability? As we saw in Chapter 11, Kreps and Wilson (1982) suggested 
the notion of a consistent assessment (Definition 11.1) to deal with this issue. 
From now on, we shall refer to the notion of consistency proposed by Kreps 
and Wilson, as KW-consistency (KW stands for ‘Kreps-Wilson’), in order to 
distinguish it from a different notion of consistency, called AGM-consistency, 
that will be introduced in this section. We shall make use of concepts 
introduced in Section 8.3 (Chapter 8): the reader might want to review that 
material before continuing. 
In this chapter it will be more convenient to use the so called “history-based” 
definition of extensive-form game, which is spelled out in Appendix 12.A. 
Essentially it boils down to identifying a node in the tree with the sequence of 
actions leading from the root to it. We call a sequence of actions starting from 
the root of the tree a history. For example, consider the extensive form of 
Figure 12.1.  
Chapter 
12 
A 
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2
3
44
a
b
ee
g mh m nh n
f
g
s
z
1
z
2
z
4
z
3
f
z
10
z
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z z
9
z
7
x
0
z
85
x
1
x
2
x
3
x
4
x
7
1
dc
x
5
x
6
 
Figure 12.1 
Node 0x  (the root of the tree) is identified with the null or empty history ∅ , 
decision node 6x  with the history (or sequence of actions) adf, terminal node 8z  
with history adfn, etc. Thus it will no longer be necessary to label the nodes of 
the tree, because we can refer to them by naming the corresponding histories.  
If h is a decision history we denote by A(h) the set of actions (or choices) 
available at h. For example, in the game of Figure 12.1, ( ) { , }A a c d= , 
( ) { , }A ac e f= , ( ) { , }A adf m n= , etc. If h is a history and a  is an action available 
at h (that is ( )a A h∈ ), then we denote by ha the history obtained by appending 
a to h.  
We saw in Chapter 8 (Section 8.3) that the AGM theory of belief revision 
(introduced by Alchourrón et al., 1985) is intimately linked to the notion of a 
plausibility order. This is what motivates the following definition. 8 
                                                 
8
 For an explicit analysis of the connection between the AGM theory of belief revision and the 
notion of plausibility order introduced in Definition 12.1 see Bonanno (2011). 
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First recall that a total pre-order on a set H is a binary relation ≾  which is 
complete (for all , ,h h H′∈  either h h′≾  or h h′≾  or both) and transitive (for 
all , , ,h h h H′′′ ∈ , if h h′≾  and h h′′′≾  then h h′′≾ ). We write ~h h′   as a short-
hand for “ h h′≾  and h h′≾ ”  and h h′≺   as a short-hand for “h h′≾  and 
h h′ /≾ ”. 
Definition 12.1. Given a finite extensive form, a plausibility order is a total pre-
order ≾  on the finite set of histories H that satisfies the following properties 
(recall that D is the set of decision histories, ( )A h  is the set of actions available 
at decision history h and ( )I h  is the  information set that contains decision 
history h):  for all h D∈ , 
PL1. For all ( )a A h∈ , h ha≾ .  
PL2.  (i) There exists an ( )a A h∈  such that ~h ha ,  and 
         (ii) for all ( )a A h∈ ,  if ~h ha  then ~h h a′ ′  for all ( )h I h′∈ , 
PL3.  if history h  is assigned to chance, then ~h ha , for all ( )a A h∈ .  
The interpretation of h h′≾  is that history h is at least as plausible as history h′ ; 
thus h h′≺  means that h is more plausible than h′  and ~h h′  means that h is just 
as plausible as h′ . An alternative reading of h h′≾  is “h weakly precedes h′  in 
terms of plausibility”. 
Property PL1 of Definition 12.1 says that adding an action to a decision history 
h cannot yield a more plausible history than h itself. Property PL2 says that at 
every decision history h there is at least one action a which is “plausibility 
preserving” in the sense that adding a to h yields a history which is as plausible 
as h; furthermore, any such action a performs the same role with any other 
history that belongs to the same information set as h. Property PL3 says that all 
the actions at a history assigned to chance are plausibility preserving. 
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Definition 12.2. Given an extensive-form, an assessment ( , )σ µ  is  
AGM-consistent if there exists a plausibility order ≾  on the set of histories H 
such that: 
(i) the actions that are assigned positive probability by σ  are precisely the  
     plausibility-preserving actions: for all h D∈  and for all ( )a A h∈ , 
( ) 0   ~a h haσ > if  and only if                                  (P1) 
(ii) the histories that are assigned positive probability by µ  are precisely those 
      that are most plausible within the corresponding information set:  
      for all h D∈ ,  
( ) 0   ,   ( )h h h h I hµ > ′ ′∈if  and only if  for all≾ .                   (P2) 
If ≾  satisfies properties P1 and P2 with respect to ( , )σ µ , we say that ≾  
rationalizes ( , )σ µ . 
In conjunction with sequential rationality, the notion of AGM-consistency is 
sufficient to rule out some subgame-perfect equilibria. Consider, for example, 
the extensive game of Figure 12.2 and the pure-strategy profile ( , , )c d fσ =  
(highlighted by double edges), which constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the 
game (and also a subgame-perfect equilibrium since there are no proper 
subgames).  
e
c
2
1
d
a
b
f fg
ggf
3a bd be
1
0
2
0
0
0
0
1
0
2
0
1
0
1
0
2
0
1
0
0
1  
Figure 12.2 
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Can σ  be part of a sequentially rational AGM-consistent assessment ( , )σ µ ? 
Since, for Player 3, choice f can be chosen rationally only if the player assigns 
(sufficiently high) positive probability to history be, sequential rationality 
requires that ( ) 0beµ > ; however, any such assessment is not AGM-consistent. 
In fact, if there were a plausibility order ≾   that satisfied Definition 12.2, then, 
by P1, ~b bd  (since ( ) 1 0dσ = >  ) and b be≺  (since ( ) 0eσ = )9 and, by P2, 
be bd≾  (since − by hypothesis − µ  assigns positive probability to be). By 
transitivity of ≾ , from b be≺  and ~b bd  it follows that bd be≺ , yielding a 
contradiction. 
On the other hand, the Nash equilibrium ( ) 1,cσ ′ =  1
2
( ) ( ) ,d eσ σ′ = ′ =   
1
2
( ) ( )f gσ σ′ = ′ =  together with beliefs 1
2
( ) ( )bd beµ µ′ = ′ =  forms a sequentially 
rational, AGM-consistent assessment: it can be rationalized by the plausibility 
order shown in Figure 12.3, where each row represents an equivalence class (∅  
denotes the null history, that is, the root of the tree):   
,
, , , , , ,
, ,
c
b bd be bdf bdg bef beg
a af ag
 
 
 
 
 
most plausible
least plausible
∅
 
Figure 12.3 
We use the following convention in representing a plausibility order: if the row 
to which history h belongs is above the row to which h′  belongs, then h h′≺  (h 
is more plausible than h′ ) and if h and h′  belong to the same row then ~h h′   
(h is as plausible as h′ ). 
 
 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced in 
this section, by going through the exercises in Section 12.E.1 of Appendix 12.E at 
the end of this chapter. 
                                                 
9
 By PL1 of Definition 12.1, b be≾  and, by P1 of Definition 12.2, it is not the case that ~b be  
because e   is not assigned positive probability by σ . Thus b be≺ . 
GAME THEORY – Giacomo Bonanno 
 
423 
 
12.2 Bayesian consistency 
The definition of AGM-consistency deals with the supports of a given 
assessment, that is with the actions that are assigned positive probability by the 
strategy profile σ and the histories that are assigned positive probability by the 
system of beliefs µ. In this sense it is a qualitative (as opposed to quantitative) 
property: how the probabilities are distributed on those supports is irrelevant 
for AGM-consistency. However, we also need to impose quantitative 
restrictions concerning the actual probabilities. The reason for this is that we 
want the given assessment to satisfy “Bayesian updating as long as possible”. By 
this we mean the following:  
(1) when information causes no surprises, because the play of the game is 
consistent with the most plausible play(s) (that is, when information sets are 
reached that have positive prior probability), then beliefs should be formed 
using Bayesian updating (Definition 8.3, Chapter 8), and 
(2) when information is surprising (that is, when an information set is reached 
that had zero prior probability) then new beliefs can be formed in an 
arbitrary way, but from then on Bayesian updating should be used to 
update those new beliefs, whenever further information is received that is 
consistent with those beliefs.  
The next definition captures the above requirements. 
Definition 12.3. Given a finite extensive form, let ≾  be a plausibility order 
that rationalizes the assessment ( , )σ µ . We say that ( , )σ µ  is Bayesian (or Bayes 
consistent) relative to ≾  if for every equivalence class E of ≾  that contains some 
decision history h with ( ) 0hµ >   (that is, E Dµ
+∩ ≠ ∅ , 
where { : ( ) 0}D h D hµ µ
+ = ∈ > ) there exists a probability distribution 
: [0,1]E Hν →   (recall that H is a finite set) such that: 
( ) 0   . E h h E Dµν
+> ∈ ∩B1. if  and only if    
B2. If ,h h E Dµ
+′∈ ∩   and 1... mh ha a′ =  (that is, h is a prefix of h′ ) then  
       1( ) ( ) ( )  ...  ( )E E mh h a aν ν σ σ′ = × × × . 
B3.  If  h E Dµ
+∈ ∩  then, for every ( )h I h′∈ , ( )
( )
( )
( )  | ( )
( )
def
E
E
E
h I h
h
h h I h
h
ν
µ ν
ν
′′∈
′
′ ′= =
′′∑
.  
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Property B1 requires that ( ) 0E hν >  if and only if h E∈  and ( ) 0hµ > . 
Property B2 requires Eν  to be consistent with the strategy profile σ  in the 
sense that if ,h h E′∈ , ( ) 0hµ > , ( ) 0hµ ′ > and 1... mh ha a′ =  then the probability 
that Eν  assigns to h′  is equal to the probability that Eν  assigns to h multiplied 
by the probabilities (according to σ )  of the actions that lead from h to h′ .10 
Property B3 requires the system of beliefs µ  to satisfy the conditional 
probability rule in the sense that if h E∈ and ( ) 0hµ >  (so that E is the 
equivalence class of the most plausible elements of I(h)) then, for every history 
( )h I h′∈ , ( )hµ ′  (the probability assigned to h′  by µ) coincides with the 
probability of h′  conditional on I(h) using the probability distribution Eν . 
As an example of an AGM-consistent and Bayesian consistent assessment, 
consider the extensive form of Figure 12.4 and the assessment 
1 2
3 3
0 0 1 1 0
a b c d e f g
σ
 
=  
 
 , 
31 1 1 2
4 4 4 4 4
0
ad ae b a bf bg
µ
 
=  
 
.  
a
c
b
1
2d e
d e
d e
f
g
f
g
f
g
1
4
3
4
3
0
1
4
1
4
2
4
2
3
1
31
3
2
3
 
Figure 12.4 
                                                 
10
 Note that if ,h h E′∈  and 1... mh ha a′ =  then ( ) 0jaσ >  for all  j = 1,…,m. In fact, since h h′∼ , 
every action ja   is plausibility preserving and thus, by Property P1 of Definition 12.2, 
( ) 0jaσ >  . 
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The assessment 
1 2
3 3
0 0 1 1 0
a b c d e f g
σ
 
=  
 
 , 
31 1 1 2
4 4 4 4 4
0
ad ae b a bf bg
µ
 
=  
 
 
is AGM consistent, since it is rationalized by the plausibility order shown in 
Figure 12.5 
,
, , , , , , , ,
, , , ,
c
a b ad bf bg adf adg bfd bgd
ae aef aeg bfe bge
 
 
 
 
 
most plausible
least plausible
∅
  
Figure 12.5 
Furthermore, the assessment is Bayesian relative to this plausibility order. First 
of all, note that { , , , , , }D a ad b bf bgµ
+ = ∅ .
11
 Let E be the top equivalence class 
( { , }E c= ∅ ), F the middle one ( { , , , , , , , , }F a b ad bf bg adf adg bfd bgd= ) and G 
the bottom one ( { , , , , }G ae aef aeg bfe bge= ). Then only E and F have a non-
empty intersection with Dµ
+  and thus, by Definition 12.3, we only need to 
specify two probability distributions: Eν  and Fν . The first one is trivial, since 
{ }EDµ
+ ∩ = ∅  and thus it must be ( ) 1Eν =∅  (and ( ) 0E hν =  for every other 
history h). Since { , , , , }a ad b bfD bgFµ
+ ∩ = , by B1 of Definition 12.3 it must be 
that ( ) 0F hν >  if and only if { , , , , }a ad b bfh bg∈ . Consider the following 
probability distribution: 
31 1 1 2
8 8 8 8 8
F
a ad b bf bg
ν
 
=  
 
   (and ( ) 0F hν =  for every other history h). 
Property B2 of Definition 12.3 is satisfied, because 
 
1
8
( )( )
( ) 1
F
F
da
ad
σν
ν
=
= × , 
 
3 1
8 3
( ) ( )
( )
F
F
b f
bf
ν σ
ν
=
= ×  and 
 
3 2
8 3
( ) ( )
( )
F
F
b g
bg
ν σ
ν
=
= × .  To check that Property B3 of 
Definition 12.3 is satisfied, let 2 { , , }I a bf bg=  be the information set of Player 2 
and 3 { , , }I b ad ae=  be the information set of Player 3. Then 2( ) ( )F FI aν ν= +  
4
8
( ) ( )F Fbf bgν ν+ =  and 
3 1 4
3 8 8 8
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0F F F FI b ad aeν ν ν ν= + + = + + = . Thus 
                                                 
11
 Recall that { : ( ) 0}
def
D h D hµ µ
+ ∈ >= . 
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1
8 1
44
2 8
( )
( )
( )
F
F
a
a
I
ν
µ
ν
= = = ,    
1
8 1
44
2 8
( )
( )
( )
F
F
bf
bf
I
ν
µ
ν
= = = ,    
2
8 2
44
2 8
( )
( )
( )
F
F
bg
bg
I
ν
µ
ν
= = =  
3
8 3
44
3 8
( )
( )
( )
F
F
b
b
I
ν
µ
ν
= = = ,    
1
8 1
44
3 8
( )
( )
( )
F
F
ad
ad
I
ν
µ
ν
= = = ,   
4
3 8
( ) 0
0 ( )
( )
F
F
ae
ae
I
ν
µ
ν
= = = . 
 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced in 
this section, by going through the exercises in Section 12.E.2 of Appendix 12.E at 
the end of this chapter. 
 
12.3 Perfect Bayesian equilibrium 
By adding sequential rationality (Definition 10.2) to AGM-consistency 
(Definition 12.2) and Bayesian consistency (Definition 12.3) we obtain a new 
notion of equilibrium for extensive-form games. 
Definition 12.4. Given a finite extensive-form game, an assessment ( , )σ µ   is a  
perfect Bayesian equilibrium if it is sequentially rational, it is rationalized by a 
plausibility order on the set of histories and is Bayesian relative to that 
plausibility order. 
For an example of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, consider the game of Figure 
12.6 (which is based on the frame of Figure 12.4) and the assessment  considered 
in the previous section, namely 
1 2
3 3
0 0 1 1 0
a b c d e f g
σ
 
=  
 
, 
31 1 1 2
4 4 4 4 4
0
ad ae b a bf bg
µ
 
=  
 
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a
c
b
1
2d e
d e
d e
f
g
f
g
f
g
1
4
3
4
3
0
1
4
1
4
2
4
2
3
1
31
3
2
3
1
2
0
0
2
3
1
3
1
3
3
2
1
2
1
3
0
2
2
2
0
3
1
1
2
0
0
 
Figure 12.6 
We showed in the previous section that the assessment under consideration is 
AGM and Bayesian consistent. Thus we only need to verify sequential 
rationality. For Player 3 the expected payoff from playing f is 
( ) ( )3 314 4 40 (0)1 1+ + =  and the expected payoff from playing  g  is  
( ) ( )3 314 4 43 (0)2 0+ + = ; thus any mixture of f and g is sequentially rational, in 
particular the mixture 
1 2
3 3
f g 
 
 
. For Player 2 the expected payoff from playing 
d  is ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 1 24 3 3 4 42 2 2 2 2 + + + =  , while the expected payoff from playing e 
is ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 51 1 2 1 24 3 3 4 4 43 3 0 1 + + + =  ; thus d is sequentially rational. For Player 1, c 
gives a payoff of 2 while a gives a payoff of 1
3
 and b a gives a payoff of 5
3
; thus c 
is sequentially rational. 
We now turn to the properties of Perfect Bayesian equilibria.  
Theorem 12.1 (Bonanno, 2013). Consider a finite extensive-form game and an 
assessment ( , )σ µ . If ( , )σ µ  is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium then (1) σ is a 
subgame-perfect equilibrium and (2) ( , )σ µ  is a weak sequential equilibrium. 
GAME THEORY – Giacomo Bonanno 
 
428 
 
The example of Figure 12.2 (Section 12.1) showed that not every subgame-
perfect equilibrium can be part of a  perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Thus, by 
Theorem 12.1, the notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium is a strict refinement 
of the notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium. 
Theorem 12.2 (Bonanno, 2013). Consider a finite extensive-form game and an 
assessment ( , )σ µ . If ( , )σ µ  is sequential equilibrium then σ is a perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium. 
Not every  perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a sequential equilibrium. To see this, 
consider the game of Figure 12.7.  
c1
f g
2
d d
3
f g
e e
0
1
0
0
0
0
2
2
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
a b
1
0
0
[0][1]
[0] [1]
 
Figure 12.7 
A  perfect Bayesian equilibrium is given by the pure-strategy profile 
( , , )c d gσ =  (highlighted by double edges), together with the degenerate beliefs 
( ) ( ) 1a beµ µ= = . In fact, ( , )σ µ  is sequentially rational and, furthermore, it is 
rationalized by the plausibility order shown in Figure 12.8 and is Bayesian 
relative to it (the probability distributions on the equivalence classes that 
contain histories h  with ( ) 0hµ >   are written next to the order): 
GAME THEORY – Giacomo Bonanno 
 
429 
 
{ , }
{ , }
{ , }
, ( ) 1
, ( ) 1
,
,        , ( ) 1
,
c
a ad
be beg
c
a ad a
b bd
be beg be
ae aeg
bef
aef
ν
ν
ν
∅ =   
   =   
   −
   
=   
   −
   
−   
   −  
most plausible
least plausible
∅ ∅
 
Figure 12.8 
The belief revision policy encoded in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium can be 
interpreted either as the point of view of an external observer or as a belief 
revision policy which is shared by all the players. For example, the perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium under consideration (for the game of Figure 12.7), namely 
( , , )c d gσ =  and ( ) ( ) 1a beµ µ= = , reflects the following belief revision policy: 
the initial beliefs are that Player 1 will play c ; conditional on learning that 
Player 1 did not play c, the observer would become convinced that Player 1 
played a (that is, she would judge a to be strictly more plausible than b) and 
would expect Player 2 to play d ; upon learning that Player 1 did not play c and 
Player 2 did not play d, the observer would become convinced that Player 1 
played b and Player 2 played e, hence judging be to be strictly more plausible 
than ae, thereby reversing her earlier belief that a was strictly more plausible 
than b. Such a belief revision policy is consistent with the AGM rationality 
axioms (Alchourrón et al., 1985) but is incompatible with the notion of 
sequential equilibrium. In fact, ( , )σ µ  is not KW-consistent (Definition 11.1, 
Chapter 11). To see this, consider an arbitrary sequence 
1,2,...n n
σ
=
 that 
converges to σ : 
1 1 1
n
n n n n n n n n
a b c d e f g
p q p q r r t t
σ
 
=  − − − − 
 with lim n
n
p
→∞
=  
lim lim lim 0n n n
n n n
q r t
→∞ →∞ →∞
= = = . Then the corresponding sequence 
1,2,...n n
µ
=
 of 
beliefs obtained by Bayesian updating is given by 
n n n n n n n n n
n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n
a b ae be
p q p r p q r q
p q p q p r q r p q p r q r p q
µ
 
 =  = = + + + + + + 
. 
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Thus, ( ) ( )n na aeµ µ= ; therefore if lim ( ) ( ) 1n
n
a aµ µ
→∞
= =  then 
lim ( )n
n
aeµ
→∞
= 1 ( ) 0aeµ≠ = . 
By Theorem 11.2 (Chapter 11), every finite extensive-form game with cardinal 
payoffs has at least one sequential equilibrium and, by Theorem 12.2, every 
sequential equilibrium is a  perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Thus the following 
theorem follows as a corollary of these two results. 
Theorem 12.3. Every finite extensive-form game with cardinal payoffs has at 
least one perfect Bayesian equilibrium. 
The relationship among the different notions of equilibrium introduced so far 
(Nash equilibrium, subgame-perfect equilibrium, weak sequential equilibrium,  
perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium) is shown in the Venn 
diagram of Figure 12.9. 
Sequential
equilibria
Subgame-perfect equilibria
Perfect Bayesian equilibria
Weak sequential equilibria
Nash equilibria
 
Figure 12.9 
 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced in 
this section, by going through the exercises in Section 12.E.3 of Appendix 12.E at 
the end of this chapter. 
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12.4 Adding independence 
The notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium imposes relatively mild restrictions 
on beliefs at information sets that are reached with zero probability. Those 
restrictions require consistency between the strategy profile σ  and the  system 
of belief µ, as well as the requirement of Bayesian updating “as long as possible”  
(that is, also after beliefs have been revised at unreached information sets). The 
example of Figure 12.7 showed that  perfect Bayesian equilibrium is compatible 
with a belief revision policy that allows a reversal of judgment concerning the 
behavior of one player after observing an unexpected move by a different 
player. One might want to rule out such forms of belief revision. In this section 
we introduce and discuss further restrictions on belief revision that incorporate 
some form of independence. 
Situations like the one illustrated in Figure 12.7 are ruled out by the following 
restriction on the plausibility order: if h and h′  belong to the same information 
set ( ( )h I h′∈ ) and a  is an action available at h ( ( )a A h∈ ), then 
 h h ha h a′ ′≾ ≾if  and only if   .                               ( 1IND ) 
1IND says that if h is deemed to be at least as plausible as h′ , then the addition 
of any action a must preserve this judgment, in the sense that ha must be 
deemed to be at least as plausible as h a′ , and vice versa. This restriction can be 
viewed as an independence condition, in the sense that observation of a new 
action cannot lead to a change in the relative plausibility of prior histories. Any 
plausibility order that rationalizes the assessment discussed for the game shown 
in Figure 12.7 violates 1IND , since it must be such that a b≺  and also be ae≺ .  
Another independence condition is the following, which says that if, 
conditional on history h, action a is implicitly judged to be at least as plausible 
as action b then the same judgment must be made conditional on any other 
history that belongs to the same information set as h:  if ( )h I h′∈  
and , ( )a b A h∈ , then 
ha hb h a h b′ ′≾ ≾  if  and only if   .                         ( 2IND ) 
Remark 12.1. The two properties 1IND  and 2IND  are independent of each 
other, in the sense that there are plausibility orders that satisfy one of the two 
properties but not the other (see Exercises 12.7 and 12.8). 
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Property 1IND  is a qualitative property, to which we can add a corresponding 
quantitative condition on the probabilities:  we call a system of beliefs µ  weakly 
independent  if it satisfies the following condition (recall that 
{ : ( ) 0}D h D hµ µ
+ ∈ >= ):   
{ }( ),  ( ), ( )  , , ,
                      
 
( ) )
( )
 
(
( )
h I h a A h h a I ha h h ha
h ha
h h a
h a Dµ
µ µ
µ µ
+′ ′′∈ ∈ ′ ∈
=
′
⊆
′
and
then    
if  
            ( 3IND ) 
The game illustrated in Figure 12.10 below shows that it is possible for an 
assessment ( , )σ µ  to satisfy Property 1IND  even though µ  fails to satisfy 
Property 3IND . 
c1
f g
2
d d
3
f g
e e
0
1
0
0
0
0
2
2
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
a b
1
0
0
 
Figure 12.10 
Consider the assessment consisting of the pure-strategy profile ( , , )c d gσ =  
(highlighted by double edges) and the system of beliefs 
31 1 1
2 2 4 4
a b ae be
µ
 
=  
 
. 
This assessment is rationalized by the plausibility order 
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,
, , ,
, , ,
,
c
a b ad bd
ae be aeg beg
aef bef
 
 
 
 
 
 
most plausible
least plausible
∅
 
which satisfies Property 1IND , since a b∼  and ad bd∼  and ae be∼ . However, 
µ fails to satisfy Property 3IND  since { , , , }a b ae be Dµ
+⊆  and 
1
3
( ) ( )
1
( ) ( )
a ae
b be
µ µ
µ µ
= ≠ = . 
Definition 12.5. Given a finite extensive-form game, an assessment ( , )σ µ   is 
an  independent perfect Bayesian equilibrium if it is a perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium that is rationalized by a plausibility order that satisfies properties 
1IND  and 2IND  and, furthermore, µ  satisfies property 3IND . 
The following theorem is proved in Appendix 12.B at the end of this chapter, 
using a result given in the next section. 
Theorem 12.4. Consider a finite extensive-form game and an assessment 
( , )σ µ . If   ( , )σ µ  is a sequential equilibrium then it is an  independent perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium.  
Exercise 12.10 shows that not every independent perfect Bayesian equilibrium 
is a sequential equilibrium. Thus the notion of sequential equilibrium is a strict 
refinement of the notion of independent perfect Bayesian equilibrium, which − 
in turn −  is a strict refinement of perfect Bayesian equilibrium, as illustrated in 
the Venn diagram of Figure 12.11 below. 
GAME THEORY – Giacomo Bonanno 
 
434 
 
Sequential
equilibria
Independent perfect Bayesian equilibria
Perfect Bayesian equilibria
 
Figure 12.11 
 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced in 
this section, by going through the exercises in Section 12.E.4 of Appendix 12.E at 
the end of this chapter. 
12.5 Filling the gap between perfect Bayesian  
 equilibrium and sequential equilibrium 
Besides sequential rationality, the notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium 
(Definition 12.4) is based on two elements: (1) the qualitative notions of 
plausibility order and AGM-consistency and (2) the notion of Bayesian 
consistency relative to the plausibility order. In this section we will show that 
by strengthening these two conditions one obtains a characterization of 
sequential equilibrium. The strengthening of the first condition is that the 
plausibility order that rationalizes the given assessment has a “cardinal” 
numerical representation that can be interpreted as measuring the plausibility 
distance between histories in a way that is preserved by the addition of a 
common action. The strengthening of the second condition imposes uniform 
consistency on the conditional probability distributions on the equivalence 
classes of the plausibility order, by requiring that the relative probabilities of 
two decision histories in the same information set be preserved when a 
common action is added. 
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Definition 12.6. Given a finite extensive form and a plausibility order ≾  on 
the set of histories H, a function :F H → ℕ  (where ℕ  denotes the set of non-
negative integers) is an integer-valued representation of ≾  if, for all ,h h H′∈ ,   
( ) ( )F h F h≤ ′   if and only if  h h′≾ . 
An integer-valued representation F of a plausibility order is analogous to an 
ordinal utility function for a preference relation: it is just a numerical 
representation of the order. Note that, in the case of a plausibility order, we 
find it more convenient to assign lower values to more plausible histories (while 
a utility function assigns higher values to more preferred alternatives or 
outcomes).  
Remark 12.2. If :F H → ℕ  is an integer-valued representation of a plausibility 
order ≾  on the set of histories H, without loss of generality we can assume that 
( ) 0F =∅  (recall that ∅  denotes the null history, which is always one of the 
most plausible histories).12 
Remark 12.3. Since H is a finite set, an integer-valued representation of a 
plausibility order ≾  on H  always exists. A natural integer-valued 
representation is the following. Define  
0 { : , } H h H h x x H= ∈ ∈for all≾  
(thus 0H  is the set of most plausible histories in H), and 
1 0 0{  \ :  ,  \ }H h H H h x x H H= ∈ ∈for all≾  
(thus 1H  is the set of most plausible histories among the ones that remain after 
removing the set 0H  from H ) and, in general, for every integer 1k ≥  define 
0 1 0 1{  \ ( ...  :  , )   \ ( .. ).  }k k kH h H H H h x x H H H− −= ∈ ∪ ∪ ∈ ∪ ∪for all≾ . Since H  
is finite, there is an m∈ℕ  such that 0{ ,..., }mH H   is a partition of H  and, for 
every ,j k∈ℕ , with j k m< ≤ , and for every ,h h H′∈ , if jh H∈  and kh H′∈   
then h h′≺ . Define ˆ :F H →ℕ  as follows: ˆ ( )F h k=  if and only if kh H∈ ; then 
the function Fˆ  so defined is an integer-valued representation of  ≾   and 
                                                 
12
 Let :F H →ℕ  be an integer-valued representation of a plausibility order ≾  and define 
:F H → ℕ  as follows: ( ) ( ) ( )F h F h F= − ∅ . Then F is also an integer-valued representation of 
≾  and ( ) 0F =∅ . 
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ˆ ( ) 0F =∅  . 
Definition 12.7. Given a finite extensive form, a plausibility order ≾  on the 
set of histories H is choice measurable  if it has at least one integer-valued 
representation F that satisfies the following property: for all h D∈ , for all 
( )h I h′∈  and  for all ( )a A h∈ ,13 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )F h F h F ha F h a′ ′− = − .                           (CM) 
If we think of F as measuring the “plausibility distance” between histories, then 
we can interpret choice measurability (CM) as a distance-preserving condition: 
the plausibility distance between two histories in the same information set is 
preserved by the addition of the same action.  
For example, consider the extensive form of Figure 12.12. 
2
d
b c
e f e f
1
a
 
Figure 12.12 
The assessment consisting of the pure-strategy profile ( , )a eσ =  (highlighted by 
double edges) and the system of beliefs 
1 0
b c
µ
 
=  
 
 (the grey node in Player 2’s 
information set represents the history which is assigned zero probability) is 
rationalized by the plausibility order shown in Figure 12.13 below together 
with two integer-valued representations ( Fˆ  is the one described in Remark 
                                                 
13
 Recall that D is the set of decision histories, ( )I h  the information set that contains decision 
history h  and ( )A h   the set of actions available at decision history h. 
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12.3). While Fˆ  does not satisfy Property CM (since ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) 3 1 2F c F b− = − =  
ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) 5 2 3F cf F bf≠ − = − = ), F does satisfy Property CM. Since there is at least 
one integer-valued representation that satisfies Property CM, by Definition 
12.7 the plausibility order of Figure 12.13 is choice measurable. 
ˆ:   :   :
,   0   0
,  1  1 
  2   3
,   3   4
  4   5
  5   6
F F
a
b be
bf
c ce
d
cf
≾
∅
 
Figure 12.13 
On the other hand, the plausibility order shown in Figure 12.14 (which 
reproduces Figure 12.8 and refers to the game of Figure 12.7) is not choice 
measurable, because any integer-valued representation F must be such that 
( ) ( ) 0F b F a− >  while ( ) ( ) 0F be F ae− < . 
,
,
,
,
,
c
a ad
b bd
be beg
ae aeg
bef
aef
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
∅
 
Figure 12.14 
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Rationalizability by a choice measurable plausibility order is one of the two 
properties that are needed to fill the gap between perfect Bayesian equilibrium 
and sequential equilibrium. The second property is a strengthening of the 
notion of Bayesian consistency (Definition 12.3).  
To set the stage for the next definition, let ( , )σ µ  be an assessment which is 
rationalized by a plausibility order ≾ . As before, let Dµ
+  be the set of decision 
histories to which µ  assigns positive probability: { }: ( ) 0D h D hµ µ+ = ∈ > . Let 
µ
+
E  be the set of equivalence classes of ≾  that have a non-empty intersection 
with Dµ
+ . Then µ
+
E  is a non-empty, finite set. Suppose that ( , )σ µ  is Bayesian 
relative to ≾  (Definition 12.3) and let { }E E µν +∈E  be a collection of probability 
distributions that satisfy the properties of Definition 12.3. We call a probability 
distribution : (0,1]Dν →  (recall that D is the set of all decision histories) a full-
support common prior of { }E E µν +∈E   if, for every E µ
+∈E , the probability 
distribution Eν  coincides with the distribution obtained by conditioning ν  on 
the set E Dµ
+∩ , that is, for all h E Dµ
+∈ ∩ , 
( )
( ) ( | )
( )
def
E
h E D
h
h h E D
h
µ
µ
ν
ν ν
ν
+
+
′∈ ∩
= ∩ =
′∑
.  
Note that a full support common prior ν  assigns positive probability to all 
decision histories, not only to those in Dµ
+ .  
Remark 12.4. Since any two elements of µ
+
E  are mutually disjoint, a full 
support common prior always exists; indeed, there is an infinite number of 
them. Furthermore, it can be shown (see Bonanno, 2015) that there always 
exists a full-support common prior ν  that satisfies the following properties: if 
( )a A h∈  and ha D∈ , then  (1) ( ) ( )ha hν ν≤  and (2) if ( ) 0aσ >   then 
( ) ( ) ( )ha h aν ν σ= × . 
The following definition requires that, among the many full-support common 
priors, there be one that, besides the properties of Remark 12.4, satisfies the 
additional property that the relative likelihood of any two histories in the same 
information set be preserved by the addition of the same action. 
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Definition 12.8. Consider an extensive form. Let ( , )σ µ  be an assessment that 
is rationalized by a plausibility order ≾  on the set of histories H and is 
Bayesian relative to it and let { }E E µν +∈E   be a collection of probability 
distributions that satisfy the properties of Definition 12.3. We say that ( , )σ µ  is 
uniformly Bayesian relative to ≾  if there exists a full-support common prior 
: (0,1]Dν →  of { }E E µν +∈E  that satisfies the following properties: 
UB1. If ( )a A h∈  and ha D∈  then (1) ( ) ( )ha hν ν≤  and (2) if ( ) 0aσ >   then 
( ) ( ) ( )ha h aν ν σ= × . 
UB2. If ( )a A h∈ , h and h′  belong to the same information set and ,ha h a D′ ∈  
then  
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
h ha
h h a
ν ν
ν ν
=
′ ′
. 
UB1 is the property of Remark 12.4, which can always be satisfied by an 
appropriate choice of a full-support common prior. UB2 requires that the 
relative probability, according to the common prior ν , of any two histories 
that belong to the same information set remain unchanged by the addition of 
the same action.  
Choice measurability and uniform Bayesian consistency are independent 
properties. For example, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium ( , , )c d gσ =  and 
( ) ( ) 1a beµ µ= =  of the game of Figure 12.7 is such that any plausibility order 
that rationalizes it cannot be choice measurable
14
 and yet ( , )σ µ   is uniformly 
Bayesian relative to the plausibility order shown in Figure 12.8 that rationalizes 
it.
15
   On the other hand, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium ( , , )c d gσ = , 
3 31 1
4 4 4 4
a b ae be
µ
 
=  
 
  of the game of Figure 12.10 is rationalized by the choice 
                                                 
14
 Because, by P2 of Definition 12.2, any such plausibility order ≾  would have to satisfy a b≺   
and be ae≺ , so that any integer-valued representation F of it would be such that 
( ) ( ) 0F b F a− >  and ( ) ( ) 0F be F ae− <  
15
 As can be seen by taking ν   to be the uniform distribution over the set { }, , , ,D a b ae be= ∅  
(that is, 1
5
( )hν =  for every h D∈ ):   UB1 is clearly satisfied and UB2 is also satisfied, since 
1
5
1
5
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
a ae
b be
ν ν
ν ν
= = . 
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measurable plausibility order 
,
, , ,
, , ,
,
c
a b ad bd
ae be aeg beg
aef bef
 
 
 
 
 
 
most plausible
least plausible
∅
 but it cannot be 
uniformly Bayesian relative to any plausibility order that rationalizes it.16 
We can now state the main result of this section, namely that choice 
measurability and uniform Bayesian consistency are necessary and sufficient for 
a perfect Bayesian equilibrium to be a sequential equilibrium. 
Theorem 12.5 (Bonanno, 2015). Consider a finite extensive-form game and an 
assessment ( , )σ µ .  The following are equivalent: 
(A)  ( , )σ µ  is a sequential equilibrium, 
(B)  ( , )σ µ  is a  perfect Bayesian equilibrium that is rationalized by a choice-
measurable plausibility order and is uniformly Bayesian relative to it. 
Thus Theorem 12.5 provides a characterization (or understanding) of sequential 
equilibrium which is free of the questionable requirement of taking a limit of 
sequences of completely mixed strategies and associated systems of beliefs (see 
the remarks in Chapter 11, Section 11.3). 
Using Theorem 12.5 one can prove Theorem 12.4, namely that a sequential 
equilibrium is an independent perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The proof is given 
in Appendix B at the end of this chapter.  
As an application of Theorem 12.5, consider the extensive-form game of Figure 
12.15 below.  
                                                 
16
 Because, by P2 of Definition 12.2, any such plausibility order would have to have the 
following equivalence classes: { , , , }E a b ad bd=  and { , , , }F ae be aeg beg=  (thus 
{ , }E D a bµ
+∩ =  and { , }F D ae beµ
+∩ = ). Hence, if ν  is any common prior then 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
E
a
a
a b
ν
ν
ν ν
=
+
  and 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
E
b
b
a b
ν
ν
ν ν
=
+
. By B3 of Definition 12.3, 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
E
E E
a
a
a b
ν
µ
ν ν
=
+  
and 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
E
E E
b
b
a b
ν
µ
ν ν
=
+
. Thus 
( )( ) ( )
3
( ) ( ) ( )
E
E
aa a
b b b
νν µ
ν ν µ
= = =  and, similarly, 
1
3
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
F
F
aeae ae
be be be
νν µ
ν ν µ
= = =  , yielding a violation of UB2 of Definition 12.8. 
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1
0
0
2
1
3
0
3
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
2
0
1
1
1
0
2
3
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
2
1
0
a
b c
d
T T
B B
e
f
RRRL L L
1
 
Figure 12.15 
Using Theorem 12.5 let us show that the assessment ( , )σ µ  with 
( , , , )a T f Lσ =  and 
7 3 7 3 8
10 10 18 18 18
b c bB cBf d
µ
 
=  
 
 is a sequential equilibrium. 
First we check sequential rationality. For Player 1 at the root the possible 
payoffs are: 1 with a, 0 with b, 0 with c (more precisely, with either ce or cf ) and 
0 with d; thus a is sequentially rational. For Player 1 at history cB the possible 
payoffs are: 1 with e and 2 with f ; thus f  is sequentially rational. For Player 2 
the possible payoffs are: 7 3 21
10 10 10
(3) (0)+ =  with T and 7 3 9
10 10 10
(0) (3)+ =  with B; 
thus T is sequentially rational. For Player 3 the possible payoffs are: 
7 3 8 15
18 18 18 18
(1) (0) (1)+ + =  with L and 7 3 8 3
18 18 18 18
(0) (1) (0)+ + =  with R; thus L is 
sequentially rational. By Theorem 12.5 it only remains to show that ( , )σ µ  is 
rationalized by a choice-measurable plausibility order and is uniformly 
Bayesian relative to it. Indeed, ( , )σ µ  is rationalized by the plausibility order 
shown in Figure 12.16 together with a choice-measurable integer-valued 
representation F. 
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: :
, 0
, , , 1
, , , , , , 2
, , , 3
F
a
b c bT cT
d bB cB cBf dL bBL cBfL
dR bBR cBfR cBe
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
≾
∅
  
Figure 12.16 
To see that ( , )σ µ  is uniformly Bayesian relative to this plausibility order, let 
1 2,E E  and 3E  be the top three equivalence classes of the order and consider the 
following probability distributions, which satisfy the properties of Definition 
12.3 (so that ( , )σ µ  is Bayesian relative to this plausibility order): 
1
( ) 1Eν =∅ , 
2 7 3
10 10
E
b c
ν

=

 
 
 and 
3 7 3 3 8
21 21 21 21
E
bB cB cBf d
ν
 
=  
 
; then a full support common 
prior that satisfies the properties of Definition 12.8 is the one shown in Figure 
12.17 below: 
9 7 7 3 3 3 8
40 40 40 40 40 40 40
b bB c cB cBf d
ν
 
=  
 
∅
  
Figure 12.17 
 
 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced in 
this section, by going through the exercises in Section 12.E.5 of Appendix 12.E at 
the end of this chapter. 
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Appendix 12.A:  
History-based definition of extensive-form game 
If A is a set, we denote by A∗  the set of finite sequences in A. If 
1,..., kh a a A
∗= ∈  and 1 j k≤ ≤ , the sequence 1,..., jh a a′ =  is called a  prefix  
of  h (a proper prefix of  h if j k< ).  If 1,..., kh a a A
∗= ∈  and a A∈ ,  we denote 
the sequence 1,..., ,ka a a A
∗∈  by ha. A finite extensive form is a tuple 
{ }, , , , i i NA H N ι ∈≈  whose elements are:  
• A finite set of actions A.   
• A finite set of histories H A∗⊆  which is closed under prefixes (that is, if  
h H∈ and h A∗′∈  is a prefix of h,  then h H′∈ ). The null (or empty) 
history . , denoted by ∅ , is an element of H and is a prefix of every 
history (the null history ∅  represents the root of the tree). A history h H∈  
such that, for every a A∈ , ha H∉ , is called a terminal history. The set of 
terminal histories is denoted by Z. \D H Z=  denotes the set of non-
terminal or decision histories. For every decision history h D∈ , we denote 
by A(h) the set of actions available at h, that is, ( ) { : }A h a A ha H= ∈ ∈ .  
• A finite set {1,..., }N n=  of players. In some cases there is also an additional, 
fictitious, player called chance.   
• A function : { }D N chanceι → ∪  that assigns a player to each decision 
history. Thus ( )hι  is the player who moves at history h. A game is said to 
be without chance moves if ( )h Nι ∈  for every h D∈ . For every 
{ }i N chance∈ ∪ , let 1( )iD iι
−=  be the set of histories assigned to Player i. 
Thus 1{ , ,..., }chance nD D D  is a partition of D. If history h is assigned to chance 
( ( )hι = chance ), then a probability distribution over ( )A h  is given that 
assigns positive probability to every ( )a A h∈ .   
• For every player , ii N∈ ≈  is an equivalence relation on iD . The 
interpretation of ih h≈ ′  is that, when choosing an action at history ih D∈ , 
Player i does not know whether she is moving at h or at h′ . The 
equivalence class of ih D∈  is denoted by ( )iI h  and is called an information 
set of Player i; thus ( ) { : }i i iI h h D h h′ ′= ∈ ≈ . The following restriction 
applies: if ( )ih I h′∈  then ( ) ( )A h A h′ = , that is, the set of actions available to 
a player is the same at any two histories that belong to the same 
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information set of that player.   
• The following property, known as perfect recall, is assumed: for every 
Player i N∈ , if 1 2, ih h D∈ , 1( )a A h∈  and 1h a   is a prefix of 2h  then, for 
every 2( )ih I h′∈ , there exists an 1( )ih I h∈  such that ha   is a prefix of h′ . 
Intuitively, perfect recall requires a player to remember what she knew in 
the past and what actions she took previously.  
• Given an extensive form, one obtains an extensive game by adding, for every 
Player i N∈ , a utility (or payoff) function :iU Z →ℝ   (where ℝ  denotes the 
set of real numbers; recall that Z is the set of terminal histories). 
Figure 12.A.1 below shows an extensive form without chance moves where 
{ , , , , , , , , , , }A a b s c d e f g h m n= , { , , , , , , , }D a b ac ad acf ade adf= ∅  (to simplify the 
notation we write a instead of ,a∅ , ac instead of , ,a c∅ , etc.), 
{ , , , , , , , , , }Z s ace acfg acfh adeg adeh adfm adfn bm bn= , H D Z= ∪ , 
( ) { , , }A a b s=∅ , ( ) { , }A a c d= , ( ) ( ) { , }A ac A ad e f= = , 
( ) ( ) { , }A acf A ade g h= = , ( ) ( ) { , }A adf A b m n= = ,  
( ) 1ι =∅ , ( ) 2aι = , ( ) ( ) 3ac adι ι= = , ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 4acf ade adf bι ι ι ι= = = = ,  
1  {( , )}≈ = ∅ ∅ , 2   {( , )}a a≈ = , 3  {( , ), ( , ), ( , ), ( , )}ac ac ac ad ad ac ad ad≈ =  and 
4  {( , ), ( , ), ( , ), ( , ), ( , ), ( , ), ( , ), ( , )}acf acf acf ade ade acf ade ade adf adf adf b b adf b b≈ = . 
The information sets containing more than one history (for 
example, 4 ( ) { , }I b adf b= ) are shown as rounded rectangles. The root of the tree 
represents the null history ∅ . 
4
2
3
4
a
b
c d
ee
g mh m nh n
f
g
1 s
f
 
Figure 12.A.1 
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If h and h′   are decision histories not assigned to chance, we write ( )h I h′∈   as 
a short-hand for ( ) ( )hh I hι′∈  . Thus ( )h I h′∈  means that h and h′  belong to the 
same information set (of the player who moves at h). If h is a history assigned to 
chance, we use the convention that ( ) { }I h h= . 
Given an extensive form, a pure strategy of Player i N∈  is a function that 
associates with every information set of Player i an action at that information 
set, that is, a function :i is D A→  such that (1) ( ) ( )is h A h∈  and (2) if ( )ih I h′∈   
then ( ) ( )i is h s h′ = . For example, one of the pure strategies of Player 4 in the 
extensive form illustrated in Figure 12.A.1 is 4 4( ) ( )s acf s ade g= =  and 
4 4( ) ( )s adf s b m= = . A behavior strategy of player i is a collection of probability 
distributions, one for each information set, over the actions available at that 
information set; that is, a function : ( )i iD Aσ → ∆   (where ( )A∆   denotes the 
set of probability distributions over A) such that (1) ( )i hσ  is a probability 
distribution over ( )A h   and (2) if ( )ih I h′∈  then ( ) ( )i ih hσ σ′ = . If the game 
does not have chance moves, we define a behavior strategy profile as an n-tuple 
1( ,..., )nσ σ σ=  where, for every i N∈ , iσ  is a behavior strategy of Player i. If 
the game has chance moves then we use the convention that a behavior strategy 
profile is an (n+1)-tuple 1( ,..., , )n chanceσ σ σ σ=  where, if h is a history assigned 
to chance and ( )a A h∈ , then ( )( )chance h aσ  is the probability associated with a. 
When there is no risk of ambiguity (e.g. because no action is assigned to more 
than one information set) we shall denote by ( )aσ  the probability assigned to 
action a by the relevant component of the strategy profile σ .17  Note that a 
pure strategy is a special case of a behavior strategy where each probability 
distribution is degenerate. A behavior strategy is completely mixed at history 
h D∈  if, for every ( )a A h∈ , ( ) 0aσ > .  For example, in the extensive form of 
Figure 12.A.1 a possible behavior strategy for Player 1 is 
0 0 1
a b s 
 
 
 , which 
can be more simply denoted by s (and which coincides with a pure strategy of 
Player 1) and a possible behavior strategy of Player 2 is 
1 2
3 3
c d 
 
 
 (which is a 
completely mixed strategy). 
                                                 
17
 If 
ih D∈   and iσ   is the 
thi   component of σ , then ( )i hσ  is a probability distribution over 
( )A h ; thus if ( )a A h∈  then ( )( )i h aσ  is the probability assigned to action a  by ( )i hσ :  we 
denote ( )( )i h aσ  more succinctly by ( )aσ  . 
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Appendix 12.B:  
Proof of Theorem 12.4 using Theorem 12.5 
We prove Theorem 12.4, namely that a sequential equilibrium is an 
independent perfect Bayesian equilibrium, using Theorem 12.5. To simplify the 
notation, we will assume that no action is available at more than one 
information set, that is, that if ( ) ( )a A h A h′∈ ∩  then ( )h I h′∈  (this is without 
loss of generality, because we can always rename some of the actions). 
Let ( , )σ µ  be a sequential equilibrium. First we show that Property 1IND  is 
satisfied. By Theorem 12.5 there is a choice measurable plausibility order ≾ 
that rationalizes ( , )σ µ . Let F be an integer-valued representation of ≾ that 
satisfies Property CM of Definition 12.6 and let ( )h I h′∈  and ( )a A h∈ . 
Suppose that h h′≾ ; then ( ) ( )F h F h′≤ , that is, ( ) ( ) 0F h F h′− ≤  and thus, by 
CM, ( ) ( ) 0F ha F h a′− ≤ , that is, ( ) ( )F ha F h a′≤ , which implies that ha h a′≾ ; 
conversely, if ha h a′≾  then ( ) ( ) 0F ha F h a′− ≤  and, by Property CM, 
( ) ( ) 0F h F h′− ≤ , which implies that h h′≾ . Thus Property 1IND  is satisfied. 
Next we shows that Property CM is equivalent to the following property: 
if ( )h I h′∈  and , ( )a b A h∈  then ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )F hb F ha F h b F h a′ ′− = −      (♦) 
Let ≾  be a plausibility order on the set of histories H and let :F H → ℕ  be an 
integer-valued representation of ≾  that satisfies Property CM of Definition 
12.6. Without loss of generality (see Remark 12.2), we can assume that 
( ) 0F =∅ . For every decision history h and action ( )a A h∈ , define  
( ) ( ) ( )a F ha F hλ = − .  The function : Aλ → ℕ   is well defined,  since, by 
assumption, no action is available at more than one information set and, by 
CM, if ( )h I h′∈  then ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )F h a F h F ha F h′ ′− = − . Then, for every history 
1 2, ,..., mh a a a= , 
1
( ) ( )
m
i
i
F h aλ
=
= ∑ . In fact,  
( ) ( )1 2 1 1 2 1( ) ( ) ... ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ...ma a a F a F F a a F aλ λ λ+ + + = − + − +∅
( )1 2 1 2 1( ... ) ( ... )m mF a a a F a a a −+ − = 1 2( ... ) ( )mF a a a F h=  
(recall that ( ) 0F =∅ ).  Thus, for every h D∈   and ( )a A h∈ , ( )F ha =  
( ) ( )F h aλ+ . Hence, ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )F hb F ha F h b F h a b aλ λ λ λ− = + − + = −  
and ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )F h b F h a F h b F h a b aλ λ λ λ′ − ′ = ′ + − ′ + = −  so that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )F hb F ha F h b F h a− = ′ − ′ . Thus we have shown that CM implies (♦).  
Now we show the converse, namely that (♦) implies (CM). Let ≾  be a 
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plausibility order on the set of histories H and let :F H → ℕ  be an integer-
valued representation of ≾  that satisfies (♦). Select arbitrary ( )h I h′∈   and 
( )a A h∈ . Let ( )b A h∈  be a plausibility-preserving action at h (there must be at 
least one such action: see Definition 12.1); then, ~h hb  and ~h h b′ ′ . Hence, 
since F  is a representation of ≾ , ( ) ( )F hb F h=  and ( ) ( )F h b F h′ = ′  so that  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )F h F h F h b F hb′ − = ′ − .  By (♦), ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )F h b F hb F h a F ha′ − = ′ − . From 
the last two equalities it follows that ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )F h F h F h a F ha′ − = ′ − , that is, CM 
holds.  
Since Property CM is equivalent to Property (♦) and the latter implies 
Property 2IND , we have also proved that a sequential equilibrium satisfies 
2IND . 
It only remains to show that a sequential equilibrium satisfies Property 3IND . 
Let ( , )σ µ  be a sequential equilibrium. Then by Theorem 12.5 there is a choice 
measurable plausibility order ≾ that rationalizes ( , )σ µ , relative to which 
( , )σ µ  is uniformly Bayesian. Let ( )h I h′∈ , ( )a A h∈ , ( ) h a I ha′ ∈ and 
{ }, , ,h h ha h a Dµ+′ ′ ⊆ . Since ( )h I h′∈ , ( ) 0hµ >  and ( ) 0hµ ′ > , by P2 of 
Definition 12.2,  h and h′  are most plausible histories in ( )I h  and thus h h′∼ . 
Similarly ha and h a′  are most plausible histories in ( )I ha  and thus ha h a′∼ . 
Let E be the equivalence class to which h and h′  belong, F  the equivalence class 
to which ha and h a′  belong and let Eν  and Fν  be the probability distributions 
postulated by Definition 12.3. Let ν   be a uniform common prior (Definition 
12.8). Then, by UB2 of Definition 1.8, 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
h ha
h h a
ν ν
ν ν
=
′ ′
 and by definition of 
common prior 
( )
( )
( )
E
x E D
h
h
x
µ
ν
ν
ν
+∈ ∩
=
∑
, 
( )
( )
( )
E
x E D
h
h
x
µ
ν
ν
ν
+∈ ∩
′
′ =
∑
, 
( )
( )
( )
F D
F
y
ha
ha
y
µ
ν
ν
ν
+∈ ∩
=
∑
 
and 
( )
( )
( )
y F D
F
h a
h a
y
µ
ν
ν
ν
+∈ ∩
′
′ =
∑
. Thus 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
E
E
h h
h h
ν ν
ν ν
=
′ ′
 and 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
F
F
ha ha
h a h a
ν ν
ν ν
=
′ ′
, so that 
(since 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
h ha
h h a
ν ν
ν ν
=
′ ′
)  
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
E F
E F
h ha
h h a
ν ν
ν ν
=
′ ′
.  By Property B3 of Definition 12.3, 
( )
( )
( )
( )
E
E
h
h
h
h
µ
ν µ
ν
=
′′
 and 
( )
( )
( )
( )
F
F
ha
h a
ha
h a
µ
µ
ν
ν
=
′′
;  thus 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
h ha
h h a
µ µ
µ µ
=
′ ′
, that is,  Property 
3IND  is satisfied.  
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Appendix 12.E: Exercises 
12.E.1. Exercises for Section 12.1:   
           Belief revision and AGM consistency 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this 
chapter. 
Exercise 12.1. Consider the following game: 
4
2
3
a
b
c d
ee
g h h
f
g
1 s
f
g gh h
1
1
1
1
2
0
2
2
3
0
1
1
3
1
1
3
1
1
3
2
3
0
0
0
2
0
2
2
3
0
1
3
1
1
3
3
2
0
1
0
 
Determine if  there is a plausibility order that rationalizes the following 
assessment (Definition 12.2): 
1 2 1 1
3 3 2 2
0 0 1 1 0
a b s c d e f g h
σ
 
=  
 
,  
31 1
5 5 5
0 1 0
ac ad acf ade adf b
µ
 
=  
 
 
GAME THEORY – Giacomo Bonanno 
 
449 
 
Exercise 12.2. Consider again the game of Exercise 12.1. Find all the 
assessments that are rationalized by the following plausibility order: 
,
, , , , , ,
, , ,
,
,
s
a ac ad ace ade adeg,b bg
acf adf acfg adfg
adeh bh
acfh adfh
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
most plausible
least plausible
∅
  
12.E.2. Exercises for Section 12.2: Bayesian consistency 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this 
chapter. 
Exercise 12.3. Consider the game of Figure 12.4, reproduced below, and the 
assessment 
1 2
3 3
0 0 1 1 0
a b c d e f g
σ
 
=  
 
, 
31 1 1 2
4 4 4 4 4
0
ad ae b a bf bg
µ
 
=  
 
 
which is rationalized by the plausibility order  
,
, , , , , , , ,
, , , ,
c
a ad adf adg b bf bg bfd bgd
ae aef aeg bfe bge
 
 
 
 
 
most plausible
least plausible
∅
. 
a
c
b
1
2d e
d e
d e
f
g
f
g
f
g
1
4
3
4
3
0
1
4
1
4
2
4
2
3
1
31
3
2
3
1
2
0
0
2
3
1
3
1
3
3
2
1
2
1
3
0
2
2
2
0
3
1
1
2
0
0
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Let { , , , , , , , , }F a ad adf adg b bf bg bfd bgd=  be the middle equivalence class of 
the plausibility order.  It was shown in Section 12.2 that the probability 
distribution 
31 1 1 2
8 8 8 8 8
F
a ad b bf bg
ν
 
=  
 
 satisfies the properties of Definition 
12.3. Show that there is no other probability distribution on F that satisfies 
those properties. 
Exercise 12.4. Consider the following extensive-form and the assessment 
1 1 1 4
2 2 5 5
, , ,
L R r
f A Dσ
  
=   
  
ℓ
, 
31 2 1
3 3 4 4
0
a b c d e
µ
 
=  
 
.  
d
[3/4]2[0] [2/3] [1/4]
e
ba c
R R R
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
L L L ℓℓ
1
3
C D
1
5
1
5
4
5
4
5
r r
2
f
A
B
[1/3] 2
 
(a) Verify that the given assessment is rationalized by the plausibility order 
, ,
, , , , , , , , , , , ,
, , , ,
f fA
b c d e bL bR cL cR d dr e er erD
a aL aR fB erC
 
 
 
 
 
∅
ℓ ℓ . 
(b) Let E  be the top equivalence class of the plausibility order: { , , }E f fA= ∅ . 
Show that there is a unique probability distribution Eν  on  E  that satisfies 
the properties of Definition 12.3. 
(c) Let F  be the middle equivalence class of the plausibility order: 
, , , , , , ,{ }, , , , ,b c d e bL bR cL cR d dr e er rDF e= ℓ ℓ . Show that both of the 
following  probability distributions satisfy the properties of Definition 12.3: 
20 40 45 15 12
132 132 132 132 132
F
b c d e er
ν
 
=  
 
 ,   
5 10 45 15 12
87 87 87 87 87
ˆ
F
b c d e er
ν
 
=  
 
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12.E.3. Exercises for Section 12.3: Perfect Bayesian equilibrium 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this 
chapter. 
Exercise 12.5. Consider the following extensive-form game: 
2
3
c d
ee
g h h
f
g
f
g h
1
1
1
3
0
1
3
1
1
1
1
3
3
0
0
3
0
2
1
1
3
ba
1
2
0
1
1
 
Find two  perfect Bayesian equilibria ( , )σ µ  and ( , )σ µ′ ′  where both σ  and σ ′  
are pure-strategy profiles and σ σ ′≠ .  
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Exercise 12.6. Consider the following game: 
4
2
3
a
b
c d
ee
g h h
f
g
1 s
f
g gh h
1
2
1
3
2
0
2
2
3
1
3
3
3
6
4
2
1
2
1
2
3
0
0
0
2
2
3
2
3
0
1
3
1
2
2
3
3
0
1
0
 
Prove that the following assessment is a  perfect Bayesian equilibrium: 
1 1 1 2 1 1
2 2 3 3 2 2
,
c d e f g h
sσ
 
=  
 
,   
61 1 2 1 2
2 2 11 11 11 11
ac ad acf ade adf b
µ
 
=  
 
. 
12.E.3. Exercises for Section 12.4:  Adding independence 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this 
chapter. 
Exercise 12.7. Draw an extensive form where Player 1 moves first and Player 2 
moves second without being informed of Player 1’s choice. Player 1 chooses 
between a and b, while Player 2’s choices are c, d and e. Find an assessment 
( , )σ µ  which is rationalized by a plausibility order that satisfies Property 1IND  
but fails Property 2IND . 
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Exercise 12.8. Find an extensive form and an assessment ( , )σ µ  which is 
rationalized by a plausibility order that violates Properties 1IND  but satisfies 
Property 2IND  and, furthermore,  µ  satisfies Property 3IND . 
12.E.1. Exercises for Section 12.5:  Filling the gap between  
            perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this 
chapter. 
Exercise 12.9. Consider the following (partial) extensive form: 
1
2 2
b e
g
b c
bg dr
dsbh
3
3
a
hg
3 ercg
sr
h
sr
ch es3
d e
c d
 
Using Theorem 12.5, prove that there is no sequential equilibrium ( , )σ µ  
where ( , , ,...)a g rσ =  (that is, σ assigns probability 1 to a, g and r ), 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0c e chµ µ µ= = =  and ( ) 0hµ >  for every other decision history h.  
[Hint: consider all the possible plausibility orders that rationalize ( , )σ µ .] 
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Exercise 12.10. Consider the game of Figure 12.4, reproduced below: 
1
0
0
2
1
3
0
3
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
2
0
1
1
1
0
2
3
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
2
1
0
a
b c
d
T T
B B
e
f
RRRL L L
1
 
Let ( , )σ µ   be an assessment with ( , , , )a T f Lσ =   (highlighted by double 
edges; note that σ  is a subgame-perfect equilibrium), ( ) 0bµ >  and ( ) 0cµ > .   
(a) Prove that ( , )σ µ  can be rationalized by a choice-measurable plausibility 
order only if µ  satisfies the following condition: 
( ) 0bBµ >   if and only if  ( ) 0cBfµ >  
(b) Prove that if,  besides from being rationalized by a choice-measurable 
plausibility order ≾ , ( , )σ µ  is also uniformly Bayesian relative to ≾   
(Definition 12.8), then µ  satisfies the following condition: 
if  ( ) 0 bBµ >   then   
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
cBf c
bB b
µ µ
µ µ
= . 
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◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊ 
Exercise 12.11. (Challenging Question).  Consider the following game: 
 
L
M
R
ℓ ℓ ℓ
1
2
3
m m
m
r r r
3
3
a a
b
b
c
d c d
e f e f
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
 
Let ( , )σ µ  be the following assessment: ( ), , , ,M a c eσ = ℓ  (highlighted by 
double edges) and 
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
L M R L Mr Lm Rr Mm R
µ
 
=  
 
ℓ ℓ
 (the 
decision histories h such that ( ) 1hµ =  are denoted by large black dots and the 
decision histories h such that ( ) 0hµ =  are denoted by small grey dots). 
(a) Prove that ( , )σ µ  is an independent perfect Bayesian equilibrium 
(Definition 12.5). 
(b) Using Theorem 12.5 prove that ( , )σ µ  is not a sequential equilibrium.  
[Hint: prove that ( , )σ µ  cannot be rationalized by a choice-measurable 
plausibility order (Definition 12.7).] 
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Appendix 12.S: Solutions to exercises  
Exercise 12.1.  From σ we get that the plausibility preserving actions are  a, s, 
d, e, f and g. Thus ade is as plausible as adf  (by transitivity, since each of them is 
as plausible as ad ) and each of them is more plausible than both acf  [since (1) ad 
is more plausible than ac, (2) ade and adf are as plausible as ad and (3) acf is as 
plausible as ac] and b [since (1) a is more plausible than b and (2) ade and adf are 
as plausible as ad, which in turn is as plausible as a]. Hence the most plausible 
histories in Player 4’s information set are ade and adf . It follows that it must be 
that ( ) 0adeµ > , ( ) 0adfµ > , ( ) 0acfµ =  and ( ) 0bµ = . Hence the given 
assessment cannot be rationalized by a plausibility order. 
Exercise 12.2.  The plausibility-preserving actions are s, c, d, e and g. Thus the 
strategy profile must be of the form 
0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
a b s c d e f g h
p p
σ
 
=  − 
 
with 0 < p < 1. At Player 3’s information set ac and ad are equally plausible 
and at Player 4’s information set ade and b are equally plausible and each is 
more plausible than acf and adf. Thus the system of beliefs must be of the form 
1 0 0 1
ac ad acf ade adf b
q q r r
µ
 
=  − − 
 with 0 < q < 1 and 0 < r < 1. 
Exercise 12.3.  Since { , , , , }a ad b bfD bgFµ
+ ∩ = , Property B1 of Definition 12.3 
requires that ( ) 0F hν >  if and only if { , , , , }a ad b bfh bg∈ . Let ( ) (0,1)F d pν = ∈  
and ( ) (0,1)F b qν = ∈ . The, by Property B2 of Definition 12.3,  ( )F adν =  
( ) ( ) 1F a d p pν σ× = × = , 13( ) ( ) ( )F Fbf b f qν ν σ= × = ×  and ( )F bgν = . 
2
3
( ) ( )F b g qν σ× = ×  Thus 1 2
3 3
F
a ad b bf bg
p p q q q
ν
 
=  
 
 and the sum of these 
probabilities must be 1:  2 2 1p q+ = , that is 1
2
p q+ = .  let 2 { , , }I a bf bg=  be 
the information set of Player 2 and 3 { , , }I b ad ae=  the information set of Player 
3. Then 1 2 12 3 3 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )F F F FI a bf bg p q q p qν ν ν ν= + + = + + = + =  and 
3( ) ( )F FI bν ν= +  12( ) ( ) 0F Fad ae q pν ν+ = + + = . Thus 1
2 2
( )
2
( )
F
F
a p
p
I
ν
ν
= =  and, by  
Property B3, we need this to be equal to 1
4
( )aµ = ; solving 1
4
2p =  we get 
1
8
p = . Similarly, 
1
3 2
( )
2
( )
F
F
b q
q
I
ν
ν
= =  and, by  Property B3, we need this to be 
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equal to 3
4
( )bµ = ; solving 3
4
2q =  we get 3
8
q =  (alternatively, we could have 
derived 3
8
q =  from 1
8
p =  and 1
2
p q+ = ). 
Exercise 12.4.  (a) The plausibility-preserving actions are , , , , ,f A L R rℓ  and D 
and these are precisely the actions that are assigned positive probability by σ. 
Furthermore, the most plausible actions in information set {a,b,c} are b and c 
and the two actions in information set {d,e} are equally plausible. This is 
consistent with the fact that { , , , , , , }D f b c d e erµ
+ = ∅ . Thus the properties of 
Definition 12.2 are satisfied. 
(b) By Property B1 of Definition 12.3 the support of Eν  must be 
{ , }D E fµ
+ ∩ = ∅  and by Property B2 it must be that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ).E E E Ef fν ν σ ν ν= × = × =∅ ∅ ∅  Thus the only solution is 
1
2
( ) ( )E E fν ν= =∅ . 
(c) Since { , , , , }D F b c d e erµ
+ ∩ = , by Property B1 of Definition 12.3 the support 
of the probability distribution must coincide with the set { , , , , }b c d e er , which 
is indeed true for both Fν  and ˆFν . By Property B2, the probability of er must 
be equal to the probability of e times 4
5
( )rσ =  and this is indeed true for both 
Fν  and ˆFν . By Property B3, the conditional probability  
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
F
F F F
b
a b c
ν
ν ν ν
=
+ +
 
20
132 1
320 40
132 132
0
=
+ +
 must be equal to ( )bµ  and this is indeed 
true; similarly, the conditional probability  
45
132 3
445 15
132 132
( )
( ) ( )
F
F F
d
d e
ν
ν ν
= =
+ +
  must 
be equal to ( )dµ  and this is also true. Similar computations show that  
ˆ ( )
( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( )
F
F F F
b
b
a b c
ν
µ
ν ν ν
=
+ +
 and 
ˆ ( )
( )
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
F
F F
d
d
d e
ν
µ
ν ν
=
+
.  
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Exercise 12.5.  The game under consideration is: 
2
3
c d
ee
g h h
f
g
f
g h
1
1
1
3
0
1
3
1
1
1
1
3
3
0
0
3
0
2
1
1
3
ba
1
2
0
1
1
 
One perfect Bayesian equilibrium  is 
( ), , ,b c e gσ = ,     
1 1
2 2
1 0 0
ac ad acf ade adf
µ
 
=  
 
. 
Let us first verify sequential rationality. For Player 1, at the root, b gives a 
payoff of 2, while a gives a payoff of 1; thus b is sequentially rational. For 
Player 2, c gives a payoff of 1 and d a payoff of 0; thus c is sequentially rational. 
For Player 3, e  gives a payoff of 3, while f  gives a payoff of 2; thus e is 
sequentially rational. For Player 1 at his bottom information set, g gives a 
payoff of ( ) ( )1 12 23 3 3+ =  and h gives a payoff of ( ) ( )1 12 21 3 2+ = ; thus g is 
sequentially rational.  
The following plausibility order rationalizes the above assessment: 
,
, ,
, , , ,
, , ,
b
a ac ace
acf acfg ad ade adeg
adf adfg acfh adeh
adfh
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
most plausible
least plausible
∅
  
Name the equivalence classes of this order 1 2 5, ,...,E E E  (with 1E  being the top 
one and 5E  the bottom one). Then the following probability distributions on 
the sets iE Dµ
+∩   (i =1,2,3: note iE Dµ
+∩ ≠ ∅  if and only if { }1,2,3i∈ , since 
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{ }, , , ,D a ac acf adeµ+ = ∅ ) satisfy the properties of Definition 12.3: 1 ( ) 1Eν =∅ ,  
2 1 1
2 2
E
a ac
ν
 
=  
 
,   
3 1 1 1
3 3 3
E
acf ad ade
ν
 
=  
 
. 
Another perfect Bayesian equilibrium  is: 
( ), , ,a d e hσ = ,     
0 1 0 1 0
ac ad acf ade adf
µ
 
=  
 
. 
Sequential rationality is easily verified. The assessment is rationalized by: 
, , , ,
, , , ,
, ,
,
a ad ade adeh
b ac ace adf adfh
acf acfh adeg
acfg adfg
 
 
 
 
 
 
most plausible
least plausible
∅
 
Only the top equivalence class { }1 , , , ,E a ad ade adeh= ∅  has a non-empty 
intersection with { }, , ,D a ad adeµ+ = ∅ . The following probability distribution 
satisfies the properties of Definition 12.3: 
1 1 1 1 1
4 4 4 4
E
a ad ade
ν
 
=  
 
∅
. 
Exercise 12.6.  The game under consideration is: 
4
2
3
a
b
c d
ee
g h h
f
g
1 s
f
g gh h
1
2
1
3
2
0
2
2
3
1
3
3
3
6
4
2
1
2
1
2
3
0
0
0
2
2
3
2
3
0
1
3
1
2
2
3
3
0
1
0
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We need to show that the following is a  perfect Bayesian equilibrium: 
1 1 1 2 1 1
2 2 3 3 2 2
,
c d e f g h
sσ
 
=  
 
,   
61 1 2 1 2
2 2 11 11 11 11
ac ad acf ade adf b
µ
 
=  
 
. 
First we verify sequential rationality. For Player 1 the possible payoffs are: 
( ) ( )
1 1
2 2
1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 11
2 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 6
: 3
: (3) (2) 2.5
: (1) (2) (1) (3) (1) (3)
s
b
a
+ =
   + + + + + =   
from  
from  
from  
 .  
Thus s is sequentially rational.      For Player 2 the possible payoffs are: 
[ ] [ ]
1 2
3 3
1 1 1 2 1 1
3 2 2 3 2 2
: (2) (2) 2
: (0) (6) (2) (1) 2
c
d
+ =
+ + + =
from  
from  
.  Thus both c and d are 
sequentially rational and so is any mixture of the two, in particular the mixture 
1 1
2 2
c d 
 
 
. 
For Player 3 the possible payoffs are: 
[ ]
[ ] [ ]
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2
: (2) (0) (4) 2
: (3) (1) (1) (3) 2
e
f
+ + =
+ + + =
from  
from  
.   Thus both e and f are 
sequentially rational and so is any mixture of the two, in particular the mixture 
1 2
3 3
e f 
 
 
.  
For Player 4 the possible payoffs are as follows: From g: 
6 262 1 2
11 11 11 11 11
(2) (0) (2) (3)+ + + =   and from h: 6 262 1 2
11 11 11 11 11
(3) (2) (3) (2)+ + + = . 
Thus both g and h are rational and so is any mixture of the two, in particular 
the mixture 
1 1
2 2
g h 
 
 
. 
For AGM consistency, note that all of the actions, except a and b, are 
plausibility preserving and, furthermore, all decision histories are assigned 
positive probability by µ. Thus there is only one plausibility order that 
rationalizes the given assessment, namely the one that has only two equivalence 
classes: the top one being { , }s∅  and the other one consisting of all the 
remaining histories. For Bayesian consistency, the probability distribution for 
the top equivalence class is the trivial one that assigns probability 1 to the null 
history ∅ . Let \{ , }E H s= ∅  be the other equivalence class and note that 
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{ , , , , , , }mE D a ac ad acf ade adf b
+∩ = . In order for a probability distribution Eν  
to satisfy the properties of Definition 12.3, the support of Eν  must be the set 
{ , , , , , , }a ac ad acf ade adf b  (Property B1). Let ( )E a pν = ; then by Property B2 it 
must be that 
2
( ) ( )
p
E Eac adν ν= =  (since 12( ) ( )c dσ σ= = ),  
3
( ) ( )
p
E Eacf adfν ν= =  (since 1 2 12 3 3( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c f d fσ σ σ σ× = × = × = ) and 
6
( )
p
E adeν =  (since 1 1 12 3 6( ) ( )d eσ σ× = × = ). Thus Eν  must be of the form 
2 2 3 6 3
p p p p p
a ac ad acf ade adf b
p q
 
 
 
 with the sum equal to 1, that is, 17
6
1p q+ = . 
Furthermore, by Property B3, it must be that 

6
11
3 6 3 ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
E
p p p
E E E E b
b q
acf ade adf b q
µ
ν
ν ν ν ν
=
= =
+ + + + + +
. 
The solution to the pair of equations  17
6
1p q+ =  and 6
11
3 6 3
p p p
q
q
=
+ + +
 is 
6
23
p q= = , yielding 
6 3 3 62 1 2
23 23 23 23 23 23 23
E
a ac ad acf ade adf b
ν
 
=  
 
. 
Thus we have shown that the given assessment is AGM- and Bayes-consistent 
and sequentially rational, hence a  perfect Bayesian equilibrium . 
Exercise 12.7.  The extensive form is as follows: 
c d e c d e
a b
1
2
 
Let 
1 0 1 0 0
a b c d e
σ
 
=  
 
, 
1 0
a b
µ
 
=  
 
. This assessment is rationalized by the 
following plausibility order:  
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, ,
,
a ac
b bc
ad
ae
be
bd
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
most plausible
least plausible
∅
 
which satisfies Property 1IND  (since a b≺  and , ,ac bc ad bd ae be≺ ≺ ≺ ) but 
fails Property 2IND  since ( )b I a∈  and ad ae≺  (implying that, conditional on 
a, d is more plausible than e) but be bd≺  (implying that, conditional on b, e is 
more plausible than d). 
Exercise 12.8.  The game of Figure 12.7, reproduced below, provides such an 
example: 
c1
f g
2
d d
3
f g
e e
0
1
0
0
0
0
2
2
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
a b
1
0
0
[0][1]
[0] [1]
 
Consider the assessment ( , , )c d gσ =  (highlighted by double edges), together 
with the system of beliefs 
1 0 0 1
a b ae be
µ
 
=  
 
. This assessment is rationalized 
by the plausibility order 
,
,
,
,
,
c
a ad
b bd
be beg
ae aeg
bef
aef
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
most plausible
least plausible
∅
 which violates Property 
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1IND , since a b≺  and be ae≺ . On the other hand, the above plausibility order 
satisfies Property 2IND  since (1) ad ae≺  and bd be≺  and (2) aeg aef≺  and 
beg bef≺ . Furthermore, µ satisfies Property 3IND : trivially, since ,a be Dµ
+∈  
but ,ae b Dµ
+∉ . 
Exercise 12.9.  The game under consideration is the following: 
1
2 2
b e
g
b c
bg dr
dsbh
3
3
a
hg
3 ercg
sr
h
sr
ch es3
d e
c d
 
Consider an arbitrary assessment of the form ( , )σ µ  where ( , , ,...)a g rσ = , 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0c e chµ µ µ= = =  and ( ) 0hµ >  for every other decision history h. There 
are plausibility orders that rationalize ( , )σ µ , for example the following: 
,
, , ,
,
, , ,
a
b bg d dr
bh ds
c cg e er
es
ch
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
most plausible
least plausible
∅
     or     
,
, , ,
, , ,
,
a
b bg d dr
c cg e er
bh ds
es
ch
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
most plausible
least plausible
∅
. 
First we show that any plausibility order ≾ that rationalizes ( , )σ µ  must 
satisfy the following properties: 
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• c e∼   [because, by P2 of Definition 12.2, cg er∼  (since ( )cg I er∈ , 
( ) 0cgµ >  and ( ) 0erµ > ) and, by P1 of Definition 12.2,  c cg∼  and 
e er∼  (since both g and r are plausibility preserving) and thus, by 
transitivity, c e∼ ], 
• es ch≺   [this follows from P2 of Definition 12.2, since es and ch belong to 
the same information set and ( ) 0esµ > , while ( ) 0chµ = ], 
• b d∼  [because, by P2 of Definition 12.2, bg dr∼  (since ( )bg I dr∈ , 
( ) 0bgµ >  and ( ) 0drµ > ) and, by P1 of Definition 12.2,  b bg∼  and 
d dr∼  (since both g and r are plausibility preserving) and thus, by 
transitivity, b d∼ ], 
• bh ds∼  [by P2 of Definition 12.2, because ( )bh I ds∈ , ( ) 0bhµ >  and 
( ) 0dsµ > . 
Next we show that no plausibility order that rationalizes ( , )σ µ  is choice 
measurable. Select an arbitrary plausibility order that rationalizes ( , )σ µ  and let 
F  be an integer valued representation of it. Then the following must be true: 
(1) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )F e F es F c F ch− > −  (because c e∼ , implying that ( ) ( )F c F e= , 
and  es ch≺ , implying that ( ) ( )F es F ch< ), 
(2) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )F b F bh F d F ds− = −  (because bh ds∼ , implying that 
( ) ( )F bh F ds= , and  b d∼ , implying that ( ) ( )F b F d= ), 
Thus if, as required by choice measurability,  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )F c F ch F b F bh− = −  then, 
by (1) and (2), ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )F e F es F d F ds− > − , which violates choice 
measurability. It follows from Theorem 12.5 that, since any plausibility 
ordering that rationalizes ( , )σ µ  is not choice measurable, ( , )σ µ  cannot be a 
sequential equilibrium. 
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Exercise 12.10.  The game under consideration is the following: 
1
0
0
2
1
3
0
3
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
2
0
1
1
1
0
2
3
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
2
1
0
a
b c
d
T T
B B
e
f
RRRL L L
1
 
Let ( , )σ µ   be an assessment with ( , , , )a T f Lσ = , ( ) 0bµ >  and ( ) 0cµ > .   
(a) We have to prove that ( , )σ µ  can be rationalized by a choice-measurable 
plausibility order only if µ  satisfies the following condition: 
( ) 0bBµ >   if and only if  ( ) 0cBfµ > . 
Let ≾   be a choice measurable plausibility order that rationalizes ( , )σ µ  and let 
F  be an integer-valued representation of ≾  that satisfies choice measurability. 
Since ( ) 0bµ >  and ( ) 0cµ > , by P2 of Definition 12.2, ~b c  and thus 
( ) ( )F b F c= ; by choice measurability, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )F b F c F bB F cB− = −  and thus 
( ) ( )F bB F cB= , so that ~bB cB . Since ( ) 0fσ > , by P1 of Definition 12.2, 
~cB cBf  and therefore, by transitivity of ≾ , ~bB cBf . Hence if ( ) 0bBµ >   
then, by P2 of Definition 12.2, { , , }bB Min bB cBf d∈ ≾  (for any set S H⊆ , 
Min S≾ ={ }: ,   h S h h h S∈ ′ ′∈for all≾ ) and thus { , , }cBf Min bB cBf d∈ ≾  so that, 
by P2 of Definition 12.2, ( ) 0cBfµ > . The proof that if ( ) 0cBfµ >  then 
( ) 0bBµ >  is analogous. 
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(b) We have to prove that if,  besides from being rationalized by a choice-
measurable plausibility order ≾ , ( , )σ µ  is also uniformly Bayesian relative to 
≾   (Definition 12.8), then µ  satisfies the following condition: 
if  ( ) 0 bBµ >   then   
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
cBf c
bB b
µ µ
µ µ
= . 
Suppose that ( ) 0bµ > , ( ) 0cµ >  (so that ~b c ) and ( ) 0bBµ > . Let ν  be a full-
support common prior that satisfies the properties of Definition12.8. Then, by 
UB2, 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
c cB
b bB
ν ν
ν ν
=  and, by UB1, since ( ) 1fσ = , 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )cBf cB f cBν ν σ ν= × = .  Let E  be the equivalence class that contains b. 
Then { , }E D b cµ
+∩ = . Since ( ) (  | )E E Dµν ν
+⋅ = ⋅ ∩ , by B3 of Definition 12.3, 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
b
b
b c
ν
µ
ν ν
=
+  and 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
c
c
b c
ν
µ
ν ν
=
+ , so that 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
c c
b b
µ ν
µ ν
= .  Let G be the 
equivalence class that contains bB.  Then, since − by hypothesis − ( ) 0bBµ > , it 
follows from the condition proved in part (a) that  either { , }G D bB cBfµ
+∩ =  or 
{ , , }G D bB cBf dµ
+∩ = .  Since ( ) (  | )G G Dµν ν
+⋅ = ⋅ ∩ , by B3 of  Definition 12.3, in 
the former case 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
bB
bB
bB cBf
ν
µ
ν ν
=
+
 and 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
cBf
cBf
bB cBf
ν
µ
ν ν
=
+
  and in  
the latter case 
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
bB
bB
bB cBf d
ν
µ
ν ν ν
=
+ +
  and 
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
cBf
cBf
bB cBf d
ν
µ
ν ν ν
=
+ +
 ; thus in both cases 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
cBf cBf
bB bB
µ ν
µ ν
= . Hence, 
since ( ) ( )cBf cBν ν= , 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
cBf cB
bB bB
µ ν
µ ν
=  and,  therefore, since (as shown above) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
cB c
bB b
ν ν
ν ν
=   and 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
c c
b b
ν µ
ν µ
=  , we have  that 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
cBf c
bB b
µ µ
µ µ
= . 
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Exercise 12.11 (Challenging Question).  The game under consideration is: 
 
L
M
R
ℓ ℓ ℓ
1
2
3
m m
m
r r r
3
3
a a
b
b
c
d c d
e f e f
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
 
Let  ( ), , , ,M a c eσ = ℓ  and 
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
L M R L Mr Lm Rr Mm R
µ
 
=  
 
ℓ ℓ
. 
(a) We have to show that ( , )σ µ  is an independent perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium. Sequential rationality is straightforward to verify. It is also 
straightforward to verify that the following plausibility order rationalizes 
( , )σ µ : 
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, ,
, ,
,
,
, ,
,
,
M M
R R R e
Mm Mme
Mr Mra
L L L a
Rm
Lm Lmc
Rr Rrc
Lr
R f
Mmf
Lmd
Rrd
Mrb
L b
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
most plausible
least plausible
ℓ
ℓ ℓ
ℓ ℓ
ℓ
ℓ
∅
 
Let us check that the above plausibility order satisfies properties 1IND  and 
2IND . For 1IND  first note that there are no two decision histories h and h′  that 
belong to the same information set and are such that h h′∼ ; thus we only need 
to check that if h and h′  belong to the same information set and h h′≺  then 
ha h a′≺  for every ( )a A h∈ . This is indeed true:  
(1) M R≺  and M Rℓ ≺ ℓ , Mm Rm≺  and Mr Rr≺ ,  
(2) M L≺  and M Lℓ ≺ ℓ , Mm Lm≺  and Mr Lr≺ ,  
(3) Mr L≺ ℓ  and Mra L a≺ ℓ  and Mrb L b≺ ℓ , 
(4) Lm Rr≺  and Lmc Rrc≺  and Lmd Rrd≺ , 
(5) R Mmℓ ≺  and R e Mmeℓ ≺  and R f Mmfℓ ≺ . 
For 2IND  first note that there is no decision history h that ha hb∼  for 
, ( )a b A h∈  with a b≠ ; thus we only need to show that if ha hb≺  and 
( )h I h′∈  then h a h b′ ′≺ . This is indeed true:  
(1) M Mmℓ ≺  and L Lmℓ ≺  and R Rmℓ ≺ , 
(2) Mm Mr≺  and Lm Lr≺  and Rm Rr≺ , 
and the rest is trivial, since at the other information sets there are only two 
actions, one of which is plausibility preserving and the other is not. 
Finally, µ satisfies 3IND  trivially since at each information set only one history 
is assigned positive probability by µ.  Thus we have shown that ( , )σ µ  is an 
independent perfect Bayesian equilibrium. 
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(b) To prove that ( , )σ µ  is not a sequential equilibrium it would not be 
sufficient to prove that the plausibility order given above is not choice 
measurable (although it is indeed true that it is not choice measurable), because 
in principle there could be another plausibility order which is choice 
measurable and rationalizes ( , )σ µ . Thus we need to show that any plausibility 
order that rationalizes ( , )σ µ  is not choice measurable. Let ≾  be a plausibility 
order that rationalizes ( , )σ µ ; then it must satisfy the following properties: 
• Lm Rr≺  (because they belong to the same information set and ( ) 0Lmµ >  
while ( ) 0Rrµ = ). Thus if F is any integer-valued representation of ≾  it 
must be that 
( ) ( )F Lm F Rr< .                                           (1) 
• Mr L L≺ ℓ ∼  (because Mr  and Lℓ  belong to the same information set and 
( ) 0Mrµ >  while ( ) 0Lµ =ℓ ; furthermore, ℓ  is a plausibility-preserving 
action since ( ) 0σ >ℓ ). Thus if F is any integer-valued representation of ≾  
it must be that 
( ) ( )F Mr F L< .                                           (2) 
• R R Mm∼ ℓ ≺  (because ℓ  is a plausibility-preserving action, Rℓ  and Mm  
belong to the same information set and ( ) 0Rµ >ℓ  while ( ) 0Mmµ = ). 
Thus if F is any integer-valued representation of ≾  it must be that 
( ) ( )F R F Mm< .                                           (3) 
Now suppose that ≾  is choice measurable and let F be an integer-valued 
representation of it that satisfies choice measurability (Property CM of 
Definition 12.7). From (1) and (2) we get that  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )F Lm F L F Rr F Mr− < −                             (4) 
and by choice measurability  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )F Rr F Mr F R F M− = −                              (5) 
It follows from (4) and (5) that  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )F Lm F L F R F M− < −                               (6) 
Subtracting ( )F M  from both sides of (3) we obtain 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )F R F M F Mm F M− < − .                            (7) 
It follows from (6) and (7) that ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )F Lm F L F Mm F M− < − , which can be 
written as ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )F M F L F Mm F Lm− < − , yielding a contradiction, because 
choice measurability requires that ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )F M F L F Mm F Lm− = − . 
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PART V 
 
 
 
Advanced Topics III: 
 
Incomplete Information 
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Incomplete Information:  
Static Games 
13.1 Interactive situations with   
 incomplete information 
n implicit assumption in game theory is that the game being played is 
common knowledge among the players. The expression “incomplete 
information” refers to situations where some of the elements of the 
game (e.g. the actions available to the players, the possible outcomes, the 
players’ preferences, etc.) are not common knowledge. In such situations the 
knowledge and beliefs of the players about the game need to be made an 
integral part of the description of the situation. Pioneering work in this 
direction was done by John Harsanyi (1967, 1968), who (together with John 
Nash and Reinhard Selten) was the recipient of the 1994 Nobel prize in 
economics. Harsanyi suggested a method for converting a situation of 
incomplete information into an extensive game with imperfect information 
(this is the so-called Harsanyi transformation). The theory of games of 
incomplete information has been developed for the case of von Neumann-
Morgenstern payoffs and the solution concept proposed by Harsanyi is 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium, which is merely Nash equilibrium of the imperfect-
information game that is obtained by applying the Harsanyi transformation.  
Although the approach put forward by Harsanyi was in terms of  “types” of 
players and of probability distributions over types, we shall develop the theory 
using the so-called “state-space” approach, which makes use of the interactive 
knowledge-belief structures developed in Chapter 8. In Chapter 15 we will 
explain the “type-space” approach and show how to convert one type of 
structure into the other. 
 
Chapter 
13 
A 
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The distinction between complete and incomplete information is not at all the 
same as that between perfect and imperfect information. To say that a game (in 
extensive form) has imperfect information is to say that there is at least one 
player who may have to make a choice in a situation where she does not know 
what choices were made previously by other players.  To say that there is 
incomplete information is to say that there is at least one player who does not 
quite know what game she is playing. Consider, for example, the players’ 
preferences. In some situations it is not overly restrictive to assume that the 
players’ preferences are common knowledge: for instance, in the game of chess, 
it seems quite plausible to assume that it is common knowledge that both 
players prefer winning to either drawing or losing (and prefer drawing to 
losing). But think of a contractual dispute. Somebody claims that you owe him 
a sum of money and threatens to sue you if you don’t pay. We can view this 
situation as a two-player game: you have two strategies, “pay” and “not pay”, 
and he has two strategies, “sue (if no payment)” and “not sue (if no payment)”. 
In order to determine your best choice, you need to know how he will respond 
to your refusal to pay. A lawsuit is costly for him as well as for you; if he is the 
“tough” type he will sue you; if he is the “soft” type he will drop the dispute. If 
you don’t know what type he is, you are in a situation of incomplete 
information. 
As explained above, we have a situation of incomplete information whenever at 
least one of the players does not know some aspects of the game: it could be the 
preferences of her opponents, the choices available to her opponents or the set 
of possible outcomes. We shall focus almost exclusively on the case where the 
uncertainty concerns the preferences of the players, while everything else will 
be assumed to be common knowledge (for an exception see Exercise 13.2). 
Harsanyi argued that every situation can be reduced to this case. For example, 
he argued, if Player 1 does not know whether Player 2 has available only 
choices a and b or also choice c, we can model this as a situation where there are 
two possible “states of the world” in both of which Player 2 has three choices 
available, a, b and c, but in one of the two states choice c gives an extremely low 
payoff to Player 2, so that she would definitely not choose c.  
The interactive knowledge-belief structures developed in Chapter 8 are 
sufficiently rich to model situations of incomplete information. The states in 
these structures can be used to express any type of uncertainty. In Chapter 9 we 
interpreted the states in terms of the actual choices of the players, thus 
expressing uncertainty in the mind of a player about the behavior of another 
player. In that case the game was assumed to be common knowledge among the 
players (that is, it was the same game at every state) and what varied from one 
GAME THEORY – Giacomo Bonanno 
 
473 
 
state to another was the choice of at least one player. If we want to represent a 
situation where one player is not sure what game she is playing, all we have to 
do is interpret the states in terms of games, that is, assign different games to 
different states.  
We shall begin with games in strategic form with cardinal payoffs where only 
one player is uncertain about what game is being played. We shall use the 
expression “one-sided incomplete information” to refer to these situations. 
 
13.2 One-sided incomplete information 
Let us model the following situation: the game being played is the one shown 
in Figure 13.1;  call this the “true” game.  
T
B
L R
1
2
6 , 3
3 , 03 , 3
0 , 9
 
Figure 13.1 
Player 1 knows that she is playing this game, while Player 2 is uncertain as to 
whether she is playing this game or a different game, shown in Figure 13.2, 
where the payoffs of Player 1 are different: 
T
B
L R
1
2
0 , 3
3 , 3
3 , 9
0 , 0
 
Figure 13.2 
For convenience, let us refer to the “true game” of Figure 13.1 as the game 
where Player 1 is of type b  and the game of Figure 13.2 as the game where 
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Player 1 is of type a.  Suppose that Player 2 assigns probability 2
3
 to Player 1 
being of type a and probability 1
3
 to Player 1 being of type b. The description is 
not complete yet, because we need to specify whether Player 1 has any 
uncertainty concerning the beliefs of Player 2; let us assume that the beliefs of 
Player 2 are common knowledge. We also need to specify whether Player 2 is 
uncertain about the state of mind of Player 1; let us assume that it is common 
knowledge that Player 2 knows that Player 1 knows what game is being played. 
This is a long verbal description! A picture is worth a thousand words and 
indeed the simple knowledge-belief structure shown in Figure 13.3 captures all 
of the above. There are two states, α  and β :  α  is interpreted as a 
(counterfactual) state where the game of Figure 13.2 is played, while β  is  
interpreted as the state where the “true” game of Figure 13.1 is played. We 
capture the fact that latter is the “true” game, that is, the game which is actually 
played, by designating state β  as  “the true state”.1 
T
B
L R
1
2
T
B
L R
1
2
1:
2:
true state
1 is of type a
α β
α β
0 , 3 6 , 3
3 , 3
3 , 9
0 , 0
1 is of type b
3 , 03 , 3
0 , 9
2
3
1
3
 
Figure 13.3 
It is easy to check that, in the knowledge-belief structure of Figure 13.3,  at state 
β all of the elements of the verbal description given above are true. Anything 
                                                 
1 This is something that is almost never done in the literature, but it is an important element of 
a description of a situation of incomplete information: what is the actual state of affairs? 
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that is constant across states is common knowledge: thus the payoffs of Player 2 
are common knowledge, the beliefs of Player 2, namely 
2 1
3 3
α β 
 
 
, are common 
knowledge and the fact that if the game being played is the one of Figure 13.2 
(associated with state α ) then Player 1 knows that they are playing that game 
and that if the game being played is the one of Figure 13.1 (associated with state 
β ) then Player 1 knows that they are playing that game, that is, Player 1 knows 
what game is being played. Note, however, that, at the true state β,  Player 1 
knows more than Player 2, namely which of the two games is actually being 
played. 
Remark 13.1.  In the situation illustrated in Figure 13.3, at every state each 
player knows his/her own payoffs. It may seem natural to make this a 
requirement of rationality: shouldn’t a rational player know her own 
preferences? The answer is Yes for preferences and No for payoffs: a rational 
player should know how she ranks the possible outcomes (her preferences over 
outcomes); however, it is perfectly rational to be uncertain about what 
outcome will follow a particular action and thus about one’s own payoff. For 
example, you know that you prefer accepting a wrapped box containing a 
thoughtful gift (payoff of 1) to accepting a wrapped box containing an insulting 
gift (payoff of − 1): you know your preferences over these two outcomes. 
However, you may be uncertain about the intentions of the gift-giver and thus 
you are uncertain about what outcome will follow if you accept the gift: you 
don’t know if your payoff will be 1 or − 1. Thus, although you know your 
payoff function, you may be uncertain about what your payoff will be if you 
accept the gift. This example is developed in Exercise 13.2. 
Figure 13.3 illustrates a situation that has to do with games, but is not a game. 
Harsanyi’s insight was that we can transform that situation into an extensive-
form game with imperfect information, as follows. We start with a chance 
move, where Nature chooses the state; then Player 1 is informed of Nature’s 
choice and makes her decision between T and B ; Player 2 then makes his choice 
between L and R, without being informed of Nature’s choice (to capture her 
uncertainty about the game) and without being informed of Player 1’s choice 
(to capture the simultaneity of the game). The game is shown in Figure 13.4 
below. 
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NaturePlayer 1 is
of type a
Player 1 is
of type b
2/3 1/3
1 1
T B T B
2
L R L R L R L R
0
3
3
9
3
3
0
0
6
3
0
9
3
3
3
0
Player 1's payoff
Player 2's payoff
 
Figure 13.4 
The reduction of the situation illustrated in Figure 13.3 to the extensive-form 
game of Figure 13.4 is called the Harsanyi transformation. Once a game has been 
obtained by means of the Harsanyi transformation, it can be solved using, for 
example, the notion of Nash equilibrium. The Nash equilibria of a game 
corresponding to a situation of incomplete information are called Bayesian Nash 
equilibria. Note that these are nothing more than Nash equilibria: the extra 
term ‘Bayesian’ is merely a hint that the game being solved is meant to 
represent a situation of incomplete information.  
Note that the Harsanyi transformation involves some loss of information: in 
particular, in the resulting game one can no longer tell what the true state is, 
that is, what the actual game being played is. 
To find the Bayesian Nash equilibria of the game of Figure 13.4 we can 
construct the corresponding strategic-form game, which is shown in Figure 13.5 
below.2 
                                                 
2 Recall that, when constructing the strategic-form game associated with an extensive-form 
game with chance moves, payoffs are expected payoffs: see Chapter 6. 
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  Player 2 
  L R 
 T if type a 
T if type b 
2 , 3 2 , 9 
Player T if type a 
B if type b 
1 , 3 3 , 6 
1 B if type a 
T if type b 
4 , 3 0 , 3 
 B if type a 
B if type b 
3 , 3 1 , 0 
Figure 13.5 
There are two pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria: ( )( , ),T B R  and  
( )( , ),B T L . How should we interpret them? 
Let us consider, for example, the Bayesian Nash equilibrium ( )( , ),T B R . This is 
a Nash equilibrium of the game of Figure 13.4; however, we assumed that the 
true state was β, where Player 1 is of type b and thus, in the actual game (the 
one associated with state β ), the actual play is (B,R), which is not a Nash 
equilibrium of that game (because, while B is a best reply to R, R is not a best 
reply to B). This is not surprising, since Player 1 knows that she is playing that 
game, while Player 2 attaches only probability 1
3
 to that game being the actual 
game. Thus the first observation is that a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a “game 
of incomplete information” does not imply that the players play a Nash 
equilibrium in the actual (or “true”) game. The second observation has to do 
with Player 1’s strategy. By definition, Player 1’s strategy in the game of Figure 
13.4 consists of a pair of choices, one for the case where she is informed that 
her type is a and the other for the case where she is informed that her type is b: 
in the Bayesian Nash equilibrium under consideration, Player 1’s strategy (T,B) 
means “Player 1 plays T if of type a and plays B if of type b”. However, Player 
1 knows that she is of type b : she knows what game she is playing. Why, then, 
should she formulate a plan on how she would play in a counterfactual world 
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where her type was a (that is, in a counterfactual game)? The answer is that 
Player 1’s strategy (T,B) is best understood not as a contingent plan of action 
formulated by Player 1, but as a complex object that incorporates (1) the actual 
choice (namely to play B) made by Player 1 in the game that she knows she is 
playing and (2) a belief in the mind of Player 2 about what Player 1 would do 
in the two games that, as far as Player 2 knows, are actual possibilities. 
An alternative (and easier)  way to find the Bayesian Nash equilibria of the 
game of Figure 13.4 is to use the notion of weak sequential equilibrium for that 
game. For example, to verify that ( )( , ),B T L  is a Nash equilibrium we can 
reason as follows: If the strategy of Player 1 is (B,T ), then Bayesian updating 
requires Player 2 to have the following beliefs: probability 2
3
 on the second 
node from the left and probability 1
3
 on the third node from the left. Given 
these beliefs, playing L yields him an expected payoff of 2 1
3 3
(3) (3) 3+ =  while 
playing R yields him an expected payoff  of 2 1
3 3
(0) (9) 3+ = ; thus any strategy 
(pure or mixed) is sequentially rational: in particular L is sequentially rational. 
If Player 2 plays L then at her left node Player 1 gets 0 with T and 3 with B, so 
that B is sequentially rational; at her right node Player 1 gets 6 with T and 3 
with B, so that T is sequentially rational. Hence ( )( , ),B T L  with the stated 
beliefs is a weak sequential equilibrium, implying that ( )( , ),B T L  is a Nash 
equilibrium (Theorem 10.1, Chapter 10).  
Definition 13.1.  In a “game of one-sided incomplete information” a pure-
strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium where the “informed” player makes the 
same choice at every singleton node is called a pooling equilibrium, while a pure-
strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium where the “informed” player makes 
different choices at different nodes is called a separating equilibrium. 
Thus in the game of Figure 13.4 there are no pooling equilibria: all the pure-
strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria are separating equilibria. 
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Remark 13.2.  Although we have only looked at the case of two players, 
situations of one-sided incomplete information can involve any number of 
players, as long as only one player is uncertain about the game being played 
(while all the other players are not). An example of a situation of one-sided 
incomplete information with three players will be given in the next chapter 
with reference to Selten’s chain-store game (which we studied in Chapter 2, 
Section 2.4).  
We conclude this section with an example of a situation of one-sided 
incomplete information involving a two-player game where each player has an 
infinite number of strategies. This is an incomplete-information version of 
Cournot’s game of competition between two firms (Chapter 1, Section 1.7). 
This example involves the use of calculus and some readers might want to skip 
it.  
Consider a Cournot duopoly (that is, an industry consisting of two firms, 
which compete in output levels) with inverse demand given by  
P(Q) = 34 −  Q, 
where 1 2Q q q= +  is total industry output ( 1q  is the output of Firm 1 and 2q  is 
the output of Firm 2). It is common knowledge between the two firms that 
Firm 1’s cost function is given by: 
C
l
(q
l
) = 6q
l
. 
Firm 2’ s cost function is  
C
2
(q
2
) = 9q
2
. 
Firm 2 knows this, while Firm 1 believes that Firm 2’s cost function is 
C
2
(q
2
) = 9q
2
  with probability 1
3
 and C
2
(q
2
) = 3q
2
    with probability  2
3
 (Firm 2 
could be a new entrant to the industry using an old technology, or could have 
just invented a new technology). Firm 1 knows that Firm 2 knows its own cost 
function. Everything that Firm 1 knows is common knowledge between the 
two firms. Thus we have the situation of one-sided incomplete information 
illustrated in Figure 13.6. 
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L
true state
2/3 1/3
H
Firm 2:
Firm 1:
1's cost function:
2's cost function:
1 1 1( ) 6C q q= 1 1 1( ) 6C q q=
2 2 2( ) 3C q q= 2 2 2( ) 9C q q=
 
Figure 13.6 
Let us find a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game obtained by applying the 
Harsanyi transformation to this situation of incomplete information and 
compare it to the Nash equilibrium of the complete information game where 
Firm 2’s cost function is common knowledge. 
In the complete information case where it is common knowledge that Firm 2’s 
cost function is  C
2
(q
2
) = 9q
2
, the profit (= payoff)  functions of the two firms  
are given by: 
( )
( )
1 1 2 1 2 1 1
2 1 2 1 2 2 2
( , ) 34 6
( , ) 34 9
q q q q q q
q q q q q q
π
π
= − + −  
= − + −  
 
The Nash equilibrium is given by the solution to the following pair of 
equations: 
1 1 2
1 2
1
2 1 2
1 2
2
( , )
34 2 6 0
( , )
34 2 9 0
q q
q q
q
q q
q q
q
π
π
∂
= − − − =
∂
∂
= − − − =
∂
 
The solution is 31 221 23 310.33  and  q 7.33q = = = = .  
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Next we go back to the incomplete-information situation illustrated in Figure 
13.6. Although it is not possible to draw the extensive-form game that results 
from applying the Harsanyi transformation (because of the infinite number of 
possible output levels) we can nevertheless sketch the game as  shown in Figure 
13.7 (where H means “high cost” and L “low cost”): 
Nature
1/3 2/3
LH
Firm 2 Firm 2
Firm 1
q
2
q
2
q
1
q
1
 
Figure 13.7 
To find a Bayesian Nash equilibrium it is easiest to think in terms of weak 
sequential equilibrium: if the strategy profile ( )( )2 2 1ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,H Lq q q  is part of a weak 
sequential equilibrium,3 then −  by sequential rationality −  2ˆ
Hq  must maximize 
the expression 1 2 2 2ˆ[(34 ) 9 ]
H H Hq q q q− − −  and 2ˆ
Lq  must maximize the expression 
1 2 2 2
ˆ[(34 ) 3 ]L L Lq q q q− − − ; furthermore, by Bayesian updating, Firm 1 must 
assign probability 1
3
 to the node following choice 2ˆ
Hq  and probability 2
3
 to the 
node following choice 2ˆ
Lq  so that 1qˆ  must maximize the expression 
1 2
1 2 1 1 1 2 1 13 3
ˆ ˆ[(34 ) 6 ] [(34 ) 6 ]H Lq q q q q q q q− − − + − − − . Thus ( )( )2 2 1ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,H Lq q q  must be a 
solution to the following system of three equations: 
                                                 
3 
2
ˆHq  is the output chosen by Firm 2 at the left node, where its cost is high, and 2ˆ
Lq  is the output 
chosen by Firm 2 at the right node, where its cost is low. 
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( )
1 2 2 2
2
1 2 2 2
2
1 2
1 2 1 1 1 2 1 13 3
1
[(34 ) 9 ] 0,
[(34 ) 3 ] 0,
ˆ ˆ[(34 ) 6 ] [(34 ) 6 ] 0.
H H H
H
L L L
L
H L
q q q q
q
q q q q
q
q q q q q q q q
q
∂
− − − =
∂
∂
− − − =
∂
∂
− − − + − − − =
∂
 
There is a unique solution given by 
1 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ9, 8, 11H Lq q q= = = . 
Since the true state is where Firm 2’s cost is high, the actual output levels are 
1
ˆ 9q =  for Firm 1 and 2ˆ 8
Hq =  for Firm 2. Thus in the incomplete information 
case Firm 2’s output is higher than in the complete information case and Firm 
1’s output is lower than in the complete information case. 
 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced 
in this section, by going through the exercises in Section 13.E.2 of Appendix 
13.E at the end of this chapter. 
13.3 Two-sided incomplete information 
Let us now consider a situation involving two players, both of whom face some 
uncertainty. Such a situation is called a two-sided incomplete-information 
situation. Note that for such a situation to arise, it is not necessary that both 
players are uncertain about some “objective” aspect of the game (such as the 
preferences of the opponent): one of the two players might simply be uncertain 
about the beliefs of the other player. A situation of this sort is illustrated in 
Figure 13.8. Let G be the game associated with states α and β  (it is the same 
game) and G′  the game associated with state γ. Suppose that the true state is α. 
Then all of the following are true at state α : 
1) both Player 1 and Player 2 know that they are playing game G (that is, 
neither player has any uncertainty about the objective aspects of the 
game), 
2) Player 1 knows that Player 2 knows that they are playing game G, 
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3) Player 2 is uncertain as to whether Player 1 knows that they are playing 
G (which is the case if the actual state is α ) or whether Player 1 is 
uncertain (if the actual state is β ) between the possibility that they are 
playing game G and the possibility that they are playing game G′  and 
considers the two possibilities equally likely; furthermore, Player 2 
attaches probability 2
3
 to the first case (where Player 1 knows that they 
are playing game G) and probability 1
3
 to the second case (where Player 
1 is uncertain between game G and game G′ ), 
4) Player 1 knows the state of uncertainty of Player 2 (concerning Player 1, 
as described in point 3 above), 
5) The payoffs of Player 1 are common knowledge; furthermore, it is 
common knowledge that Player 2 knows his own payoffs. 
1,3 0,1
0,0 3,1
A
B
C D
1
2
1,3 0,1
0,0 3,1
A
B
C D
1
2
1:
2:
α β
2/3 1/3
1,0 0,2
0,0 3,1
A
B
C D
1
2
γ
1/2 1/2
 
Figure 13.8 
In principle, the Harsanyi transformation can be applied also to situations of two-
sided incomplete information. However, in such cases there is an issue concerning 
the probabilities with which Nature chooses the states. In the case of one-sided 
incomplete information we can take those probabilities to be the beliefs of the 
uninformed player, but in the case of two-sided incomplete information we have 
two uninformed players and thus two sets of beliefs. For example, if we look at 
state β  in Figure 13.8, we have two different probabilities assigned to that state: 1
2
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by Player 1 and 1
3
 by Player 2. Which of the two should we take as Nature’s 
probability for state β ? The answer is: neither of them. What we should take as 
Nature’s probabilities is a probability distribution over the set of states { , , }α β γ  
that reflects the beliefs of both players: we have encountered such a notion before, 
in Chapter 8: it is the notion of a common prior (Definition 8.10). A common prior 
is a probability distribution over the set of states that yields the players’ beliefs 
upon conditioning on the information represented by a cell of an information 
partition. For example, in the situation illustrated in Figure 13.8 we are seeking a 
probability distribution :{ , , } [0,1]ν α β γ →  such that ( |{ , })ν β β γ =  
1
2
( )
( ) ( )
ν β
ν β ν γ
=
+
, 2
3
( )
( |{ , })
( ) ( )
ν α
ν α α β
ν α ν β
= =
+
 (and, of course,  ( ) ( )ν α ν β+ +  
( ) 1ν γ = ). In this case a common prior exists and is given by 
2 1
4 4
( )   ( ) ( ) .ν α ν β ν γ= = =and  Using this common prior to assign probabilities to 
Nature’s choices we obtain the imperfect-information game shown in Figure 13.9. 
A B A BA B
1
1
2 2
C D C DD CDCDC CD
1
3
1
3
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
1
3
1
3
1
0
2
0
1
γ
1/4
1
/4
2/
4
α
β
zyxwvu
ts
NATURE
 
Figure 13.9 
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The following pure-strategy profile is Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game 
of Figure 13.9: Player 1’s strategy is AB (that is, he plays A if informed that the 
state is α and plays B if informed that the state is either β or γ ) and Player 2’s 
strategy is  CD (that is, she plays C at her information set on the left and D at 
her information set on the right). To verify that this is a Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium it is easier to verify that it is a weak sequential equilibrium together 
with the following system of belief, obtained by using Bayesian updating (note 
that every information set is reached by the strategy profile): 
1 1 2 1
2 2 3 3
0 0 0 1
s t u v w x y z
µ
 
=  
 
  
Let us check sequential rationality. We begin with Player 1: (1) at the singleton 
node on the left, A gives Player 1 a payoff of 1 (given Player 2’s choice of C ) 
while B gives him a payoff of 0, hence A is sequentially rational; (2) at the 
information set on the right, given his beliefs and given Player 2’s strategy CD, 
choosing A gives him an expected payoff of 1 1 1
2 2 2
1 0+ =  while B gives him an 
expected payoff of 31 1
2 2 2
0 3+ = , hence B is sequentially rational. Now consider 
Player 2: (1) at her information set on the left, given her beliefs, C gives her an 
expected payoff of 2 1
3 3
3 0 2+ =  while D gives her an expected payoff of 
2 1
3 3
1 1 1+ = , hence C is sequentially rational; (2) at her information set on the 
right, given her beliefs, C gives her a payoff of 0 while D gives her a payoff of 1, 
hence D is sequentially rational.  
The existence of a common prior is essential in order to be able to apply the 
Harsanyi transformation to a situation of two-sided incomplete information. In 
some cases a common prior does not exist (see Exercise 13.6) and thus the 
Harsanyi transformation cannot be carried out. 
Remark 13.3.  Besides the conceptual issues that arise in general with respect to 
the notion of Nash equilibrium, the notion of Bayesian Nash equilibrium for 
games with incomplete information raises the further issue of how one should 
understand or justify the notion of a common prior. This issue is not a trivial 
one and has been the object of debate in the literature.4 
 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced 
in this section, by going through the exercises in Section 13.E.3 of Appendix 
13.E at the end of this chapter. 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Bonanno and Nehring (1999), Gul (1998) and Morris (1995). 
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13.4 Multi-sided incomplete information 
So far we have only considered strategic-form games with two players. 
However, the analysis extends easily to games involving more than two players.  
If there are n ≥ 3 players and only one player has uncertainty about some 
aspects of the game, while the others have no uncertainty whatsoever, then we 
have a situation of one-sided incomplete information; if two or more players 
have uncertainty (not necessarily all about the game but some possibly about 
the beliefs of other players) then we have a multi-sided incomplete-information 
situation (the two-sided case being a special case). We will consider an example 
of this below. Let 1G  and 2G  be the three-player games in strategic form (with 
cardinal payoffs) shown in Figure 13.10. 
C D
A 4 1 0 2 4 2
B 4 1 0 0 0 0
C D
A 2 0 2 0 1 0
B 0 0 0 0 2 0Player  1
Player  1
Player 2
Player 2
Player 3 chooses  E
Player 3 chooses  F
1GAME G  
 
C D
A 4 4 0 2 1 2
B 4 4 0 0 1 0
C D
A 2 1 2 0 0 0
B 0 2 0 0 0 0Player  1
Player  1
Player 2
Player 2
Player 3 chooses  E
Player 3 chooses  F
2GAME G  
Figure 13.10 
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Consider the multi-sided situation of incomplete information illustrated in 
Figure 13.11, where with each state is associated one of the two games of Figure 
13.10. 
 
α β γ δ
α β γ δ
α β γ δ
1 :
2 :
3 :
1
2
1
2
2
3
1
3
3
4
1
4
3
5
2
5
g a m e g a m e g a m e g a m e
1G 1G 1G2G
t r u e
s t a t e
 
Figure 13.11 
At the true state α, all of the following are true: 
• all three players know that they are playing game 1G , 
• Player 1 knows that Players 2 and 3 know that the actual game is 1G ; 
• Player 2 knows that Player 3 knows that the actual game is 1G , but is 
uncertain as to whether Player 1 knows or is uncertain; furthermore, 
Player 2 assigns probability 2
3
 to Player 1 being uncertain; 
• Player 3 knows that Player 1 knows that the actual game is 1G , but is 
uncertain as to whether Player 2 knows or is uncertain; furthermore, 
Player 3 assigns probability 2
5
 to Player 2 being uncertain; 
• The payoffs of Players 1 and 3 are common knowledge. 
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The beliefs of the players in the situation illustrated in Figure 13.11 are 
compatible with each other, in the sense that there exists a common prior. In 
fact the following is a common prior: 
3 6 6 2
17 17 17 17
α β γ δ
ν
 
=  
 
 . Thus we can apply 
the Harsanyi transformation and obtain the game shown in Figure 13.12. 
F
E E E E E E E EF F F F F F F F
FE E E E E E E E FFFFFF
C D D DC CDC
Nature
B
A
A
B
B
A
A
B
3
17
6
17
6
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2
17
α
γβ
δ
1 1
1
2 2
3
3 3
C
C C C
D
D
D
D
4
1
0
2
0
2
2
4
2
0
1
0
4
1
0
2
0
2
2
4
2
0
1
0
4
1
0
2
0
2
2
4
2
0
1
0
4
1
0
4
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
0
4
1
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
4
0
4
4
0
2
1
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
1
2
0
2
0
0
1
0  
Figure 13.12 
The task of finding Bayesian Nash equilibria for the game of Figure 13.12 is left 
as an exercise (see Exercise 13.7). 
 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced 
in this section, by going through the exercises in Section 13.E.4 of Appendix 
13.E at the end of this chapter. 
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Appendix 13.E: Exercises 
13.E.2 .  Exercises  for  Section 13.2 :           
           One-sided  incomplete information. 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this 
chapter. 
Exercise 13.1. Albert and Bill play a Game of Chicken.  Each player can choose 
“swerve” or “don’t swerve.”  Choices are made simultaneously.  If a player 
swerves then he is a chicken.  If he does not swerve, then he is a rooster if the 
other player swerves, but he gets injured if the other player does not.  A player 
can be a “normal” type or a “reckless” type.  A “normal” type gets a payoff of  
100 from being a rooster, 85 from being a chicken, and zero from being injured.  
A “reckless” type thinks being a rooster is worth 100, being injured is worth 50, 
but being a chicken is worth zero!  As a matter of fact, both Albert and Bill are 
normal; it is common knowledge between them that Bill is normal, but Bill 
thinks that there is a 20% chance that Albert is reckless (and an 80% chance 
that Albert is normal). Bill knows that Albert knows whether he (= Albert) is 
reckless or normal. Everything that Bill knows is common knowledge between 
Albert and Bill. 
(a) Construct an interactive knowledge-belief structure that represents the 
situation of incomplete information described above. 
(b) Apply the Harsanyi transformation to obtain an extensive-form game. 
(c) Construct the strategic-form associated with the extensive-form game of 
part (b). 
(d) Find the pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria and classify them as either 
pooling or separating. 
Exercise 13.2. Bill used to be Ann’s boyfriend. Today it is Ann’s birthday. Bill 
can either not give a gift to Ann or give her a nicely wrapped gift. If offered a 
gift, Ann can either accept or reject. This would be a pretty simple situation, if 
it weren’t for the fact that Ann does not know if Bill is still a friend or has 
become an enemy. If he is a friend, she expects a nice present from him. If Bill 
is an enemy, she expects to find a humiliating thing in the box (he is known to 
have given dead frogs to his “not so nice friends” when he was in third grade!). 
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The preferences are as follows: Bill’s favorite outcome (payoff = 1) occurs 
when he offers a gift and it is accepted (in either case: if he is a friend, he enjoys 
seeing her unwrap a nice present, and if he is an enemy, he revels in the cruelty 
of insulting Ann with a humiliating “gift”). Whether he is a friend or an enemy, 
Bill prefers having not extended a gift (payoff = 0) to enduring the humiliation 
of a rejected gift (payoff = − 1). Ann prefers accepting a gift coming from a 
friend (payoff = 1) to refusing a gift (payoff = 0); the worst outcome for her 
(payoff = − 1) is one where she accepts a gift from an enemy. Ann attaches 
probability p (with 0 < p < 1) to the event that Bill is a friend (and 1 − p to Bill 
being an enemy); however, Ann knows that Bill knows whether he is a friend 
or an enemy. Everything that Ann knows is common knowledge between Ann 
and Bill. As a matter of fact, Bill is a friend.  
(a) Construct an interactive knowledge-belief structure that represents the 
situation of incomplete information described above. 
(b) Apply the Harsanyi transformation to obtain an extensive-form game. 
(c) Construct the strategic-form associated with the extensive-form game. 
(d) Find all the pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria and classify them as 
either pooling or separating. 
(e) Suppose that  p = 1
4
.  Is the outcome associated with a pure-strategy 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium Pareto efficient? 
 
13 .E.3 .  Exercises  for  Section 13.2 :  
           Two-sided incomplete information. 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this 
chapter. 
Exercise 13.3. Consider the situation of two-sided incomplete information 
illustrated below (where the true state is α ). 
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6,3 0,9
3,3 3,0
T
B
L R
1
2
0,3 3,9
3,3 0,0
T
B
L R
1
2
1:
2:
α β
1/3
0,1 3,2
3,4 0,3
T
B
L R
1
2
γ
3/4 1/4
2/3
 
Use the Harsanyi transformation to represent this incomplete-information 
situation as an extensive-form game. Be explicit about how you calculated the 
probabilities for Nature. 
Exercise 13.4. Consider the following congestion situation (a variant of the so 
called El Farol Bar Problem).5 Two students at a college are simultaneously 
deciding between going to a bar and going home. The bar is extremely small 
and it gets congested when more than one person is there. In principle, there 
are two types of students. One type, call it the b type, prefers going to the bar if 
he is the only customer there (in which case he gets a utility of 20) but dislikes 
congestion and gets a utility of − 20 if he goes to the bar and is not the only 
customer there; furthermore, for the b type, the utility of being at home is 0. 
The other type of student, call him the  not-b  type, prefers being at home (in 
which case his utility is 20) to being at the bar; being at the bar alone gives him 
a utility of 0 but being at the bar with other customers is very stressful and 
gives him a utility of −40. Let 1 2( , )G b b  be the game where both players are b 
types, 1 2( , not- )G b b  the game where Player 1 is a b type and Player 2 a not-b 
type, etc. Assume that all payoffs are von Neumann-Morgenstern payoffs. 
(a) Write the four possible strategic-form games. 
                                                 
5 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/El_Farol_Bar_problem  
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(b) (b.1) For each of the games of part (a) find the pure-strategy Nash 
equilibria.  
(b.2) For game 1 2( , )G b b  find also a mixed-strategy equilibrium where each 
choice is made with positive probability. 
(c) Assume now that, as a matter of fact, both players are b types. However, it 
is a situation of incomplete information where it is common knowledge 
that each player knows his own type but is uncertain about the type of the 
other player and assigns probability 1
5
 to the other player being the same 
type as he is and probability 4
5
 to the other player being of the opposite 
type. Draw an interactive knowledge-belief structure that represents this 
situation of incomplete information. 
(d) Use the Harsanyi transformation to represent the above situation of 
incomplete information as an extensive-form game. 
(e) For the game of part (d), pick one strategy of Player 1 and explain in words 
what it means. 
(f)  For the game of part (d), write the corresponding strategic-form game. 
(g) Find a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game of part (d). 
(h) For the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of part (g), find (h.1) where the players 
are actually going and (h.2) the actual payoffs of the players in the game 
they are actually playing (that is, at the true state). (h.3) Do their actual 
choices yield a Nash equilibrium of the game that they are actually 
playing?  
(i) If you didn’t know what the true state was but you knew the game of part 
(d), what probability would you assign to the event that the players would 
end-up making actual choices that constitute a Nash equilibrium of the 
true game that they are playing? 
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Exercise 13.5. Consider the situation of two-sided incomplete information 
illustrated below (where the true state is α ). 
4,4 0,0
2,0 2,2
T
B
L R
1
2
0,4 4,0
2,0 0,2
T
B
L R
1
2
1:
2:
α β
0,4 4,0
2,0 0,2
T
B
L R
1
2
γ
1/2 1/2
4,4 0,0
2,0 2,2
T
B
L R
1
2
δ
1/4 3/4 1/4 3/4
 
(a) Use the Harsanyi transformation to represent this situation as an extensive-
form game. Be explicit about how you calculated the probabilities for 
Nature. 
(b) Write down all the pure strategies of Player 1 and all the pure strategies of  
Player 2. 
(c) Consider the following pure-strategy profile: Player 1 plays T always and 
Player 2 plays L always. What belief system, paired with this strategy profile, 
would satisfy Bayesian updating?  
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13.E.4 .  Exercises  for  Section 13.4 :  
           Multi-sided incomplete information. 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this 
chapter. 
Exercise 13.6. Consider the multi-sided situation of incomplete information 
shown below (what games 1G  and 2G  are  is irrelevant to the following 
question). For what values of p can the Harsanyi transformation be carried out? 
α         β         γ        δ
α         β         γ        δ
α         β         γ        δ
1:
2:
3:
game
1G
game
2G
game
1G
game
2G
1
5
4
5
2
3
1
3
1
3
2
3
1 p−p
 
 
 
Exercise 13.7. Find a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game of 
Figure 13.12. 
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◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊ 
Exercise 13.8: Challenging Question.   
Consider the following situation. It is common knowledge between Players 1 
and 2 that tomorrow one of three states will occur: a, b or c. It is also common 
knowledge between them that (1) if state a materializes, then Player 1 will only 
know that either a or b occurred and Player 2 will only know that either a or c 
occurred, (2) if state b materializes, then Player 1 will only know that either a 
or b occurred and Player 2 will know that b occurred, (3) if state c  materializes, 
then Player 1 will know that c occurred while Player 2 will only know that 
either a or c occurred. Tomorrow they will play the following simultaneous 
game: each will report, confidentially, one of her two possible states of 
information to a third party (for example, Player 1 can only report 
{ , }  { }a b cor ). Note that lying is a possibility: for example, if the state is a  
Player 1 can choose to report { }c . Let 1R  be the report of Player 1 and 2R  the 
report of Player 2. The third party, who always knows the true state, then 
proceeds as follows:  
(1) if the reports are compatible, in the sense that 1 2R R∩ ≠ ∅ , then he gives the 
players the following sums of money: 
1 2
   
5 4 6
5 6 4
a
R R a b c∩ =
If  the true state is
1 gets
2 gets
               
1 2
   
5 4 4
0 1 1
b
R R a b c∩ =
If  the true state is
1 gets
2 gets
            
1 2
   
0 1 1
5 4 4
c
R R a b c∩ =
If  the true state is
1 gets
2 gets
 
(2) if the reports are incompatible ( 1 2R R∩ = ∅ ) then he gives the players the 
following sums of money: 
  5 4 1
5 1 4
a b cThe true state is
1 gets
2 gets
 
(a) Represent this situation of incomplete information by means of an 
interactive knowledge structure (for the moment do not worry about 
beliefs). 
(b) Apply the Harsanyi transformation to the situation represented in part (a) 
to obtain an extensive-form frame (again, at this stage, do not worry about 
probabilities). 
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(c) Suppose first that both players have no idea what the probabilities of the 
states are and are not willing to form subjective probabilities. It is common 
knowledge that each player is selfish (i.e. only cares about how much 
money she herself gets) and greedy (i.e. prefers more money to less) and 
ranks sets of outcomes according to the worst outcome, in the sense that 
she is indifferent between sets X and Y if and only if the worst outcome in 
X is equal to the worst outcome in Y and prefers X to Y if and only if the 
worst outcome in X is better than the worst outcome in Y.   
(c.1) Write the normal-form (or strategic-form) of the game of Part (a). 
(c.2) Find all the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of this game. 
(c.3) Among the Nash equilibria, is there one where each player tells the 
truth? 
(d) Suppose now that it is common knowledge between the players that there 
are objective probabilities for the states as follows: 
2 1 2
5 5 5
a b c 
 
 
. This time 
assume that it is common knowledge that both players are selfish, greedy 
and risk-neutral. (Thus ignore now the preferences described in part c.) 
(d.1) Suppose that Player 2 expects Player 1 to report truthfully. Is it 
rational for Player 2 to also report truthfully? 
(d.2) Is “always lying” for each player part of a pure-strategy weak 
sequential         equilibrium? Prove your claim. 
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Appendix 13.S: Solutions to exercises  
Exercise 13.1.  (a) The structure is as follows (s  means “swerve”, ds  means 
“don’t swerve”): 
s
s ds
s
s ds
1:
2:
α β
α β
0 ,85 850 ,100
0 , 0
Albert is reckless Albert is normal
,85100 50,0
,85 85 ,100
,85100
0.80.2
true state
Albert
Bill Bill
Albert
ds ds
 
(b) The Harsanyi transformation yields the following game: 
NATURE
Albert Albert
BILL
reckless normal
0.2 0.8
s ds s ds
s ds s ds s ds s ds
0
85
0
100
100
85
50
0
85
85
85
100
100
85
0
0
Albert's payoff
Bill's payoff
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(c) The corresponding strategic-form game is as follows: 
s ds
s, s (0.8)85 = 68 , 85 (0.8)85 = 68 , 100
s, ds (0.8)100 = 80 , 85 0 , (0.2)100 = 20
ds, s (0.8)85 +(0.2)100 = 88 , 85 (0.8)85 + (0.2)50 = 78 , (0.8)100 = 80
ds, ds 100 , 85 (0.2)50 = 10 , 0
A
l
b
e
r
t
Bill
 
(d) There is only one pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium, namely 
((ds,ds),s) and it is a pooling equilibrium. 
 
Exercise 13.2.  (a) The structure is as follows (g means “gift”, ng means “no 
gift”, a means “accept” and r means “reject”): 
g
a ra r
1:
2:
α β
α β
1 , 1 −1
, 0 , 0
true state
ng ng
Bill
Ann Ann
Bill
g
Bill is a friend Bill is an enemy
00
, 0
,  00 ,  00
,  −11 −1 , 0
p 1− p
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(b) The Harsanyi transformation yields the following game: 
1−pp
Nature
Bill Bill
g g
r a ra
ng
Ann
ng
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
−1
−1
0
−1
0
fri
en
d enemy
 
(c) The corresponding strategic-form game is as follows: 
a r
g, g 1  ,  2p −1 −1  ,  0
g, ng p   ,   p −p    ,  0
ng, g 1−p  ,  p −1 p −1  ,  0
ng, ng 0  ,  0 0  ,  0
B
i
l
l
Ann
 
(d) If p ≥ 1
2
 then there are two pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria: ((g,g), a) 
and ((ng,ng), r ). Both of them are pooling equilibria.  If p < 1
2
 then there is 
only one Bayesian -Nash equilibrium:  ((ng,ng), r ) (a pooling equilibrium). 
(e) If p = 1
4
 the only Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is  ((ng,ng), r ) and the outcome 
is that Bill does not offer a gift to Ann. This outcome is Pareto inefficient in 
the true game because, given that the true state of affairs is one where Bill is 
a friend, a Pareto superior outcome would be one where Bill offers a gift 
and Ann accepts. 
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Exercise 13.3.  (a) and (b.1): 
1 2( , ) :G b b  B −20 −20 20 0
H 0 20 0 0
Player 2
B H
Player 1
  
Nash equilibria: (H,B) and (B,H) 
1 2( , not- )G b b :  B −20 −40 20 20
H 0 0 0 20
Player 2
B H
Player 1
  
Nash equilibrium: (B,H) 
1 2(not- , )G b b :  B −40 −20 0 0
H 20 20 20 0
Player 2
B H
Player 1
  
Nash equilibrium: (H,B) 
1 2(not- , not- )G b b :  B −40 −40 0 20
H 20 0 20 20
Player 2
B H
Player 1
  
Nash equilibrium: (H,H). 
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(b.2) Let p be the probability that Player 1 plays B and q the probability that 
Player 2 plays B. Then the mixed-strategy equilibrium is given by the solution 
to 20 20(1 ) 0  20 20(1 ) 0q q p p− + − = − + − =and , which is 1
2
p q= = . 
 
(c) The structure is as follows: 
true state
2:
1:
1/5
1/5 4/5 4/5 1/5
1/5 4/5
4/5
b ,b1 2 b , bnot-1 2 not-b ,b1 2 not- not-b , b1 2
 
 
(d) First of all, note that the common prior is  
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2, , not- not- , not- , not-
1 4 4 1
10 10 10 10
b b b b b b b b 
 
  
 
.  
Thus the extensive form is as follows: 
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NATURE
b1
,b2
n
o
t-b
1
,b
2
not-b1,not-b2
4
/1
0
1/10
1
1
2
2
−20
−20
20
0
0
20
0
0
−20
−40
20
20
0
0
0
20
−40
−20
0
0
20
20
20
0
−40
−40
20
20
20
0
0
20
b
1
,n
o
t-
b2
1/1
0 4
/1
0
B H
B H B H
B H
B
B B
B B B B
H
HB
H H H H H H
 
(e) One possible strategy for Player 1 is (B,H) which means “if I am the b type 
then I go to the bar and if I am the not-b type then I go home”. 
(f) The strategic form is as follows: 
   Player 2  
  B , B  B , H H , B  H , H 
 B , B  −30, −30 −10 , 0 −10 , −20 10, 10 
Player B , H 0, −10 16, 16 4 , −16 20, 10 
1 H , B  −20 , −10 −16 , 4 −4 , −4 0, 10 
 H , H 10 , 10 10 , 20 10 , 0 10 , 10 
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(g) There is a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, namely ( )( , ), ( , )B H B H  
where each player goes to the bar if he is a b type and goes home if he is a not-b 
type. This can be found either the long way, by filling in all the payoffs in the 
above matrix, or by reasoning as follows. For each player, going home is 
strictly better than going to the bar if the player is of type not-b, no matter 
what she anticipates the other player doing (in other words, H strictly 
dominates B at the information set where not-bi  holds). Thus the question is 
what to do if you are of type b. You know that the other player is going home 
if he is of type not-b, thus you only need to consider his choice if he is of type 
b; if his plan is to go home also in that case, then B gives you 20 for sure and H 
gives you 0 for sure, hence B is better; if his plan is to go to the bar, then H 
gives you 0 for sure while B gives you the lottery 
1 4
5 5
20 20− 
 
 
, that is, an 
expected payoff of 12; hence B is better in that case too. 
(h) At the true state, both players prefer going to the bar, thus (h.1) they both 
end up going to the bar and (h.2) get a payoff of − 20. (h.3) (B,B) is not a Nash 
equilibrium of the game that they are actually playing (game 1 2( , )G b b ). 
(i) If the true game is 1 2( , )G b b  they end up playing (B,B) which is not a Nash 
equilibrium of that game, if the true game is 1 2( , not- )G b b  they end up playing 
(B,H) which is a Nash equilibrium of that game, if the true game is 1 2(not- , )G b b  
they end up playing (H,B) which is a Nash equilibrium of that game and if the 
true game is 1 2(not- , not- )G b b  they end up playing (H,H) which is a Nash 
equilibrium of that game. Since the probability of 1 2( , )G b b  is 
1
10
, the 
probability that they end-up playing a Nash equilibrium of the actual game is 
9
10
. 
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Exercise 13.4.  The game is as follows: 
NATURE
3/11 2/11
6/11
T T TB B B
L L L L L LR R R R R R
6
3
0
3
3
4
3
2
0
1
0
0
3
3
3
9
0
3
3
0
3
3
0
9
β γα
1 1
2 2
 
Nature’s probabilities are obtained by solving 1
3
p
p p
α
α β
=
+
, 3
4
p
p p
β
β γ
=
+
 and 
1.p p pα β γ+ + =  
Exercise 13.5.  (a)  The game is as follows: 
3/16
2
1
NATURE
1/16
T T TB B B
L L L L L LR R R R R R
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
2
2
0
0
0
T B
L LR R
α δ
9/16
4
0
4
0
0
0
2
0
2
2
0
4
4
0
2
0
0
2
4
0
1 1
2
γβ
3/16
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Nature’s probabilities are obtained solving the following equations: 
1
4
p
p p
α
α β
=
+
, 31
2 4
, , 1
p p
p p p p
p p p p
β γ
α β γ δ
β γ γ δ
= = + + + =
+ +
. 
(b) Player 1 has 8 strategies: TTT, TTB, TBT, TBB, BTT, BTB, BBT, BBB. 
       Player 2 has four strategies: LL, LR, RL, RR. 
(c)  Player 1’s beliefs must be 12  at the left node and 
1
2  at the right node of his 
middle information set.  Player 2’s beliefs at her information set on the left 
must be: 1
4
 at the left-most node and 3
4
 at the third node from the left. The 
same is true for the other information set of Player 2. 
Exercise 13.6.  The Harsanyi transformation requires that there be a common 
prior. Thus we need a probability distribution { }: , , , (0,1)ν α β γ δ →  such that: 
(1) 1
5
( )
( ) ( )
ν α
ν α ν β
=
+
,   (2) 2
3
( )
( ) ( )
ν γ
ν γ ν δ
=
+
,   (3) 1
3
( )
( ) ( )
ν β
ν β ν γ
=
+
  
and   (4) 
( )
( ) ( )
p
ν α
ν α ν δ
=
+
. 
From (1) we get ( ) 4 ( )ν β ν α= , from (2) we get ( ) 2 ( )ν γ ν δ=  and from (3) we 
get ( ) 2 ( )ν γ ν δ= ; these three equalities, together with 1α β γ δ+ + + =  yield a 
unique solution, namely 
81 4 4
17 17 17 17
α β γ δ
ν
 
=  
 
. This is a common prior if and 
only if 
1
17 1
51 4
17 17
( )
( ) ( )
p
ν α
ν α ν δ
= = =
+ +
. Thus 1
5
p =  is the only value that makes it 
possible to apply the Harsanyi transformation. 
Exercise 13.7.  The game under consideration is reproduced below, with the 
equilibrium described below highlighted in red.  Given the complexity of the 
game, it is definitely not a good idea to construct the corresponding strategic 
form. It is best to think in terms of weak sequential equilibrium. Consider the 
assessment ( , )σ µ , highlighted in the figure above, where ( ), ,BBB CC EEEσ =  
(that is, σ  is the pure-strategy profile where Player 1 chooses B at each of his 
three information sets, Player 2 chooses C at each of her two information sets 
and Player 3 chooses E at each of her three information sets) and µ is the 
following system of beliefs: Player 1 attaches probability 1
2
 to each node in his 
bottom information set; Player 2, at her information set on the left, attaches 
GAME THEORY – Giacomo Bonanno 
 
506 
 
probability 1
3
 to the second node from the top and probability 2
3
 to the bottom 
node and,  at her information set on the right, attaches probability 1
3
 to the 
second node from the top and probability 2
3
 to the bottom node; Player 3, at 
her top information set, attaches probability 3
5
 to the left-most node and 
probability 2
5
 to the second node from the right and,  at her bottom-left 
information set, attaches probability 1 to the third node from the left and, at 
her bottom-right information set, attaches probability 1 to the left-most node. 
F
E E E E E E E EF F F F F F F F
FE E E E E E E E FFFFFF
C D D DC CDC
Nature
B
A
A
B
B
A
A
B
3
17
6
17
6
17
2
17
α
γβ
δ
1 1
1
2 2
3
3 3
C
C C C
D
D
D
D
4
1
0
2
0
2
2
4
2
0
1
0
4
1
0
2
0
2
2
4
2
0
1
0
4
1
0
2
0
2
2
4
2
0
1
0
4
1
0
4
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
0
4
1
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
4
0
4
4
0
2
1
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
1
2
0
2
0
0
1
0
[ 1/3]
[2/3]
[1]
[1]
[1/3]
[2/ 3]
[3/5] [2/ 5]
[1/ 2] [1/2]
 
Let us verify that ( , )σ µ  is a weak sequential equilibrium. The beliefs described 
above are obtained from σ using Bayesian updating. Thus we only need to 
check sequential rationality.  
For Player 1: (1) at the top-left node, both A and B give the same payoff 
(namely, 4), thus B is sequentially rational; (2) the same is true at the top-
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right node; (3) at the bottom information set both A and B give an expected 
payoff of 1 1
2 2
(4) (4) 4+ = , thus B is sequentially rational. 
For Player 2: (1) at the left information set C gives an expected payoff of 
1 2
3 3
(1) (1) 1+ =  while D gives 1 2
3 3
(0) (0) 0+ = , thus C is sequentially rational;  
(2) at the information on the right C gives an expected payoff of 
1 2
3 3
(1) (4) 3+ =  while D gives an expected payoff of 1 2 2
3 3 3
(0) (1)+ = , thus C is 
sequentially rational. 
For Player 3: (1) at the top information set both E and F give an expected 
payoff of 3 2
5 5
(0) (0) 0+ = , thus E is sequentially rational; (2) at the bottom-
left information set both E and F give a payoff of 0, thus E is sequentially 
rational; (3) the same is true at the bottom-right information set. 
 
Exercise 13.8 (Challenging Question).  (a) The structure is as follows: 
a b c
aPlayer 1:
Player 2:
b c
 
(b) The game is as follows: 
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{a,b} {c}
{b} {a,c}{a,c} {b}
2
1
a b
{a,b} {c}
2
c
0
5
1
4
5
0
4
1
1
4
4
1
4
1
1
4
{a,c} {b} {b}
5
5
4
6
6
4
5
5
{a,c} {b} {a,c} {b}
1
{a,c}
{a,b}
{c}
Nature
 
(c)  (c.1) The strategic form is as follows (where the strategy ( , )x y  for Player 1 
means x if { , }a b  and y if {c} and the strategy ( , )z w  for Player 2 means z if 
{ , }a c  and w if {b}). Inside each cell the sets of outcomes are given: 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) { } { } { } { }
( ) { } { } { }
Player 2
{ , },{ , } { , },{ } { },{ , } { },{ }
{ , },{ , } (5,5), (5,0), (0,5) (5,5), (4,1), (0,5) (4,6), (5,0), (1, 4) (4,6), (4,1), (1, 4)
Pl { , },{ } (5,5), (5,0), (1, 4) (5,5), (4,1), (1, 4) (4,6), (5,0), (1, 4) (4,6), (4,1), (1, 4
a c a c a c b b a c b b
a b a b
a b c { }
( ) { } { } { } { }
( ) { } { } { } { }
)
1 { },{ , } (6,4), (4,1), (0,5) (6, 4), (4,1), (0,5) (5,5), (4,1), (1, 4) (5,5), (4,1), (1, 4)
{ },{ } (6,4), (4,1), (1, 4) (6, 4), (4,1), (1, 4) (5,5), (4,1), (1, 4) (5,5), (4,1), (1, 4)
c a b
c c
 
Taking as payoffs the smallest sum of money in each cell (for the corresponding 
player) the game can be written as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
Player 2
{ , },{ , } { , },{ } { },{ , } { },{ }
{ , },{ , } 0  ,  0 0  ,  1 1  ,  0
Pl { , },{ } 1  ,  0 1  ,  0
1 { },{ , } 0  ,  1 0  , 
1  ,  1
1  ,  1 1  ,  1
1   1
{
,  1 1  ,  1
},{ } 1  ,  1 1  ,  1 1  ,  1 1  ,  1
a c a c a c b b a c b b
a b a b
a b c
c a b
c c
 
(c.2) There are 9 Nash equilibria which are highlighted in red. 
(c.3) Truth telling is represented by the strategy profile 
( ) ( )( ){ , },{ } , { , },{ }a b c a c b  and it is one of the Nash equilibria. 
(d)  (d.1) No. If the state is b then it is a good idea for Player 2 to report 
truthfully because { , }a c  yields her 0 while {b} yields her 1. But if the state is 
either a or c then, by Bayesian updating, Player 2 must assign probability 12  to 
the left-most node and probability 12  to the right-most node of her bottom 
information set; thus her expected payoff from reporting { , }a c  is 
1 1
2 2
(5) (4) 4.5+ =  while the expected payoff from reporting {b} is 
1 1
2 2
(6) (4) 5+ = . 
(d.2) Yes. “Always lie” corresponds to the strategy profile 
( ) ( )( ){ },{ , } , { },{ , }c a b b a c . By Bayesian updating the corresponding beliefs must 
be: for Player 1 ( )2 13 3,  and for Player 2 ( )1 12 20, , ,0  at the bottom information set 
and (0,1) at the top information set. Sequential rationality is then satisfied at 
every information set: for Player 1 at the top information set {c } gives an 
expected payoff of 2 1 14
3 3 3
(5) (4)+ =  while {a,b} gives 132 1
3 3 3
(4) (5)+ =  and at the 
singleton node on the right {a,b} gives 1 and so does {c }; for Player 2 at the 
bottom information set {b} gives an expected payoff of 1 1
2 2
(5) (4) 4.5+ =  and 
{a,c } gives 1 1
2 2
(4) (5) 4.5+ =  and at the top information set both {a,c } and {b} 
give 1.  
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Incomplete Information:  
Dynamic Games 
14.1 One-sided incomplete information 
t the conceptual level, situations of incomplete information involving 
dynamic (or extensive-form) games are essentially the same as 
situations involving static games: the only difference in the 
representation is that one would associate with every state a dynamic game 
instead of a static game.6 As in the case of static games, we will distinguish 
between one-sided and multi-sided incomplete information. In this section we 
will go through two examples of the former, while the latter will be discussed 
in Section 14.2. 
21
T
B
A
D
1
?
0
?
2
?
 
Figure 14.1 
                                                 
6 The reader might have noticed that in Exercise 13.2 we “sneaked in” a dynamic game (where 
Bill moved first and decided whether or not to offer a gift and Ann − if offered a  
gift −  decided whether or not to accept it) .  However, the game could also have been 
written as a simultaneous game, where Ann decided whether or not to accept before knowing 
whether Bill would offer a gift (without knowing Ann’s decision). 
Chapter 
14 
A 
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Consider the perfect-information frame shown in Figure 14.1, where the 
question marks in place of Player 2’s payoffs indicate that her payoffs are not 
common knowledge between the two players. Suppose that, on the other hand, 
Player 1’s payoffs are common knowledge. Furthermore, Player 1 is uncertain 
between the two possibilities shown in Figure 14.2 and assigns probability 1
3
 to 
the one on the left and probability 2
3
 to the one on the right. The thick edges 
represent the backward-induction solutions of the two games.  
21
T
B
A
D
1
0
0
2
2
1
 
21
T
B
A
D
1
0
0
1
2
2
 
Figure 14.2 
Thus if Player 1 knew that he was playing the game on the left, then he would 
choose B, while if he knew that he was playing the game on the right then he 
would choose T. If we assume that Player 1’s beliefs are common knowledge 
between the players, then we have the situation of one-sided incomplete 
information shown in Figure 14.3. Assume that state α  is the true state. 
21
T
B
A
D
1
0
0
2
2
1
1:
2:
α β
1/3 2/3
21
T
B
A
D
1
0
0
1
2
2
 
Figure 14.3 
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Using the Harsanyi transformation we can convert the situation illustrated in 
Figure 14.3 into the extensive-form game shown in Figure 14.4. 
NATURE
1/3 2/3
1
1
0
1
0
0
2
2
2
2
1
0
1
B B
T T
D D AA
2 2
 
Figure 14.4 
The solution concept used for the case of static games was Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium (that is, Nash equilibrium). In the case of dynamic games this is no 
longer an appropriate solution concept, since −  as we know from Chapter  
3 −  it allows a player to “choose” a strictly dominated action at an unreached 
information set. To see this, consider the strategic-form game associated with 
the game of Figure 14.4, shown in Figure 14.5. 
B 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
T 0 4/3 4/3 2 2/3 1 2 5/3
Player 1
Player  2
DD DA AD AA
  
Figure 14.5 
The Nash equilibria of the strategic-form game shown in Figure 14.5 (and thus 
the Bayesian Nash equilibria of the game shown in Figure 14.4) are: (B , DD),  
(B, AD) and (T, DA). Of these only (T,DA) is a subgame-perfect equilibrium. 
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Thus from now on we shall use either the notion of subgame-perfect 
equilibrium or the notion of weak sequential equilibrium (in the game of 
Figure 14.4 the two notions coincide). Thus we will take (T,DA) to be the 
solution of the game of Figure 14.4  Since we postulated that the true game was 
the one associated with state α, as a matter of fact the players end up playing 
(T,D) which is not the backward induction solution of the true game. This is 
not surprising in light of what was already pointed out in Chapter 13. 
Next we consider a more complex example, built on Selten’s Chain-Store Game 
analyzed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4). Recall that the story is as follows (we will 
consider the special case where m, the number of towns and thus of potential 
entrants, is 2). A chain store is a monopolist in an industry. It owns stores in 
two different towns. In each town the chain store makes $5 million if left to 
enjoy its privileged position undisturbed. In each town there is a 
businesswoman who could enter the industry in that town, but earns $1 
million if she chooses not to enter; if she decides to enter, then the monopolist 
can either fight the entrant, leading to zero profits for both the chain store and 
the entrant in that town, or it can accommodate entry and share the market 
with the entrant, in which case both players make $1.5 million in that town. 
Thus, in each town the interaction between the incumbent monopolist and the 
potential entrant is as illustrated in Figure 14.6 below.  
in
out fight
1 0
1.5
1.5
05
Incumbent
Potential
entrant
share
 
Figure 14.6 
Decisions are made sequentially, as follows. At date t (t = 1,2) the 
businesswoman in town t decides whether or not to enter and if she enters then 
the chain store decides whether or not to fight in that town. What happens in 
town t (at date t ) becomes known to everybody. Thus the businesswoman in 
town 2 at date 2 knows what happened in town 1 at date 1 (either that there 
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was no entry or that entry was met with a fight or that entry was 
accommodated). Intuition suggests that in this game the threat by the 
Incumbent to fight early entrants might be credible, for the following reason. 
The Incumbent could tell Businesswoman 1 the following: 
“It is true that, if you enter and I fight, I will make zero 
profits, while by accommodating your entry I would make 
$1.5 million and thus it would seem that it cannot be in my 
interest to fight you. However, somebody else is watching us, 
namely Businesswoman 2. If she sees that I have fought your 
entry then she might fear that I would do the same with her 
and decide to stay out, in which case in town 2  I would 
make $5 million, so that my total profits in towns 1 and 2 
would be $(0+5) = $5 million. On the other hand, if I 
accommodate your entry, then she will be encouraged to 
entry herself and I will make $1.5 million in each town, for a 
total profit of $3 million. Hence, as you can see, it is indeed 
in my interest to fight you and thus you should stay out.” 
We showed in Chapter 2 that the notion of backward induction does not 
capture this intuition. In the game depicting the entire interaction (Figure 2.10, 
Chapter 2) there was a unique backward-induction solution whose 
corresponding outcome was that both businesswomen entered and the 
Incumbent accommodated entry in both towns. The reason why the backward-
induction solution did not capture the “reputation” argument outlined above 
was explained in Chapter 2. We remarked there that, in order to capture the 
reputation effect, one would need to allow for some uncertainty in the mind of 
some of the players. This is what we will show below. 
Suppose that, in principle, there are two types of incumbent monopolists: the 
rational type and the hotheaded type. The payoffs of a rational type are as 
shown in Figure 14.6, while a hotheaded type enjoys fighting; Figure 14.8 
summarizes the payoffs for the two types of Incumbent (while there is only one 
type of potential entrant, whose payoffs are as shown earlier). 
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If the Incumbent is rational: 
  potential entrant 
  in out 
Incumbent 
fight 0  ,  0 5  ,  1 
share 1.5  ,  1.5 5  ,  1 
  
If the Incumbent is hotheaded: 
  potential entrant 
  in out 
Incumbent 
fight 2  ,  0 5  ,  1 
share 1.5  ,  1.5 5  ,  1 
Figure 14.7 
Thus a hotheaded Incumbent enjoys fighting entry (he considers a fight to be as 
good as getting $2 million!).  
Consider the following situation of one-sided incomplete information. As a 
matter of fact, the Incumbent is rational and this fact is common knowledge 
between the Incumbent and Potential Entrant 1 (from now on denoted by PE-
1). However, Potential Entrant 2 (PE-2) is uncertain whether the Incumbent is 
rational or hotheaded and attaches probability p to the latter case. The beliefs of 
PE-2 are common knowledge as are the payoffs of PE-1 and PE-2. This 
situation can be illustrated with the knowledge-belief structure of Figure 14.8 
below. 
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α                 β
α                 β
α                 β
I:
PE-1:
PE-2: p(1 )p−
true
state
I is 
rational
I is 
hotheaded
 
Figure 14.8 
Applying the Harsanyi transformation to the situation depicted in Figure 14.8 
yields the extensive-form game shown in Figure 14.9 below. We want to see if 
this situation of one-sided incomplete information can indeed capture the 
reputation effect discussed above; in particular, we want to check if there is a 
weak sequential equilibrium of the game of Figure 14.9 where the Incumbent’s 
strategy would be to fight PE-1’s entry in order to scare off PE-2 and, as a 
consequence, PE-1 decides to stay out and so does PE-2.  
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fight
fight
sh
ar
e figh
t
outin
in figh
t
sha
re
in
out
rational
incumbent
hot
hea
ded
 
inc
um
ben
t
inout
in
NATURE
1−pp
PE-1
PE-1
PE-2
out
1     PE-1
1     PE-2
10    I
1
1
10
I
I
1
0
5
1
1.5
6.5
outI
1
0
7
1
1.5
6.5
share
PE-2
share
fight
sh
ar
e
out
1.5
1
6.5I
fight
sh
ar
e
1.5
1.5
3
1.5
0
1.5
I
in
1.5
1
6.5
I
1.5
1.5
3
1.5
0
3.5
fight
fight
PE-2
out
inin out
0
1
5
0
1
7
I
sh
ar
e
I
sh
ar
e
0
0
4
0
0
0
0
1.5
3.5
0
1.5
1.5  
Figure 14.9 
Using the notion of weak sequential equilibrium allows us to simplify the 
game, by selecting the strictly dominant choice for the Incumbent at each of his 
singleton nodes followed only by terminal nodes. It is straightforward to check 
that at such nodes a hotheaded Incumbent would choose “fight” while a 
rational Incumbent would choose “share”. Thus we can delete those decision 
nodes and replace them with the payoff vectors associated with the optimal 
choice. The simplified game is shown in Figure 14.10 below. 
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PE -2
outin
in
sha
re
in
out
rational 
incumbent
ho
the
ade
d 
inc
um
ben
t
inout
in
NATURE
1−pp
PE -1
PE -1
PE -2
out
1     PE-1
1     PE-2
10    I
1
1
10
I
1
1.5
6.5
outI
1
0
7
share
out
1.5
1
6.5
1.5
1.5
3
in
1.5
1
6.5
1.5
0
3.5
fight
out
inin out
0
1
5
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Figure 14.10 
Consider the following pure-strategy profile, call it σ, for the simplified game 
of Figure 14.10 (it is highlighted in dark pink in Figure 14.10):  
(1) PE-1’s strategy is “out” at both nodes,  
(2) PE-2’s strategy is “out” at the top information set (after having observed that 
PE-1 stayed out), “in” at the middle information set (after having observed 
that PE-1’s entry was followed by the Incumbent sharing the market with 
PE-1) and “out” at the bottom information set (after having observed that 
PE-1’s entry was followed by the Incumbent fighting against PE-1), 
(3) the Incumbent’s strategy is to fight entry of PE-1 in any case (that is, 
whether the Incumbent himself is hotheaded or rational). 
We want to show that σ, together with the system of beliefs µ shown in Figure 
14.10 (where at her top information PE-2 assigns probability p to the 
Incumbent being hotheaded, at her middle information set she assigns 
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probability 1 to the Incumbent being rational and at her bottom information 
set she assigns probability 1 to the Incumbent being hotheaded) constitutes a 
weak sequential equilibrium for any value of 1
3
p ≥ . Bayesian updating is 
satisfied at PE-2’s top information set (the only information set reached by σ ), 
and at the other two information sets of PE-2 any beliefs are allowed by the 
notion of weak sequential equilibrium. Sequential rationality also holds: 
• For PE-1, at the left node “in” yields 0 and “out” yields 1, so that “out” is 
sequentially rational; the same is true at the right node. 
• For the Incumbent, at the left node “fight” yields 7 and “share” yields 3.5, 
so that “fight” is sequentially rational; at the right node “fight” yields 5 and 
“share” yields 3, so that “fight” is sequentially rational. 
• For PE-2, at the top information set “in” yields an expected payoff of 
(0) (1 )(1.5)p p+ −  and “out” yields 1, so that “out” is sequentially rational as 
long as 1
3
p ≥ ; at the middle information set, given her belief that I is 
rational,  “in” yields 1.5 and “out” yields 1, so that “in” is sequentially 
rational; at the bottom information set, given her belief that I is hotheaded,  
“in” yields 0 and “out” yields 1, so that “out” is sequentially rational. 
Thus the equilibrium described above captures the intuition suggested in 
Chapter 2, namely that − even though it is common knowledge between the 
Incumbent and PE-1 that the Incumbent is rational and thus would suffer a loss 
of 1.5 by fighting PE-1’s entry − it is still credible for the Incumbent to threaten 
to fight PE-1’s entry because it would influence the beliefs of PE-2 and induce 
her to stay out; understanding the credibility of this threat, it is optimal for  
PE-1 to stay out. 
The above argument exploits the fact that the notion of weak sequential 
equilibrium allows for any beliefs whatsoever at unreached information sets. 
However, the beliefs postulated for PE-2 at her middle and bottom information 
sets seem highly plausible. Indeed, as shown in Exercise 14.2, the assessment 
described above is also a sequential equilibrium. 
We now turn to an example that deals with the issue of labor-management 
negotiations and the inefficiency of  strikes. It is not uncommon to observe a 
firm and a union engaging in unsuccessful negotiations leading to a strike by 
the workers, followed by renewed negotiations and a final agreement. Strikes 
are costly for the workers, in terms of lost wages, and for the firm, in terms of 
lost production. Why, then, don’t the parties reach the agreement at the very 
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beginning, thus avoiding the inefficiency of a strike? The answer in many cases 
has to do with the fact that there is incomplete information on the side of the 
labor union and enduring a strike is the only credible way for the firm to 
convince the union to reduce its demands. We shall illustrate this in a simple 
example of one-sided incomplete information.  
Consider the following game between a new firm and a labor union. The union 
requests a wage (either high, Hw , or low, Lw ) and the firm can accept or reject. 
If the union’s request is accepted, then a contract is signed and production starts 
immediately. If the request is rejected, then the union goes on strike for one 
period and at the end of that period makes a second, and last, request to the 
firm, which the firm can accept or reject. If the firm rejects, then it cannot 
enter the industry. When no agreement is signed, both parties get a payoff of 0. 
Both firm and union have a discount factor of δ, with 0 < δ < 1, which means 
that $1 accrued one period into the future is considered to be equivalent to $δ 
at the present time (this captures the cost of waiting and thus the desirability of 
avoiding a strike). The extensive-form game is shown in Figure 14.11, where π 
denotes the firm’s profit (gross of labor costs).  
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Figure 14.11 
Suppose, however, that the union does not know the firm’s expected profit π  
(gross of labor costs). It is not unlikely that the management will know what 
profits to expect, while the union will not (because, for example, the union does 
not have enough information on the intensity of competition, the firm’s non-labor 
costs, etc.). Suppose we have a one-sided incomplete information situation where 
the union believes that π can have two values: Hπ  (high) and Lπ  (low) and assigns 
probability α to π
H
 and (1−α) to π
L
. This situation of one-sided incomplete 
information is illustrated in Figure 14.12. 
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Firm:
The game
with Hπ π=
The game
with Lπ π=
α 1 α−
 
Figure 14.12 
Let π
H  
> π
L
 > 0 and  w
H
 > w
L
 > 0 (so that H indeed means “high” and L indeed 
means “low”).   We also assume that  π
H 
− w
H
 > 0  (so that the high-profit firm 
could in fact afford to pay a high wage), π
L 
− w
L
 > 0 (that is, the low wage is 
sufficiently low for the low-profit firm to be able to pay it) and π
L
 − w
H
 < 0 (that is, 
the low-profit firm cannot afford to pay a high wage). Finally we assume that the 
true state is the one where π = π
L
, that is, the firm’s potential profits are in fact 
low. These assumptions imply that it is in the interest of both the firm and the 
union to sign a contract (even if the firm’s profits are low). 
Using the Harsanyi transformation we can convert the situation shown in Figure 
14.12 into the extensive-form game shown in Figure 14.13.  
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 Figure 14.13 
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Let us find conditions under which the following strategy profile is part of a 
separating weak sequential equilibrium:  
(1) The union requests a high wage in the first period. 
(2) The high-profit firm accepts while the low-profit firm rejects. 
(3) After rejection of the first-period high-wage offer the union requests a low 
wage and the firm accepts. 
That is, we want an equilibrium where the low-profit firm endures a strike to 
signal to the union that its expected profits are low and cannot afford to pay a 
high wage. The union reacts to the signal by lowering its demand. Of course, 
we need to worry about the fact that the high-profit firm might want to 
masquerade as a low-profit firm by rejecting the first-period offer (that is, by 
sending the same signal as the low-profit firm). 
First of all, we can simplify the game by eliminating the second-period choice 
of the firm (under our assumptions any second-period offer will be accepted, 
except for wH by the low firm). The simplified game is shown in Figure 14.14. 
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Figure 14.14 
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In order for a low-wage offer to be optimal for the union in Period 2 it is 
necessary for the union to assign sufficiently high probability to the firm being 
a low-profit one: if p is this probability, then we need (1 )L Hw p wδ δ≥ − , that is,  
1 L
H
w
p
w
≥ −  (for example, p = 1 would be fine). For the high-profit firm not to 
have an incentive to send the same signal as the low-profit firm it is necessary 
that ( )H H H Lw wπ δ π− ≥ − , that is H H
H L
w
w
π
δ
π
−
≤
−
. If this condition is satisfied, 
then the high-profit firm will accept wH in period 1, the low-profit firm will 
reject and Bayesian updating requires the union to assign probability 1 to the 
right node of its middle information set (that is, to the firm being a low-profit 
type), in which case adjusting its demand to wL  is sequentially rational. On the 
other hand, requesting a low wage in period 1 will lead to both types of the 
firm accepting immediately. So in order for a high-wage offer to be optimal for 
the union in period 1 it is necessary that (1 )L H Lw w wα α δ≤ + − , which will be 
true if α is sufficiently large, that is, if 
(1 ) L
H L
w
w w
δ
α
δ
−
≥
−
. Finally, given the above 
equilibrium choices, the notion of weak sequential equilibrium  imposes no 
restrictions on the beliefs (and hence choice) of the union at the bottom 
information set.   
For example, all the above inequalities are satisfied if:  πH = 100,   πL = 55,   
wH = 60,  wL = 50,  α = 0.7,   δ = 0.6.  Then  πH −wH = 40 > δ (πH −wL) =  
0.6 (50) = 30,  wL = 50  <  α wH + (1−α) δ wL = (0.7) 60 + 0.3 (0.6) 50 = 51. 
We conclude this section with one more example that has to do with the 
effectiveness of truth-in-advertising laws.  
Consider the case of a seller and a buyer. The seller knows the quality x of his 
product, while the buyer does not, although she knows that he knows. The 
buyer can thus ask the seller to reveal the information he has. Suppose that 
there is a truth-in-advertising law which imposes harsh penalties for false claims 
in advertising. This is not quite enough, because the seller can tell the truth 
without necessarily revealing all the information. For example, if x is the octane 
content of gasoline and x = 89, then the following are all true statements:  
“the octane content of this gasoline is at least 70” 
“the octane content of this gasoline is at least 85” 
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“the octane content of this gasoline is at most 89” 
“the octane content of this gasoline is exactly 89” 
etc. 
Other examples are: (1) the fat content of food (the label on a package of 
ground meat might read “not more than 30% fat”),  (2) fuel consumption for 
cars (a car might be advertised as yielding “at least 35 miles per gallon”),  (3) the 
label on a mixed-nut package might read “not more than 40% peanuts”, etc. 
An interesting question is: Would the seller reveal all the information he has or 
would he try to be as vague as possible (while being truthful)? In the latter case, 
will the buyer be in a worse position than she would be in the case of complete 
information? 
Milgrom and Roberts (1986) consider the following game (resulting from 
applying the Harsanyi transformation to the situation of one-sided incomplete 
information described above). First Nature selects the value of x, representing 
the seller’s information, from a finite set X; as usual, the probabilities with 
which Nature chooses are a reflection of the buyer’s beliefs. The seller 
“observes” Nature’s choice and makes an assertion A to the buyer; A is a subset 
of X. The seller is restricted to make true assertions, that is, we require that 
x∈A. The buyer observes the seller’s claim A and then selects a quantity q ≥ 0 
to buy. Milgrom and Roberts show that (under reasonable hypotheses), if the 
buyer  adopts a skeptical view concerning the seller’s claim, that is, she always 
interprets the seller’s claim in a way which is least favorable to the seller (for 
example “not more than 30% fat” is interpreted as “exactly 30% fat”), then 
there is an equilibrium where the outcome is the same as it would be in the case 
of complete information. We shall illustrate this phenomenon by means of a 
simple example. 
Suppose that there are three possible quality levels for the good under 
consideration: low (l ), medium (m) and high (h); thus X = {l,m,h}. The buyer 
believes that the three quality levels are equally likely. The buyer has to choose 
whether to buy one unit or two units. The seller can only make truthful 
claims. For example, if the quality is l, the seller’s possible claims are {l} (full 
revelation) or vague claims such as {l,m}, {l,h}, {l,m,h}. The extensive-form 
game is shown in Figure 14.15. 
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Figure 14.15 
It is straightforward to check that the following is a weak sequential 
equilibrium:  
• The seller claims {l} if Nature chooses l, {m} if Nature chooses m and 
{h} if Nature chooses h (that is, the seller reveals the whole truth by 
choosing not to make vague claims). 
• The buyer buys one unit if told {l}, two units if told {m} or if told {h}; 
furthermore, the buyer adopts beliefs which are least favorable to the 
seller: if told {l,m} or  {l,h} or {l,m,h} she will believe l with probability 
one and buy one unit, if told {m,h} she will believe m with probability 
one and buy two units. All these beliefs are admissible because they 
concern information sets that are not reached in equilibrium and 
therefore Bayesian updating does not apply. 
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On the other hand, as shown in Exercise 14.4, if the buyer is naïve then there is 
an equilibrium where the seller chooses to make vague claims. 
 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced 
in this section, by going through the exercises in Section 14.E.1 of Appendix 
14.E at the end of this chapter. 
14.2 Multi-sided incomplete information 
The case of situations of multi-sided incomplete information involving dynamic 
games is conceptually the same as the case of multi-sided situations of 
incomplete information involving static games. In this section we shall go 
through one example.  
Consider the following situation of two-sided incomplete information. A seller 
(player S ) owns an item that a buyer (player B ) would like to purchase. The 
seller’s reservation price is s (that is, she is willing to sell if and only if the price 
paid by the buyer is at least s ) and the buyer’s reservation price is b (that is, he 
is willing to buy if and only if the price is less than or equal to b). It is common 
knowledge between the two that (1) both b and s belong to the set {1,2,…,n}, 
(2) the buyer knows the value of b and the seller knows the value of s, (3) both 
the buyer and the seller attach equal probability to all the possibilities among 
which they are uncertain.  
Buyer and Seller play the following game. First the buyer makes an offer of a 
price {1,..., }p n∈  to the seller. If p n=  the game ends and the object is 
exchanged for $p. If p n<  then the seller either accepts (in which case the game 
ends and the object is exchanged for $p) or makes a counter-offer of p p′ > , in 
which case either the buyer accepts (and the game ends and the object is 
exchanged for $ p′ ) or the buyer rejects, in which case the game ends without 
an exchange. Payoffs are as follows: 
0
 $
seller
x s x
π

= 
−
if  there is no exchange
if  exchange takes place at price
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0
 $  
 $  
buyer b p p
b p p
π
ε


= −
 ′ ′− −
if  there is no exchange
if exchange takes place at price (the initial offer)
if  exchange takes place at price (the counter - offer)
 
where ε > 0 is a measure of the buyer’s “hurt feelings” for seeing his initial 
offer rejected.  These are von Neumann-Morgenstern payoffs. 
Let us start by focusing on the case n = 2. First we represent the situation 
described above by means of an interactive knowledge-belief structure. A 
possible state can be written as a pair ( , )b s , where b is the reservation price of 
the buyer and s that of the seller. Thus when n = 2 the possible states are (1,1), 
(1,2), (2,1) and (2,2). Figure 14.16 below represents this two-sided situation of 
incomplete information. 
(1,1)               (1,2)
(2,1)               (2,2)
(1,1)               (1,2)
(2,1)               (2,2)
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
BUYER:
SELLER:
 
Figure 14.16 
Next we apply the Harsanyi transformation to the situation illustrated in 
Figure 14.16. For each state there is a corresponding extensive-form game. The 
four possible games are shown in Figure 14.17 below (the top number is the 
Buyer’s payoff and the bottom number the Seller’s payoff). 
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Figure 14.17 
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The extensive-form game that results from applying the Harsanyi 
transformation to the situation illustrated in Figure 14.16 is shown in Figure 
14.18 below. 
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p=2 p=2
p=2
p=1 p=1 p=1
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0
0
0
0
0
0
0
−1−ε
1
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0
−ε
1
−ε
0
(1,2)
1/4
(2,1)
1/4
 
Figure 14.18 
Let us find all the pure-strategy weak sequential equilibria of the game of Figure 
14.18. First of all, note that at the bottom information sets of the Buyer, “Yes” 
is strictly dominated by “No” and thus a weak sequential equilibrium  must 
select “No”. Hence the game simplifies to the one shown in Figure 14.19 
below. 
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Figure 14.19 
In the game of Figure 14.19, at the middle information of the Seller, making a 
counteroffer of 2p′ =  strictly dominates “Yes”. Thus the game can be further 
simplified as shown in Figure 14.20. 
BUYER BUYER
p=2 p=2
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p'=2
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1
0
0
0  
Figure 14.20 
In the game of Figure 14.20 at the left information set of the Buyer p = 1 
strictly dominates p = 2. At the right information set the Buyer’s beliefs must 
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be 12  on each node so that if the Seller’s strategy is to say Yes, then p = 1 is the 
only sequentially rational choice there, otherwise both p = 1 and p = 2 are 
sequentially rational. Thus the pure-strategy weak sequential equilibria of the 
reduced game shown in Figure 14.20 are as follows: 
(1) ( )( )1, 1 ,p p Yes= =  with beliefs given by  probability ½  on each node at 
every information set.  
(2) ( )( )1, 1 , 2p p p′= = =  with beliefs given by  probability ½  on each 
node at every information set.  
(3) ( )( )1, 2 , 2p p p′= = =  with beliefs given by (i)  probability ½  on each 
node at both information sets of the Buyer and (ii) probability 1 on the 
left node at the information set of the Seller.  
These equilibria can be extended to the original game of Figure 14.18 as 
follows: 
(1) ( ) ( )( )1, 1, , , 2,p p No No p Yes′= = =  with beliefs given by (i)  probability 
½  on each node at both information sets of the Buyer at the top and at 
both information sets of the Seller and (ii) probability 1 on right node at 
both information sets of Buyer at the bottom. The corresponding 
payoffs are: ¼  for the Buyer and 0 for the Seller. 
(2) ( ) ( )( )1, 1, , , 2, 2p p No No p p′ ′= = = =  with beliefs given by probability 
½  on each node at every information set. The corresponding payoffs 
are 0 for both Buyer and Seller.  
(3) ( ) ( )( )1, 2, , , 2, 2p p No No p p′ ′= = = =  with beliefs given by (i)  
probability  ½  on each node at both information sets of the Buyer at 
the top and at the lower left information set of the Buyer, (ii) any beliefs 
at the lower right information set of the Buyer and (iii) probability 1 on 
the left node at each information set of the Seller. The corresponding 
payoffs are: 0 for the Buyer and ¼ for the Seller. 
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Now let us consider the case n = 100. Drawing the interactive knowledge-belief 
structure and the corresponding extensive-form game (obtained by applying the 
Harsanyi transformation) is clearly not practical. However, one can still reason 
about what could be a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium of that game. 
As a matter of fact, there are many Bayesian Nash equilibria. One of them is 
the following: (i) each type of the Buyer offers a price equal to his reservation 
price, (ii) the Seller accepts if, and only if, that price is greater than or equal to 
her reservation price, (iii) at information sets of the Seller that are not reached 
the Seller rejects and counteroffers $100, (iv) at information sets of the Buyer 
that are not reached the Buyer says “No”. The reader should convince 
himself/herself that this is indeed a Nash equilibrium. 
 
 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced 
in this section, by going through the exercises in Section 14.E.2 of Appendix 
14.E at the end of this chapter. 
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Appendix 14.E: Exercises 
14.E.1 .  Exercises  for  Section 14.1 :           
           One-sided  incomplete information 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this 
chapter. 
Exercise 14.1.  Consider the following situation of one-sided incomplete 
information. Players 1 and 2 are playing the extensive-form game shown below 
(where 1 2, ,z z  etc. are outcomes and the question mark stands for either 
outcome 5 6  z zor outcome ). The outcome that is behind the question mark is 
actually outcome 5z  and Player 1 knows this, but Player 2 does not know. 
Player 2 thinks that the outcome behind the question mark is either 5 6 or  z z  
and assigns probability 25% to it being 5z  and probability 75% to it being 6z . 
Player 2 also thinks that whatever the outcome is, Player 1 knows (that is, if it 
is 5z , then Player 1 knows that it is 5z , and if it is 6z  then Player 1 knows that 
it is 6z ). The beliefs of Player 2 are common knowledge between the two 
players. 
A
B C
D E D E
1z
2z 3z 4z ?
1
2
 
(a) Represent this situation of incomplete information using an interactive 
knowledge-belief structure. 
(b) Apply the Harsanyi transformation to transform the situation represented 
in part (a) into an extensive-form frame. [Don’t worry about payoffs for the 
moment.] 
From now on assume that the following is common knowledge: (1) both 
players have von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences, (2) the ranking of Player 
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1 is 
4 6 1 2 3 5
second
, , ,
best worst
z z z z z z
 
 
 
 and he is indifferent between 1z  for sure and the 
lottery 6 5
0.5 0.5
z z 
 
 
,  (3) the ranking of player 2 is 
6 4 2 5 1 3
second third
, ,
best worst
z z z z z z
 
 
 
 and 
she is indifferent between 4z  for sure and the lottery 6 3
0.5 0.5
z z 
 
 
 and she is also 
indifferent between 2z  for sure and the lottery 6 3
0.25 0.75
z z 
 
 
. 
(c) Calculate the von Neumann-Morgenstern normalized utility functions for 
the two players. 
(d) Is there a weak sequential equilibrium of the game of part (b) where Player 
1 always plays A (thus a pooling equilibrium)? Explain your answer. 
(e) Is there a weak sequential equilibrium of the game of part (b) where player 
1 always plays C (thus a pooling equilibrium)? Explain your answer. 
(f) Is there a pure-strategy weak sequential equilibrium of the game of part (b) 
where Player 1 does not always choose the same action (thus a separating 
equilibrium)? 
 
Exercise 14.2. Show that the assessment highlighted in the following figure, 
which reproduces Figure 14.10, is a sequential equilibrium as long as 1
3
.p ≥  
PE -2
outin
in
sha
re
in
out
incumbent
rational
inc
um
ben
t
fan
ati
c
inout
in
NATURE
1−pp
PE -1
PE -1
PE -2
out
1     PE-1
1     PE-2
10    I
1
1
10
I
1
1.5
6.5
outI
1
0
7
share
out
1.5
1
6.5
1.5
1.5
3
in
1.5
1
6.5
1.5
0
3.5
fight
out
inin out
0
1
5
0
1
7
0
0
4
0
1.5
1.5
fight
[p] [1−p]
PE -2 [1]
[1] [0]
[0]
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Exercise 14.3. (a) For the case where 1
3
p ≤ , find a pure-strategy weak 
sequential equilibrium of the game shown in Exercise 14.1 (which reproduces 
Figure 14.10) where PE-1 stays out but PE-2 enters; furthermore, the 
Incumbent would fight PE-1 if she entered. Prove that what you propose is a 
weak sequential equilibrium.  
(b) Either prove that the weak sequential equilibrium of part (a) is a sequential 
equilibrium or prove that it is not a sequential equilibrium. 
Exercise 14.4.  Show that in the “truth-in-advertising” game of Figure 14.15 
there is a weak sequential equilibrium  where the seller makes vague claims 
(that is, does not reveal the whole truth). 
Exercise 14.5. Consider a simpler version of the “truth-in-advertising” game, 
where there are only two quality levels: L and H. The payoffs are as follows: 
• If the quality is L  and the buyer buys one unit, the seller’s payoff is 9 
and the buyer’s payoff is 1, 
• If the quality is L  and the buyer buys two units, the seller’s payoff is 18 
and the buyer’s payoff is 0, 
• If the quality is H  and the buyer buys one unit, the seller’s payoff is 6 
and the buyer’s payoff is 2, 
• If the quality is H  and the buyer buys two units, the seller’s payoff is 12 
and the buyer’s payoff is 3, 
Let the buyer’s initial beliefs be as follows: the good is of quality L with 
probability (0,1)p∈  (and of quality H with probability 1 − p). 
(a) Draw the extensive-form game that results from applying the Harsanyi 
transformation to this one-sided situation of incomplete information. 
(b) Find the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of the game of part (a) for 
every possible value of (0,1)p∈ . 
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14.E.2 .  Exercises  for  Section 14.2 :  
           Multi-sided incomplete information. 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this 
chapter. 
Exercise 14.6. Consider the following situation of two-sided incomplete 
information. Players 1 and 2 are having dinner with friends and during dinner 
Player 2 insinuates that Player 1 is guilty of unethical behavior. Player 1 can 
either demand an apology (D) or ignore (I ) Player 2’s remark; if Player 1 
demands an apology, then Player 2 can either apologize (A) or refuse to 
apologize (not-A); if Player 2 refuses to apologize, Player 1 can either concede 
(C ) or start a fight (F ). Thus the extensive form is as follows (where 1 4,...,z z  are 
the possible outcomes): 
C F
1
2
1
1z
2z
3z
4z
I D
A
not A
I= ignore,   D = demand apology
A = apologize, not A = not apologize
C = concede, F = fight 
 
Let iU  be the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of Player i (i = 1,2). 
The following is common knowledge between Players 1 and 2: 
1 1 1 2 1 3( ) 4, ( ) 2, ( ) 6U z U z U z= = =   
2 1 2 2 2 3 2 4( ) 6, ( ) 8, ( ) 2, ( ) 0U z U z U z U z= = = = . 
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The only uncertainty concerns the value of 1 4( )U z . As a matter of fact, 
1 4( ) 0U z = ; Player 1 knows this, but Player 2 does not. It is common 
knowledge between Players 1 and 2 that Player 2 thinks that either 1 4( ) 0U z =  
or 1 4( ) 3U z = . Furthermore, as a matter of fact, Player 2 assigns probability 
1
4
 
to 1 4( ) 0U z =  and probability 
3
4
 to 1 4( ) 3U z = ; Player 1 is uncertain as to 
whether Player 2’s beliefs are 1 4 1 4
31
4 4
( ) 0 ( ) 3U z U z= = 
 
 
 or 1 4
( ) 0
1
U z = 
 
 
 and he 
attaches probability 1
2
 to each.  
(a) Construct a three-state interactive knowledge-belief structure that captures 
all of the above.  
(b) Draw the extensive-form game that results from applying the Harsanyi 
transformation to the situation of part (a). 
(c) Find the pure-strategy weak sequential equilibria of the game of part (b). 
◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊ 
Exercise 14.7: Challenging Question. 
There are two parties to a potential lawsuit: the owner of a chemical plant and 
a supplier of safety equipment. The chemical plant owner, from now on called 
the plaintiff, alleges that the supplier, from now on called the defendant, was 
negligent in providing the safety equipment. The defendant knows whether or 
not he was negligent, while the plaintiff does not know; the plaintiff believes 
that there was negligence with probability q. These beliefs are common 
knowledge between the parties. The plaintiff has to decide whether or not to 
sue. If she does not sue then nothing happens and both parties get a payoff of 0. 
If the plaintiff sues then the defendant can either offer an out-of-court 
settlement of $S or resist. If the defendant offers a settlement, the plaintiff can 
either accept (in which case her payoff is S and the defendant’s payoff is –S ) or 
go to trial. If the defendant resists then the plaintiff can either drop the case (in 
which case both parties get a payoff of 0) or go to trial. If the case goes to trial 
then legal costs are created in the amount of $P for the plaintiff and $D for the 
defendant. Furthermore (if the case goes to trial), the judge is able to determine 
if there was negligence and, if there was, requires the defendant to pay $W to 
the plaintiff (and each party has to pay its own legal costs), while if there was 
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no negligence the judge will drop the case without imposing any payments to 
either party (but each party still has to pay its own legal costs). It is common 
knowledge that each party is “selfish and greedy” (that is, only cares about its 
own wealth and prefers more money to less) and is risk neutral. 
Assume the following about the parameters:   
0 < q < 1,    0 < D < S,    0 < P <  S < W −P. 
(a) Represent this situation of incomplete information by means of an 
interactive knowledge-belief structure (the only two players are the plaintiff 
and the defendant). 
(b) Apply the Harsanyi transformation to represent the situation in part (a) as 
an extensive-form game.  [Don’t forget to subtract the legal expenses from 
each party’s payoff if the case goes to trial.] 
(c) Write down all the strategies of the plaintiff. 
(d) Prove that there is no pure-strategy weak sequential equilibrium which  
(1) is a separating equilibrium and (2) involves suing. 
(e) For what values of the parameters (q, S, P, W, D) are there pure-strategy 
weak sequential equilibria which (1) are pooling equilibria and (2) involve 
suing? Consider all types of pooling equilibria and prove your claim. 
(f) For the case where 1
12
, 70, 80, 100q P S W= = = =  find all the pure-strategy 
weak sequential equilibria which (1) are pooling equilibria and (2) involve 
suing. [Note that here we have dropped the assumption that S < W −P.] 
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Appendix 14.S: Solutions to exercises  
Exercise 14.1.  (a) Let G1 be the game with outcome 5z  and G2 the game with 
outcome 6z . Then the structure is as follows, with 
1
4
q = . The true state is a. 
G1 G2 
1:
2: q (1−q)
 
α β 
 
(b) The extensive form is as follows: 
x y
A
C
D E D E
1z
2z 3z 4z
z
B C
D E D E
1z
2z 3z 4z5z 6
z
Nature
α β
1
4
3
4
2
1 1
A
B
w
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(c)   
1 2 3 4 5 6
1
2
: 0.5 0 0 1 0 1
: 0 0.25 0 0.5 0.25 1
z z z z z z
U
U
 
 
 
 
 
.   
Adding these payoffs to the extensive form we obtain the following game: 
x y
A
C
D E D E
1z
2z 3z 4z
z
B C
D E D E
1z
2z 3z 4z5z 6
z
Nature
α β
1
4
3
4
2
1 1
A
B
w
0.5
0
0.5
0
0
0
0
0
1
0.5
0
0.25
0
0.25
0
0.25
1
0.5
1
1
 
(d) No, because at the right node of Player 1, C gives a payoff of 1 no matter 
what Player 2 does and thus Player 1 would choose C rather than A (which 
only gives him a payoff of 0.5). 
(e) If Player 1 always plays C (that is, his strategy is CC), then − by Bayesian 
updating − Player 2 should assign probability 1
4
 to node y and probability 3
4
 to 
node z, in which case D gives her a payoff of 0.5 while E gives her a payoff of 
31
4 4
(0.25) (1) 0.8125+ = ; hence she must choose E. But then at his left node 
Player 1 with C gets 0 while with A he gets 0.5. Hence choosing C at the left 
node is not sequentially rational. 
(e) Yes, the following is a weak sequential equilibrium: ( ),AC Eσ =  with 
beliefs 
0 0 0 1
x y w z
µ
 
=  
 
. It is straightforward to verify that sequential 
rationality and Bayesian updating are satisfied. 
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Exercise 14.2.  Sequential rationality was verified in Section 14.1. Thus we only 
need to show that the highlighted pure-strategy profile together with the 
following system of beliefs 
1 0 1 1 0
s t u v x w
p p
µ
 
=  − 
 (for the names of the 
nodes refer to the following figure) constitutes a consistent assessment 
(Definition 11.1, Chapter 11). Let 
1,2,...n n
σ
=
 be the sequence of completely 
mixed strategies shown in the following figure. 
in
2
1
n
sh
ar
e
3
1
n
11 n−
11 n−
out
PE -2
outin
in
in
out
incumbent
rational
inc
um
ben
t
fan
ati
c
out
in
NATURE
1−pp
PE -1
PE -1
PE -2
out
1     PE-1
1     PE-2
10    I
1
1
10
I
1
1.5
6.5
I
1
0
7
out
1.5
1
6.5
1.5
1.5
3
in
1.5
1
6.5
1.5
0
3.5
fight
out
inin out
0
1
5
0
1
7
0
0
4
0
1.5
1.5
fight
PE -2
s t
u v
x w
1
n
11 n−
2
11
n
−1
n
11 n−
3
11
n
−
1
n
1
n
1
n
1
n
1
n
1
n
11 n−
11 n−
11 n−
11 n−
sha
re
 
It is clear that lim n
n
σ σ
→∞
= . Let us calculate the system of beliefs nµ  obtained 
from nσ  by using Bayesian updating: 
( )
( ) ( )2
1
1 1
1
( )
1 (1 ) 1
n
n
n n
p
s
p p
µ
−
=
− + − −
 and 
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lim ( )
(1 )
n
n
p
s p
p p
µ
→∞
= =
+ −
;  
( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
3
3 2
1 1
1 1 1 1
( )
(1 )(1 )
n n
n
n nn n
p p
u
p n pp p
µ = =
+ −+ −
  
and lim ( ) 0n
n
uµ
→∞
= ; 
( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
3
3 2
1 1
1 1 1 1
1
( )
1 (1 ) 1
n n
n
n nn n
p
x
p p
µ
−
= =
− + − −
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
3
3
1
1 1 1
1
1 (1 ) 1
n
n nn
p
p p
−
− + − −
  and  lim ( ) 1n
n
xµ
→∞
=  (the numerator tends to 
(1)p p=   and the denominator tends to (1) (1 )(0)(1)p p p+ − = ). Thus ( , )σ µ  is 
consistent and sequentially rational and therefore it is a sequential equilibrium. 
Exercise 14.3.  (a) Consider the following pure-strategy profile, call it σ, which 
is highlighted in dark pink in the figure below:  
 (1) PE-1’s strategy is “out” at both nodes,  
(2) PE-2’s strategy is “in” at the top information set (after having observed that 
PE-1 stayed out), “in” at the middle information set (after having observed that 
PE-1’s entry was followed by the Incumbent sharing the market with PE-1) and 
“out” at the bottom information set (after having observed that PE-1’s entry 
was followed by the Incumbent fighting against PE-1), 
(3) the Incumbent’s strategy is to fight entry of PE-1 in any case (that is, 
whether the Incumbent himself is hotheaded or rational). 
We want to show that σ, together with the system of beliefs µ shown in the 
Figure below (where at her top information PE-2 assigns probability p to the 
Incumbent being hotheaded, at her middle information set she assigns 
probability 1 to the Incumbent being rational and at her bottom information 
set she assigns probability 1 to the Incumbent being hotheaded) constitutes a 
weak sequential equilibrium for any value of 1
3
p ≤ . Bayesian updating is 
satisfied at PE-2’s top information set (the only non-singleton information set 
reached by σ), and at the other two information sets of PE-2 any beliefs are 
allowed by the notion of weak sequential equilibrium. Sequential rationality 
also holds: 
• For PE-1, at the left node “in” yields 0 and “out” yields 1, so that “out” is 
sequentially rational; the same is true at the right node. 
• For the Incumbent, at the left node “fight” yields 7 and “share” yields 3.5, 
so that “fight” is sequentially rational; at the right node “fight” yields 5 and 
“share” yields 3, so that “fight” is sequentially rational. 
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• For PE-2, at the top information set “in” yields an expected payoff of 
(0) (1 )(1.5) (1 )(1.5)p p p+ − = −  and “out” yields 1, so that “in” is 
sequentially rational as long as 1
3
p ≤ ; at the middle information set  “in” 
yields 1.5 and “out” yields 1, so that “in” is sequentially rational; at the 
bottom information set “in” yields 0 and “out” yields 1, so that “out” is 
sequentially rational. 
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(b) The assessment described in part (a) is in fact a sequential equilibrium. This 
can be shown using the sequence of completely mixed strategies marked in 
the figure above, which coincides with the sequences of mixed strategies 
considered in Exercise 14.2; thus the calculations to show consistency are 
identical to the ones carried out in Exercise 14.2. 
GAME THEORY – Giacomo Bonanno 
 
546 
 
Exercise 14.4.  The game under consideration is the following (which 
reproduces Figure 14.15): 
{l}
NATURE
SELLER
SELLER
SELLER
l
m
h(1/3)
(1/3)
(1/3)
B
1 2
9
1
18
0
{l,m} {l,m}
BUYER
{l,h}
1
2 1
2
9
1
18
0
5
3
10
6
B
1 2
6
2
12
3
{m}
{l,m,h}
{l,m,h} {l,m,h}
BUYER
1
2
9
1
18
0
{h}
B
1 2
5
3
10
6
1 2
6
2
12
3
5
3
10
6
{m,h}
BUYER
{m,h}
1 2 1 2
6
2
12
3
5
3
10
6
1 2
6
2
12
3
1 2
1 2
9
1
18
0
BUYER
{l,h}
 
Let the buyer be naïve, in the sense that at every unreached information set she 
assigns equal probability to each node; furthermore, let the buyer’s strategy be 
as follows:  if told {l} buy one unit, in every other case buy two units. Let the 
seller’s strategy be as follows: if Nature chooses l or m claim {l,m} and if 
Nature chooses h then claim {h}. Let us verify that this assessment constitutes a 
weak sequential equilibrium. The only non-singleton information set that is 
reached by the strategy profile is the top information set (where the buyer 
hears the claim {l,m}) and Bayesian updating requires the buyer to assign equal 
probability to each node. Every other non-singleton information set is not 
reached and thus the notion of weak sequential equilibrium  allows any beliefs: 
in particular beliefs that assign probability 1
2
 to each node. Now we check 
sequential rationality. Let us start with the buyer. At the singleton node 
following claim {l}, buying one unit is optimal and at the singleton nodes 
following claims {m} and {h} buying two units is optimal. At the top 
information set (after the claim {l,m}) choosing one unit gives an expected 
payoff of 1 1
2 2
(1) (2) 1.5+ =  and choosing two units yields 1 1
2 2
(0) (3) 1.5+ = , thus 
buying two units is sequentially rational. At the information set following 
claim {l,h} choosing one unit gives an expected payoff of 1 1
2 2
(1) (3) 2+ =  while 
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choosing two units yields 1 1
2 2
(0) (6) 3+ = , thus buying two units is sequentially 
rational. At the information set following claim {l,m,h} choosing one unit gives 
an expected payoff of 1 1 1
3 3 3
(1) (2) (3) 2+ + =  while choosing two units yields 
1 1 1
3 3 3
(0) (3) (6) 3+ + = , thus buying two units is sequentially rational. Finally, at 
the information set following claim {m,h} choosing one unit gives an expected 
payoff of 1 1
2 2
(2) (3) 2.5+ =  while choosing two units yields 1 1
2 2
(3) (6) 4.5+ = , 
thus buying two units is sequentially rational. Now let us check sequential 
rationality for the seller’s strategy. At the left node (after Nature chooses l ) 
claiming {l} yields a payoff of 9, while every other claim yields a payoff of 18. 
Thus {l,m} is sequentially rational. At the other two nodes, the seller is 
indifferent among all the claims, because they yield the same payoff (12 at the 
node after Nature chooses m and 10 at the node after Nature chooses h) thus 
the postulated choices are sequentially rational. 
Exercise 14.5.  (a) The extensive form is as follows: 
 
{L}
NATURE
SELLER
SELLER
L
H
Probability p
B
1 2
9
1
18
0
{L,H}
B
1 2
6
2
12
3
{H}
1 2
6
2
12
3
Probability 1−p
BUYER
1 2
9
1
18
0
{L,H}
1 p−p
 
(b) At any subgame-perfect equilibrium,  the buyer buys one unit at the 
singleton information set on the left and two units at the singleton 
information set on the right. Thus we can simplify the game by replacing 
the buyer’s node on the left with the payoff vector (9,1) and the buyer’s 
node on the right with the payoff vector (12,3). The strategic form 
corresponding to the simplified game is as follows (the buyer’s strategy 
refers to the buyer’s only information set that has remained, where he is 
told LH): 
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L, LH 9p + 6(1−p), p + 2(1−p) 18p + 12(1−p),  3(1−p)
Seller L, H 9p + 12(1−p), p + 3(1−p) 9p + 12(1−p), p + 3(1−p)
LH, LH 9p + 6(1−p), p + 2(1-p) 18p + 12(1-p),  3(1−p)
LH,H 9p + 12(1-p), p + 3(1-p) 18p + 12(1-p),  3(1−p)
simplifying:
L, LH 6 + 3p, 2 − p 12 + 6p, 3 − 3p
Seller L, H 12 − 3p, 3 − 2p 12 − 3p, 3 − 2p
LH, LH 6 + 3p, 2 − p 12 + 6p, 3 − 3p
LH,H 12 − 3p, 3 − 2p 12 + 6p, 3 − 3p
Buyer
Buy 1 unit Buy 2 units
Buy 1 unit Buy 2 units
 
Since p < 1,  12−3p > 6 + 3p.  Thus ((LH,H),1) and ((L,H),1) are always Nash 
equilibria for every value or p. Note that 2− p > 3− 3p if and only if 1
2
p > ; 
thus if 1
2
p >  then there are no other pure-strategy Nash equilibria. On the 
other hand, if 1
2
p ≤  then the following are also Nash equilibria: ((L,LH),2) and 
((LH,LH),2). To sum up, the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of this normal form, 
which correspond to the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of the reduced 
extensive form, are as follows:  
• If 1
2
p > ,  ((LH,H),1) and ((L,H),1); 
• If 1
2
p ≤ , ((LH,H),1), ((L,H),1), ((L,LH),2) and ((LH,LH),2). 
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Exercise 14.6.  (a) Let 1G  and 2G  be the following perfect-information games 
(whose backward induction solution has been highlighted in dark pink): 
2
1
1
D
4
6
2
8
6
2
0
0
I
not A
A
FC
 
2
1
1
D
4
6
2
8
6
2
3
0
I
not A
A
FC
 
Game G
1
 Game G
2
 
The interactive knowledge-belief structure is as follows: 
α                        β                        γ
α                        β                        γ
1:
2:
G1
game
G1
game
G2
game
true
state
1
2
1
2
1
4
3
4
 
GAME THEORY – Giacomo Bonanno 
 
550 
 
(b) The common prior is given by 
31 1
5 5 5
α β γ 
 
 
. The Harsanyi transformation 
yields the following game: 
C
2
Nature
β
I
1
D D
I
4
6
4
6
1 I
D
4
6
A
n-A
A
6
2
6
2
6
2A
F
1
2
8
3
0
1
C CF F
2
8
2
8
0
0
0
0
1
5
α
1
5
γ
3
5
n-A
A
2
n-A
vu
x y
 
(c) At the bottom information set of Player 1, C strictly dominates F and thus 
we can replace the two nodes in that information set with the payoff vector 
(2,8). At the bottom singleton node of Player 1, F strictly dominates C and 
thus we can replace that node with the payoff vector (3,0). Thus, by 
appealing to sequential rationality, the game can be reduced to the 
following: 
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n-A
2
Nature
β
I
1
D D
I
4
6
4
6
1 I
D
4
6
A
6
2
6
2
6
2A
3
0
2
8
2
8
1
5
α
1
5
γ
3
5
A
2
vu
x y
n-An-A
 
Now at the bottom-right node of Player 2, n-A strictly dominates A and thus 
we can replace that node with the payoff vector (2,8) and further simplify the 
game as follows: 
2
Nature
β
I
1
D D
I
4
6
4
6
1 I
D
4
6
n-A
A
6
2
6
2A
3
0
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2
8
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5
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3
5
vu
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The following are the pure-strategy weak sequential equilibria of the reduced 
game (which can be extended into weak sequential equilibria of the original 
game by adding the choices that were selected during the simplification 
process): 
• ((I,I ), n-A) with beliefs 
1 1
2 2
1
u v x y
p p
µ
 
=  − 
 for any 1
4
p ≥ . 
• ((I,D), A) with beliefs 
1 1
2 2
1
u v x y
p p
µ
 
=  − 
 for any 1
4
p ≤ . 
• ((D,D), A) with beliefs 
31 1 1
2 2 4 4
u v x y
µ
 
=  
 
. 
Exercise 14.7 (Challenging Question).  (a) Let G1 and G2 be the following 
games (in G1 the defendant is negligent and in G2 he is not): 
0
0
sue
trialdrop
PLAINTIFF
settle
PLAINTIFFPLAINTIFF
offerresist
DEFENDANT
not sue
0
0
sue
trial
S
−S
W−P
−W−D
drop
PLAINTIFF
settle
PLAINTIFF
PLAINTIFF
offerresist
DEFENDANT
not sue
GAME  G GAME  G1 2
0
0 0
0
trial trial
(defendant is negligent) (defendant is not negligent)
W−P
−W−D
−P
−D
−P
−D
S
−S
 
Then the situation can be represented as follows (at state α is the defendant is 
negligent and at state β  the defendant is not negligent): 
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G1      G2 
1:
2: q (1−q)
 
α       β 
(b) The extensive-form game is as follows: 
NATURE
PLAINTIFF
PLAINTIFF
PLAINTIFF
DEFENDANT DEFENDANT
negl igent not negligent
q 1−qnot
sue
not
sue
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
sue sue
offer
offer
settle settletrial trial
resistresist
S
−S
S
−S
−P
−D
W−P
−W−D
W−P
−W−D
−P
−D
drop trial drop trial
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(c) Plaintiff’s strategies: (1) (sue; if offer settle; if resist drop), (2) (sue; if offer 
settle; if resist go to trial), (3) (sue; if offer go to trial; if resist drop), (4) (sue; 
if offer go to trial; if resist go to trial), (5) (not sue; if offer settle; if resist 
drop), (6) (not sue; if offer settle; if resist go to trial), (7) (not sue; if offer go 
to trial; if resist drop), (8) (not sue; if offer go to trial; if resist go to trial).  
(d) There are two possibilities for a separating equilibrium: (1) the defendant’s 
strategy is “resist if negligent and offer if not negligent” and  
(2) the defendant’s strategy is “offer if negligent and resist if not negligent”. 
In both cases we assume that the plaintiff’s strategy involves suing with 
probability 1.  
Consider Case 1 first. By Bayesian updating, at the bottom information set 
the plaintiff must attach probability 1 to the negligent type and thus, by 
sequential rationality, must choose “trial” (because W − P > 0). Similarly, 
by Bayesian updating, at the middle information set the plaintiff must 
attach probability 1 to the non-negligent type and thus by sequential 
rationality must choose “settle”. But then the negligent type of the 
defendant gets −(W+D) by resisting and would get −S by offering. Since, by 
assumption, S < W (< W + D), the choice of resisting is not sequentially 
rational. 
Consider now Case 2. By Bayesian updating, at the bottom information set 
the plaintiff must attach probability 1 to the non-negligent type and thus by 
sequential rationality must choose “drop”. But then the negligent type of 
the defendant gets a negative payoff by offering, while he would get 0 by 
resisting.  Hence the choice of offering is not sequentially rational. 
(e) There are two candidates for a pure-strategy pooling equilibrium: (1) both 
types of the defendant choose “offer” and (2) both types of the defendant 
choose “resist”. 
Consider Case 1 first (both types of the defendant choose “offer”). In order 
for “offer” to be sequentially rational for the non-negligent type, it cannot 
be that the plaintiff’s strategy involves “settle” at the middle information set 
(the non-negligent type would get either 0 or −D by resisting and both 
payoffs are greater than −S) and/or “drop” at the bottom information set. 
That is, it must be that the plaintiff chooses “trial” at both information 
sets.  By Bayesian updating, at the middle information set the plaintiff must 
attach probability q to the negligent type and probability (1−q) to the non-
negligent type. Hence at the middle information set “trial” is sequentially 
rational if and only if  ,  S P
W
qW P S q +− ≥ ≥that is, . In order for “trial” to be 
sequentially rational at the bottom information set, the plaintiff must attach 
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sufficiently high probability (namely P
W
p ≥ ) to the negligent type. This is 
allowed by weak sequential equilibrium because the bottom information set 
is not reached. Finally, in order for “sue” to be sequentially rational it must 
be that 0,  P
W
qW P q− ≥ ≥that is, , which is implied by S P
W
q +≥ . Thus 
there is a pooling equilibrium with ((sue,trial,trial),(offer,offer) )  
if and only if  
S P
q
W
+
≥ . 
Now consider Case 2 (both types of the defendant choose “resist”). [Note: 
since in part (f) the restriction S W P< −  does not hold, we will carry out 
the analysis below at first without imposing the restriction.]  If the 
plaintiff’s strategy involves “drop” at the bottom information set, then it is 
indeed sequentially rational for both types of the defendant to choose 
“resist”. Furthermore, “drop” is sequentially rational in this case if, and only 
if, 0,  P
W
qW P q− ≤ ≤that is, . Then “sue” is also sequentially rational, since 
the Plaintiff’s payoff is 0 no matter whether he sues or does not sue. Thus 
there is a pooling equilibrium with ((sue,x,drop),(resist,resist)) if and 
only if 
P
q
W
≤  and appropriate beliefs as follows (p is the probability 
on the left node of the unreached middle information set): 
either x = settle and any p if W S P≤ +  or  if 
S P
p W S P
W
+
≤ > +  
or x = trial and 
S P
p
W
+
≥ , which requires W S P≥ +  (since 1p ≤ ). 
Since it is assumed that W S P> + , we can conclude that 
((sue,settle,drop),(resist,resist)) is an equilibrium if and only if  
P
q
W
≤    with 
S P
p
W
+
≤  
((sue,trial,drop),(resist,resist)) is an equilibrium if and only if  
P
q
W
≤    with 
S P
p
W
+
≥ . 
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If, on he other hand, P
W
q ≥ , then “trial” is sequentially rational at the 
bottom information set. Then, in order for the non-negligent type of the 
defendant to choose “resist” it must be that the plaintiff’s strategy involves 
“trial” also at the middle information set, for which we need him to assign 
probability S P
W
p +≥  to the negligent type (which is possible, since the 
middle information set is not reached); of course, this requires W S P≥ + . 
Thus, 
 
((sue,trial,trial),(resist,resist)) is an equilibrium if and only if   
P
q
W
≥   with 
S P
p
W
+
≥ . 
(f) Note that here the restriction W P S− >  does not hold. In this case, 
80 70 3
100 2
S P
W
q + +< = =  and thus, by the previous analysis, there is no pooling 
equilibrium of type (1), that is, ((sue,trial,trial),(offer,offer)) is not an 
equilibrium. 
Also, since S P W+ >  there is no pooling equilibrium of type (2), that is, 
neither ((sue,trial,trial),(resist,resist)) nor ((sue,trial,drop),(resist,resist)) is an 
equilibrium. 
However, there is a pooling equilibrium of type (2) with 
((sue,settle,drop),(resist,resist)) with any beliefs at the middle information 
set, since “settle” strictly dominates “trial” there (and, of course, belief  
q = 1
12
 on the left node of the bottom information set). 
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Incomplete Information:  
The Type-Space Approach 
15.1 Types of players 
s noted in Chapter 13, the theory of “games of incomplete 
information”
7
 was pioneered by John Harsanyi (1967-68). Harsanyi’s 
approach was developed using a different approach from the one we 
employed in Chapters 13 and 14, which is based on the interactive knowledge-
belief structures introduced in Chapter 8. The interactive knowledge structures 
of Chapter 8 are in fact a special case of the more general notion of interactive 
Kripke structure, named after the philosopher and logician Saul Kripke, whose 
work on this goes back to 1959 and was written while he was still an 
undergraduate.8 Although well known among logicians and computer 
scientists, these structures were not known to game theorists. Perhaps, if 
Harasnyi had been aware of Kripke’s work he might have developed his theory 
using those structures. We find the interactive Kripke structures more natural 
and elegant and thus prefer to explain the “theory of games of incomplete 
information” using those structures. In this chapter we will explain the “type-
space” approach developed by Harsanyi and show that the two approaches are 
equivalent. We will limit ourselves to situations of incomplete information 
                                                 
7 We use quotation marks because, strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a game of 
incomplete information. There are situations of incomplete information involving the 
playing of a game and what Harsanyi did was to suggest a way of transforming such 
situations into extensive-form games with imperfect information. Once the so-called 
“Harsanyi transformation” has been applied, the resulting game is a game of complete 
information. Thus the “theory of games of incomplete information” is a theory on how to 
represent a situation of incomplete information concerning the playing of a game and how to 
transform it into a dynamic game with imperfect, but complete, information. 
8 Kripke (1959, 1963). For further details the reader is referred to van Ditmarsch et al. (2015). 
Chapter 
15 
A 
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involving static games. We will begin in the next section with a simpler special 
case, which is often all that one finds in game-theory textbooks, and then 
explain the general case in Section 15.3. 
15.2 Types that know their own payoffs 
We take as a starting point the case of incomplete information concerning a 
strategic-form game-frame ( )1, , .., , ,nI S S O f .
9
 In the special case considered in 
this section, any uncertainty Player i has (if any) concerns either the von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function :jU O → R  ( j i≠ ) of another player 
(or several other players) or the beliefs of the other player(s) (or both). Within 
the approach of Chapter 13, we would represent such a situation with an 
interactive knowledge-belief structure,10 by associating with every state ω  a 
game based on the given game-frame.
11
 Let , :iU Oω → R  be the utility function 
of Player i at state ω. The assumption that every player knows her own payoffs 
is captured by the following restriction:  
if ,ω ω′∈Ω  and ( )iIω ω′∈  then , ,i iU Uω ω′ = . 
An example of such a situation of incomplete information is given in Figure 
15.1, which reproduces Figure 13.3.
12
 
                                                 
9 Recall (Definition 1.1, Chapter 1) that the elements of ( )1, ,..., , ,nI S S O f  are as follows:  
I = {1,…,n} is a set of players, (2) Si  is the set of strategies  of Player i ∈ I (and 1 ... nS S S= × ×  is 
the set of strategy profiles), O is a set of outcomes and :f S O→  is a function that associates 
with every strategy profile s an outcome ( )f s O∈ . 
10 Recall that an interactive knowledge-belief structure consists of a set of states Ω, n partitions 
1,..., nI I  of Ω  and a collection of probability distributions on Ω, one for each information set 
of each partition, whose support is a subset of that information set. Recall also that, for every 
state ω∈ Ω, we denote by ( )iI ω  the information set of Player i (that is, the element of the 
partition 
iI
) that contains state ω. 
11 Recall that, given a game-frame ( )1, ,..., , ,nI S S O f , a game based on it is obtained by 
specifying, for every Player i, a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function :iU O →R  on 
the set of outcomes. 
12 In this case the game-frame is given by: I = {1,2}, S1 = {T,B},  S2 = {L,R} (so that S = {(T,L), 
(T,R), (B,L), (B,R)}), 
1 2 3 4{ , , , }O o o o o= , ( ) ( )1 2( , ) , ( , ) ,f T L o f T R o= =  ( ) 3( , )f B L o= , 
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T
B
L R
1
2
T
B
L R
1
2
1:
2:
true state
1 is of type a
α β
α β
0 , 3 6 , 3
3 , 3
3 , 9
0 , 0
1 is of type b
3 , 03 , 3
0 , 9
2
3
1
3
 
Figure 15.1 
In the “type-space” approach the situation illustrated in Figure 15.1 would be 
represented using types of players: each type of  Player i  represents a utility 
function of Player i as well as Player i’s  beliefs about the types of the other 
players. The formal definition is as follows. 
                                                                                                                                     
( ) 4( , )f B R o= . The (state-dependent) utility functions are given by 
1 2 3 4
1,
0 3 3 0
o o o o
U α
 
=  
 
, 
1 2 3 4
1,
6 0 3 3
o o o o
U β
 
=  
 
  and  2, 2,U Uα β= =  1 2 3 4
3 9 3 0
o o o o 
 
 
.  
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Definition 15.1.  A static Bayesian game of incomplete information with 
knowledge of one’s own payoffs consists of the following elements: 
• a set I ={1,…,n} of players; 
• for every Player i ∈ I, a set Si of strategies (as usual, we denote by S the set 
of strategy profiles); 
• for every Player i ∈ I,  a set Ti  of possible types; we denote by 
1 ... nT T T= × ×  the set of profiles of types and by 
1 1 1... ...i i i nT T T T T− − += × × × × ×  the set of profiles of types for the players other 
than i; 
• for every Player i  and for every type i it T∈  of Player i,  a utility (or payoff) 
function , :ii tU S → R ; 
• for every Player i  and for every type i it T∈  of Player i,  a probability 
distribution , : [0,1]ii t iP T− →  representing the beliefs of type it  about the 
types of the other players. 
The beliefs of all the types are said to be Harsanyi consistent if there exists a 
common prior, that is, a probability distribution : [0,1]P T →  such that, for 
every Player i and for every type i it T∈  of Player i, , ii tP  coincides with the 
probability distribution obtained from P by conditioning on the event { it }, 
that is (denoting a profile t T∈  by ( , )i it t− ), 
( )
( ),
( , )
( )
( , )i
i i
i i
i t i
i i
t T
P t t
P t
P t t
− −
−
−
−
′ ∈
=
′∑
.  
Let us recast the situation illustrated in Figure 15.1 in the terminology of 
Definition 15.1. First of all, we have that I = {1,2}, S1 = {T,B},  S2 = {L,R} (so 
that S = {(T,L), (T,R), (B,L), (B,R)}). Furthermore there are two types of Player 
1 and only one type of Player 2: 1 1 1{ , }
a bT t t= , 2 2{ }T t= , so that 
{ }1 2 1 2( , ), ( , )a bT t t t t= . The utility functions are given by: 
11,
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) (
0
, )
3 3 0
at
T L T R B L B R
U
 
=  
 
, 
11,
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) (
6
, )
0 3 3
bt
T L T R B L B R
U
 
=  
 
 
and 
22,
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
3 9 3 0
t
T L T R B L B R
U
 
=  
 
. 
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The beliefs are given by 
1 1
2
1, 1, 1
a bt t
t
P P
 
= =  
 
, 
2
1 1
2, 2 1
3 3
a b
t
t t
P
 
=  
 
 and the common 
prior is 1 2 1 2
2 1
3 3
( , ) ( , )a bt t t t
P
 
=  
 
.  
Before we explain in detail how to transform a “state-space” structure into a 
“type-space” structure and vice versa, we give one more example in which there 
is double-sided incomplete information. Consider the situation illustrated in 
Figure 15.2, which reproduces Figure 13.8. The true state is α. 
1,3 0,1
0,0 3,1
A
B
C D
1
2
1,3 0,1
0,0 3,1
A
B
C D
1
2
1:
2:
α β
2/3 1/3
1,0 0,2
0,0 3,1
A
B
C D
1
2
γ
1/2 1/2
 
Figure 15.2 
In this case we have that each player has two types: we can identify a type of a 
player with a cell of the player’s information partition. Thus we have that 
{ }1 1 1,a bT t t= , { }2 2 2,a bT t t= , 
1 11, 1,
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
1 0 0 3
a bt t
A C A D B C B D
U U
 
= =  
 
, 
1
2
1, 1
a
a
t
t
P
 
=  
 
, 
1
2 2
1, 1 1
2 2
b
a b
t
t t
P
 
=  
 
 
22,
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
3 1 0 1
at
A C A D B C B D
U
 
=  
 
, 
22,
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
0 2 0 1
bt
A C A D B C B D
U
 
=  
 
, 
2
1 1
2, 2 1
3 3
a
a b
t
t t
P
 
=  
 
 and 
2
1
2, 1
b
b
t
t
P
 
=  
 
. The 
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common prior is given by 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
2 1 1
4 4 4
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
0
a a a b b a b bt t t t t t t t
P
 
=  
 
. Thus the 
two types of Player 1 have the same utility function but different beliefs about 
the types of Player 2, while the two types of Player 2 differ both in terms of 
utility function and in terms of beliefs about the types of Player 1. 
From the last example it should be clear how to transform a “state-space” 
model into a “type-space” model. First of all, for every Player i, create one type 
for every cell of Player i’s partition, making sure that different cells are 
associated with different types. In this way we have identified each state with a 
profile of types. Since there is a probability distribution over each information 
set of Player i, that probability distribution will give us a probability 
distribution for the associated type of Player i over some set of type-profiles for 
the other players. Finally, since our hypothesis (to be relaxed in the next 
section) is that each player knows her own utility function (that is, the utility 
function of a player does not vary from state to state within the same 
information set of that player), with each type it  of Player i is associated a 
unique utility function , ii tU .  
Conversely, we can convert a “type-space” structure into a “state-space” 
structure as follows. Let the set of states be the set T of profile of types. For 
every Player i and for every two states ,t t T′∈ , let t  and t′  belong to the same 
information set of Player i (that is, to the same cell of Player i ’s partition) if and 
only if Player i ’s type is the same in  t  and t′ : ( )it I t′∈  if and only if i it t′= . 
The beliefs of each type of Player i then yield a probability distribution over 
the information set of Player i corresponding to that type. An example of this 
transformation is given in Exercise 15.2. 
 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced 
in this section, by going through the exercises in Section 15.E.2 of Appendix 
15.E at the end of this chapter. 
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15.3 The general case 
As pointed out in Remark 13.1 (Chapter 13), it may very well be the case that a 
rational player does not know her own payoffs (for example, because she is 
uncertain about what outcomes might occur if she chooses a particular action). 
Uncertainty about a player’s own payoffs is compatible with the player 
knowing her own preferences (that is, how she ranks the outcomes that she 
considers possible). Definition 15.1 is not general enough to encompass such 
possibilities. The following, more general, definition allows the utility function 
of a player to depend not only on the player’s own type but also on the types 
of the other players. Definition 15.2 is identical to Definition 15.1 except for 
the fourth and fifth bulleted items, which have been highlighted in bold red 
characters, and the additional part in the last bulleted item, which is also 
highlighted in bold red characters. 
Definition 15.2.  A static Bayesian game of incomplete information consists of 
the following elements: 
• a set I ={1,…,n} of players; 
• for every Player i ∈ I,  a set Si of strategies (as usual we denote by S the set 
of strategy profiles); 
• for every Player i ∈ I,  a set Ti  of possible types; we denote by 
1 ... nT T T= × ×  the set of profiles of types and by 
1 1 1... ...i i i nT T T T T− − += × × × × ×  the set of profiles of types for the players other 
than i; 
• a set Y T⊆  of relevant profiles of types;  
• for every Player i  and for every profile of types t Y∈ ,  a utility (or 
payoff) function , :i tU S → R ; 
• for every Player i  and for every type i it T∈  of Player i,  a probability 
distribution , : [0,1]ii t iP T− →  representing the beliefs of type it  about the 
types of the other players satisfying the restriction that if , ( ) 0ii t iP t− >  
then ( , )i it t Y− ∈ . 
As in the special case considered in the previous section, also in the general case 
one can transform a “state-space” structure into a “type-space” structure and 
vice versa. 
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Given a “state-space” structure, for every Player i we identify the cells of Player 
i’s partition with the types of Player i (one type for every information set). 
Since there is a probability distribution over each information set of Player i, 
that probability distribution will yield the probability distribution for the 
associated type of Player i over some set of type-profiles for the other players. 
Finally, having identified each state with a profile of types (since each state 
belongs to one and only one information set of each player), we can assign to 
the corresponding type of Player i the utility function of Player i at that state. 
We shall illustrate this conversion using the “state-space” structure shown in 
Figure 15.3 below (taken from Exercise 13.2). The corresponding “type-space” 
structure (static Bayesian game of incomplete information) is the following:  
I = {1,2} (letting Bill be Player 1 and Ann Player 2), S1 = {g,ng},  S2 = {a,r} (so 
that S = {(g,a), (g,r), (ng,a), (ng,r)}). Furthermore there are two types of Player 
1 and only one type of Player 2: 1 1 1{ , }
f eT t t=  (f stands for ‘friend’ and e for 
‘enemy’), 2 2{ }T t= , so that { }1 2 1 2( , ), ( , )f eT t t t t= . In this case we have that Y = T.  
The utility functions are given by: 
1 221 1,( , )1,( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
1 1 0 0
f et tt t
g a g r ng a ng r
U U
 
= =  − 
, 
212,( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
1 0 0 0
ft t
g a g r ng a ng r
U
 
=  
 
 
1 22,( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
1 0 0 0
et t
g a g r ng a ng r
U
 
=  − 
. 
The beliefs are given by 
11
2
1,1, 1
f ett
t
P P
 
= =  
 
, 
2
1 1
2,
1
f e
t
t t
P
p p
 
=  
− 
 and the common 
prior is 1 2 1 2
( , ) ( , )
1
f et t t t
P
p p
 
=  
− 
. 
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g
a ra r
1:
2:
α β
α β
1 , 1 −1
, 0 , 0
true state
ng ng
Bill
Ann Ann
Bill
g
Bill is a friend Bill is an enemy
00
, 0
,  00 ,  00
,  −11 −1 , 0
p 1− p
 
Figure 15.3 
Conversely, we can convert a “type-space” structure into a “state-space” 
structure as follows. Let the set of states be the set Y of relevant profiles of 
types. For every Player i and for every two states ,t t Y′∈ , let t  and t′  belong 
to the same information set of Player i (that is, to the same cell of Player i ’s 
partition) if and only if Player i ’s type is the same in  t  and t′ : ( )it I t′∈  if and 
only if i it t′= . The beliefs of each type of Player i then yield a probability 
distribution over the information set of Player i corresponding to that type. 
An example of this transformation is given in Exercise 15.3. 
 This is a good time to test your understanding of the concepts introduced 
in this section, by going through the exercises in Section 15.E.3 of Appendix 
15.E at the end of this chapter. 
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Appendix 15.E: Exercises 
15.E.2. Exercises for Section 15.2: Types that know their own payoffs 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S. 
Exercise 15.1.  Transform the following situation of incomplete information 
into a “type-space” structure. 
α                        β                        γ                        δ
α                        β                        γ                        δ
2:
3: 1323
G1
game
G1
game
G2
game
G2
game
1: α                        β                        γ                        δ
2
3
1
3
7
9
7
9
2
9
2
9
1
2
1
2
 
C D
A 4 1 0 2 4 2
B 4 1 0 0 0 0
C D
A 2 0 2 0 1 0
B 0 0 0 0 2 0Player  1
Player  1
Player 2
Player 2
Player 3 chooses  E
Player 3 chooses  F
1GAME G  
 
C D
A 4 4 0 2 1 2
B 4 4 0 0 1 0
C D
A 2 1 2 0 0 0
B 0 2 0 0 0 0Player  1
Player  1
Player 2
Player 2
Player 3 chooses  E
Player 3 chooses  F
2GAME G  
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Exercise 15.2.  Consider the following Bayesian game of incomplete 
information: 
1 2{1, 2}, { , }, { , }I S A B S C D= = =  1 1 1 2 2 2 2{ , }, { , , }
a b a b cT t t T t t t= =  
11, 4 1 0 2
at
AC AD BC BD
U
 
=  
 
,   
11, 0 0 2 1
bt
AC AD BC BD
U
 
=  
 
 
2 22, 2, 2 1 2 3
a bt t
AC AD BC BD
U U
 
= =  
 
,  
22, 0 2 2 0
ct
AC AD BC BD
U
 
=  
 
 
1
2 2 2
1, 31
4 4
0
a
a b c
t
t t t
P
 
=  
 
, 
1
2 2 2
1, 3 64
13 13 13
b
a b c
t
t t t
P
 
=  
 
, 
2
1 1
2, 1 2
3 3
a
a b
t
t t
P
 
=  
 
, 
2
1 1
2, 2 1
3 3
b
a b
t
t t
P
 
=  
 
  
2
1 1
2, 0 1
c
a b
t
t t
P
 
=  
 
. 
(a) Are the beliefs of the types consistent (that is, is there a common prior)? 
(b) Transform this type-space structure into an interactive knowledge-belief 
structure. 
  
15.E.3 .  Exercises  for  Section 15.3 :  The general case 
The answers to the following exercises are in Appendix S at the end of this 
chapter. 
Exercise 15.3.  Consider the following Bayesian game of incomplete 
information. 
{1, 2,3}I = , 1 2 3{ , }, { , }, { , }S A B S C D S E F= = = , { }1 1 1,a bT t t= , { }2 2 2,a bT t t= , 
{ }3 3 3,a bT t t= ,  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3, , , , , , , , , , ,a a a b b a b a b b b bY t t t t t t t t t t t t=  
1 2 31,( , , ) 2 2 3 0 0 0 1 1
a a at t t
ACE ADE BCE BDE ACF ADF BCF BDF
U
 
 
 
= , 
1 2 3 1 2 31,( , , ) 1,( , , ) 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 1
b b a b b bt t t t t t
ACE ADE BCE BDE ACF ADF BCF BDF
U U
 
 
 
= = , 
1 2 31,( , , ) 0 0 2 1 2 0 0 1
b a bt t t
ACE ADE BCE BDE ACF ADF BCF BDF
U
 
 
 
=  
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1 2 32,( , , ) 2 4 2 0 0 1 0 2
a a at t t
ACE ADE BCE BDE ACF ADF BCF BDF
U
 
 
 
=  
1 2 3 1 2 32,( , , ) 2,( , , ) 4 1 4 1 1 0 2 0
b b a b b bt t t t t t
ACE ADE BCE BDE ACF ADF BCF BDF
U U
 
 
 
= =  
1 2 32,( , , ) 4 3 1 2 0 1 0 2
b a bt t t
ACE ADE BCE BDE ACF ADF BCF BDF
U
 
 
 
=  
1 2 33,( , , ) 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 0
a a at t t
ACE ADE BCE BDE ACF ADF BCF BDF
U
 
 
 
=  
1 2 3 1 2 33,( , , ) 3,( , , ) 3 2 0 1 1 2 2 0
b b a b b bt t t t t t
ACE ADE BCE BDE ACF ADF BCF BDF
U U
 
 
 
= =  
1 2 33,( , , ) 1 2 0 1 2 0 0 1
b a bt t t
ACE ADE BCE BDE ACF ADF BCF BDF
U
 
 
 
=  
( )
1
2 3
1,
,
1
a
a a
t
t t
P
 
=   
 
, 
( ) ( ) ( )
1
2 3 2 3 2 3
1, 2 2 1
5 5 5
, , ,
b
b a a b b b
t
t t t t t t
P
 
=  
 
 
,  
( ) ( )
2
1 3 1 3
2, 5 2
7 7
, ,
a
a a b b
t
t t t t
P
 
=  
 
 
,   
( ) ( )
2
1 3 1 3
2, 2 1
3 3
, ,
b
b a b b
t
t t t t
P
 
=  
 
 
 
( ) ( )
3
1 2 1 2
3, 5 2
7 7
, ,
a
a a b b
t
t t t t
P
 
=  
 
 
,   
( ) ( )
3
1 2 1 2
3, 2 1
3 3
, ,
b
b a b b
t
t t t t
P
 
=  
 
 
 
(a) Are the beliefs of the types consistent (that is, is there a common prior)? 
(b) Transform this type-space structure into an interactive knowledge-belief 
structure. 
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◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊ 
Exercise 15.4: Challenging Question.   
Consider the following Bayesian game of incomplete information:   
{1, 2}I = , 1 { , }S T B= , 2 { , }S L R= ,  { }1 1 1,A BT t t= , { }2 2 2,a bT t t= , 
1 2 1 21,( , ) 1,( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
6 0 3 3
A a A bt t t t
T L T R B L B R
U U
 
= =  
 
, 
1 2 1 21,( , ) 1,( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
0 3 3 0
B a B bt t t t
T L T R B L B R
U U
 
= =  
 
, 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 22,( , ) 2,( , ) 2,( , ) 2,( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
3 9 3 0
A a A b B a B bt t t t t t t t
T L T R B L B R
U U U U
 
= = = =  
 
,   
1
2 2
1, 1 1
2 2
A
a b
t
t t
P
 
=  
 
, 
1
2 2
1, 3 2
5 5
B
a b
t
t t
P
 
=  
 
,  
2
1 1
2, 31
4 4
a
A B
t
t t
P
 
=  
 
 and 
2
1 1
2, 1 2
3 3
b
A B
t
t t
P
 
=  
 
.  
(a) Transform the situation described above into an interactive knowledge-
belief structure. Assume that the true state is where Player 1 is of type 1
At  
and Player 2 is of type 2
at . 
(b) Apply the Harsanyi transformation to obtain an extensive-form game. 
(c) Write the strategic-form game corresponding to the game of part (b). 
(d) Find all the pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria. Does any of these yield 
a Nash equilibrium in the true game being played? 
(e) Of the pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria select one where Player 1 is 
uncertain about Player 2’s choice of action. For this equilibrium complete 
the structure of part (a) by turning it into a model (that is, associate with 
each state an action - not a strategy - for each player) and verify that at the 
true state there is common knowledge of rationality. 
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Appendix 15.S: Solutions to exercises  
Exercise 15.1.  The structure is as follows (the elements are given as listed 
Definition 15.1). {1, 2,3}I = , 1 2 3{ , }, { , }, { , }S A B S C D S E F= = = , 
{ }1 1 1 1, ,a b cT t t t= , { }2 2 2,a bT t t= , { }3 3 3,a bT t t= ,   
1 1 11, 1, 1,
a b ct t t
U U U= = =
4 2 4 0 2 0 0 0
ACE ADE BCE BDE ACF ADF BCF BDF 
 
 
, 
22, 1 4 1 0 0 1 0 2
at
ACE ADE BCE BDE ACF ADF BCF BDF
U
 
=  
 
 
22, 4 1 4 1 1 0 2 0
bt
ACE ADE BCE BDE ACF ADF BCF BDF
U
 
=  
 
 
3 33, 3, 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 0
a bt t
ACE ADE BCE BDE ACF ADF BCF BDF
U U
 
= =  
 
 
( )
1
2 3
1,
,
1
a
a a
t
t t
P
 
=   
 
, 
( ) ( )
1
2 3 2 3
1, 1 1
2 2
, ,
b
b a a b
t
t t t t
P
 
=  
 
 
, 
( )
1
2 3
1,
,
1
c
b b
t
t t
P
 
=   
 
 
( ) ( )
2
1 3 1 3
2, 7 2
9 9
, ,
a
a a b b
t
t t t t
P
 
=  
 
 
,   
( ) ( )
2
1 3 1 3
2, 2 1
3 3
, ,
b
b a c b
t
t t t t
P
 
=  
 
 
 
( ) ( )
3
1 2 1 2
3, 7 2
9 9
, ,
a
a a b b
t
t t t t
P
 
=  
 
 
,   
( ) ( )
3
1 2 1 2
3, 2 1
3 3
, ,
b
b a c b
t
t t t t
P
 
=  
 
 
 
The common prior is given by  
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
7 2 2 1
12 12 12 12
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
a a a a a b a b a a b b b a a b a b b b a b b b c a a c a b c b a c b bt t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
P
 
=  
 
  
Exercise 15.2.  (a) Yes, the following is a common prior: 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
6 3 62 4
21 21 21 21 21
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
0
a a a b a c b a b b b ct t t t t t t t t t t t
P
 
=  
 
 
(b) The knowledge-belief structure is as follows: the set of states is 
{ , , , , }α β γ δ εΩ = , where 1 2 1 2 1 2( , ), ( , ), ( , ),
a a a b b at t t t t tα β γ= = = 1 2( , ),
b bt tδ =  
1 2( , )
b ct tε = . 
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A 4 , 2 1 , 1
B 0 , 2 2 , 3
2
C D
1
A 0 , 2 0 , 1
B 2 , 2 1 , 3
2
C D
1
A 4 , 2 1 , 1
B 0 , 2 2 , 3
2
C D
1
A 0 , 2 0 , 1
B 2 , 2 1 , 3
2
C D
1
α β γ δ ε
α β γ δ ε
1:
2:
1
4
3
4
1
3
2
3
2
3
1
3
4
13
3
13
6
13
 
A 0 , 0 0 , 2
B 2 , 2 1 , 0
2
C D
1
 
Exercise 15.3.  (a) Yes: the following is a common prior: 
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
1 1 1 1
2 5 5 10
a a a b a b b b a b b b
t t t t t t t t t t t t
P
 
=  
 
 and ( ) 0P t =  for every other t T∈ . 
(b) First define the following games: 
C D
A 2 2 0 2 4 2
B 3 2 0 0 0 0
C D
A 0 0 2 0 1 0
B 1 0 0 1 2 0
Player 3 chooses  F
Player  1
Player  1
Player 2
Player 2
Player 3 chooses  E
1GAME G  
C D
A 1 4 3 2 1 2
B 0 4 0 0 1 1
C D
A 1 1 1 0 0 2
B 0 2 2 1 0 0
Player 3 chooses  F
Player  1
Player  1
Player 2
Player 2
Player 3 chooses  E
2GAME G  
C D
A 0 4 1 0 3 2
B 2 1 0 1 2 1
C D
A 2 0 2 0 1 0
B 0 0 0 1 2 1
Player 3 chooses  F
Player  1
Player  1
Player 2
Player 2
Player 3 chooses  E
3GAME G  
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Then, letting ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3, , , , , , , , , , ,a a a b b a b a b b b bt t t t t t t t t t t tα β γ δ= = = = , the 
interactive knowledge-belief structure is as follows: 
α                        β                        γ                        δ
2:
3: 1323
G1
game
G3
game
G2
game
G2
game
1: α                        β                        γ                        δ
2
5
2
5
1
5
5
7
2
7
α                        β                        γ                        δ2
3
1
3
5
7
2
7
 
Exercise 15.4 (Challenging Question) (a) The interactive knowledge-belief 
structure is as follows, where ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2, , , , , , ,A a A b B a B bt t t t t t t tα β γ δ= = = = : 
3, 0
0, 9
types: 1B & 2b
2
types: 1B & 2a
2
types: 1A & 2b
γ δ
types: 1A & 2a
βα
2:
1:
2
1
RL
B
T
3, 3
6, 3
2/3
1/2 1/2 3/5 2/5
1/4
3/41/3
3, 0
0, 9
1
RL
B
T
3, 3
6, 3
2
0, 0
3, 9
1
RL
B
T
3, 3
0, 3
0, 0
3, 9
1
RL
B
T
3, 3
0, 3
T T B B
 
(b) First of all, there is a common prior: 
31 1 2
7 7 7 7
α β γ δ 
 
 
. The extensive-form 
game is as follows: 
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NATURE
1a
 &
 2a
1
b
 &
 2
a
1b & 2b
3
/7
2/7
1
1
T B T B
2
2
T
T
B
B
L L
L
L
L L L L
R
RR
R
RR
RR
R
6
3
0
9
3
3
3
0
6
3
0
9
3
3
3
0
0
3
3
9
3
3
0
0
0
3
0
0
3
3
3
9
1
a
 &
 2
b
1/7
1/
7
 
(c) The strategy profiles give rise to the following lotteries: 
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   Player 2  
  L  if type 2a 
L if type 2b 
L  if type 2a 
R if type 2b 
R  if type 2a 
L if type 2b 
R  if type 2a 
R if type 2b 
 T  if type 1A 
T if type 1B 
3333
0066
7/27/37/17/1
TLTLTLTL  
9393
3006
7/27/37/17/1
TRTLTRTL  
3939
0360
7/27/37/17/1
TLTRTLTR  
9999
3300
7/27/37/17/1
TRTRTRTR  
Player T  if type 1A 
B if type 1B 
3333
3366
7/27/37/17/1
BLBLTLTL  
0393
0306
7/27/37/17/1
BRBLTRTL  
3039
3060
7/27/37/17/1
BLBRTLTR  
0099
0000
7/27/37/17/1
BRBRTRTR  
1 B  if type 1A 
T if type 1B 
3333
0033
7/27/37/17/1
TLTLBLBL  
9303
3033
7/27/37/17/1
TRTLBRBL  
3930
0333
7/27/37/17/1
TLTRBLBR  
9900
3333
7/27/37/17/1
TRTRBRBR  
 B  if type 1A 
B if type 1B 
3333
3333
7/27/37/17/1
BLBLBLBL  
0303
0333
7/27/37/17/1
BRBLBRBL  
3030
3033
7/27/37/17/1
BLBRBLBR  
0000
0033
7/27/37/17/1
BRBRBRBR  
 
Thus the strategic form is as follows: 
   Player 2  
  L  if type 2a 
L if type 2b 
L  if type 2a 
R if type 2b 
R  if type 2a 
L if type 2b 
R  if type 2a 
R if type 2b 
 T  if type 1A 
T if type 1B 
12
7
3,  
12
7
39
7
,  
15
7
45
7
,  
15
7
9,  
Player T  if type 1A 
B if type 1B 
27
7
3,  
15
7
3,  
12
7
18
7
,  0
18
7
,  
1 B  if type 1A 
T if type 1B 
6
7
3,  
12
7
30
7
,  
15
7
36
7
,  3
45
7
,  
 B  if type 1A 
B if type 1B 
3 3,  15
7
12
7
,  
12
7
9
7
,  
6
7
0,  
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(d) The pure-strategy Nash equilibria are: (TB,LL), (TB,LR) and (BT,RR).  None 
of them yields a Nash equilibrium of the game associated with state α, since 
neither (T,L) nor (B,R) are Nash equilibria of that game. 
(e) The only pure-strategy equilibrium where Player 1 is uncertain of Player 2’s 
choice is (TB,LR). The corresponding model is: 
3, 0
0, 9
types: 1B & 2b
2
types: 1B & 2a
2
types: 1A & 2b
γ δ
types: 1A & 2a
true state
βα
2:
1:
2
1
RL
B
T
3, 3
6, 3
2/3
1/2 1/2 3/5 2/5
1/4
3/41/3
3, 0
0, 9
1
RL
B
T
3, 3
6, 3
2
0, 0
3, 9
1
RL
B
T
3, 3
0, 3
0, 0
3, 9
1
RL
B
T
3, 3
0, 3
1's choice
2's choice
T
L
T
R
B
L
B
R
There is common knowledge of rationality because at every state both players are 
rational. In fact, at states α and β  Player 1 has an expected payoff of 3 from both T 
and B (thus T is a best reply) and at states γ  and δ  Player 1 has an expected payoff of 
9
5
  from  B and  6
5
 from  T (thus B is a best reply).  At states α and γ  Player 2 has an 
expected payoff of 3 from L and 9
4
  from R (thus L is a best reply) and at states β and 
δ  Player 2 has an expected payoff of 3 from both L and R (thus R is a best reply). 
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